Public Bill Committees

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: † Dawn Butler, Esther McVey, Karl Turner, Sir Jeremy Wright

† Betts, Mr Clive (Sheffield South East) (Lab)

† Bonavia, Kevin (Stevenage) (Lab)

Dewhirst, Charlie (Bridlington and The Wolds) (Con)

Dickson, Jim (Dartford) (Lab)

† Dillon, Mr Lee (Newbury) (LD)

† Foxcroft, Vicky (Lord Commissioner of His Majesty's Treasury)

† French, Mr Louie (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)

† Jopp, Lincoln (Spelthorne) (Con)

Martin, Amanda (Portsmouth North) (Lab)

† Naish, James (Rushcliffe) (Lab)

† Onn, Melanie (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)

Patrick, Matthew (Wirral West) (Lab)

† Peacock, Stephanie (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport)

† Pearce, Jon (High Peak) (Lab)

† Robertson, Joe (Isle of Wight East) (Con)

† Shanker, Baggy (Derby South) (Lab/Co op)

† Wilkinson, Max (Cheltenham) (LD)

Aaron Kulakiewicz, Kevin Maddison, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Thursday 12 June 2025

(Morning)

[Dawn Butler in the Chair]

Football Governance Bill [Lords]

Before we begin, I remind Members to switch all electronic devices to silent. We will now continue our line by line consideration of the Bill.

Clause 37 Matters relevant to determinations

I beg to move amendment 110, in clause 37, page 28, line 28, at end insert— “(fa) whether the individual is a member of a proscribed organisation as per section (3) and schedule (2) of the Terrorism Act 2000.”

This amendment requires that IFR, in determining whether an owner or officer has the requisite honesty or integrity, to consider whether the person is a member of an organisation proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000. It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship again, Ms Butler. I welcome all Committee members back for day four. Amendment 110, tabled in my name, requires this Government’s regulator, in determining whether an owner or officer has the requisite honesty or integrity, to consider whether the person is a member of an organisation proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000.

Clause 37 sets out the framework under which the Government’s football regulator must assess whether an owner or officer of a football club meets the required standards of honesty, integrity and competence. This is an important part of the Bill. Football clubs are not like ordinary businesses, as we have discussed; they are institutions rooted in community, tradition and even national identity. Those who control them must be held to the highest standards and supporters quite rightly expect that clubs should be fit to uphold those responsibilities.

The Government’s regulator’s task in clause 37 is to ensure that persons in positions of influence over our national game are financially sound and professionally competent. However, the clause as currently drafted leaves the test for honesty and integrity open to interpretation—arguably too open. That is why we have tabled amendment 110, which provides a clear and unambiguous requirement that, in determining whether a person has the requisite honesty or integrity, the regulator must take into account whether that person is or has been a member of an organisation proscribed under the Terrorism Act 2000.

Let me be clear: this is not about political views, past associations or guilt by implication, but about having a national minimum standard of moral fitness. It should be inconceivable that a person with demonstrable ties to a terrorist organisation could pass the fit and proper person test to own or operate a football club in this country. Football clubs are part of the fabric of British civil society. They are symbols of local pride and national values, and they have international reputations. To allow a person associated with a proscribed group, many of which pose active threats to our national security, public order and democratic way of life, to take a controlling interest in such an institution would be not only morally indefensible, but deeply dangerous.

This is not a hypothetical concern. We live in an increasingly globalised football economy and genuine questions have been raised in recent years about the sources of funding, ownership and political influence across the game. My amendment does not attempt to legislate morality in broad terms; it simply anchors the Government’s regulator’s assessment in existing law, specifically the Terrorism Act 2000, which provides a clear, publicly available list of proscribed organisations that Parliament has already determined pose an unacceptable risk to our way of life.

By incorporating that into clause 37, we do two things. First, we clarify the threshold for what constitutes a failure of the honesty and integrity test, giving both clubs and the regulator a clear reference point. Secondly, we send a signal to not just fans and communities here at home, but investors and foreign Governments abroad, that English football will not be compromised by individuals whose allegiances lie with organisations committed to violence, extremism or the subversion of our national interest.

Football is a global sport, but it must still reflect and uphold our national values. It is not alarmist or over zealous to say that those who control our clubs must have a character as close to unimpeachable as possible. We are asking them not to be saints—unless, perhaps, they own Southampton FC—but to be the pillars of the community that we already expect them to be.

That was so bad.

I have woken everyone up there.

Clause 37 is an important safeguard, but without amendment 110, it lacks a clear and necessary line in the sand. Parliament has already determined that proscribed organisations represent a threat to public safety and national order. That same logic must apply here. I urge the Government to accept this modest but essential amendment and, in doing so, to help to ensure that our clubs are not just well run and financially sustainable, but led by people whose values are consistent with the country, communities and traditions that they are entrusted to serve.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Butler. I rise to support amendment 110. I suspect the Minister might say that we do not need to cover everything and that there is a general catch all measure in the clause, so we do not need to make this amendment.

I will draw the Committee’s attention to a similar case in my own constituency, however, where a member of the public wrote to ask if I could please hurry up his EU settlement scheme application. When we checked with the visas and immigration service, it turned out that he had been subject to a deportation order in 2017, and had indeed been deported in 2017. He had somehow managed to get back into this country illegally and make an EUSS application. He is still subject to that deportation order, yet for some crazy reason, the Home Office still have to go through his application. That is the sort of thing that we should not have to legislate for and that we should not have to state, but sadly we do.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. I rise to add my support to the amendment that the shadow Minister discussed very well and clearly.

The point is that the list set out in clause 37(2)(a) to (f), which gives examples of things that would prevent a potential owner from having the requisite honesty and integrity to own a football club, is missing a provision about their being a member of a proscribed organisation such as a terrorist organisation. In football, which is the most international sport and which has very international ownership, it seems particularly sensible to have that provision.

I do not think a terrorist offence is captured by someone being “convicted of a criminal offence”, because, as we know, the Terrorism Act 2000 was put in place to introduce various provisions relating to terrorism where it had not necessarily been identified that a perpetrator had committed a criminal offence. The provision in the amendment would therefore be a fair addition to that list.

Of course, clause 37(2)(g) is a catch all measure that refers to “such other matters”. Nevertheless, the point is that this matter is particularly important and we do not want to leave it to be swept up in a catch all measure. Of course, if it is argued that it could be swept up in a catch all measure such as clause 37(2)(g), why have the list in clause 37(2)(a) to (f) at all? I support the sensible and non controversial amendment.

It is a pleasure to serve once again under your chairship, Ms Butler. I echo the welcome back from the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Old Bexley and Sidcup, to Committee members.

I will respond to amendment 110. I reassure the shadow Minister that the intent of his amendment is already achieved within the current drafting of clause 37, which lists the matters that the regulator must take into account when it conducts its owners and directors test. We will discuss that in more detail when we consider the next group of amendments, but I will summarise briefly now.

When assessing an owner or officer’s fitness, the regulator must have regard to any criminal convictions and proceedings, in particular those included in schedule 1 to the Serious Crime Act 2007. Membership of a proscribed organisation is an offence under the Terrorism Act 2000, and that offence is included in paragraph 2A of schedule 1 to the Serious Crime Act 2007.

The regulator will seek information and expertise from relevant organisations to help it to stay alive to both national and international concerns. The shadow regulator is already building a strong relationship with the National Crime Agency and law enforcement in general to ensure that the regulator is in a strong position to gather the information it needs.

I also reassure Members that the regulator and its staff will have the requisite measures and security clearance to be able to receive information relevant to their functions. Consequently, the current provisions in the Bill deliver the intent of the amendment. On that basis, I would be grateful if the shadow Minister would withdraw it.

I appreciate the Minister’s comments with regard to amendment 110, which I tabled. I have listened carefully to her arguments, but it is still unclear to those of us on this side of the Committee why consideration of the Terrorism Act 2000 was not included in the list of factors set out in clause 37. We believe that is an oversight and, consequently, that the clause lacks the clarity that the amendment seeks to deliver in the Bill and that those who refer to it will seek going forward—in other words, the regulator. We will therefore press the amendment to a vote.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

32|0|3|10|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 37 lists the matters the regulator must take into account when it conducts an owners and directors test. That includes what it must consider when determining whether an individual is financially sound, has the requisite honesty and integrity and, for officers only, has the competence needed to do their role—ultimately, to determine whether they are suitable. The matters listed in the clause draw heavily on existing fit and proper person tests applied by other regulators, such as the Financial Conduct Authority and Bar Standards Board.

For financial soundness, the clause includes past bankruptcies and the financial situation of companies and other bodies they have been responsible for. For honesty and integrity, it includes an individual’s criminal history, legal cases they have been involved in, regulatory or disciplinary action, and whether they are banned from entering the UK or sanctioned by the UK Government. When assessing officers’ competency, it includes qualifications, experience and training.

Those factors are specified because they have a bearing on whether the owner or officer could have a significant detrimental impact on a club’s financial sustainability. That is why the legislation requires that they are taken into account when the regulator is considering someone’s suitability. Listing specific matters also provides greater clarity to the industry about what will be tested, and it constrains the regulator, as the matters listed in the clause are the only things it will take into account when considering their fitness. To future proof the test, the regulator has the power to use its rules to add further matters it will take into account. That will ensure that the list of matters for fitness tests continues to be relevant over time.

Before using the power, the regulator must consult with the leagues. Suitability should be based purely on an impartial assessment of the individual’s fitness, their source of wealth, and their financial plans and resources. The Government have been clear that the independence of the regulator is vital, which is why they have removed the requirement for the regulator to have regard to His Majesty’s Government’s foreign and trade policy objectives when assessing an owner’s suitability. The clause will ensure that the test can be applied consistently and that it remains fair, transparent and robust and focused on whether the individual is a suitable person to own a football club.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 37 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 38 Disqualification orders Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss clauses 39 to 42 stand part.

The financial distress experienced by some of English football’s most historic clubs was partly down to unsuitable owners and directors. As we have already discussed, the regulator will be able to conduct strengthened owners and directors tests to tackle that and to help to ensure that each club has suitable custodians. I previously set out what powers the Bill gives the regulator to disqualify a person it finds unsuitable, what happens when an individual is found unsuitable, how they can be removed, how they can be prevented from causing further harm to the club, and the tools the regulator needs to ensure the continued effective operation of the club.

Where the regulator finds someone to be unsuitable to be an owner or an officer at a particular club, clause 38 gives the regulator the power to disqualify that person from being an owner or an officer at any regulated club in the future. In order to ensure that sufficient protections are in place, relevant parties will be allowed to express their views before the regulator makes its decision. Once a decision has been made that takes those views into account, the regulator must publish a notice of that decision, including the rationale behind it. That will help to ensure that those key community assets have suitable custodians who run the club properly.

When the regulator finds an incumbent owner unsuitable, the regulator must begin the process of removing them from the club. Clause 39 therefore gives the regulator the power to direct an unsuitable owner to relinquish ownership of the club. This is the first step in removing an unsuitable owner. They are directed to leave by the regulator and given a deadline, but they have a chance to take steps to leave the club on their own terms before the regulator takes direct action to remove them. For instance, those steps could include selling their stake in the club.

To ensure that sufficient protections are in place, the regulator must consult the unsuitable owner, the relevant club and the relevant league before issuing the direction. If an owner does not comply with such a direction, the regulator can escalate to the next stage of making a removal order under clause 43, which we will discuss in the debate on the next group.

Clause 40 ensures that when the regulator finds someone to be unsuitable to be an officer, the regulator must either give the unsuitable officer a direction to take all reasonable steps to cease to be an officer of the club, give the relevant club a direction to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the unsuitable officer is no longer at the club, or both. To ensure that sufficient protections are in place, the regulator must consult the unsuitable officer, the relevant club and the relevant league before issuing the direction. The regulator can take effective action to get unsuitable owners and officers out of the club to prevent future harm. That in turn will help to ensure that these key community assets have suitable custodians who run them properly.

It is important that unsuitable owners and officers are not able to cause any damage to the club in the interim—before they leave the club—so the regulator can use the powers in clause 41 to prohibit an unsuitable individual from undertaking certain activities or exercising certain rights at the club. For instance, that could include prohibiting them from exercising any right to vote on club matters, hiring or firing employees at the club, changing the corporate structure of the club, or undertaking any specified actions without the regulator’s approval. The regulator can require both the unsuitable owner or officer and the club itself to ensure that prohibition is respected. That will help to safeguard the club from any potential further damage while the unsuitable owner or officer is still there.

When the regulator finds someone unsuitable to be an owner or an officer a club, it can direct them to leave the club in a specified timeframe. Additionally, the regulator can prohibit them from undertaking certain activities at the club in the interim. There is a risk that in doing so, however, the club will no longer be able to operate effectively—for instance, if the unsuitable officer was one of the few directors of the club. To mitigate or avoid that risk, clause 42 allows the regulator to appoint an individual as an interim officer at the club. The regulator can also require the club to redistribute responsibilities among its remaining suitable officers. Where the regulator appoints an officer, the club, owners and other officers must co operate with that appointed officer. That gives the regulator the tools to ensure the continued effective operation of the club.

Clause 38 is one of the most consequential provisions in the entire Bill. It gives the Government’s football regulator the power to disqualify an individual not only from being an owner or an officer of a specific club, but from holding such a position in any regulated club going forward. That is an extraordinarily wide ranging power, which amounts to a professional ban from participation in the administration or ownership of an English football club. That power must be exercised with the utmost care on the basis of clear evidence, robust procedural safeguards and fair opportunities for representation.

Under subsection (1), the regulator may issue a disqualification order if it is determined that a person is not suitable to be an owner of a particular regulated club. Subsection (2) extends that same power to issue a disqualification order against officers. The clause in effect makes the Government’s regulator the gatekeeper of who may or may not participate in the leadership of English football. While the Opposition accept the rationale, particularly in the light of past controversies and failures of governance, we must be careful about vesting that level of authority in a politically appointed body.

Three concerns arise. First, there is the question of proportionality. Not every failure of suitability in one club ought to trigger an automatic blanket ban from the entire football pyramid. A disqualification order is not a light matter in itself; it carries reputational consequences that may extend far beyond football. Will the Minister confirm what thresholds of seriousness must be met before a disqualification order is considered appropriate? How will the regulator ensure that such orders are not used disproportionately, particularly in cases where suitability determinations may be contested or borderline?

Secondly, there is the question of due process. The clause appears to allow the regulator to act not only in determinations it makes directly, but on decisions it is deemed to have made by operation of law. That introduces a grey area where someone might find themselves disqualified without ever having had a clear and fair hearing. There must be a full right to representation, explanation and appeal before such a decision takes effect. Will there be an express duty on the regulator to provide reasons in writing to allow for full and fair challenge after a decision has been made? Will the affected individual have the right to appeal to a genuinely independent body—one that is outside the Government’s regulator’s own structure?

Thirdly, there is a concern about consistency and transparency. The risk is of regulatory opacity. If a disqualification order is issued without published reasoning, or if standards vary from case to case, we will quickly see a collapse of confidence in the regulator’s impartiality. Will the Minister consider introducing a requirement for an annual report to Parliament listing the disqualification orders that have been issued in the preceding year, and for a publicly accessible register of disqualified individuals, with anonymised or redacted reasoning where appropriate, for transparency? Crucially, will the Minister confirm that this power cannot be used retroactively—that is, to punish individuals for matters known and previously tolerated under prior regimes, should there be a change of chairman, deputy chairman, chief executive or board members?

English football needs good owners—as a Charlton fan, I can say that with a great deal of confidence and with sympathy for other clubs that have been in similar situations. It needs competent, honest and engaged officers, and there must be consequences when individuals fall short of the standards we all expect, but clause 38 must not become a tool of regulatory vengeance, nor of political interference. The power must be used sparingly, lawfully and accountably.

I declare that I am a member, and former chair, of the RamsTrust. Does the shadow Minister agree, on his point about Charlton, that we would want the use of this clause to err on the side of caution? As Rams fans, we went through a situation where an American businessman was passed by the EFL on the fit and proper person test, and the only reason he did not buy the club was because the money never turned up. This was after he had been approved as a fit and proper person. It turned out that he was a fraudster, and he is now serving 20 years in prison in the US, having passed the fit and proper person test. Contrary to the shadow Minister’s argument, it would be better if the provision was used quite strictly, because we only want the best people to be running our football clubs, which are so precious to communities across the country.

I thank the hon. Member for that valuable contribution and for telling us his experiences as a Derby fan. There are many examples that have been drawn on in various aspects of the Committee’s debates, and I suspect that there will be more going forward. Just to be clear, we are not seeking to press the provision to a Division. The point we are making is that we want the strongest owners and fittest people to run clubs, but we also want to ensure that the regulator is seen to be acting lawfully and in a balanced way at all times, to avoid any issues of impartiality. I understand the point the hon. Member makes, which is why I have always supported strengthening ownership tests, even in the previous Parliament.

We do not believe that exclusion based on reputational judgment or politics should come into these kinds of judgment. The Government must not forget that they are regulating not just football clubs, but people’s lives, reputations and livelihoods. That demands humility, caution and a presumption in favour of freedom and innocence, unless the case for restriction is absolutely clear and overwhelming. Where there is doubt, the Government’s regulator must not fill in the blanks with its own qualifications or prejudices.

The Opposition support the need for disqualification in serious cases, but we continue to press the Government to ensure that the clause is not open to abuse, and that football remains a competitive, plural and fair environment, rather than one policed by the regulator, acting as judge, jury and executioner in uncertain circumstances.

Clause 39 empowers the regulator to give a removal direction in requiring an unsuitable owner to take all reasonable steps to cease being an owner by the end of a specified period. The exception to this requirement is when an owner did not have prior regulatory approval, and the regulator can exercise its power to make an ownership removal order within three months, starting from the determination day. The clause requires the football regulator to inform the owner of the club and relevant competition organiser before giving a removal direction. It also requires the football regulator to notify the owner and the club of the possible enforcement action for not complying with the direction.

It is because of powers such as these that the regulator must be seen as independent. If a Government regulator is to order the removal of incumbent owners, this could be seen by competition organisations as clear interference, which as we have discussed at length, and could cause many issues for English clubs, especially when competing in UEFA and FIFA competitions. I would be interested to hear some assurances from the Minister about how that might work in practice. If the Government’s regulator is to tell clubs that they must change ownership, how confident is the Minister that that will not breach the rules that we have discussed?

This goes back to a point I made in a previous sitting about something that is a theme of the clauses in this group. Giving the owner or officer of a club notice of a regulatory action that is coming will hopefully allow them the rights of representation and challenge, if they feel that they have been handled wrongfully, but it also opens up issues around insider information, particularly with regard to a club’s valuation. I suspect that all hon. Members appreciate that such a change, particularly at the top levels of ownership, will have a dramatic impact on the valuation of a club. We want to understand how the regulator will deal with that issue to ensure that insider dealing, in particular, does not become a widespread issue where the regulator is trying to enforce its actions, as provided for by these clauses. We want to understand how that will work in practice, to ensure that these clauses do not have unintended consequences.

Clause 40 empowers the regulator either to issue a removal direction to an unsuitable officer, requiring them to take all reasonable steps to cease being an officer by the end of a specified period, or to give such a direction to the relevant club, or both. It requires the independent football regulator to inform the owner, club, and relevant competition organiser before giving a removal direction. It also requires the IFR to notify the owner and the club of the possible enforcement action for not complying with the direction. I have the same question about this clause as for the previous one: how will the risk of inside information be managed?

Clause 41 empowers the regulator to prohibit an unsuitable owner or officer from carrying out specified activities or exercising specific rights and/or to issue a direction to the club requiring it to ensure that the unsuitable owner or officer does not exercise specified activities or rights. The clause provides a non exhaustive list of such activities and rights, including any right “to vote on any matter relating to the…club’s activities”; appointing, terminating or changing the terms of appointment or responsibilities of any officer or employee; changing the corporate structure; and undertaking any specified actions without obtaining prior approval from the independent regulator.

Clause 41 also requires the IFR to notify the owner and the club of the possible enforcement action for not complying with the direction. Such action could seriously impair the ability of a club to function while it seeks a new owner or officers, as ordered by the regulator. As we all know, it takes a significant amount of time to find a new owner, and many may be deterred by perceived interference in English football, compared with other nations without a state regulator. Clause 41 may cause more damage to a football club than the owner, who the regulator cannot dismiss. How will the Minister ensure that the regulator uses these powers only if and when deemed strictly necessary?

Clause 42 relates to situations where directions under clause 41 would impede a club’s ability to operate effectively or comply with regulatory requirements. It empowers the IFR to temporarily appoint an officer to carry out a specified function, or redistribute functions among existing officers. It stipulates that those functions must be specified, must be for a specified amount of time, and can be revoked or varied by another order. It specifies that an interim officer is not subject to the duties and requirements placed on officers by the Bill. It also requires the IFR to notify the owner and club of the possible enforcement action for not complying with the direction.

Clause 42 adds to the fear that the regulator could erode the independence of English clubs and how they operate. It empowers the regulator to effectively govern a club while seeking to remove unsuitable officers or owners. Given the time that it takes to find new ownership, that situation could last for a considerable period and cause massive issues on the pitch with regards to investment and transfers—as we discussed in a previous sitting—and how the club functions. It would also leave the regulator wide open to criticism if its actions lead to relegation, for example, for a particular club. Does the Minister think that there is a risk that such a club could be barred from international competitions—as I suggested earlier—or that the Government’s regulator could be left wide open to legal challenge if it directly impacts a club’s performance on the pitch, or its financial performance off the pitch while such considerations, or changes of ownership, take place?

I thank the shadow Minister for his points, to which I will respond briefly. There are no changes in the bit of the Bill that we are talking about compared with the previous Bill, other than—as I referenced in my previous contribution—the removal of the requirement for the regulator to “have regard to the foreign and trade policy”

of the Government. We think that removal strengthens the independence of the regulator, and I reiterate that we do not have any concerns in relation to UEFA.

The shadow Minister asked some specific questions. There are no thresholds in the Bill, but the regulator will need to act fairly and proportionately. There are robust appeals processes through the Competition Appeal Tribunal. The shadow Minister made points about the publication of information. In order to ensure that sufficient protections are in place, relevant parties will be able to express their views before the regulator makes a decision. Once the decision is made, it will take these views into account, and the regulator must publish a notice of that decision, including the rationale behind it.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 38 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clauses 39 to 42 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 43 Ownership removal orders

I beg to move amendment 94, in clause 43, page 34, line 38, at end insert— “(e) following the revocation by the IFR of the club’s operating licence under clause 19 or under paragraph 9 of Part 1 of Schedule 9.”

I am pleased to see you in the Chair again, Ms Butler; it is a pleasure to have you presiding over us. The amendment is fairly simple, and I hope the Minister will consider it. Clause 43 is quite an important clause, because it deals with the removal of ownership. Ownership, in the end, is of a private asset. A club is a public good for the fan base, but in the end, it is owned by an individual or a corporate entity. The clause provides the regulator with a power, not a duty, to remove owners in certain circumstances if appropriate. All my amendment would do is add the revocation of a club’s operating licence to the circumstances in which the regulator can act. In other words, if the club does not have an operating licence, should not that be a factor that allows, but not forces, the regulator to deal with the ownership of the club?

I thank my hon. Friend for his amendment. We have seen far too many examples of the damage that can be caused by unsuitable custodians of clubs, and that is why the Bill introduces a strengthened owners and directors test.

I believe that my hon. Friend hopes that the amendment will give reassurance to fans that, where a club fails to comply with regulation and loses its licence as a result, the regulator will be able to remove the owner. The aim is to hold those responsible to account. Let me reassure my hon. Friend that the regulator is already empowered to hold individuals to account for their actions. If the club’s non compliance or its financial situation gives the regulator concern about the owner’s suitability, it can test them, and they could be failed on that basis. If they are found to be unsuitable, the regulator will have the power to remove them. That ability to isolate and remove unsuitable owners and officers should mean that a club never has to have its licence suspended or revoked on the basis of poor ownership. That means that a club’s fans should not have to suffer the consequences of bad leadership.

The revocation of a club’s licence is the very last resort. We hope the regulator will never have to do that, but I reassure my hon. Friend that if a club is so seriously and consistently non compliant that the regulator has no choice but to revoke its licence, we would expect the regulator to consider very carefully whether any responsibility for that failure can be laid at the owner’s door, and if the owner is tested and found unsuitable, they can be removed on that basis. We believe that the Bill’s provisions are sufficient to protect fans and hold owners to account where necessary. We hope that they will ensure that a licence is never revoked.

If a club has lost its licence, has it not therefore been taken beyond the purview of the regulator? How is the regulator still empowered to pursue the owner?

I will address that point in just a moment.

As a club’s licence is separate from its owners, the licence is held directly by the club itself, not its owners. The removal of an owner will not impact the club’s licence status. This ability to isolate and remove unsuitable and owners and officers should mean that a club never has to have its licence suspended or revoked because of its owner, which means that a club’s fans should not have to suffer the consequences of bad leadership.

We hope that a club losing its licence will be the very last resort, and an unsuitable owner will have to follow the removal order made by the regulator. It will be in the best interests of an unsuitable owner to sell their stake in a club before the regulator has to step in to force divestment and a sale at no minimum price. If the owner fails to comply with this order, the regulator will have enforcement powers that it can use to ensure compliance.

These powers will include a variety of sanctions against the individuals calling shots at the club and, where necessary, directly against the club itself. Where appropriate, the regulator will also be able to seek an injunction from the courts. Having this broad range of tools of escalating severity at its disposal will allow the regulator to take strong action as and when required. For those reasons, I hope that my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East will withdraw his amendment.

Sometimes the Minister has partially satisfied me with her responses; this time she has wholly satisfied me. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 44 stand part.

As set out previously in the debate on clauses 38 to 42, the regulator will be able to direct an unsuitable owner to leave the club in a specified timeframe and to prohibit them from undertaking certain activities at the club in the interim. However, there is a risk that an unsuitable owner does not comply with these directions. For instance, they may refuse to leave the club or continue to use their position as an owner to damage the club. In these situations, the regulator will need sufficient powers to directly remove the unsuitable owner from the club. That is why clause 43 gives the regulator broad discretion in such cases.

The regulator can make an order containing such provision as the regulator considers appropriate to secure the unsuitable owner’s removal. For example, that could include appointing trustees, empowering the trustees to sell the club and requiring the unsuitable owner, or any other person, to comply with the trustees’ directions. However, the regulator can use this power only against unsuitable owners who have demonstrated that they are willing to flout regulatory requirements, or if they fail to comply with the directions that the regulator has made to protect the club from harm. As set out previously, in certain situations the regulator will have the power to make an ownership removal order containing whatever provision is appropriate to ensure that an unsuitable owner leaves a club.

To ensure that there are sufficient safeguards in place, clause 44 sets out the process that needs to be followed by the regulator. In particular, before issuing an ownership removal order, the regulator must publish a notice that it intends to issue the order and allow a period for interested parties to express their views. After this, the regulator must decide whether to make the order, and must publish a notice of its decision including its rationale. This helps to ensure that the views of those affected are taken into account in the decision making process. Separately, the regulator may make rules requiring unsuitable owners to pay costs associated with an ownership removal order, such as costs incurred by a trustee appointed by an order. This power helps to ensure that the costs are borne by the unsuitable owner.

Clauses 43 and 44 set out how ownership removal orders are to be made, and the legal consequences of non compliance. Clause 43 matters hugely because it allows the regulator to force an individual to sell their ownership stake in a club. That is a serious and intrusive power, so we must ensure that it is used sparingly, lawfully and with robust safeguards. On process and fairness, we welcome the requirement in clause 44 to notify the person and allow representations to be made before an order is issued. However, is that enough? Will representations be meaningful, or will this just be a procedural tick box exercise?

I have some questions for the Minister. Will the regulator be required to give full written reasons for the proposed removal? Will the owner have access to the evidence relied upon? Is there a statutory right of appeal or review, and if not, why? Secondly, on liability and legal exposure, clause 44(6) imposes the liability for costs incurred by non compliance with an order on to an owner. What types of loss are envisaged for owners? Are they just financial, or reputational and contractual? Who decides whether a loss is caused by the non compliance, and is causation clearly defined? Could this lead to vexatious or opportunistic claims in the future? How will this work with ownership groups, when there are multiple owners of a club?

On commercial realities, forcing the sale of a football club is not simple; in most cases, these are not liquid assets. The value depends on market conditions, the timing of the economy and sale, and obviously buyer availability and demand to purchase a football club. I therefore ask the Minister: will the regulator have a duty to ensure fair market value is preserved during a forced sale? What happens if the regulator’s actions or any delays cause the value of a club to fall? Could we see a situation where the regulator is frequently appearing in court on such claims? Fourthly, on the broader principle, the clause is in effect a power to force the sale of a privately owned business. That is a major constitutional step. Property rights in this country matter, due process matters, and so does the rule of law. We need real safeguards, not just procedural gestures.

We want to keep football in safe hands, but the clause needs to be clearer, fairer and more restrained in its use. It must not give the regulator quasi judicial power without necessary oversight of Parliament. That is not regulation; we believe it would be overreach. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s comments on my questions.

I echo the shadow Minister’s comments about the power being used clearly, robustly and fairly. I think all of us on the Committee can agree that that is absolutely right. On his question about whether the reasons would have to be written, the regulator will have to give the owner enough reasons for its decision to enable them to understand why it has been taken. That has one of the strongest appeal routes in the Bill; it can go directly to the Competition Appeals Tribunal and be heard on its merits. We think there are robust protections in place here already.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 43 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 44 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 45 Duty not to operate a team in relation to a prohibited competition Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The clause is the first in part 5 of the Bill, which deals with duties on clubs and competition organisers. It prevents all regulated clubs and clubs that have been regulated in the previous 10 years from having a relevant team participate in a prohibited competition.

The European super league proposed in 2021 posed an existential threat to the English football pyramid. It was an attempt by a small number of clubs to set up a closed shop league to benefit themselves at the expense of all other clubs and against the wishes of fans. Ultimately, the European super league was stopped by the sheer will of fans around the country and the then Government’s promise to consider legislation. However, the risk of a similar breakaway competition rearing its head in the future remains, which is why we are now bringing forward statutory protections.

The clause will prevent a regulated club, or a club that has been regulated in the previous 10 years, from entering a team into a competition that the regulator has prohibited. The extension to clubs regulated in the past 10 years will stop clubs circumventing the rules by withdrawing from existing competitions to join a new breakaway competition. Similar safeguards against circumvention are found in clauses 46 and 47, which require clubs to gain the approval of the regulator for the disposal of the home ground or the appointment of an administrator. I will speak to them later.

On clause 45, the regulator is expected to prohibit competitions on the basis of a predetermined, proportionate and transparent framework based on the prescribed factors set out in legislation. That will provide up front clarity to the industry and mean that new competitions will not just be prohibited outright. That is important to ensure that the regulator does not unduly stand in the way of innovation in the market, such as when the old First Division became the Premier League in 1992.

The clause requires the regulator, when deciding whether to prohibit a competition, to consider several factors, including whether the competition is merit based, operates on the basis of fair and open competition, jeopardises the suitability of English football’s existing competitions or the clubs in those competitions, or harms the heritage of English football. Football belongs to its fans, so the regulator will also determine and consider the views of fans in England and Wales before prohibiting a competition.

As the national governing body for football, the FA will be consulted before the regulator prohibits any competition, and the regulator will also consult anyone else it considers appropriate. For example, we might reasonably expect that to include other competition organisers, clubs and players who might have been involved in the competition that the regulator is considering prohibiting.

I want to raise one small point with the Minister. Some time ago, when we debated clause 6, I raised the ability of the regulator to take a view about the impact of new competitions, particularly the world club championship, on the legacy of important domestic competitions like the FA cup. Those competitions will now be constrained for time, with replays being abolished, because a few clubs had to go and do more things in Europe, depriving the majority of clubs of their traditional way of playing in competitions. The Minister’s answer at the time was that a regulator cannot deal with competition matters.

The headings for part 5 and clause 45 include the word “competition”. Indeed, the fan led review came about because of the European super league, and the then Prime Minister deciding it was so awful that we needed to do something about it. Given that competition can be looked at by the regulator, does the Minister want to have another think, perhaps before Report, about whether, without putting this in the Bill, the regulator should be able to consider such matters, when clubs’ finances and their fanbases’ enjoyment are particularly affected by a competition for a few that prevents more competition for the many?

The hon. Member for Sheffield South East has stolen some of my lines. As always, he picked up the ball and put it in the net, as would be expected of the chair of the football all party parliamentary group. There are inconsistencies in what is being discussed, and he was right to highlight them.

Clause 45 introduces a legal duty on clubs not to enter or operate a team in a competition deemed to be prohibited by the regulator. As has been discussed, the clause is clearly a response to the threat posed by breakaway leagues such as the attempted European super league a few seasons ago. While the intention behind the duty is understandable—to protect the structure and integrity of English football—the mechanism raises serious questions about competition and proportionality, as the hon. Gentleman just touched on.

First, on the principle, we agree that the pyramid structure of English football must be preserved wherever possible. Promotion and relegation are sacred principles of our game, and competition on and off the pitch must be upheld. The competitive nature of English football is what makes it so great. This season, certainly in the Premier League, has probably been slightly dimmer because it has been perceived to have not such great competition for the Championship and in relegation, as things were determined quite early in the season.

The Opposition have some sympathy with, in particular, the National League’s 3UP campaign, which has sought to close the gap between the National League and League Two. If we are looking at how to close the gap between the Premier League and the Championship, which has been the main argument from proponents of the Bill, we must also look at the bottom half of the pyramid to see how that competition can also be improved. That is a principle of fairness and competition for which I have a lot of sympathy.

Does my hon. Friend agree with the analogy that, although we are all very proud of having the Special Air Service as our elite forces, the SAS cannot be created without a very large Army underneath? While the Premier League is the jewel in the crown, it simply cannot exist on its own; it absolutely needs the game beneath it.

I will not question the experience of my hon. Friend, whose military background is far greater than one I could even dream of on a PlayStation, let alone in practice. He makes a valid point that English football is much more than just the Premier League. We take enormous pride in all the leagues in our country, as we do for British football more broadly. They are some of the most watched leagues in the world, with amazing clubs and competition. Competition across the pyramid is what we seek to promote and preserve going forward.

The proposed European super league rightly provoked outrage from fans, clubs and Parliament itself, and rightly collapsed after pressure from all those groups, but we must be cautious about giving a regulator the power to prohibit competitions on open ended grounds. As the Minister has said, the Premier League probably would not exist in its current form if we had sought to prohibit it around 30 years ago.

Does the hon. Gentleman recognise that, as there is not a level of regulation, there is increasingly a welfare issue around the amount by which players are required to shrink their off season to continue to play football? The commercial imperatives of clubs will potentially have a detrimental impact on the quality of the game.

I completely agree with the hon. Member’s sentiment. We will seek to debate that when we come to our player welfare amendment, because we are concerned about increasing the length of the season to generate further revenues. The tournament in America and the Asia tour that has just taken place at Man United are probably the prime examples of the impact that can have on players. The English team, in their performance the other night, sadly looked quite tired. There is an issue around player welfare that we must all acknowledge, particularly given the demands to generate more revenues for the financial fair play rules. I thank the hon. Member for making that point; I am sure we will come back to it when we reach the player welfare amendment.

On definitions and discretions in the clause, the Bill defines a prohibited competition in quite vague terms, and it is ultimately left to the discretion of the regulator. The explanatory notes state that subsection (5) sets out some factors that the IFR must consider when deciding whether to specify a competition as prohibited. What are the criteria for a competition to be deemed prohibited? Will they be set in primary legislation, by guidance from the Secretary of State or by the regulator? Is there a right of appeal if a competition is believed to have been unfairly designated as prohibited?

On international alignment, there is another issue that we must highlight. We must accept that football operates in a global ecosystem, as we have discussed. English clubs routinely participate in international and cross border competitions, whether that be the Champions League, the Europa League or the Club World Cup, as does the national team. How does the clause interact with UEFA and FIFA competition rules? What happens if, for example, a competition is sanctioned by UEFA but deemed prohibited by the football regulator, or vice versa? This is a real issue for the regulation. We would like some clarity from the Minister on how such a conflict would be resolved, because it would put clubs in a very confusing situation.

On enforcement and penalties, clause 45 creates a legal duty not to participate, but what are the sanctions if a club does so? One assumes that it would lead to licence revocation, but what else? Would there be fines or points deductions? What penalties will the regulator look to enforce? Will they be proportionate? Will clubs be given prior notice and the chance to make representations?

On unintended consequences, we must avoid stifling innovation and competitive evolution in the sport. Not every new competition is a threat; some may bring financial or structural benefits, or benefits for fans. As I and the Minister have highlighted, we must remember that the Premier League was technically a breakaway league from the old First Division. If that happened today, we believe that the Bill and the regulator would be responsible for preventing that league, and all the attributes and characteristics that we celebrate in this country, from existing. We have to look at innovation carefully, and the answer must not always be no if there are clear benefits to the country and to the game of football itself.

We support the aim of preserving the integrity of English football, but the clause must be clearly defined, tightly drawn and fairly enforced. A law designed to stop the next European super league must not become a tool for bureaucratic overreach or political intervention by the regulator. The game belongs to its fans and its communities, not to the regulator or the governing body. I am interested to hear the Minister’s comments on my questions, particularly those about how the international system would interact with a prohibited competition.

I wish to build on my hon. Friend’s themes. Football has the unfortunate concept of the friendly; frequently, they are not very friendly at all. When I read the Bill, it was clear to me that the drafters had in mind the prevention of another flyaway European super league, which we have debated.

I would like the Minister to look at look at the example of a one off friendly match. Many of our teams tour in the far east and in America, in their off season, to generate additional revenues and expand their fan base and brand. Let us envisage a set of circumstances in which a North Korean has somehow managed to purchase an English football team, and they have the bright idea that they would like to play a “friendly” match in North Korea. It is a one off match, but the Government in North Korea decide that they want to make a big deal of it, so it becomes the Pyongyang cup—a one off match between the English team and the North Korean team. In the Minister’s view, would the regulator be justified in considering whether such a one off match was a competition and therefore within the purview of the regulator?

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Butler. Pre season friendlies constitute cup competitions all the time. There is the Audi cup; any major brand we could name will have sponsored friendly cups. When the Minister gives the hon. Gentleman assurance on the Pyongyang cup, perhaps she might also cover the friendly cups that actually exist.

The hon. Member makes a pertinent point. As I said, the word “competition” seems to refer to the sort of flyaway league we have discussed; are one off friendlies competitions under the terms of the Bill?

I am grateful to Members for their contributions and will take their points in turn.

The clause applies both to existing and to new competitions. If any competition breaches the criteria, it can be prohibited, but matters such as scheduling are for competition organisers.

On shadow Minister’s points, we will come on to player welfare, to which we are all very sympathetic, just as we are sympathetic to the 3UP campaign, but it is outside the Bill’s scope and is for organisers. He asked some specific questions on the criteria; that will be for the regulator to determine. It is expected to do so based on a predetermined, proportionate, objective and transparent framework based on factors listed in the clause. For example, if a competition is not merit based, jeopardises the sustainability of existing domestic competitions, and is not supported by the fans, we would expect it to be prohibited.

My hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne and the hon. Member for Newbury highlighted the issue of friendlies. The Minister has indicated that she will come to that, but I do think we need some clarity as to what that might look like in practice. The end of season competitions are normally internationally designed, and although they may be endorsed by UEFA or FIFA, they would breach some of the conditions under the definition the Minister just gave. We need clarity about how this will work, because we do not want to put English football on a collision course with international football.

No, of course we do not. I totally agree. I was coming to that point. As I understand it, friendlies would be out of scope, but I am happy to write to Committee members if they would like greater clarity.

We have discussed the appeals and representations several times. The relevant competition organiser will be given a period in which they can make representations. If the organiser has concerns about the regulator’s decision to prohibit the competition, it will be able to appeal the decision. As has been discussed, the organiser can also appeal to the competition appeal tribunal.

I thank the Minister for those remarks. I suspect that a letter of clarity would be helpful for all Members. There is a risk that FIFA, or UEFA, as we have seen with the Nations League in recent years, looks to introduce a new competition, whether at club or international level, that would contradict the regulator. As we have spoken about at length, and as the hon. Member for Sheffield South East has described, the different governing bodies of UEFA and FIFA are often in competition with our national competitions. We have to ensure that clubs are not forced to choose between a licence in the English game and partaking in international competitions. We fear that could drive acceleration toward a breakaway league, rather than prevent one.

I completely appreciate the shadow Minister’s comments. As I said in my opening remarks, we do not ban all international competitions automatically. We are mindful of enabling innovation in the market. I am happy to supplement my comments with a letter to Committee members.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 45 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 46

Duty not to dispose etc of home ground without approval

I beg to move amendment 87, in clause 46, page 38, line 26, leave out first “home ground” and insert “specified properties”.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 88, in clause 46, page 38, line 26, leave out second “home ground” and insert “specified properties”.

Amendment 89, in clause 46, page 38, line 27, leave out “home ground” and insert “specified properties”.

Amendment 90, in clause 46, page 38, line 28, leave out “home ground” and insert “specified properties”.

Amendment 86, in clause 46, page 39, line 11, leave out subsection (10) and insert— “(10) In this section, ‘specified properties’— (a) in relation to a body that is a regulated club, means the ground at which a relevant team operated by it customarily plays its home matches, the property at which a relevant team customarily trains and any other properties that make up a more than negligible part of the relevant team’s operations; (b) in relation to a body that is a formerly regulated club, means (immediately before it ceased to be a regulated club) the ground at which a relevant team operated by it customarily played its home matches, the property at which a relevant team customarily trained and any other properties that make or made up a more than negligible part of the relevant team’s operations.”

The purpose of this group of amendments is to introduce a wider definition of a club’s home ground that includes the training ground, which is how the different amendments link together. Amendment 86 sets out the wider definition that is then used in the other amendments. In the end, in this day and age, most professional clubs cannot survive with just a home ground and need additional facilities. If those additional facilities are sold off, the club can become unviable. That is what some unscrupulous owners will seek to do, because sometimes the training ground is the most valuable asset in potential for development.

The hon. Gentleman’s amendments find support from the Liberal Democrats. He referenced training grounds, and Reading football club’s training ground, Bearwood Park, was actually in that exact position. The owner tried to sell it off because it was prime land for residential development. However, without that training facility, the club would clearly struggle to continue. There was even the potential to sell the training ground to rivals Wycombe Wanderers, so that they could then have an enhanced training ground. The hon. Gentleman will be aware that the Liberal Democrats have tabled new clause 11, which seeks to protect various assets of a football club, including the training ground, so he has our support.

I hope the Minister can take this seriously; it is a worry that the Bill does not quite go far enough at present. The reality is that this legislation tries to deal with bad owners and anticipate how they might behave. The more restrictions that we can build around bad behaviour, and possibilities for controlling it, the better.

I appreciate the desire to legislate for bad owners, but is the hon. Gentleman not concerned about good owners who might find money very tight? They have assets beyond the home ground and team itself that they might have to consider selling, including a training ground, to remain financially viable and therefore be on the right side of the regulator in their business plan. Is he not concerned that, by extending even further the regulator’s purview into all properties, he might overly constrain good owners from doing what they want to save their clubs?

I do not believe that is the case. I understand the hon. Gentleman’s concern, but I think what we are saying here is that this gives the regulator the power to look at that situation. The worry is that some owners will try to exploit not for good football purposes but because they can see themselves making a profit on the side. That can damage the competitive ability of the clubs that they own. Unfortunately, some owners take that capricious view, and it is for them that we must legislate. I do not believe my amendments would adversely affect good owners, as I do not think the Bill does either.

I am intrigued by the hon. Gentleman’s amendments. Similar sympathies apply to the situation at Reading, which is also still the case at Charlton’s Sparrows Lane training ground, which is owned not by the current owners but by two owners ago, as is the stadium. How would the hon. Gentleman’s amendments work with regards to the Everton example, where Goodison is now to be used for the women’s game? How would his amendments cover those kinds of properties? An owner might want to sell the women’s ground, even though the women’s game is technically outside the scope of the regulator.

At this stage, my amendments cover the facilities that are within the scope of the regulator, so I do not think they apply to any properties that are outside the scope of the regulator. Obviously, the regulator cannot deal with things outside its scope.

I hope the Minister might give some consideration, even if the wording of my amendments are not absolutely right, to how the Bill can be better drafted to cover the point. Straying slightly on to amendment 83, there is a similar point about trying to ensure that, where there is a sale of certain assets, before they are sold, suitable alternatives are in place so that the club does not potentially lose its licence, as it has nowhere to play and train. I appreciate that I have strayed there; you have been very considerate, Ms Butler, in helping me to do that. I just thought it would help move proceedings along.

We will come to amendment 83 later on.

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East for tabling his amendments. Prior to speaking to them, I would like to let him know that I have raised his points on a similar issue—on assets of community value—with the Under Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham North and Kimberley (Alex Norris). I spoke to him following our Committee session on Tuesday, and he has committed to write to my hon. Friend as swiftly as possible, so I will follow up with him in a timely fashion.

Turning to my hon. Friend’s amendments, I hope I will be able to reassure him on the development of the reform. I understand the intention of his amendments, but I will explain why we intend to resist the changes to include specified properties. On extending the scope of clause 46 to include training grounds, among other properties, the legislation has carved out specific protections to safeguard home grounds against risky financial decisions or sales of the grounds. I will speak specifically to the mechanism of clause 46 and the approval process later, but the focus on the home ground is to reflect that it is often the most financially significant asset at the club. That does not mean that other assets such as training grounds or office space are not also important to the club, but that there is a specific consideration necessary for the home ground.

I understand that my hon. Friend’s amendments are likely in response to instances where owners have intended to asset strip or make reckless decisions. Members on the Committee have shared some examples, and we are all familiar with recent ones. I wish to reassure all that there are protections elsewhere in the Bill to safeguard against this. That includes an enhanced owners and directors test that will ensure that owners are prepared to be appropriate custodians of their club and its assets, as we discussed on part 4 of the Bill. If it were to become evident that an owner’s actions were likely to worsen the financial position of the club, the licensing regime gives the regulator power to place licensing conditions on the club. The regulator can also take enforcement action where such a condition has been breached or the financial plan has not been followed. Additionally, the regulator will have oversight of the financial plans and balance sheets of the regulated clubs, ensuring that the club is not putting itself in a risky position unnecessarily.

On the point about risky situations and the risk averse nature the Minister is describing, the Bill is clearer on disposable home grounds. I am intrigued to see how the regulator would deem a club either selling its freehold and then having a leaseback option, which we have heard has happened, or looking to move to a ground or stadium that it did not own and pay rent going forward. Would that be seen as a bad financial move or a good one by the regulator? It is not quite clear how it would work for non disposable treatment of assets.

I do not want to get drawn into hypotheticals. As we previously discussed, there might be a perfectly legitimate reason for a club to move—or to move temporarily, such as for flooding. It is not an absolute power. We want to give the regulator discretion when clubs may need that for legitimate reasons. The amendment speaks to where we think clubs are asset stripping or acting in bad faith.

We would expect the power to include assets remaining in the club’s ownership and any plans to change its financial arrangements. It would be at odds with the sustainability of a football club for there to be no home ground or location to train. It is therefore implicit that the regulator would address that.

Does that mean that if the regulator felt that an owner was proposing to divest themselves or the club of a training ground that could influence the club’s financial sustainability and competitiveness, it could act to prevent that before the sale was completed?

Yes, I believe that there is provision in the Bill to do that. For those reasons, I ask my hon. Friend to withdraw the amendment.

The Minister knows—I have approached her about this—that a club in my constituency of Spelthorne has gone into administration. It has no home ground, but it does have a training ground, which is a community asset. I am intrigued to know whether, in the potential conflict between the purview of the regulator and the enactment of companies law in dealing with the administration of the company, the provisions in the clause give the regulator power to influence the administrator on the manner of the administration and whether clubs’ training grounds can be bought or sold. What is the hierarchy of legislative authority between companies law and the clause?

Can I write to the hon. Gentleman on that point?

The Minister is doing quite well today: she has satisfied me once again. I am reassured that the regulator does have the power that I sought to put in the Bill, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment 83, in clause 46, page 39, line 2, at end insert— “(ii) in the case of the home ground and training ground, it is satisfied that there are suitable plans in place to ensure the club’s continued long term use of the home ground or training ground or to secure an alternative home ground or training ground for the next football season; (iii) in the case of a home ground, it is satisfied that any alternative under sub paragraph (ii) will have been actively approved by the club’s fans domiciled in England and Wales if any of the following non exhaustive factors represent a significant upheaval of the connection between the fans of a club and the club: proximity to home ground, proximity to other clubs' grounds, journey time for fans and any other factors that the Regulator deems relevant;”

I have a simple question for the Minister. If the regulator decides that a sale can go ahead, is the power there to allow it to be satisfied that there are suitable plans to ensure that the club will have long term use of a home ground and training ground? That may not be the ground it had before, but there must at least be a replacement. Does the regulator have the power to ensure that?

I thank my hon. Friend tabling the amendment. It seeks a number of things: extending the clause to include training grounds; guaranteeing long term use of home grounds and/or training grounds; and introducing parameters for home ground relocation. If it is helpful, I will address those briefly, but I appreciate that this debate is similar to the one we just had.

On extending the scope of the clause to include training grounds, the Bill has carved out specific protections to safeguard home grounds against risky financial decisions or the sale of grounds. As I said in the previous debate, that is to reflect the home ground being the club’s most important asset. It does not mean that other assets, such as training grounds or office space, are not important.

I understand that, as we have discussed, the amendment is really focused on asset stripping. As I have alluded to—I will be a bit clearer and perhaps more explicit—the regulator has the power to attach discretionary licence conditions. Therefore, on the point about needing a training ground, I believe that the regulator could apply a temporary or particular licence condition on a club.

I will not dwell on this point too much, but the implications of this amendment and the ones that we were just discussing are not hypothetical; we have seen real life examples of where this issue has become a real one for football clubs. So, we seek some clarity from the Minister about how the regulator would act in such scenarios in the future.

As I said in my previous comments, I think the disposal of a ground is probably slightly clearer than the relocation of a ground. However, I will use the example of Coventry City football club. When they moved to the Ricoh Arena, I believe that the stadium was jointly owned by the local council and another group. I assumed that the club moved to a new stadium with the best interests of the club at heart. I had the pleasure of going to Coventry’s old stadium when Charlton played Coventry in the FA Cup, but that is a bit by the by. It was in need of improvements; most people would have thought that.

How would this measure work? We know that Coventry ran into a number of issues with the Ricoh Arena, which I believe is now owned by the Frasers Group. At that point in time, when the club moved, would that move have been deemed to be in the regulator’s purview of an inappropriate action by the previous owners? I ask that question because this is a real life example of where it is not clear how this legislation would apply. As Parliament, we have to be clear how we intend the regulator to behave in such situations, because, as I say, that was a real life example of how football clubs might seek to improve their stadia when they do not have the assets to do so themselves.

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for his comments. I draw his attention to the discretionary licensing addition that I have referred to: the regulator can react to different situations. I do not want to be drawn on individual cases, nor do I want to pre empt the actions of the regulator.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment 84, page 39, line 5, at end insert— “(c) in the case of a disposal under subsection (1)(a), it has taken reasonable steps to establish that the majority of the club’s fans domiciled in England and Wales approve of the disposal.”

With this, it will be convenient to discuss amendment 85, page 39, line 5, at end insert— “(6A) Before the IFR grants an approval under subsection 6 it must— (a) consult the supporters of the body in question, the relevant competition organisers and persons representing the local community with which the body is associated, and (b) have regard to the views expressed by those consulted.”

I really do not understand the way in which the Bill is written at present; perhaps the Minister can help me with that.

We will come on to clause 48, which is about the relocation of a club; of course, that means moving grounds. As set out in clause 48 4(c) and (d), there is a specific requirement on the club to consult with fans. We can have another discussion at some point—we may do—about consultation with which fans and which groups. I still think that this is a challenging issue that we need more clarity about.

Clause 46 is about the disposal of a ground, which is a very emotive subject for fans. It may not be the wrong decision to relocate, and clubs can relocate and take their fans with them, with proper involvement; the Everton example is probably in that category. However, there is no requirement at all to consult the fans on the potential sale of a ground. That seems to be a big omission in the Bill. Fans would not have a veto, because it is understood that sometimes there are very good commercial reasons as to why a club needs to move, which can be accepted and explained to the regulator.

Therefore, I am not saying that the disposal of a ground has to get the full approval of the fans, but surely there should be a measure whereby the fans are at least consulted and their views taken into account before the home ground of a club, where the club may have played for 100 years, is disposed of. That would not be inappropriate.

I thank my hon. Friend for tabling the amendments. Home grounds are a vital asset for all clubs, so I do understand his intent.

Regarding changes to the ownership of a home ground, the potential adverse outcomes are entirely financial. We do not believe that they impact the heritage of the club, which is why clause 46 does not require any heritage consideration or fan engagement. Additionally, decisions about the financial arrangements of a home ground are commercial decisions and therefore we do not think it is appropriate to legislate on them. However, I will reassure my hon. Friend that if the sale of a club’s home ground would result in the relocation of the club, fans absolutely have to be consulted about that, as per clause 48, which we will discuss later. We know how much home grounds matter to fans and communities, but this clause is purely about protecting a club’s financial position.

I seek some clarity on the relocation of a ground. White Hart Lane was demolished and rebuilt on a similar, but bigger footprint. Obviously, at Old Trafford, Manchester United’s owners are talking about building on land next to the stadium. Personally, I would not class either of those moves as the relocation of a ground. However, in the Bill would they count as relocation, because those new stadia are not on the same footprint as the original stadium?

I will double check that point, but I believe they would. I also refer to the points we discussed earlier in the Committee: clubs may want to move for a particular, legitimate reason—to improve their ground, or because they have to due to flooding in adverse weather, for example. We appreciate that these are not all bad actors and it is not all bad faith, but I will double check that point and come back to the hon. Gentleman. We know how much home grounds matter to fans and communities; this clause, together with the owners and directors test, is about protecting the club’s financial position and its balance sheet from asset stripping by bad actors.

Is the Minister saying, then, that a club owner could sell the ground without even consulting the fans—just present it as a fait accompli—and then, because there would not be a home ground to play on and the club might have to relocate, at that point they could say to the fans, “Well, the ground’s gone; we’re now going to ask you whether you want to move.”? There seems to be a gap in the thinking somewhere.

I appreciate that point, but the sale of home grounds is a primarily financial decision, separate from the decision about where the club actually plays its games. That is why there is currently no requirement to consult or obtain approval. If the club has not actually relocated, it would be caught in clause 48 and would be required to consult fans. We will come on to discuss that later.

I must admit that—like other members of the Committee, to judge from their facial expressions—I am slightly confused by the reasoning the Minister has given in response to the hon. Member for Sheffield South East on this clause, and where the distinction lies between the ultimate decision to relocate the ground and the sale of the ground. The decisions are clearly interlinked, and I would argue that fans would have strong concerns if a club owner was seeking to sell the ground, which would in a number of instances lead to either a relocation or an impact on the club’s heritage. The sale, for example, could lead to the renaming of a stadium, and the fans would clearly have a view on how that would impact their support for the club.

I ask the Minister to reflect on the hon. Gentleman’s points, because the clause seems to lack clarity on how that distinction is being made. I understand the point she is making about the financial considerations of owners, but the Government should reflect carefully on the argument against this clause, because it is not very clear to members of the Committee.

I appreciate the comments that have been made, and I will take them away and reflect on them, but I ask my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East at this point to withdraw his amendment.

The Minister has taken a very sensible approach. I accept that accepting an amendment here and now, out of the blue, is not how Government operate; but there is a lack of consistency between the two clauses, so I appreciate her agreeing to go and have a look at them. She has not committed to a change, but she has agreed to have a look, and that is very helpful. On that basis, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

As discussed during the debate on the previous amendments, clause 46 serves as an important protection for the home ground of a club. It requires clubs to gain the approval of the regulator prior to any sale or use of the home ground as collateral. A home ground is often one of the most vital and valuable assets a club can own. If it is used as collateral for debt or sold off, that can impact a club’s financial position by weakening the balance sheet. Not owning the stadium may also threaten a club’s long term financial sustainability.

This clause requires clubs who own their ground to obtain the approval of the regulator prior to any sale or use as collateral. The regulator will consider the risk to the financial sustainability of the proposed transaction and block any potentially financially damaging sale of a club’s home ground. This applies to regulated clubs and also to any club regulated within the last five years, which prevents bad actors from being able to circumvent regulation by leaving regulated leagues in order to skirt protections and strip assets. It recognises the important role that football grounds play in the financial sustainability of clubs and adds protections against bad actors.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 46 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 47 Duty not to appoint administrator without approval Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

This clause sets out the duty on regulated and formally regulated clubs not to appoint an administrator without approval from the regulator. This is to ensure that administration is transparent, acts in the best interests of the club and its creditors and avoids any perceived or actual conflicts of interest. This will give all stakeholders, especially fans, confidence in the administration process.

As with clause 46, this applies to regulated and formally regulated clubs to avoid any risk of circumvention of the rules. The regulatory framework is not a zero failure regime, so it is possible that football clubs may enter administration despite the best efforts of the regulator. There is already a legal framework for companies, including football clubs, to enter into administration, which is detailed in the Insolvency Act 1986. In many cases, the existing framework has enabled clubs to go into administration and re emerge as solvent.

However, there are occasions where the administration of a club is not initiated by the creditors but the club itself, so it does not require a court to sanction the appointment in advance. In these circumstances, there have been occasions when some have had cause to question a relationship between the insolvency practitioner appointed as administrator and the football club. This is why, in specific circumstances, the appointment of an administrator requires the regulator’s approval to ensure that the process is transparent, and to avoid conflicts of interests or perceived bias in the appointment. By doing so, all stakeholders, particularly fans, should have more confidence that the outcome is the best one available in the circumstances for the individual club.

Clause 47, as the Minister has just outlined, creates a new legal duty on clubs not to enter administration without the prior approval of the regulator. This is an unprecedented intervention: a regulator potentially blocking access to what is, in most sectors, a standard insolvency mechanism. We understand the intent to prevent abuse of administration as a means of dodging financial responsibility and to help protect club continuity. However, this clause raises serious concerns about the balance between corporate law and football regulation going forward.

As drafted, subsection (1) says, “as soon as reasonably practicable after the body considers that there is a reasonable prospect of an administrator of the body being appointed”.

I would therefore naturally ask the Minister: what constitutes “reasonably practicable” and “a reasonable prospect”? We all appreciate that, in most examples, an owner’s wealth is generated not by the club itself but other business interests. It may become very difficult to determine what is “a reasonable prospect” if we are looking at business interests far from football.

Administration is recognised as part of UK insolvency law, which the Minister referred to, and it exists to help distressed businesses rescue viable parts and protect creditors where possible. Blocking access to administration could make things worse, not better, specifically if it delays actions or deters future buyers. Why are the Government confident that the regulator is better placed than insolvency professionals to determine when administration is appropriate?

On some of the practical risks, insolvency situations often develop quickly, and clubs may need to act fast to avoid a complete liquidation of assets. A duty to obtain the regulator’s approval would therefore add delay and could risk total collapse where speed might be essential. We have seen that in a number of club takeovers over the years. Will there be an emergency approval process for an administrator? Within what timeframe does the Minister expect the regulator to respond? Is there a default route if it does not respond in a quick enough time?

On consistency with company law, clause 47 effectively overrides the Companies Act 2006, creating a two tier insolvency regime for football clubs. That is not a small step. It sets a precedent for sector specific interference into commercial law. What discussions has the Minister’s Department had with the Insolvency Service and the Department for Business and Trade on this specific clause and mechanism going forward? Are there any comparable sectors in the UK where companies would be forbidden from entering administration without the regulator’s consent?

Lastly, on unintended consequences, could this provision make distressed clubs less attractive to investors who fear regulatory delays? I fear that it may. It may also push clubs to delay taking action, making outcomes worse for creditors, fans and staff in the longer term. It could also expose clubs to legal risks, if creditors challenge a failure to act promptly to directors. The Opposition support strong oversight, but clause 47 must not become a regulatory roadblock in moments of crisis. Football clubs must be able to act swiftly to protect their future. The football regulator should be a safeguard, not a barrier to survival. We urge the Minister to have a close look at some of those questions and hopefully provide some answers today. We fear that this clause, as drafted, may have a number of unintended consequences.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Vicky Foxcroft.)

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: † Gill Furniss, Carolyn Harris, Sir Desmond Swayne, Martin Vickers

† Bloore, Chris (Redditch) (Lab)

† Brandreth, Aphra (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)

† Burton Sampson, David (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)

Chambers, Dr Danny (Winchester) (LD)

† Craft, Jen (Thurrock) (Lab)

† Dean, Josh (Hertford and Stortford) (Lab)

† Dixon, Anna (Shipley) (Lab)

† Evans, Dr Luke (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)

† Franklin, Zöe (Guildford) (LD)

† Irons, Natasha (Croydon East) (Lab)

† Joseph, Sojan (Ashford) (Lab)

† Kinnock, Stephen (Minister for Care)

† Morris, Joe (Hexham) (Lab)

† Owatemi, Taiwo (Lord Commissioner of His Majesty’s Treasury)

† Shastri Hurst, Dr Neil (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)

† Stafford, Gregory (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)

† Wrighting, Rosie (Kettering) (Lab)

Claire Cozens, Harriet Deane, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Thursday 12 June 2025

(Morning)

[Gill Furniss in the Chair]

Mental Health Bill [Lords]

Clause 5

Grounds for detention

I beg to move amendment 26, in clause 5, page 11, line 22, leave out— “by a constable or other authorised person”.

One of the tests for detaining a person under the mental health legislation is that harm may be caused, or that treatment is not possible, without detention. This amendment and amendments 27, 28 and 29 remove wording stipulating that the detention that is necessary must be detention by a constable or other authorised person (as defined).

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendments 27 to 29.

Clause stand part.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Furniss.

Government amendments 26 to 29 seek to remove previous amendments to the clause tabled by Lord Kamall, Earl Howe and Baroness May of Maidenhead, which added police and other authorised persons to sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Mental Health Act 1983, giving the police additional powers to detain people under the Act where they currently have no powers to intervene. We do not support extending police powers in that way, and we understand that the police do not support an extension either. It would not be appropriate to involve police officers in clinical decision making about whether a person meets the criteria for detention for assessment or treatment under the Act, or to involve them unnecessarily in the temporary detention of patients who are already in hospital to enable a Mental Health Act assessment to take place. We also seek to remove clause 50 from the Bill; we look forward to discussing that at the appropriate time on a future day in Committee.

I will now move on to clause 5 in its entirety. The grounds for detention provide decision makers with criteria that must be applied when deciding whether it is appropriate to detain, or to continue to detain, a person under the relevant sections of part II of the Mental Health Act, covering civil patients. The clause will replace the existing criteria, which the independent review of the Mental Health Act found were too vague, and will take forward changes recommended by the review. It will strengthen and clarify the criteria to require a risk of “serious harm” to justify detention. Consideration must also be given to the nature, degree and likelihood of the harm. For a patient to be detained for treatment under section 3, there must be a “reasonable prospect” of therapeutic benefit.

The code of practice already directs clinicians to consider the “nature”, “likelihood” and “severity” of harm. We believe it is right to formalise those considerations by putting them in primary legislation. We have not defined serious harm in the Bill. We will work with stakeholders to provide guidance on that in the code of practice. We are not seeking to raise the bar on detention, which could put patients and the public at risk. However, we think that when the serious decision is taken to deprive someone of their liberty, and potentially to treat them against their wishes, there needs to be consistent consideration of the potential risk of harm to a person or to others to justify that.

The revised risk criteria will not apply to part 3 patients. There are already tailored risk criteria for patients in the criminal justice system. Those are considered by the court and the Secretary of State for Justice, and allow for all relevant factors, including public protection, to be considered on a case by case basis. For those reasons, I commend Government amendments 26 to 29 and clause 5 to the Committee.

It is a pleasure to be here on day two in Committee. I will first address clause 5 and then the Government amendments.

The clause marks significant reform to the legal foundations of mental health detention in this country. At its core, the clause seeks to update the grounds for detaining individuals under the Mental Health Act. It will amend several critical sections—sections 2, 3, 5, 20 and 145—to ensure that detention is used only when absolutely necessary and in line with the principle of least restriction, which was put forward in the Wessely review and is now in the Bill.

Let me outline what the changes will do in practical terms, as the Opposition see it. Under section 2 of the Mental Health Act, “Admission for assessment”, detention will now be justified only if “serious harm” may occur to the “health or safety” of patients or others. The decision must weigh the “nature, degree and likelihood” of that harm, a much more structured and risk based framework than previously existed. Under section 3, “Admission for treatment”, we will see a clearer threshold. Detention will be permitted only if “serious harm” may occur without treatment, if the treatment is necessary, if the treatment cannot be provided unless the individual is detained and, crucially, if appropriate treatment is available.

Section 5(4), on emergency hospital detention, will be updated to align with the same “serious harm” test, recognising that even urgent situations demand clear legal justification. Section 20, which governs the renewal of detention process, will be brought in line with the same standards, such that they apply not just once but every time detention is extended. That is an important safeguard. A statutory definition of “authorised person”, those empowered to detain, will be introduced in section 145, ensuring that such persons are appropriately trained and regulated.

Those changes respond to real and long standing concerns. The 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act warned that our current criteria are too broad and that they allow for detention that is often unnecessary, sometimes prolonged and, in too many cases, distressing for patients and families. Clause 5 seeks to change that by grounding detentions in a clear, evidence based assessment of risk and necessity.

The clause has significant advantages. It will introduce stronger safeguards against inappropriate detention and will shift the focus away from diagnosis alone and towards the actual risk of serious harm. It will offer greater clarity for professionals, giving them structured criteria for making decisions that are ethically and legally sound. It will enhance patients’ rights by aligning the law more closely with the principles of autonomy and proportionate care.

However, with every reform there are challenges, and we must not ignore them. The terms “serious harm” and “likelihood”, although essential, remain open to interpretation. We must ensure that the forthcoming code of practice offers clear, detailed guidance that minimises subjectivity and inconsistency in their application.

Furthermore, there is a question mark over public safety, which the Minister seemed to point to but which I want to explore a bit further. We have not tabled an amendment, but I am keen to understand how this works. Given that the definition is potentially ambiguous and in practice quite difficult to judge, has the Minister considered inserting the words “cumulative” or “escalating”? To be clear, this is a call not to water down those safeguards, but to shore them up with a safety net, so that this reform does not inadvertently trade off liberty against safety, especially in communities.

We need to ensure that we are not inadvertently introducing a real risk that someone, particularly someone on the margins of eligibility, may fall through the cracks. There are individuals whose behaviour is escalating and whose pattern of deterioration is known to services, but who do not yet meet the “serious harm” threshold at the time of assessment. I have seen this at first hand as a clinician—a picture that goes round and round. These are some of the most complex situations that one will ever have to deal with in one’s clinical career. The words “escalating” or “cumulative” may help to give further clarification to clinicians on the frontline.

For those on the margins, what consideration have the Government given to the notion of a duty for professionals to produce a risk management plan in any case in which detention is considered but not authorised, so that we do not simply assess and walk away, but assess and act in a community setting? That would not lower the threshold, but contextualise it. It would ensure that detention remains a measure of last resort, but not too late a resort.

My hon. Friend is making a powerful point about some of the challenges around the interpretation of the Bill. Does he agree that there needs to be a clear plan for the training of professionals so that there is consistency across the board?

My hon. Friend is spot on about training. It is one thing to enshrine these measures in primary legislation; it is another thing to have the training and interpretation that go with them. One of the reasons that we have not tabled an amendment on the matter, as yet, is that there could be some concerns about what “cumulative” or “escalating” behaviour looks like. Ask any clinician and they will say that they have seen patients who are on the borderline and are struggling. It can be unclear whether they are within or outside the definition; they could be wavering between the two, given the state of their mental health. That is a real concern, but the broader pattern of identifying the picture of what is happening could be helpful and important.

One way to address the issue would be to review the data and legislation. Would the Government consider carrying out a review two years after the implementation of the Bill, specifically to look at the working of the legislation through the lens of public safety? I hope that there will be no concerns, but that would provide a backstop and a legal safety net. We do not want to wait another 40 years if there are changes that need to be made.

I entirely agree with my hon. Friend’s request to the Government for a review two years after implementation. Does he agree that it needs to be cross governmental? The Home Office and other bodies such as the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and the NHS will need to be involved.

My hon. Friend makes an incredibly important point. We heard on day one how these services interact, and that is completely correct. We need to look through the lens of public safety, because while we are quite rightly enshrining the autonomous nature of the patient as an individual, there is also the question of what we look at as a society. It includes the likes of local councils, mental health care and NHS care. Schooling could also be involved, as well as the judiciary and the Home Office. I think it is reasonable to ask the Government to look at that, in the light of recent high profile cases, and say, “What are we doing? Does the legislation really do what we think it does?”

Clause 5 is a good step forward, but we must make sure that it is fit for purpose and that we have a review mechanism in place. I do not think that it necessarily needs to be in statute yet, but it will be interesting to hear the Minister’s response. Conducting a review on such a change, through the lens of patient safety, would be very useful.

There is also the matter of resources, which we keep coming back to. Change in detention criteria will rightly push us towards community based alternatives—that is the whole point of what we are doing—but unless those alternatives are properly resourced with staffing, crisis services, housing and follow up care, we will risk replacing one form of system failure with another. I appreciate that the Secretary of State is committed to reporting each year to the House, but will the Government publish a timetable and framework to support the implementation?

As we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley, training is also critical. Professionals need the tools and time to learn the framework. They need support, implemented in real time, often under pressure and in complex, high- stakes circumstances.

Clause 5 is a welcome and thoughtful step in modernising mental health law. It will strengthens patients’ rights, sharpen clinical practice and bring us closer to a system that balances safety, liberty and humanity. However, we must be mindful about the risk of delayed intervention. In borderline cases in which the threshold is not clearly met but concerns remain high, we must ensure that there is still a route to timely, compassionate support. Otherwise, we may swing the pendulum too far in the opposite direction, from the overuse of detention to the underuse of care.

On Second Reading, I said: “There is little greater moral burden than deciding for someone who cannot decide for themselves where care ends and control begins.”

Clause 5 typifies that burden: we are deciding who should be detained and why. I said: “Make no mistake, this is what this House is grappling with”, and indeed it is what our Committee is now looking at in detail. I also said: “Involuntary care should never be the first instinct or answer, but a resort to prevent harm to both the individual and those around them.”

I said that compassionate care demands precision not only in its delivery, but in its design. I concluded: “Without precision, we simply have sentiment.”

I promised then, as I promise now, that “we will endeavour to ensure that the Government’s sentiment becomes a commitment.”—[Official Report, 19 May 2025; Vol. 767, c. 850-851.] That neatly sets the scene for discussing Government amendments 26 to 29.

Before my hon. Friend moves on to the amendments, I want to press him on the point about training, which my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley brought up. I support the change to the thresholds for detention but, given that it is potentially quite a significant change, what level of training will be required? Does my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth have any suggestion about how long it will take to train the relevant professionals so that there is consistency when the Bill becomes law? Does he feel that there should be a period of cooling off or training time before this part of the Bill is implemented, so that the training can catch up?

My hon. Friend makes an important and poignant point. The Government have rightly stated that this change could take up to 10 years to implement, but we need to ensure that the most important safeguards are set out. Elsewhere, the Government have suggested that they will be in the code of practice. When we were discussing section 5 of the Mental Health Act and other issues, I said to the Minister that we need a constructive timetable, not only to know what the roll out will look like but so that we can consult with the professions and ensure that they are able to deal with it.

Later, we will again discuss the interface between the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the changes that bring in new tests. That will be really important. We will also discuss the change of statutory safeguards for electroconvulsive therapy and changes to the statutory safeguards around who the second clinician will be—there is quite a feast of movements through this legislation. Make no mistake: that is what the country wants, but the Government must clearly set out some rationale for the timetable.

Unfortunately, the Opposition’s proposal for a costed plan was defeated. We wanted to set out some kind of concrete timetable over 18 months to ensure that we do not slip back, and to give the Government the flexibility to make the necessary cultural and legal changes. I hope that that addresses some of my hon. Friend’s concerns, but he was right to put that point to the Minister.

I oppose Government amendments 26 to 29, which would remove the reference to detention “by a constable or other authorised person”, and to delete the proposed definition of “authorised person”. I support the argument advanced powerfully in the other place by Baroness May, whose experience as a former Home Secretary gives her deep insight into the interaction between policing and mental health. Of course, it was under her premiership that the entirety of this discussion was progressed. I thank her for everything she has done, although I am not quite so thankful for the workload that it has created for me in my evenings and weekends. Her central message was clear: we must stop treating mental health as a policing issue and start delivering the right care from the right person in the right place. I wholeheartedly agree, as I am sure the Committee does.

I understand what the Government are trying to achieve. On the face of it, the amendments are technical. They seek to ensure that detention under the Bill is solely based on necessity where there is a risk of serious harm or the need for urgent treatment, and that it is not tied to who is doing the detaining. On paper that sounds reasonable, but in practice those changes will remove vital clarity and will risk baking in a system that has already failed too many people in mental health crisis.

Let us look at the problem with removing “authorised person”. The Bill, as amended in the Lords, wisely recognises the need to broaden the group of people who can respond to mental health incidents so that they include not just police officers, but trained and equipped professionals, mental health nurses, paramedics and approved mental practitioners—people who are qualified to care, not just to detain. The definition of “authorised person” in clause 5(7) ensures that only those with training competence and safety considerations are empowered to act, so it provides a framework for accountability, not a free for all. By removing the framework, the Government amendment would create a legal vacuum: it tells us that someone must be detained, but not by whom. In doing so, it would leave NHS trusts, police forces and local authorities with a lack of legal guidance and with a risk averse default to the police.

I think we agree that the police should not be the first responders. As Baroness May has reminded us, and as many officers have told me, the police are routinely called out to mental health incidents, not because they are best placed to respond but because there is no one else available or authorised. That is neither fair to the police nor fair to the individuals in crisis. A police uniform can escalate distress. A custody cell is not a place of recovery. An officer guarding a patient in accident and emergency for 29 hours, as the Metropolitan police have reported, helps no one—not the patient, not the police and not the public. The 2019 College of Policing snapshot found that 95% of mental health related calls did not require a police response. That is staggering. It underlines why we must build up the capacity and legal authority of clinical professionals, not erase them from the statute.

I turn to the Government’s argument and why it falls short. The Government’s case is that removing the phrase “by a constable or other authorised person”

will de emphasise the police and make the law more flexible. Ironically, however, removing the clarity about who may act risks re entrenching police dominance in these scenarios, simply because no one else will feel legally empowered to intervene. The Government argue that the definition is unnecessary or potentially restrictive, but I say the opposite: a well drafted enabling definition gives confidence, clarity and a lawful mandate for healthcare led responses. This is not about excluding the police altogether. There will always be situations in which an immediate threat to life or serious violence requires a police presence, but that should be the exception, not the structure around which our mental health law is designed.

I think, from what my hon. Friend has said and what the Minister said at the outset, that Members on both sides of the Committee want the same thing, which as far as possible is to keep the police out of the making of these decisions, unless of course—I made this point on Second Reading and was intervened on by the hon. Member for Ashford—someone with a mental health issue has a firearm or something like that. The clear point of dispute is about whether the phrase that was placed in the Bill in the other place achieves that. Would my hon. Friend not agree that someone who has served as Home Secretary and Prime Minister and the noble Lords, who have vast experience in healthcare over many years, have probably got the definition right, which is why the Government should support the wording currently in clause 5?

My hon. Friend is right: we agree that this is not a place for the police unless there is an absolute sign of criminal intent. The problem is that what happens is a member of the public sees something, reports it to the police and, naturally, it is the police, the fire service or the paramedics who come forward. If a person is unsure about someone behaving in an irrational manner, which by definition someone with a mental health issue could well be doing, the likelihood is that they will call the police and the police will be the first responders. We know that they tend to be the fastest to respond.

Slightly widening and refining the definition of who can respond would allow us to build a framework and culture that might encourage a first responder—we often say that the AA is the fourth emergency service; it may well be that mental health services would be the fifth emergency service and could respond. That is what we need for service provision. The idea behind this is to try to crowbar the police out of that position, unless absolutely necessary, as my hon. Friend rightly says. Allowing a new framework would be good for safety and good for the police, because they would be freed up to do other stuff. More importantly, it would get the care as quickly as possible to the people who need it the most.

I think there is some agreement between us, in the sense that obviously a police officer is not necessarily best placed to deal with those who are in mental distress. Having spoken to my local police team, I know that they would much rather there were frontline mental health professionals with the capability to take a person to a place of safety that is not a police station. We will come on to that in relation to later clauses, but does the hon. Gentleman agree that we already have some highly skilled professionals who are closely involved in these decisions in the form of approved mental health professionals? The vast majority of them—95%—are social workers. They play a very strong and excellent role, particularly to counterbalance the narrower clinical health perspective that there may sometimes be. Does he agree that, in a way, we already have in place some highly skilled individuals who are closely involved in making sure that these decisions are made in the best interests of the patient and the public, but also with clinical input?

The hon. Lady makes an incredibly important point about the range of people who can and do respond in such cases. The Opposition are not saying that is a problem; we want to support them by giving them the legal backing and framework to step up to be the first port of call. Unfortunately, by default it is always the police, because they are the only ones whose ability to deal with such situations is covered. The amendment aims to create a culture so that the people she mentions have the confidence to deal with them, and the accountability so that we can say, “The police should not be there first; it should be the first responders that we have.” We are starting to see cross fertilisation; we are simply providing a legal framework that says that this should be the way forward by default and design, not an exception where people are working around the system.

I think we are on the same page here. It is about the nuances of how we do this, and whether it requires primary legislation. The House of Lords voted that it requires primary legislation, and the Opposition share that belief. That is why I am asking Government Members to reconsider when the amendment comes to a vote whether the balance is right because we would give people the security, legal certainty and ability to do exactly what they want to do, which is to care for patients, not worry about whether there will be some criminal side to the situation, and what the police interaction could be.

Obviously, the Lords amendment puts the role of the police into law. I think we agree that we do not want to have the police’s role enshrined in legislation. Over the implementation period for this important Bill, the idea is that community health services will be in place, including urgent response for those who find themselves in crisis. We need to remove this provision to make sure that the default position remains for community support.

The hon. Lady points to the fact that the police are named, as they should be. Imagine if we took out the police completely—whowould then have the power to restrain, restrict and detain people under the Mental Health Act? That is the whole point of having the provision. What we are trying to do is refine and constrict the definition to make it clear for everyone in this country exactly who is entitled to do what. Emergency incidents could happen outside this House—would the police and mental health responder be there? That will come down to the clinical judgment of the 999 responder, the call handler and the clinician there, so I do not want to make it too restrictive. At the same time, we have to consider the evidence that is right under our nose, which is that 95% of the time the police are being called out inappropriately for mental health conditions. I guess that is the rub of what we are trying to sort out.

Our responsibility in this House is not only to write good law, but to enable better systems of care. That means ensuring that the law empowers the right professionals to act at the right time, and centring the needs of the individuals in crisis, not just managing risk from the top down. I therefore ask the Minister to reconsider the amendments. Instead of deleting the definition of “authorised person”, let us work to try to strengthen and clarify it to support a wider, safer and compassionate response to mental health crises. Let us seize this opportunity to reset the balance between policing and care, which the police themselves are asking for and our continents desperately need.

Much was made of the amendment in the other place, and I am grateful to the Lords Minister, Baroness Merron, for writing to Baroness May with an explanation of her concerns about the changes. The letter is dated 3 June and a copy was kindly laid before this House and the Committee. It is worth working our way through some of the issues raised. I fully recognise the Government’s concerns within it, and I agree with the need for extreme care when legislating on the deprivation of liberty, but I express reservations about the Government’s decision to overturn the amendment.

According to the letter, the Government’s central concern seems to be the unintended extension of police powers. The Government argue in the letter: “Your amendments to clause 5 would give the police additional powers under the Mental Health Act. We do not support extending police powers in this way, and we understand that the police do not support this extension either.”

That is also what the Minister has said in Committee. Respectfully, that is a mischaracterisation of the amendments. The original Lords amendments do not extend the powers of the police; they reflect current practice where the police are often involved in detaining individuals in mental health crises.

Does the hon. Member agree that, since detentions under sections 2, 3 and 5(4) of the Act often happen in clinical settings, are completed by consultants, psychiatrists and social workers, and do not involve police, we do not actually need police presence on these occasions?

I bow to the hon. Member’s expertise on this; the problem is that all the evidence shows that the police are the first there. I would like to see much more of him and his colleagues being able to respond and carry this out. We are giving them the legal certainty to do so. That is the argument for making sure that we have codified safeguards around who is and is not able to make such decisions. At the moment, it is purely the police who are called out to these situations, but this gives us another legal weapon with which we could fight this inappropriate use.

The aim is to codify the safeguards around who can exercise detention, ensure accountability and, importantly, enable health led alternatives to police detention. Are the Government confident that the decision does not leave a legal grey area around which profession or agency has the statutory power to detain, especially during urgent community or hospital based crises?

On the authorised person category in the section 135 and 136 powers, the Government say in their letter: “Extending these powers to ‘authorised persons’…could potentially lead to staff, patient and public safety issues.

That is precisely why the Lords amendment included a tightly defined category of authorised person, subject to the Secretary of State’s regulation, mandatory training and safety provision. The intent is to ensure that when a professional, such as a trained mental health nurse, is better placed to respond than the police, they can do so lawfully and appropriately.

The Government say: “Section 135 and 136 powers have been designed for police officers who have specific training, equipment and access to rapid support”.

Many frontline NHS and social care professionals, including AMHPs, crisis team members and community psychiatric nurses, already respond to acutely distressed patients in highly volatile environments. They lack the police powers, but not the clinical expertise. The amendments would bring clarity and lawful backing to the situations they already manage. Take, for example, a mental health nurse in a community who arrives at a person’s home to conduct an urgent assessment. The individual is clearly experiencing psychosis, and is at immediate risk of self harm. Under the current law, the nurse must call the police, delaying the care and potentially escalating the situation. Under the amendment, they could lawfully detain, provided they are authorised and trained.

There are also confusions over the emergency response roles. The Government letter states: “There is a very real risk of confusion over who should respond in an emergency if multiple agencies have the same powers, which could lead to delays.”

That concern is valid, but confusion is far more likely under the current law, where roles are unclear and NHS professionals must sometimes act unlawfully or wait for overstretched police. A regulated and accountable authorised person category, established in law and detailed in the code of practice, would clarify responsibilities, not blur them. Have the Government done any modelling of the delays and safety risk caused by not empowering suitably trained healthcare professionals to act in urgent situations?

The letter also highlights concerns from stakeholders that this is “a radical proposal with a number of serious and potentially dangerous consequences and should not be pushed through without proper consideration”.

These proposals were not developed in isolation; they were advanced in the House of Lords, where the former Mental Health Act reviewers, legal experts and mental health professionals carefully considered their scope. They are also consistent with the direction of the 2018 independent review, which emphasised reducing coercion, racial disparity and the overuse of police powers.

The “right care, right person” initiative already expects health professionals to step in, but—unless I stand corrected—the initiative is not underpinned by any legal reform. Without amending the Act, health staff are still expected to take on crisis care without the powers of protection that they need to safely or lawfully do so. How can we expect health led responses to mental health crises without giving health professionals the power in law to act?

Turning to guidance and the code of practice, the Government say that they will issue further guidance on police handover protocols and the legal frameworks. While guidance is welcome, it is not a substitute for statutory reform. Guidance cannot grant powers to detain or protect professionals from liability. We can have legal clarity with this framework.

If the Government want to push ahead with removing the amendments, will the Minister consider committing to a formal consultation with NHS England, the AMHP leads, frontline staff and patients on creating a legally robust authorised persons role? Would he consider piloting models of community based urgent response teams that include AMHPs and trained nurses with delegated powers? Would he legislate for police exit strategies in A&E and community crisis responses that are enforceable, not just guidance based? Given our discussion about new clause 24, there is clearly scope for a sensible piece of work in the grey area to improve the interface for patients, clinicians and police. I think that is one we can all agree on.

I agree with my hon. Friend. I think we agree on both sides of the Committee that, where appropriate, police should not be the first responders to this issue, although, obviously, there will be situations where they should be. If the Government push ahead with removing the amendments, is there any indication in the Bill, or indeed elsewhere from the Government, of what they will do to achieve what Members on both sides of the Committee seem to want, which is to avoid, as far as possible, having the police as the detainers and responders? If there is nothing else, I cannot see why the Government would want to remove the amendments made by the noble Lords in the other place.

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Under the last Government, the “right care, right person” initiative was launched with the Humberside police force to try to ensure appropriate care, but that is an example in isolation.

One solution would be to include guidance in the codes of practice, but it would not have the statutory footing to allow that legal certainty, which is the concern. Another would be to include something in the annual statement that we will receive from the Government. We should work collaboratively to try to find a decent piece of work to look for the evidence base and build a delivery plan to help the police extract themselves from situations, when appropriate, and care givers to insert themselves. It is admirable to share a problem that is difficult not just in England but in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

I agree that the Government are right to proceed with caution, but caution is not the same as inaction, especially when lives are at stake and the law no longer reflects the reality of mental health care. The amendments are not about expanding police powers; they are about reducing the need for police involvement by giving others the lawful authority to act. Although maths may not be my strong point, I am not blind to the make up of this Committee; I realise that the change will inevitably happen. I want to press the Minister on how he proposes to reduce the burden on the police to safeguard them from thousands of hours spent dealing with mental health crisis issues. In extreme cases, they are not appropriate responders.

This is the key issue to improve so many aspects of our society. We could improve the working life of the police, allowing them to do what they are paid to do, trained to do and passionate about: policing and protecting their communities. We could improve life for the public, because it would free up the police to tackle crime and keep them safe. Most importantly, we could provide the correct care to those patients at their biggest time of need. I hope the Minister will set out how the Government plan to achieve that.

I rise to support the Government amendments, which will simply remove the words “by a constable or other organised person”.

On Second Reading, I highlighted my concern about the amendments made to the Bill in the other place that sought to extend police powers of detention under sections 135 and 136 of the Mental Health Act to other organised persons, including medical practitioners, approved mental health professionals, mental health nurses or doctors and further healthcare and social care professionals.

I know that the noble Lords who introduced the amendments intended to remove the need for the police to be present at mental health incidents in the absence of any risk. However, they would grant the police greater powers; as an unintended consequence, they would also apply to detentions under sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Mental Health Act, where the police currently do not have power to intervene.

A section 2 application is completed by two doctors and a social worker, and the patient may already be in a clinical setting. Section 3 relates to somebody who is already receiving treatment or already has a known diagnosis in a clinical setting. Doctors’ powers extend to that section; the police currently do not have any role in completing a section 3 application. Section 5(4) provides nurses with a holding power for a patient who is already in the clinical setting, where the nurse believes that the patient is at immediate risk; again, the police have no role.

If we did not make the Government amendments, we would give more power to the police to get involved under those sections of the Mental Health Act and put more pressure on police services.

I am interested in the hon. Member’s argument, but it seems to be entirely the opposite of the one he made when he intervened on me on Second Reading. He said then: “Sections 135 and 136 of the current Mental Health Act give the police the power to break into someone’s property or detain somebody in a public place where there is the possibility of the involvement of weapons. Does the hon. Member think that health professionals would be able to manage those kinds of situations? Would the police not be the best people to deal with those situations?”—[Official Report, 19 May 2025; Vol. 767, c. 815.] In that intervention, the hon. Member was pressing for police involvement; now, he seems to be arguing that he wants to take the police out of these settings. I am a little confused by his stance.

What the hon. Member read is absolutely right. I was talking about sections 135 and 136. I am talking here about sections 2, 3 and 5. I absolutely stand by what I said about sections 135 and 136, and I am happy to come to that. As a former mental health nurse, I certainly would not support giving the police greater powers under sections 2, 3 and 5 of the Mental Health Act.

I am also opposed to the amendments passed in the other place because I believe that the extension of legal powers held by the police to other healthcare professionals would represent a major shift in the roles and responsibilities of healthcare and care professionals, placing significant additional pressure on the NHS and social care providers.

The Royal College of Psychiatrists, the Royal College of Nursing and the British Medical Association are among the health and social care organisations that have warned against such an extension, saying that it is “a radical proposal with a number of serious and potentially dangerous consequences”.

Those organisations also point out that the proposed extension has not been properly tested with relevant health and social care professionals and has been given minimal serious consideration during the eight years in which reform of the Mental Health Act has been under discussion.

The majority of assessment under the Mental Health Act already happens without police involvement. However, where the police may be required to make a detention, I know from my experience working in mental health that the presence of officers can often ensure that an otherwise risky situation remains contained and everyone remains safe.

Entering someone’s home without permission is fraught with huge risk and currently is done only with the assistance of police intelligence. Under section 135, health professionals ask the court for an order to remove somebody forcefully from their residence and the police use that order to do so; sometimes, they have to break in. That is the power that the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth spoke to earlier. Without it, health and social care professionals would be expected to enter homes without police help, and without crucial intelligence that could ensure their safety. As Dr Lade Smith, the president of the Royal College of Psychiatrists, said: “It is well known that at times, people experiencing a mental health crisis cannot be safely reached and cared for without the assistance of the police. Delegating police powers without proper consultation or planning is likely to disproportionately affect those from minoritised backgrounds and would increase risk to patients and compromise the safety of others. It sets a dangerous precedent.”

I am also concerned that the amendments passed in the other place granting police powers to authorised persons risk damaging their therapeutic relationships with patients. They would have the effect of lessening clinicians’ ability to treat patients, and I fear that patients would be less likely to attend an appointment if they thought they might be forcibly detained by the clinician.

If the police are called to a public place where a disturbance is taking place and they think that the disturbance has been caused because of a person’s mental health, they have the power to use section 136. It is not health professionals’ role to attend a disturbance in a public place. That is why the extension of powers is a huge concern for mental health professionals. It is the police’s role to attend a disturbance in a public place, and they can use the section 136 power to detain someone if they think they are suffering from a mental illness.

Although I acknowledge that police forces have faced an increase in workload pressures in recent years, I do not accept that the amendments passed in the other place are the correct way to address that. Indeed, I believe that keeping them in the Bill risks being counterproductive. The expertise, skills and equipment of the police remain essential for safely reaching individuals in crisis, especially where they might be an immediate danger to themselves, pose a risk to others, or face a threat from others. I therefore welcome the Government amendments and urge Members to support them.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Furniss.

Government amendments 26 to 29 risk undoing some of the good work done in the other place, where careful improvements were made to strengthen the Bill and ensure a more compassionate and effective response to mental health crises. I am concerned that by removing the words “by a constable or other authorised person”

and deleting clause 5(7), which provides a clear definition of who the authorised persons are, we will open up ambiguity about who is permitted to detain someone under the Mental Health Act. This is not just a technical or drafting issue; it has very real consequences for the people involved.

I understand and support the principle of enabling more flexible and clinically led responses to mental health incidents. We all recognise that the police should not be the default option in every case. The amendments made in the Lords acknowledged that and broadened the group of people who could respond to mental health crises beyond police officers to trained and equipped professionals: mental health nurses, approved mental health professionals, paramedics and, crucially, someone trained and equipped to carry out detentions under the Act and who would not be put at unnecessary risk by doing so. “Trained and equipped”—that is the key point.

The definition of “authorised person” in the Bill as it stands makes it clear that those given such a serious responsibility must have the appropriate training and experience and must not be “put at unnecessary risk” when carrying out that role. That wording is important. As the shadow Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, said, it provides a framework of accountability, not a free for all. By removing that structure, the Government’s amendments will leave a legal vacuum. The law will say that someone must be detained, but not by whom. That uncertainty will create a risk that services will simply revert to defaulting to the police.

I stress again that that is not fair on the police, who are already under immense pressure. Yes, they are used to seeing people at their most vulnerable, but dealing with someone in a mental health crisis is a very particular challenge, and one that they might not be fully trained to manage. The College of Policing’s 2019 mental health snapshot found that almost 95% of police call outs flagged as involving mental health did not actually require a police response, yet police officers continue to be sent out because the system lacks clarity and capacity elsewhere.

Baroness May, speaking from real experience as a former Home Secretary, made that very point in the other place. She said that police officers were being sent to mental health incidents for which they had no training or clinical expertise, and were being asked to make judgments that they simply were not equipped to make. She went on to say that “the very essence of a police presence—somebody in the uniform coming to deal with them—could actually exacerbate their mental health situation”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 20 January 2025; Vol. 842, c. 1525.] I would add that, for the individual experiencing a mental health crisis, being approached by the police may feel criminalising rather than supportive. It reinforces a justice led response rather than a health led one. That is not the direction in which we should be going.

Although I welcome the Government’s intention to offer more flexibility in emergency and clinical settings, we have to be careful about how we achieve that. Removing the wording inserted into the Bill will not create clarity; it will create confusion. In a system already under pressure, confusion tends to mean delay, risk aversion and inappropriate responses. Removing the specification will not free professionals; it will expose them, and it will expose patients to the possibility of being handled by someone without the right qualifications, which may worsen their condition or create a longer term distrust of mental health services.

I hope that the Minister can offer some reassurances, both about who will be expected to carry out these detentions and about how we can ensure that they have the proper training, resourcing and protection. Without a clear definition of “authorised person”, we cannot be confident that those involved will have the right expertise to support extremely vulnerable individuals at times of acute need.

I want to touch briefly on the importance of early intervention and de escalation. Situations involving mental health crises can often be tense, and support in the early moments can be critical. De escalation is a vital skill; the presence of a calm, trained mental health nurse, for example, in those early moments can change the outcome of a person’s crisis. Having the right professional present—someone who can act without waiting for the police to attend—can be the difference between escalation and calm. The identity of the responder matters.

This is not just about outcomes, but about the experience of the individual. Removing the criminal justice framing from the outset is essential to delivering dignity and the right kind of care.

There seems to be some circular talk about the level of risk that clinicians and medical professionals can be expected to shoulder. I notice that clause 5(7), inserted in the other place, specifies that they would “not be put at unnecessary risk”.

Is there not an inherent risk involved in detaining people who need to be detained under the Mental Health Act? Those people are not in a position to give consent and quite often do not wish to be detained. By stipulating that the police will not be involved in situations or by making medical professionals the first responders, is there not a risk of putting them in harm’s way?

It is extremely important that people are not put at risk, and that is exactly the point I have been making. People need to be properly trained, and we need to set out who those individuals can be, rather than leaving ambiguity in the wording. The Government amendment will undo exactly the protection that the hon. Lady rightly points out.

My hon. Friend is making a clear point, but I want to add that there are clearly places and situations in which non police professionals, such as mental health professionals, deal with extremely dangerous and violent patients. They are appropriately trained to do so. It is not in isolation that non police public professionals are dealing with dangerous people. It is about the right situation, the right place and the right training.

My hon. Friend helpfully expands on the points that I and other Opposition Members have been making. If we are not careful, the Government amendments will move us further away from the aim of a person centred approach.

I urge the Minister to reconsider the amendments. The wording inserted in the other place struck a thoughtful balance. The wording inserted in the other place struck a thoughtful balance. It allowed flexibility, but grounded it in clear criteria of training, safety and competence. Removing that definition will weaken the Bill. It will make it harder, not easier, to ensure that the right person is supporting someone at their moment of greatest need. We owe it to patients, professionals and the police themselves to get this right.

The clause is a necessary reset—[Interruption.] Goodness, what a background noise! If only I had such a response to everything I said.

The clause is rooted in the central recommendation of the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act, that the criteria for detention are too broad and being applied too inconsistently. Too often we hear stories of people being detained not because they pose a real and present danger, but because services are stretched, community alternatives are not available, or there is simply a lack of clarity on when detention is justified.

This clause is necessarily corrective. It raises the bar by introducing a clear and structured risk threshold that requires the possibility of serious harm to health or safety, rather than vague concerns or subjective impressions. The inclusion of terms such as “likelihood” and the focus on actual risk mark a clear move towards the evidence based practice that we want to see and away from overreach.

For me, the key strengths of the clause include, first, a higher threshold for detention. Under section 2 of the Mental Health Act, detention for assessment is permitted only if serious harm may occur. That means that professionals must assess the nature and the degree of harm, as well as the likelihood, injecting rigour and proportionality into decision making.

The clause also clarifies the treatment criteria. Under section 3 of the Act, detention for treatment is allowed only if serious harm may occur without it and if treatment is necessary, and, crucially, it must be available. That prevents people from being detained without any therapeutic benefit, a concern that has long plagued the system. The clause also aligns measures across the Mental Health Act: the new threshold applies not only to the initial decision to detain, but to emergency detentions and renewals. That brings consistency and coherence across the different parts of the legislation.

The final key point among the strengths of the clause is the definition of the authorised person, which is vital. It ensures that those tasked with detention powers are properly trained and equipped to deal with the complex and often volatile realities of mental health crises. Whether a doctor, an approved mental health professional or a specially trained nurse, the provision ensures that detention is exercised by someone with relevant expertise, not by default by the police. Taken together, the changes significantly strengthen the legal framework around detention, reduce the risk of misuse and reaffirm the principle of least restriction, the idea that coercive care should be used only when no other alternative exists.

The problems I have with Government amendments 26 to 29 are as follows. The Minister proposes to delete references to “a constable or other authorised person”

from the clause. On the surface, that may appear to be technical, but in fact I think it is a profound and problematic shift. The amendments would weaken the very safeguards that the clause is trying to strengthen. We must be careful about how we frame this.

The amendments risk undoing the clarity and purpose of the clause by making it ambiguous who can lawfully detain someone under the Mental Health Act. Instead of defining the responsibility clearly and ensuring that it is held by trained professionals, the amendments will strip the clause back to vague flexibility, with no guarantee that the right expertise is present in real time decisions.

The power to detain and to move individuals to a place of safety, in particular under sections 135 and 136 of the Act, is largely restricted and falls under the responsibility of police officers. These provisions, while designed to protect the public, can often result in the criminalisation of people in acute mental health crises, even when there is no threat of violence or risk to others.

Furthermore, the clause as passed by the House of Lords would relieve police officers of responsibilities that fall outside their core expertise, while also reducing the stigma and trauma associated with police led interventions. It would streamline the process, ensure that individuals are supported by professionals trained specifically in mental health care, and maintain police involvement only where there is a clear and present risk to safety. In doing so, it would significantly strengthen the system and place mental health crises more firmly within the domain of health rather than law enforcement.

Let me set out the key problems with Government amendments 26 to 29. First, I think that they will blur the lines of responsibility. The clause rightly states that detention must be carried out by a constable or other authorised person, namely someone who has been designated and trained to carry out this high stakes task. The Government amendments will remove that requirement. In doing so, they risk creating confusion on the ground about who is permitted to act. In a moment of crisis, ambiguity costs time, and time costs lives.

On clause 5(4), the amendment in the other place inserted the phrase “by a constable or other authorised person”

which relates specifically to the phrase “unless the patient is immediately restrained from leaving the hospital”.

What the hon. Gentleman describes as a level of ambiguity in the subsection allows that to be done by people who are not necessarily listed as an authorised person, such as a medical practitioner. I think we would all agree that we would not expect to see a nurse, doctor or other clinician immediately and physically restraining a patient, and that when a police constable is not available, other people, such as hospital security staff, can carry out the task. The clause says, “immediately restrained”. The specification in the list of words proposed in the other place can leave people at risk of harm, particularly clinicians.

I confess that I do not entirely follow the hon. Lady’s argument. My understanding is that the people she has listed—for example, hospital security staff—are not covered at the moment, so I do not think that that is the case. As I said in response to my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth, there are situations, in a number of settings, in which mental health professionals act in the capacity of restraining. With the correct and appropriate training, which is what I think all Opposition Members want, I do not think that the issue that the hon. Member for Thurrock is raising would necessarily arise. Having said that, if she really feels that the wording needs to be tweaked, I look forward to seeing and potentially supporting her amendment to the subsection, and I hope she tables it.

The second key problem is the risk of returning the burden to police officers. We have heard from Members on both sides of the House in the debate, and from police forces up and down the country for years, that the police do not have the expertise, training or capacity to be the first responders to mental health emergencies. Clause 5 finally reflects that reality, helping to move the response from law enforcement to healthcare. The Government amendments would muddy that distinction. They would result in the police once again becoming the default responders—not because it is right but because it is unclear who else is meant to act.

Thirdly, the amendments introduce legal and safe guarding risks. Without a clear definition of who can detain, one risks inconsistency, poor practice and potentially unlawful deprivation of liberty. The amendments offer no alternative safeguards—just the deletion of the existing ones. That is not reform; it is abdication of responsibility. Finally, they undermine the spirit of the Bill. The Bill aims to modernise mental health legislation by making it more humane and effective, and more rooted in health than enforcement. The amendments point in the opposite direction. They strip away clarity, increase reliance on the police and risk compounding trauma for those already in crisis.

It is not just about legislative precision; it is about protecting people. When someone is in acute mental health crisis, they are at their most vulnerable. Turning up with police officers, sirens and handcuffs does not calm the situation; it escalates it. It creates trauma, damages trust and can lead to long term disengagement from mental health services. Clause 5 offers us a path out of that pattern. It allows approved professionals—such as paramedics, mental health nurses and crisis practitioners —to intervene early, with care and dignity. It does not exclude the police, where there is a genuine risk to safety, but it rightly repositions them as the last resort, not the first response. The Government amendments may be well intentioned, but they threaten to unravel that balance. We cannot allow vague flexibility to become a smokescreen for inadequate planning or under resourced services.

If the Minister pushes his amendments to a vote, and, as the parliamentary maths suggests they will, those amendments pass, what will he do to sort out the problem that we, on both sides of the House, have talked about today? He is currently planning to keep the status quo, which we all seem to agree is not appropriate. At least we and our noble Friends in the other place have attempted to improve the situation. What will he and his Department do?

The clause is part of a broader rethinking of how we response to mental health need. It supports community based care. It pushes for better training. It honours patient autonomy and it places the right people—clinicians, not constables—at the centre of care delivery. We all want a system where people in distress are met with compassion, not criminalisation. Clause 5 helps us to get there. The Government’s amendments drag us backwards. Clause 5 is one of the most thoughtful and necessary parts of the Bill. It raises standards, reduces harm and finally begins to close the gap between what the Mental Health Act allows and what good mental health care demands.

I will touch on the questions that have been asked on cumulative and escalating behaviour, on having a review of public safety and on the training plan. The details will be provided for in a mixture of the code of practice and the annual written ministerial statement.

The code of practice will be based on consulting both those who use the new criteria, such as clinicians, approved mental health professionals and members of the tribunal and, then, of course, on the other side, those with lived experience, service users, families and carers. It will be shaped and drafted on that basis. It will then go out to public consultation and will be laid before Parliament so that Parliament will have an opportunity to debate it. It will be a comprehensive and detailed development of the code of practice, and will address the issues around cumulative and escalating behaviour, the public safety issues and training.

On cumulative and escalating, it is worth noting that under the reforms in both the Bill and the current Act, clinicians have the power to detain on the basis of a risk of harm that may occur, not that already has or is happening at the time. That power already exists.

Maybe it is my clunky naivety as someone stepping into the legal statutory framework, but I was hoping the Minister would guarantee he could take that away to look at with the team. I know from my clinical experience and from speaking to colleagues that it is one of the hardest things to measure and look for. Later, we will discuss areas where there are good case examples of people who have shown the problem of escalating behaviour that is missed by the authorities. This might be a clumsy and clunky way of trying to highlight that point, which is why we have not yet come up with amendments, but I would appreciate the commitment to look further at that when the Government takes the point away. It is really important to make sure we can give clinicians more certainty around what this looks like.

I thank the hon. Member for the intervention, but I simply repeat that under both the Act and this Bill, which will reform that Act, clinicians have the power to detain on the basis of a risk of harm that may occur, not one that has already or is happening at the same time, so, in my opinion, this power already exists. What is the point of over embroidering and adding more questions and considerations when those questions and considerations are already answered? Let us just try and streamline things, please, and make things simple rather than complicated.

We had a lengthy debate on the amendment. Let us just boil this point down to its essence: the majority of mental health incidents are managed without police involvement. Approved mental health professionals have powers under section 115, section 6 and section 137 to enter a person’s home and to assess and convey said person to a hospital. That is the first point: all the concerns that have been raised by the Opposition are very clearly addressed by the powers that already exist for AMHPs.

We support “right care, right person”. Policing is of course operationally independent, and those “right care, right person” arrangements are planned and developed through detailed multi agency partnerships on the ground. We need to be pragmatic and recognise that “right care, right person” is the right way forward. The Government are committed to it, so let us let the practitioners, the experts and the police on the ground work in a practical and pragmatic way to address these incidents as they occur. In many cases, it is simply impossible to legislate for these incidents. By definition, every person experiencing trauma experiences it for different reasons, and it manifests itself in different ways, so top down micromanagement of that would be deeply counterproductive and unhelpful.

Officials in the Department of Health and Social Care and in the Home Office have engaged with senior representatives of the police on these amendments in great detail. I can give the Committee an 100% assurance that the police do not support an extension of their powers to sections 2, 3 and 5. I am therefore baffled by the fact that Opposition Members appear to be claiming that they know better than the police whether their powers should be extended.

Let us stop trying to pretend that we have the police’s expertise. Let us please take a pragmatic approach to this. The police do not want an extension of these powers, and the Home Office is clear that that is the case. There seems to be a fundamental misunderstanding at the heart of the lengthy debate that we have just had. On that basis, I thank hon. Members for their interventions and I commend the amendments to the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

4|0|11|4|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly agreed to.||0|0

Amendment 26 agreed to.

Amendment proposed: 27, in clause 5, page 11, line 33, leave out

“by a constable or other authorised person”.—(Stephen Kinnock.)

See explanatory statement for amendment 26.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

5|0|11|4|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly agreed to.||0|0

Amendment 27 agreed to.

Amendment proposed: 28, in clause 5, page 12, line 6, leave out

“by a constable or other authorised person”.—(Stephen Kinnock.)

See explanatory statement for amendment 26.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

6|0|11|4|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly agreed to.||0|0

Amendment 28 agreed to.

Amendment proposed: 29, in clause 5, page 12, line 23, leave out subsection (7).—(Stephen Kinnock.)

See explanatory statement for amendment 26.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

7|0|11|4|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly agreed to.||0|0

Amendment 29 agreed to.

Clause 5, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Grounds for community treatment orders

I beg to move amendment 11, in clause 6, page 13, line 6, at end insert— “(c) after subsection (6) insert— ‘(6A) Any person subject to a community treatment order must be informed orally and in writing at the time of the making of the order of their right to an independent mental health advocate under section 130A of this Act.’”

The amendment would ensure that people who are to be subject to a community treatment order would receive information about their right to advocacy.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Government amendment 30.

Clause stand part.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Furniss. Our amendment would ensure that people who are subject to community treatment orders receive information about their right to advocacy. People under CTOs should not miss out on advocacy because they were not aware. CTOs can have a significant impact on how people are able to live their lives, and ensuring that those who are subject to them are effectively represented is crucial. I am delighted that advocacy is a crucial part of the Bill, but this seems something of an oversight.

Not being aware of mental health advocacy could lead to a damaging lack of autonomy and voice for an individual. This simple change would ensure that people receive the support to which they are entitled. People in this situation are in acute mental distress, so the idea that they must actively seek out information on advocacy seems an unfair burden that will make the welcome provisions around mental health advocates far less effective.

We also need to be aware that CTOs have consistently been shown to be a point of disparity in care for black and minority ethnic groups. Clearly pointing towards an advocate may help to alleviate that and ensure that the patient is adequately supported on leaving the hospital.

Is the Minister satisfied that people subject to CTOs will have adequate access to advocacy under the Bill? Is he satisfied that information on rights to mental health advocates will be clear enough? My Liberal Democrat colleagues and I are concerned that the answer to those questions is no, which is why we tabled the amendment.

I rise to speak to clause 6 and Government amendment 30. Clause 6 will make important amendments to conditions for community treatment orders under the Mental Health Act. CTOs are a tool that allows certain detained patients to receive ongoing treatment in the community rather than in hospital, providing continuity of care and supporting recovery outside institutional settings. Since their introduction in 2007, they have offered a mechanism to maintain contact with mental health services and prevent relapse while balancing the patient’s right to live more freely.

However, CTOs have not been without controversy. There is concern about their overuse and their disproportionate effect on black and ethnic minority patients. There are also a number of questions about the evidence for their effectiveness in reducing relapse or readmission. Moreover, concerns about coercion and the infringement of patient autonomy have been raised repeatedly. The 2018 independent review recommended tightening their use. Some also argue for going further by abolishing them completely.

Clause 6 seeks to address many of those concerns. It will introduce stronger safeguards, clear risk based criteria and a maximum 12-month duration to prevent indefinite or inappropriate use. It will mandate patient involvement through consultation and regular review, promoting shared decision making. Accountability is enhanced by aligning CTOs with a code of practice and introducing external oversight. Crucially, CTOs will now be used only when there is a clear and necessary risk, focusing on clinical need and safety.

Challenges remain. The new requirements bring complex administration and an increasing workload for clinicians. Despite reforms, CTOs remain a form of compulsory treatment, raising concerns about ongoing coercion. Their success depends heavily on the availability of community services, which are not always adequately resourced. Finally, terms such as “serious harm” may be open to interpretation, risking inconsistency. To unpack all that, we must take a closer look.

Clause 6 rightly seeks to update and clarify the legal framework governing CTOs to ensure that their use is proportionate, justified and consistent with evolving standards of care and risk management. It does so primarily by aligning the grounds for making and renewing a CTO with the new, more precise risk criteria for detention. It specifies that a CTO should be made only if there is real risk that “serious harm may be caused to the health or safety”

of a patient or others without treatment, and if that treatment is necessary given “the nature, degree and likelihood of the harm”.

Again, there is an argument about the definition of “serious harm”, and the same discussion as the one we had under clause 5 about escalation of behaviour or cumulative concerns applies here.

In the light of that discussion, it might be helpful if the Minister clarified the interface between CTOs and grounds for detention. Is there scope for the code of conduct to cover the management of risk, both to the public and to patients themselves, across both? Given the emphasis placed on real risk of serious harm, clause 6 aligns CTOs more clearly with the threshold for detention, with the aim of reducing the inappropriate use or overuse of CTOs, which is much more welcome. It will help to safeguard and protect patients from unnecessary restrictions on their liberty, while maintaining the ability of a responsible clinician to act decisively when there is genuine risk.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that CTOs help to keep people out of hospital so that rather than having long term admissions, they can live in the community and in their own house, and that clinicians can recall patients to hospital if they are not complying with the agreed treatment?

Spot on. The hon. Gentleman will have used them far more than I ever have, and that was exactly the point of them when they were brought in in 2008. The reason they have been so contentious is their misuse, misapplication and ongoing use. That is what we are trying to highlight. With clause 6 the Government are trying to streamline their use.

That leads me neatly on to why the Lords introduced clause 6(3), which Government amendment 30 would remove. It is about how to ensure that there is adequate oversight so that people do not remain on CTOs in perpetuity or, more likely, have them applied inappropriately. Concerns have been raised about racial disparities in the use of CTOs—particularly for black men, but there is also work to be done on those from other communities who find themselves on CTOs. The hon. Gentleman is right: that is the ethos behind ensuring that we push people to community care. The problem is how to set that against the legislation on CTOs and how to provide the resources to enable an appropriate setting for that care.

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that this is more an issue of practice than of the law itself?

Yes. As the Minister pointed out on the Committee’s first day, legislation sets the culture. One the main reasons for the Wessely report was the racial disparities that had been found. We still have to look into the cause and effect of that, but one of the big markers was that CTOs were increasing indefinitely and seemed to hit certain communities disproportionately, without there being a full understanding of why. That was why in the House of Lords some argued that we should get rid of CTOs completely. The Opposition do not agree with that; we agree that clause 6 is important and that CTOs serve a purpose, for the reason that the hon. Gentleman explains so eloquently. The emphasis is on getting people into community treatment where we think it will be better for them, but ensuring that CTOs are not an undue burden on clinicians or patients and are not used inappropriately.

Clause 6(3), introduced in the Lords, sets out a maximum duration of 12 months for CTOs, after which an extension would require thorough review. That process would demand consultation with the patient, their nominated persons and relevant mental health professionals, and the written agreement of a qualified psychiatrist. That multi layered review process is vital to ensure that any extension is based on clear therapeutic benefit and necessity rather than routine or bureaucratic inertia. Moreover, the requirement of regular reviews every six months to extend CTOs would further strengthen oversight and accountability. The involvement of tribunals, which may recommend variations or terminations, would add yet another layer of protection for patients’ rights, as the Government and Opposition both acknowledge.

While the reforms are, on the whole, positive, we must remain vigilant. The consideration of risks must be applied carefully and consistently to avoid unintended consequences such as deterring clinicians from using CTOs when they are genuinely needed.

Ordered, That the debate be now adjourned.—(Taiwo Owatemi.)

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: † Dawn Butler, Esther McVey, Karl Turner, Sir Jeremy Wright

† Betts, Mr Clive (Sheffield South East) (Lab)

† Bonavia, Kevin (Stevenage) (Lab)

Dewhirst, Charlie (Bridlington and The Wolds) (Con)

† Dickson, Jim (Dartford) (Lab)

† Dillon, Mr Lee (Newbury) (LD)

† Foxcroft, Vicky (Lord Commissioner of His Majesty's Treasury)

† French, Mr Louie (Old Bexley and Sidcup) (Con)

† Jopp, Lincoln (Spelthorne) (Con)

Martin, Amanda (Portsmouth North) (Lab)

† Naish, James (Rushcliffe) (Lab)

† Onn, Melanie (Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes) (Lab)

Patrick, Matthew (Wirral West) (Lab)

† Peacock, Stephanie (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport)

† Pearce, Jon (High Peak) (Lab)

† Robertson, Joe (Isle of Wight East) (Con)

† Shanker, Baggy (Derby South) (Lab/Co op)

† Wilkinson, Max (Cheltenham) (LD)

Aaron Kulakiewicz, Kevin Maddison, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Thursday 12 June 2025

(Afternoon)

[Dawn Butler in the Chair]

Football Governance Bill [Lords]

Clause 47

Duty not to appoint administrator without approval

Question (this day) again proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

It continues to be a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. I do not know whether the Minister has ever run a company that was approaching either administration or insolvency, but had she, she would know that a number of incredibly onerous and important duties are placed on the directors of such companies, which are literally minute by minute, in terms of them being shown to be acting responsibly. That can include, potentially, having multiple board meetings during a day, which are minuted, in order to revisit the “going concern” statement that the company does indeed have sufficient resources to meet its obligations as they fall due.

The penalties for failing to act responsibly and in accordance with the Insolvency Act 1986 in such circumstances can include being barred as a director of any company by the Secretary of State for a number of years, whereas the jeopardy in this Bill is possibly losing the ability to own a football club or to be an officer thereof. On the basis that we can all become millionaires or start up billionaires and buy a football club, it is very concerning that we are putting in law the ability to override the directors of said companies’ obligations under the Insolvency Act. I would be grateful if the Minister could tell us whether the Government have taken any legal advice on the specific question about the potential conflict between obligations on directors under the Insolvency Act and obligations on owners and officers under the Bill.

I will respond to the points made by the shadow Minister and then come to those from the hon. Member for Spelthorne. The appointment of an administrator would not delay a club entering administration, as that is a separate process from the appointment of a specific administrator. My officials have met both relevant teams in the Insolvency Service and the Department for Business and Trade to ensure that the provisions in the Bill do not impinge on the existing insolvency processes. That speaks to the point made by the hon. Member for Spelthorne.

As for the shadow Minister’s other questions on precedent, special administration regimes exist for various purposes, such as the water utilities or energy suppliers. They have distinct processes for entering administration. The provision in the Bill does not go as far as that. Ideally, the provision will not need to be used frequently, if at all, but if it is, it will look to ensure that fans can feel more confident than they do now. It works alongside the requirements but it still stands alone, so I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 47 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48 Duty not to relocate without approval

I beg to move amendment 91, in clause 48, page 40, line 18, at end insert— “(e) if the arrangements would represent a significant upheaval of the connection between the fans of a club domiciled in England and Wales and the club (taking into account the following non exhaustive factors: proximity to home ground, proximity to other clubs’ grounds, journey time for fans and any other factors that the IFR deems relevant) the club’s fans have actively approved the arrangements.

(4A) In order for the Regulator to be satisfied with subsection (4)(b), a regulated club must take reasonable steps to establish that the majority of the club’s fans domiciled in England and Wales do not consider the arrangements to constitute significant harm to the heritage of the club.”

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 14—Incorporation of heritage restrictions in Articles of Association— “(1) A regulated club must, within the time limit, ensure that the requirements in sections 48(4A) and 49(1) are incorporated into its Articles of Association.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the time limit is the period of one year from the day on which this section comes into force, or such other period of time as the Regulator may direct in relation to a particular regulated club.

(3) Subsection (1) is fulfilled if the club’s Articles of Association provide for even greater fan consultation than sections 48(4A) and 49(1) require.”

It is good to have you back in the Chair with us this afternoon, Ms Butler—I am sure you are happy to be here. We are moving to further deliberation on the issue of consultation, in connection with the movement of grounds and the importance of the fans’ views. One issue is around not the desire or intention to stop clubs moving grounds at all costs, but ensuring that if ground movement happens, the fans’ interests are clearly taken into account. It is not to stop the Everton move, a little way down the road in Liverpool; it is to stop the Wimbledon move to Milton Keynes. That is what this is about—the fact that a club could be uprooted.

I have wandered around parts of London for many years, seeing Wimbledon play at various grounds. I think they played at Charlton for a time, and probably also at West Ham—they certainly moved to different places. I think Brighton played in Gillingham for a time as well. Those were temporary moves, but they should have been stopped in the first instance by not letting the club owner sell the ground. For Wimbledon, it was simply a move that took no account of where fans live or their loyalty to the club. It operated a bit like an American franchise system: “I’ve got the ownership of the club. I can move it where I want.” That is what happens in football in the States. We do not want it to happen here.

Amendment 91 is an attempt to add certain criteria when the regulator is looking at the potential to approve a transfer of grounds, including the proximity to the current home ground and the club’s other grounds, where fans live and how far they have to travel. I suppose Manchester United could locate almost anywhere because they have fans, they would claim, all over the world, and Man City fans would claim that there are more Man United fans outside Manchester than in it. But those are internal rivalries that we should not get into here. The reality for most clubs is that they have a local fanbase, and that should be taken into account before any move is deemed acceptable.

Even if the Minister cannot accept the amendment’s wording, I hope she might recognise that in reaching those decisions, the regulator must seriously take account of fans’ views—not just the view, “We don’t want to move; we’ve always been here,” but, “We don’t want to move because they’re trying to locate us 100 miles away and we simply can’t get to home games on that basis.” I hope that the Minister might think about that.

New clause 14 aims to get clubs to write into their articles of association the issues in the Bill that they have to take account of—the heritage restrictions—to ensure that they are firmly embedded in how the club operates.

I hope that everyone is appropriately refreshed after the lunch break. I will not seek to go to VAR to rehash any of the debates we had before lunch, but we have great sympathy with the points made by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East. We also believe that fans should have a strong say if clubs seek to move ground, as we have debated. The obvious questions, which we will come to in the next set of debates, are about what fan consultation and approval would look like. I know that that will be part of our heritage discussion in a moment, so I will not proceed on that now.

In thinking about some of the hon. Gentleman’s examples—Wimbledon being the most obvious one—I recall that as a teenager, or a bit younger, I would watch Wimbledon play at Crystal Palace, at Selhurst Park. They were the Crazy Gang in south London at that point, and they would often play there. So I understand his point, especially about the move to Milton Keynes and the controversy that that caused. As he highlighted, thankfully, we have not had too many examples that are similar to the American franchise system, where, in the National Football League, the Raiders have moved a number of times over the years, to different cities, depending on the financial attraction of each state.

Beyond the Man United and Everton examples, which we have discussed, there are other clubs who have moved. The one I first think of, which is closest to where I am from, is the Arsenal move a number of years ago from Woolwich Arsenal in south east London to Islington. It is an interesting point, because a lot of the fans in south east London are still strong supporters of Arsenal because of their generational links. For example, my brother in law’s grandfather was an Arsenal fan, so he is an Arsenal fan. The London example is probably not the best one, because it is simple to argue that fans can get across London fairly easily. It would be more dramatic if a club were being moved to the other end of the country, which is the point he is making—he is nodding in agreement.

I will be interested to know how the Minister and the Government view the amendments and how this issue might impact the regulator’s operations. I have a lot of sympathy for the amendments, and I will listen carefully to the Minister’s response.

Welcome back to the Committee after lunch, Ms Butler. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East for tabling the proposals, which seek to strengthen the protections on club heritage. The safeguarding of football heritage will be a key priority for the regulator, and there are a number of provisions in the Bill to uphold that key objective. It is vital that fans can have their voices heard at their clubs, especially regarding key heritage assets that can play a significant role in community identity and history.

That is why, as we will discuss in relation to clause stand part, clause 48 requires clubs to consult their fans and have regard to their views on a proposed relocation of a home ground. It is also why the regulator will determine whether the relocation will result in significant harm to a club’s heritage. This is not a binary decision, however, and in lots of cases will require a holistic approach and for the regulator to consider a number of factors, including not just the views of current fans, but the club’s history and the ability of fans to get to the ground. We would expect the regulator to engage and consult fans of the club, because it would be necessary to do so to ascertain the impact on club heritage. As the shadow Minister touched on, we will discuss this further in a little bit.

Amendment 91 would require the club to take reasonable steps to establish the views of the majority of supporters, rather than allowing the regulator to take the multifaceted approach that the Government think is best suited to the nuanced issue of club heritage. The importance of fan voices being heard is why the regulator spells out a number of protections for heritage assets, such as the home brand and home shirt colours, among others. Any breach of these duties would qualify as a relevant infringement by the club. Although we expect that the regulator will take an advocacy first approach, a range of sanctions will be available.

Although the Government understand that the intention behind new clause 14 is to further entrench these duties, this legislation has been designed so that the duties apply across the clubs, with the regulator ensuring compliance. Amending articles of association can be resource heavy and require shareholder agreement. It also does not guarantee that there will be compliance. This is not something that the Government see as an appropriate or necessary step to require all clubs to take. Instead, the Bill will protect fan consultation through other means. For those reasons, I am unable to accept the amendments.

I thank the Minister for the reply—I think. That was a bit of a reply about new clause 14 but she did not really address amendment 91 and the regulator being required to take account of factors such as relocation over distance and where fans live. In some ways, I think that is the strongest part of this discussion, because it is the thing that worries fans the most.

I talked about taking a holistic approach, and I said that the regulator must consider a number of factors—not just the current views of fans but the club’s history and how fans get to the ground. I acknowledge some of the examples that my hon. Friend has given, and I was really pleased to visit the new Everton stadium a few months ago. We obviously recognise that sometimes it is very legitimate, and other times it is not. That is why we have gone for the holistic approach.

So does the Minister expect that the factors in amendment 91 would be taken into account by the regulator in reaching a decision?

Yes, and I have obviously drawn attention to some of them in my remarks. That is why we do not want to be prescriptive; we want the regulator to be able to take a holistic, case by case approach.

I think that was a yes, so the regulator would be expected to take them into account. Am I right in thinking that?

It was. I gave some examples in my contribution about history—

And it would include these.

Yes, it would—I have given some examples.

Order. Both of you are standing; I might have to go to VAR.

I think we just about got there with some assurance that the regulator would take these factors, and others, into account in reaching a decision. As the Minister said, it is a holistic decision, but one that needs to respect the interests of fans. The idea that fans can travel 100 miles to watch a home game is nonsense, but unfortunately, that nonsense has come to pass in some cases.

On that basis, I will not push the amendment to a vote, but it is crucial that we never get to a position where the wording in the Bill is not sufficient to ensure that the regulator takes the interests of fans into account in this respect. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 48 places a duty on clubs not to relocate from their home ground without approval from the regulator. As we just discussed, home grounds play an important role in the history of a club and are often the club’s most valuable asset. These grounds are where many thousands of fans watch their teams play every weekend. Relocating them to areas that have no connection to the heritage and history of a club can have a significant impact on those supporters and the local area, as we saw when Wimbledon moved to Milton Keynes, which my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East just spoke about.

The impact of a home ground relocation on fans and the club is why we are legislating for the regulator to pre approve any proposal in that regard. As subsection (4) of the clause sets out, the regulator must be satisfied that the proposed relocation would not “undermine the financial sustainability” and significantly harm the heritage of the club. This Government have added a requirement for the regulator to be satisfied that the club has taken “reasonable steps to determine the views of… fans”

and taken those views into account.

The Government do not want to stifle development where it brings value and aligns with the heritage of the club. The clause makes the important and necessary recognition of the vital role that home grounds play in communities and adds an extra layer of protection to them while leaving room for clubs to evolve and continue to develop. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 48 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 49 Duty not to change crest, home shirt colours or name without approval

I beg to move amendment 140, in clause 49, page 40, line 31, at end insert— “(1A) A regulated club must notify the IFR if it is considering making any material changes under subsection (1) and the IFR must monitor the reasonable steps taken to independently establish that the changes are supported by a majority of the club’s fans.”.

This amendment would require the IFR to take steps to independently oversee a club’s fan consultation process on the material changes specified.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 92, in clause 49, page 40, line 33, leave out “approved by the Football Association”

and insert “supported by a majority of the club’s fans domiciled in England and Wales.”.

Amendment 111, in clause 49, page 40, line 33, at end insert “and a majority of the club’s fans”.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Ms Butler. Clause 49 is an important part of the Bill, particularly if we look at recent history. We saw Cardiff City unilaterally changing the colour of their kit and the Leeds United club badge redesigned using something similar to Microsoft Paint. All that was done without consultation or agreement with fans. Both those decisions were met with overwhelming negative reaction from football fans.

Our amendment would allow for fans to be properly consulted before such irresponsible and poorly supported changes even see the light of day. The regulator should be responsible for ensuring that the consultation of fans on such changes is independently observed in a fair and transparent process. In this morning’s debate, the hon. Member for Sheffield South East raised the point about what consultation and fan engagement mean. This amendment tries to get to that in some respect.

It would be all too easy for some clubs to hand pick a small group of fans that they know will agree with them and make an announcement claiming overwhelming support for a change. If the regulator is able to observe the process, fans can be reassured in the knowledge that the proposals will be given proper scrutiny and challenging views will be heard and considered.

Can the hon. Member explain what the process the football regulator should go through would look like? The amendment does not specify any standards for what acceptable oversight of the consultation process would be.

We are happy to put the onus on the regulator to create a process by which it can reassure itself that a full consultation process has been undertaken. That consultation process could look different for different teams. A Premier League club has a country wide fan base and a large amount of fans to engage with, whereas a smaller club might have a regional fan base and a smaller number of fans to engage with, so a different consultation method may be appropriate. We would be happy for the regulator to have that in its purview.

I just want to ask a simple question: why has “the Football Association” suddenly appeared at this point in the Bill? It has not been part of the requirements on the regulator until now. If I am right, it was not in previous iterations of the Bill—I may be wrong. I would have thought that the view of fans is most important. The FA does excellent work on many issues in football, not least trying to engage with England fans, but in this respect, are the fans of the club not more important?

Clause 49 introduces a duty on regulated clubs to safeguard key aspects of what the Bill defines as club heritage. This specifically relates to changes in a club’s name, its badge and its home shirt colours—things that may seem cosmetic to the outsider, but which football fans know are part of the heart and soul of a club.

Whether it is the famous black and white of Newcastle United or the immense history of Deepdale in Preston, these things mean more than just the colour of the top or where people watch football. They are integral parts of footballing communities. They symbolise membership of something bigger than oneself. The club colours, the club badge and the home ground are all ways in which fans identify themselves as being part of a footballing family. They must be protected.

This clause is an important recognition in statute that football clubs are not just commercial entities, but cultural institutions, symbols of community identity and civic pride. As such, changes to these heritage elements should not be made casually or without due regard to those whose lifelong support gives clubs their very meaning, often across generations.

We welcome the inclusion of clause 49, which we believe is essential, but we do not believe it goes far enough. That is why we tabled amendment 111.

Similar to the challenge to my amendment on what consultation looked like, this amendment is silent on how a majority of the club’s fans is worked out. I wonder whether the hon. Member could address that point.

Yes, I am happy to and will come on to that point. Amendment 111 would require the majority of fans to approve any such changes to a club’s official name, its badge or its home shirt colours, not just to support them. “Support” can be vaguely defined. It can be skewed by a few loud voices or specific interest groups, rather than being a genuine exercise in democracy. While consultation is important, it is ultimately no substitute for consent.

Football clubs are, by their very nature, multi generational institutions. Most are older than the companies or corporate vehicles that now own them and some are even older than the Labour party that now seeks to impose this regulator. They existed before many of their current directors were born and will, we hope, outlast all of us.

The badge on the shirt is not simply a badge: it is a symbol of place, of pride, of glory and heartbreak, of a historic past and a hopeful future. The name of a club is not simply branding: it is geography, history and memory all in one. And the home shirt, whether it is red, claret, blue or black and white, is more than a colour scheme—I apologise if I missed any; orange for Wolves, maybe, but I am sure hon. Members get the point. It is part of the club’s identity, part of the community’s fabric.

When clubs change these things, particularly when they do so without the blessing of their supporters, they do more than upset tradition. They erode trust and sever the cultural connection that keeps that team and the English game alive. Let us not forget that when Cardiff City’s owner unilaterally changed their home shirt from blue to red, the backlash was enormous, because it was not Cardiff’s colour. Cardiff’s owners, much like the electorate, came to regret switching from blue to red pretty darn quickly. Will the Minister confirm whether clause 49 would prevent what happened at Cardiff or whether such a change could still be pushed through after a period of consultation, however superficial?

The clause imposes a duty on clubs to consult fans before making changes to heritage elements. That is better than nothing, but is quite a low bar. We have all seen what consultation can look like in practice—a web form, a vague email or a one off survey. Then the changes proceed regardless of overwhelming opposition, with clubs claiming that consultation has been completed.

I think most hon. Members would agree that that is not meaningful engagement and it certainly does not reflect the degree of ownership that supporters rightly feel over the identity of their home club. That is why we support the amendment to move the requirement from consultation to majority fan approval—that is, in other words, a vote, or a similarly binding expression of fan will, overseen through whatever supporter representation structure the club has in place. Will the Minister set out what the Bill actually means when it states, “the club has taken reasonable steps to establish that the changes are supported by a majority of the club’s fans in England and Wales.”?

The shadow Minister is making a completely reasonable amendment. We have the emblem, colours and name. Does he agree that it would be helpful if the Minister explained why the name has been taken out for different treatment from the emblem and the colours?

I am sure that the Minister will have heard that contribution from my hon. Friend and will be able to pick up on that in her comments. He is right to identify that such a distinction has been made in the Bill.

What does this mean? For example, will an hour long Twitter poll on what a club should do be sufficient? We have seen how clubs have sought to use X in some quite funny ways at times, but on something as serious as this, we need proper consultation. Instead, does the Minister expect that clubs will engage in a full, proper and open consultation with their fans, such as one that includes a call for evidence, votes on different proposals and genuine engagement from the clubs themselves? Otherwise, this all risks just being for show, rather than real consultation.

Why stop at just consultation? If a proposed change is sensible, justifiable and supported by a club’s reasoning, why would the club not be able to win over the majority of its fans, if the fans agree it is in the best interests of the club? Why are the Government, in this Bill’s drafting, afraid of allowing fans to have a real and final say on these matters? This is not about allowing fans to micro manage a club; it is about recognising that the symbols, colours and names of clubs are all held in trust, not owned in a transactional sense.

Football club owners are, in truth, temporary stewards. Their role is not to reshape the soul of a club but to protect it and hopefully strengthen it before passing it on. Far too often we have seen the reverse: owners who arrive with branding ideas and marketing consultants, determined to reshape the club’s visual identity to fit a certain commercial strategy, often with little or no understanding of the local footballing tradition in that community. Supporters have had to campaign, protest and plead to get what should have been theirs almost by birthright: a say in the symbols of their club. Does the Minister agree that clause 49, if limited to just consultation, risks becoming just a tick box exercise, particularly in clubs without strong fan representation models in place?

There is a precedent for this kind of requirement. In Germany, the so called 50+1 rule ensures that fans retain majority voting rights over key aspects of club identity and operation. In Spain, the socios model does so too. To be clear, we are not calling for full fan ownership, but we are saying that, on issues of identity, the final word should ultimately rest with the fans. Let us remember that this amendment would apply only to three specific heritage areas: the club’s official name, the badge—or crest, depending on how we want to describe it—and the home shirt colours. This is not about banning innovation or marketing altogether. It is simply saying that, when it comes to fundamentals, supporters should have a say.

We have seen in the past things such as the renaming of St James’ Park in Newcastle to the Sports Direct Arena, and other fans groups around the country have been furious when historic stadium names have been changed to sponsors’ names. Would the shadow Minister extend the sentiment that he is now expressing to those circumstances as well?

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s contribution, and that is the point that we were discussing earlier with the hon. Member for Sheffield South East. We were seeking clarification from the Government on how that would affect the consultation of fans on the relocation of stadiums or a change in their ownership. I agree that it is crucial that fans have a say in the naming and history of their ground.

The hon. Member for Great Yarmouth (Rupert Lowe) once fell foul of this when he attempted to change the name of the Dell to the Friends Provident stadium. Perhaps we might consult him on his learnings from that experience after we have completed this Committee.

I am not sure how to answer that. How Members decide to use their time is a decision for them, but the hon. Gentleman has made the point well. Without wishing to put off Government Members, the argument behind my amendment is deeply Conservative in some ways; it is about tradition, continuity and community. It is about respecting the past while also securing the future. It is about recognising that football is strongest when it listens to the people who love it most.

The clause is a step forward, and we think its inclusion in the Bill is important. Without our amendment, however, we are concerned that the clause will lack the legal bite required to safeguard the symbols that matter most to supporters. In truth, clubs that respect their fans would already seek that approval; the amendment would simply ensure that those who do not are held to the same standard. To be clear, no one should be able to change the name of Barnsley FC, the badge of Wigan Athletic or the home colours of Aston Villa without the backing of the very people who built the stands and carry the soul of the club every single week across multiple seasons.

I urge the Minister and colleagues across the Committee to back the amendment. Football’s future must be modern and well run, yes, but it must also be anchored in tradition, and the tradition belongs to the fans.

I thank hon. Members for tabling the amendments to clause 49. We will discuss the clause in more detail in the clause stand part debate, so I will reserve some of my comments until then. To summarise, however, the clause places a duty on regulated clubs not to make changes to key items of club heritage without the support of the majority of the club’s fans and approval by the Football Association.

As set out in clause 7(4), the regulator is already required to monitor compliance with obligations. However, we do not think it appropriate for the regulator to be directly involved in every instance of a heritage change. As a light touch regulator, we do not expect it to intervene where clubs are already meeting what is required of them. Instead, it will be able to have a wide view, and intervene where there are concerns.

Any change to heritage assets will necessarily come under significant scrutiny by fans and the public, as well as the FA through its existing fan engagement standards. Additionally, in any case of non compliance, the regulator will have sufficient enforcement options at its disposal. The process is therefore appropriately safeguarded without the need for direct regulatory involvement each time.

Turning to amendments 111 and 92, club names are a vital part of the club’s heritage. The legislation therefore introduces legal protections for that heritage asset. The FA has a long track record of being able to take a considered approach to name changes, listening to fans and heritage concerns, and taking appropriate action. That was demonstrated in the case of Hull City: the FA blocked multiple attempts to change the name to “Hull Tigers”. The FA, with oversight of all levels of football, is also in a good position to ensure that name changes do not have unintended implications for clubs that are outside the regulator’s scope.

The Government therefore believe that the FA is in the best position to take into account fan opinions and all the other relevant considerations, with the regulator acting as an enforcement backstop. That is in addition to any mandatory licensing requirement for clubs to consult their fans on any matters relating to the club’s name, among other heritage assets.

The shadow Minister asked which fans will be consulted. For the most part, clubs will be in the best position to understand the demographics of their fans. The regulator will be able to provide guidance for clubs for on how best to consult fans. Clubs in the lower leagues will tend to have a more local fanbase, whereas larger clubs will have fanbases from across the world, as the hon. Member for Sheffield South East pointed out. That is why we want to implement proportional and flexible proposals.

We all feel concerned about this issue. It is not about the clubs that already consult well; it is about those that do not consult, but will be compelled to consult by the legislation, and will not really want to—they will find ways around it. The regulator can give guidance, but if a club does not follow that guidance, what will the regulator’s likely course of action be?

We will come on to enforcement, but a range of enforcement options will be available to the regulator, if it feels that a club is not doing what it asked the club to do.

To add to the point made by the hon. Member for Sheffield South East, if a club—the Minister gave the example of Hull—decided that it wanted to go ahead and change its name to “Hull Tigers”, but the regulator felt that the fans had not been consulted thoroughly enough, could the regulator deduct points from a club?

No, there are no sporting sanctions in the Bill. Those are not in scope. To take the point about the FA further, it has a long track record of being able to take a considered approach to name changes, to listening to fans and heritage concerns, and to taking appropriate action.

I welcome the fact that the Minister is saying, “Let’s trust existing organisations to do it”, rather than bringing it within the purview of a higher regulator. On the basis that the FA has exercised such responsibilities when it comes to names, why cannot it be trusted to have the same consideration for emblems and colours?

As I said, the FA, with oversight of the levels of football, is in a good position to ensure that name changes do not have unintended implications for clubs that are outside the regulator’s scope. It has done that point on names well. That is why we want to leave it to do the good job it is doing.

I thank the Minister for her response. Although the Bill tackles financial sustainability, it has a real ability to rebuild trust between fans and football clubs. I feel that all three amendments are still worthy of being pressed to a vote, and I commend amendment 140 to the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

33|0|2|8|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Amendment proposed: 111 in clause 49, page 40, line 33, at end insert—

“and a majority of the club’s fans”.—(Mr French.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

34|0|3|8|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 49 requires a club to establish that a majority of domestic supporters approve any material change to its emblem, crest or predominant home shirt colours. A club’s name, home shirt colours and emblem are intrinsic parts of its heritage, intertwined with decades of club and supporter history. The decision to materially change any of them therefore requires considered thought and consultation. The clause means that changes can still be made, but only if, and once, fans have voiced their support. In practice, we expect that could take place through a formal survey of fan opinion, as we saw last season with Bristol Rovers, where supporters opposed the final proposal that was put to them, resulting in the club halting the redesign of their emblem.

The clause also requires clubs to get FA approval prior to changing the name that the club’s team plays under. The view of supporters is a significant factor in the FA’s decision making. However, the FA may also need to balance wider considerations regarding to a name change. That might include whether there would be any adverse effects on other clubs throughout the pyramid. The existing FA rule has been used to prevent name changes, which have been proposed in the past against the wishes of fans, as I mentioned with the example with Hull City. Codifying this as a legal duty will mean there are additional powers to ensure clubs do not make changes without proper approval and allow the regulator to respond to instances of non compliance. The clause serves one of the key objectives of the regulator: protecting the heritage of English football. I commend it to the Committee.

I am still a bit uneasy about those clubs that are not going to enter into the spirit of the really important part of the Bill: proper fan consultation. I come back to Sheffield Wednesday and its owner, who thinks sitting down for 10 hours of deliberation with hand picked fan groups and not answering any questions amounts to a consultation—it does not.

I was interested in what the Minister said about how the regulator will have the right to issue guidance about how consultation should happen, and then there can be enforcement if the guidance is not followed, which means the guidance effectively becomes a requirement. I hope that we can elaborate on that later in the Committee’s discussions, as she indicated we would, because, without those backstop powers, there will be some club owners who regard the club as their personal possession and believe that no one has a right to interfere in how they run it.

I am intrigued to know whether, with all his experience, his chairmanship of the football all party parliamentary group and his background with the Bill, the hon. Gentleman thinks he has yet received an adequate explanation from the Minister on why emblems and colours are treated differently from the names of clubs.

No, not really—I have not. I am still not sure why it is so difficult to have a requirement to consult on a name. I hope the Minister might reflect on that, a bit like she reflected earlier.

Names interact with other clubs in the pyramid, which is not the case with shirts and colours, and we think there are strong provisions in the Bill for fan consultation.

I hear what the Minister said, but I want to think about that. I know what her good intentions are, but I also know there may be some people out there with bad intentions; it is about making sure that they come in line with the Minister’s good intentions. I am holding back to see what further discussions we have, but this is really important. It is a wider issue: there are so many clubs with so many disparate fan groups, and owners will pick and choose if there is not certainty. That is why I raised the issue, which I think we ought to come back to, of a clear role for the Football Supporters’ Association, the body that oversees fan groups in this country. It has a neutral view of which groups are the most important and relevant in different clubs, and it can help the regulator enormously in what, in some cases, will be a challenging process of trying to identify the fan groups who really speak for fans in those clubs.

I will not put the hon. Member for Sheffield South East at risk with his own side by talking too fondly about the comments he just made—I will not make it sound like we are trying to do a double act—but we have heard a lot of concern in our debates on the clause, and the amendments tabled to it, about how it will work. The hon. Member mentioned that some club owners—one would hope only a minority of them—would seek to expose loopholes in the Bill. That is why we tabled amendment 111, which would introduce a safeguard by requiring a clear vote and the approval of the majority of fans.

There are a number of risks for the Government with this Bill, but one of the biggest is this: if it does not protect the things it is designed to protect—in this case, the heritage of a football club and a say for fans—what is its purpose at all? If one of the examples we have discussed plays out in future, that question will be asked of the Government. In our future debates on the Bill, perhaps they can provide more clarity about their thinking, and perhaps they will incorporate some of the arguments we have made today.

I am grateful to hon. Members for their contributions. We believe that we have strengthened measures in the Bill to put fans and communities back at the heart of the game and to protect football heritage. All regulated clubs will now be required to have an effective framework in place to meet and consult regularly a representative group of fans on the specified relevant matters, including any proposal to relocate the home ground and some of the issues we have just discussed. We expect that the regulator will be best placed to understand the circumstances of individual clubs across the country. It will produce guidance to support clubs in meeting its requirements, and it will take into account things like precedent and ensuring proportionality.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 49 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 50 Duty to notify of changes in circumstances relevant to the IFR’s functions Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The clause places a duty on all regulated clubs to notify the regulator of any material change in circumstances that is relevant to the regulator’s functions, as soon as reasonably practicable. The regulator will need a complete picture of each club in order to effectively regulate. Full transparency and timely updates will allow the regulator to stay up to date on any relevant changes in real time.

The duty to notify in the clause is an ongoing duty on regulated clubs. By contrast, the annual declaration mandatory licence condition applies to licensed clubs only. The annual declaration is about creating an annual touchpoint for clubs as part of the licensing regime, rather than requiring an annual licence renewal. It will allow clubs to declare a summary of any matters that they notified, or should have notified, over the past year.

I will not rehash the Minister’s description of the clause, but it raises a number of questions about the interpretation of the clause and the requirements on clubs. What guidance will be provided to clubs to determine what constitutes a “relevant” change in circumstances, because that is very open to interpretation? What might such a change look like? We are not trying to micromanage, but we think clubs might find it helpful to understand, even if it is via a list of frequently asked questions from the regulator, what constitutes a change of circumstances so that they do not accidently fall foul of well intentioned drafting.

Could the duty to notify a change in circumstances be accidentally disproportionate to lower league clubs? We have discussed at length that those clubs generally do not have the same administrative resources as the big clubs. Will the regulator look to have a more flexible approach to clubs lower down the pyramid that may not have the ability to notify as quickly as those at the top?

We expect the regulator to look at this on a case by case basis. As we have said throughout, we very much intend for the regulator to be proportionate depending on where a club sits in the pyramid.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 50 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 51 Duty to keep fans informed of insolvency proceedings Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The clause places a duty on all regulated clubs in relevant insolvency proceedings to keep fans informed of the progress of the proceedings. Any fan that has experienced their club going into administration can attest that it is a worrying and often confusing time. Although the regime will look to best protect clubs, it cannot be zero failure. However, the clause is intended to make the process more transparent for fans when the worst happens. The duty will apply only as far as is reasonable and will not fall on the administrators or any body not regulated by the football regulator. The clause was added to the Bill in order to mitigate unnecessary worry and confusion for fans.

I have a few questions. How will the regulator assess whether a club has sufficiently fulfilled its duty to keep fans informed? Could the requirement to disclose information during insolvency proceedings create additional reputational or financial risks for clubs? How will the clause be applied consistently while respecting confidential obligations to creditors? We have spoken a lot about insider information. If the Minister does not have the answers today, it would be helpful to get them in writing in order to understand how some of these complex legal matters might work.

I am happy to write to the shadow Minister. I appreciate that we added this clause; it was not in the previous iteration of the Bill. That is why I was keen to talk about reasonability. We appreciate that insolvency is a complex, fast paced, changing and challenging situation, but we also appreciate—Members have talked about different clubs that have gone into administration—the worry for fans, so we want to keep them as informed as reasonably possible. The shadow Minister asked me for something further in writing and I am very happy to provide that.

Again, I am concerned about the clash of duties. The Minister has already told us that her team and the insolvency team have met and considered this issue. In a period of liquidation, not putting additional debt into a company, or indeed spending cash, is one of the directors’ responsibilities, but this will undoubtedly cost the club. Has the Minister sought and received reassurances that this approach is consistent with the Insolvency Act?

Perhaps I will add the answer to that question to my letter to the shadow Minister, and I will copy it to the hon. Member for Spelthorne. The clause is clear that the duty will apply only as far as possible, because we do not want to add a burden at an already difficult time. As this is quite a complex but important point, I am happy to write to both hon. Gentlemen.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 51 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 52 Duty to publish a personnel statement Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The clause requires licensed clubs to prepare a personnel statement and submit it to the regulator for approval. Alongside the statement, clubs must provide an explanation as to why they consider it to be accurate. The owners and officers who control and run football clubs are vital to their sustainability. Therefore, the regulator needs to know who is running the show behind the scenes in order to implement its regime effectively.

A personnel statement must outline each of the club’s owners and its ultimate owner, as we have discussed; its officers, with a job description for each; and its senior managers and their roles. Once the statement has been submitted, the regulator will review it and decide either to approve it or to modify it. Any modification to the statement must be made in consultation with the relevant club to ensure that the statement is accurate. Once the statement is approved by the regulator, the club must publish it online, increasing transparency and accountability in football. Subsequent statements must be submitted to the regulator if an old statement becomes out of date—for example, after the departure or hiring of an officer.

Let me also highlight the role of the Secretary of State’s guidance in providing clarity to owners about who meets the definition of someone who exercises significant influence or control. We committed in the other House to producing the Secretary of State’s guidance before clubs are required to identify owners who meet that definition to the regulator. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 52 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 53 Duty to pay a levy

I beg to move amendment 133, in clause 53, page 42, line 3, at end insert— “(1A) But the IFR may not require a club with fewer than 10 full time equivalent employees to pay the IFR a levy in respect of a chargeable period during which the club is a licensed club.”

This amendment would exempt clubs with fewer than 10 full time equivalent employees from having to pay the levy.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 5—Opportunity for levy exemption for clubs below the Football League— “(1) The Secretary of State must by regulations make provision for a process whereby a licensed club may apply for a full or partial exemption from the levy established under section 53 if— (a) the club’s first men’s team competes in the National League or any lower tier of the English football pyramid, and (b) the club demonstrates, to the satisfaction of the IFR, that paying the levy would pose a significant risk to its financial sustainability.

(2) The IFR must report annually on the number of exemptions granted and the rationale for each decision.”

This new clause allows clubs in National League North and National League South to apply for a levy exemption under specific circumstances. New clause 24—Levy exemption procedure for clubs in administration— “(1) The Secretary of State must make regulations establishing a procedure under which a regulated club that has entered administration may apply for an exemption from the levy provided for by section 53.

(2) The regulations under subsection (1) must include provision for the IFR to determine whether an exemption from the levy should be granted.

(3) Provision under subsection (2) must require the IFR— (a) to take account of the circumstances under which the club entered administration, and (b) only to grant an exemption from the levy if the IFR is satisfied that the owners of the club have not taken a decision to enter administration in order to secure an exemption from the levy.

(4) In this section, a club has ‘entered administration’ if an administrator of the club has been appointed under paragraph 22 of Schedule B1 to the Insolvency Act 1986.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to establish a procedure for clubs in administration to apply for an exemption from the levy. The IFR would only be able to grant an exemption if satisfied that the club had not deliberately entered administration as a means of securing the exemption.

It is my pleasure to speak to amendment 133. Clause 53 introduces a duty on regulated clubs to pay a statutory levy to the Government’s new regulator—a mechanism intended to fund its operations and ensure its independence from Government and industry influence. The principle is not unreasonable. If clubs are to be regulated, one could argue that it is fair that they should contribute to the costs of said regulation.

However, we have two initial concerns. First, as the initial costs incurred are to be borne by the taxpayer, that does not ensure independence from Government—quite the opposite; it creates a reliance on the Government for funding and therefore for direction and sponsorship of activities. According to the Government’s own impact assessment, the regulator will cost taxpayers around £106 million until the levy provided for by the clause is up and running.

To put that in context, that money could fund the Lionesses futures fund, which the Government have scrapped, more than three times over. In what should be a fantastic and inspirational year for women’s sport, the Government are choosing to spend money on regulating men’s football instead of investing in the growth of the women’s game. I make that comparison with quite a lot of regret because I believe that it is the wrong decision by the Government, but I will stick to the Bill.

Secondly, many clubs have not asked to be regulated, and they might ask why they should pay for a regulator that seeks to stifle their operations or interfere with their performance and make them uncompetitive in the competitive world of sport. I have asked the question the Minister in previous sittings what would happen if a club chose not to apply for a licence. I am a bit unclear how that would look. According to the Government’s own impact assessment, the yearly cost to all regulated clubs in the English football pyramid will be up to around £142 million, with up to £1.2 million in one off familiarisation costs, ongoing compliance costs of up to £35.8 million every year following the first year, and operational costs, which will be incurred every year. As I mentioned earlier, the operational costs will be funded initially by the taxpayer, before an industry levy is introduced.

That is an extraordinary amount of money to be leaving the game, especially as the Minister has recognised that money leaving the game in agents’ fees, for example, is detrimental to the sustainability of English football. The costs that the Government are imposing on clubs through the regulator clearly threaten the sustainability of some clubs, as a stand alone issue. Moreover, as the Minister’s own impact assessment states, the costs are not expected to fall equally on each club; proportionately, they will be greater, and felt more greatly, further down the pyramid.

The impact assessment also states that factors such as “existing levels of compliance impact the level of activity required”

by the regulator. We all know that that means more work and higher costs for lower level clubs over the wealthiest. They will have more catching up to do than the big clubs in most instances, leaving them to bear the brunt of the Government’s regulator. It is vital that, as Opposition Members have said throughout this Committee, the regulator is not captured either financially or politically by any one interest group. However, that will now prove difficult with the appointment that the Government have made.

Although we support the broad purpose of clause 53, we must interrogate its fairness, proportionality and impact on smaller clubs. That is why I tabled amendment 133, which would exempt clubs with fewer than 10 full time equivalent employees from the statutory levy. Regulators do not run on good will alone, and this one certainly will be no different. They need staff systems and legal support, but costs must be borne fairly and in a way that does not threaten the institutions that the Bill seeks to protect.

Clause 53 allows the regulator to determine how much is paid, by whom and how often, subject to regulations approved by the Secretary of State. It is a wide power and an open ended one. As it is drafted, the Bill does not place any cap on the amount or impose any statutory criteria on proportionality. Will the Minister confirm whether the Government intend to introduce guidance or a statutory cap on the total amount that might be levied by the regulator, either per club or across the sector?

Given that the proposed appointee to the role of chair donated to the Secretary of State, can the Minister confirm that the Secretary of State will not make any decision on how much money can be levied in the future? As it stands, the clause effectively allows the Secretary of State to write a blank cheque to a regulator run by a person who donated directly to her leadership campaign. That alone creates the perception of a conflict of interest, for which the current Secretary of State, as we all know, is under independent investigation.

Although some Premier League clubs might be able to absorb the costs, the same cannot be said for smaller, lower league or community based clubs such as Barnsley, Bromley or Wigan. My amendment would create a simple, fair exemption. Any club with fewer than 10 full time equivalent employees would not be required to pay the levy. That is not just an administrative fix; it is a recognition of football’s diversity and, in true footballing spirit, would champion the underdogs by allowing them to focus on their squads or stadium improvements that would benefit fans. A club with eight employees is not in the same universe, financially or structurally, as a Premier League club with a commercial team, global brand and multimillion pound payroll.

Is the shadow Minister aware of how many clubs within the scope of the Bill currently have fewer than 10 full time employees? Players are club employees, so they would need to be excluded from that number.

That is a fair challenge. To be clear, we are not talking about five a-side teams. To give a straight answer, we are talking about backroom staff affected by the administration. We can see that in the wage bill at opposite ends of the pyramid in 2022-23, with the Premier League’s wage bill running at more than £4 billion and League Two’s wage bill sitting at just £96 million, or 2.4% of the Premier League’s total.

I appreciate the shadow Minister’s response to my previous intervention, but he did not answer how many clubs currently within scope of the Bill have fewer than 10 employees. Just out of interest, does he know how many would benefit from his amendment?

To be completely up front, I do not have that answer in front of me, but I will find out—the team has drafted this amendment.

Without this amendment, clubs in both the Premier League and League Two could find themselves subject to the same regulatory levy. This risks creating a two tier burden, where the most vulnerable clubs are saddled with costs that they cannot pay for a regulator that many of them do not want.

Why have the Government chosen not to introduce an automatic exemption for the very smallest clubs, and has an exemption based on staffing levels or turnover been considered? We already accept differential treatment in other areas of public policy—for example, small businesses are treated differently from large corporations, and community amateur sports clubs benefit from separate tax and regulatory frameworks. We believe that the same logic could apply here.

I am sure the shadow Minister is aware that many top flight footballers are effectively self employed through independent companies that they set up. Does he not recognise that this amendment would create a loophole that enables football clubs to split into multiple organisations to fall short of having 10 full time employees?

I understand the hon. Gentleman’s point, and I know that certain players have sought to do that through advertising and other financial arrangements. We are talking about clubs at the lowest level, and we do not believe that is a particular risk of this amendment.

One of the key failings of the football system in recent years has been the concentration of financial risk at the lower levels of the pyramid. Clubs overextend themselves chasing promotion, owners gamble recklessly to stay afloat, and supporters ultimately bear the costs when that does not work and when clubs collapse. The last thing we believe we should be doing is introducing a new statutory cost that could tip the balance for smaller clubs already running on the thinnest margins. This amendment is not about letting anyone off the hook; it is about recognising scale, and recognising the difference of scale in the football pyramid.

Will the Minister please commit to publishing a full impact assessment of the levy’s distribution before regulations are laid? Without that, how can Parliament be sure that the burden will not fall disproportionately on those least able to bear it? One of the justifications for the levy is to secure the regulator’s operational independence, which is a principle that we support, but independence should never mean insulation from scrutiny. If clubs are paying the regulator’s bill, they should at least know where the money is going and have confidence that it is not being wasted.

The Minister has maintained that football regulation cannot be one size fits all, and we understand that is her reason for leaving the wording of the Bill quite open ended in places. Clause 53 is sound in many ways, but in practice it risks imposing an undue burden on the very clubs that the Bill is supposed to help—those rooted in their communities, run on small budgets and kept alive, more often than not, by volunteers, not venture capitalists. In that spirit, I will be pressing this amendment to a vote.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. Earlier in our deliberations—I cannot remember how many sittings ago—the Liberal Democrats made the case for extending the Bill’s scope to the sixth tier, the National Leagues. Effectively, we feel that helping those clubs up the pyramid would be useful, and on a cross party basis, we have discussed support for the National League’s 3UP campaign, which we can take forward after Committee as a group of Members who are interested in football.

This amendment is quite simple, as it is about extending the Bill’s scope to the sixth tier. It would give clubs in National League North and National League South the opportunity to apply for an exemption from the levy, were it to be extended to that level. Clubs at that level may well not have the capacity to take on the administration associated with regulation. Such increased financial protections for lower league clubs—those in the National League and National Leagues North and South—would align with the principles of the Bill.

It is a privilege to serve under your chairship, Ms Butler. New clause 24, tabled in my name, seeks to introduce a fair and transparent exemption procedure for football clubs in administration. When a football club enters administration, it is not merely a financial event; it is often a crisis that rocks the entire community, as we saw in Bury. Supporters, many of whom have been lifelong followers, are left facing uncertainty and fear for the future of their club, which is often the heartbeat of their town or city.

New clause 24 seeks to strike a vital balance by maintaining the integrity of the levy while allowing compassionate and evidence based interventions when a club is on its knees. It would ensure that exemptions are not handed out indiscriminately, and that the regulator must assess each case on its merits and satisfy itself that the club’s financial difficulties are not a calculated move to evade its levy responsibilities. Most importantly, the new clause would give clubs a chance.

I thank the shadow Minister for his amendment, and I thank the hon. Members for Cheltenham and for Newbury for their new clauses. I acknowledge the intent behind them.

We will shortly discuss the levy in more detail when I speak to clauses 53 and 54, but in short, the Bill gives the regulator the power to collect a levy to recover its running costs from football clubs that hold an operating licence. I will outline why the Government intend to resist this amendment and these new clauses before directly answering some of the specific points that hon. Members have put to me.

The levy arrangement follows the precedent of other regulators, such as the Financial Conduct Authority, the Competition and Markets Authority and Ofcom. As the regulator is designed to improve the financial sustainability of English football, it is vital that the associated costs do not burden clubs, especially those further down the pyramid.

Amendment 133 and new clause 5 seek to address similar issues relating to ensuring that small or lower league clubs are not burdened by unaffordable costs as a result of this regulation. I assure the Committee that the Bill is already designed with National League clubs in mind. The regulator will be tasked with improving the financial sustainability of football, and placing an undue burden on small clubs would be completely contradictory to that aim.

Clause 53(10) introduces a statutory requirement for the regulator to have regard to each club’s individual financial circumstances, and the league in which it plays, when setting the levy. Given that requirement, we expect that the levy will be proportionate, with the Premier League—specifically the six clubs with the highest revenues—covering the majority of the cost. That solidarity will reduce the burden on clubs lower down the pyramid. No club should be charged more than it can afford.

Through its levy rules, the regulator will also have the power to exempt clubs from paying the levy. That power, provided by clause 53(8), ensures that there is a mechanism to avoid burdening clubs. If certain conditions set by the regulator through rules are met, the regulator has the discretion to exempt clubs from paying the levy—that answers the shadow Minister’s question. The power will work in conjunction with the requirement on the regulator to consider each individual club’s financial resources, and the competition in which it plays, when setting the levy, as well as the requirement to consult all regulated clubs on its levy rules.

On new clause 24, I agree wholeheartedly that the regulator should not place an undue burden on a club that has already entered administration. I reassure the hon. Member for Newbury that the regulator will set out its levy methodology, including the discretion to set the levy according to a club’s individual circumstances, and to exempt a club completely if specified conditions are met.

The regulator has a core objective of improving the financial sustainability of English football, and I am confident that it will be cognisant of the impact that the levy could have on any club, and especially a club in administration or other financial distress. The Bill’s provisions, such as the regulator’s discretion to exempt certain clubs from the levy, if necessary, account for that core objective.

In response to the shadow Minister, I note that there is no cap, but the regulator can set costs related only to its functions. As I have just outlined, under the powers granted to the regulator by the Bill, it could exempt small clubs from the levy, if that is deemed necessary. However, we do not think that mandating a complete exemption in legislation is appropriate. Exempting a whole league before an assessment has been made of whether clubs in that league can afford the levy would be disproportionate.

I want to clarify whether the Minister is entirely comfortable that the Government are in no way able to control the amount of money spent by the regulator. If, in fulfilling its duties, the regulator decided it was important to fly business class to meet UEFA and FIFA once a month—if I were the regulator, I could probably make the case that I was fulfilling my duties by doing that—it would create a huge cost and involve hiring additional staff. Are the Government really prepared to give the regulator a blank cheque?

There is no cap. However, I draw the hon. Gentleman’s attention to the regulatory principles we addressed earlier in the Bill. Obviously, the regulator needs to be proportionate and reasonable. The regulator will guide its operations according to those principles.

On the allocation of the levy, the Minister said that the top six teams would cover the majority. Can she point to where that is in the Bill? Is it the top six financially or in league positions?

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for taking the words out of my mouth, because I was going to conclude by drawing the Committee’s attention to a letter placed in the Libraries of both Houses when the Bill was in the other place. The letter, dated 6 March, was sent by Baroness Twycross, who took the Bill through the Lords. I will not detain the Committee by reading out the letter—Members can look at it—but it breaks down the proportions. Obviously, costs are based on the impact assessment and are indicative, so they are not meant to be prescriptive; it is meant to be an indicator. The letter may be helpful if the Committee would like more detail.

I have listened carefully to the Minister’s arguments, and she has made some helpful clarifications. However, due to the lack of a cap, as my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne said, it is difficult to rely on the letter for what club certainty might look like in the future. We have discussed at length how well intentioned plans can easily spiral, which is why we believe amendment 133 is important in helping to safeguard the clubs with the smallest means and those lowest down the pyramid.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

35|0|3|10|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

On a point of order, Ms Butler. I do not think we have withdrawn or taken a decision on the new clauses. I am happy to withdraw mine, but this is just for formality.

Decisions on the new clauses will be made at the end of the Committee’s considerations.

I beg to move amendment 18, in clause 53, page 42, line 8, leave out “leviable functions” and insert “functions under this Act”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 19 to 26.

These amendments will make all regulatory functions under the Bill fundable through the levy. As drafted, the Bill sets out the specific functions that will be funded through the levy, making a distinction between the funding of leviable and non leviable functions—I will discuss those concepts in greater detail shortly. Currently, the former would be funded via the levy and the latter via rules set by the regulator.

These amendments would make the funding mechanism simpler and more reliable by clarifying and ensuring that the regulator will be able to recover litigation costs related to non leviable functions. If the regulator were unable to recover those costs, there is a risk that it would either be unable to use some of its powers or have to seek Government financial assistance to fund them. That is why we propose these changes.

Government amendment 22 removes the definition of “leviable functions” so that the small number of non leviable functions are brought under the levy. Those non leviable functions are: orders and directions affecting alternative officer arrangements and ownership removal orders in part 4 of the Bill; the distribution of revenue in part 6; and the reports on clubs by expert reporters for the investigatory powers in part 7.

Those functions could have been funded through a separate mechanism, whereby the regulator would have set separate rules to recover the costs directly. However, in line with the Government’s commitment to agile, light touch regulation, we feel that having two separate funding mechanisms is needlessly complex. That is why we have tabled these amendments to deliver a simpler mechanism for cost recovery by the regulator.

The change will ensure that all costs can be funded through the levy and will be subject to the extensive consultation requirements set out in clause 54. We will discuss clause 54 more fully in the clause stand part debate, but to summarise briefly, it imposes a statutory duty on the regulator to consult the Secretary of State, His Majesty’s Treasury and regulated clubs, as well as other relevant stakeholders, on its levy rules.

As well as being clearer and more transparent, the amendments will reduce the risk that the regulator is unable to fund costs related to any of its necessary functions, such as litigation. If the regulator were unable to cover these costs, there is a risk that it would either be unable to use some of the powers or it would have to seek Government financial assistance to fund them.

This change will ensure that the football industry covers the cost of regulation, and that the regulator has the necessary resources to be effective. That has always been the Bill’s policy intent. We do not anticipate that the changes will increase the costs on clubs. The functions that are currently non leviable are some of the strongest last resort powers the regulator can use. We expect them to be used only in exceptional circumstances, where collaboration and light touch intervention has been exhausted, and therefore it should not be a regular cost that clubs have to bear. The other amendments in this group are consequential, removing all references to the concept of leviable functions.

For the reasons I have set out, I hope the Committee will support these amendments.

I listened very carefully to the Minister’s explanation of these amendments, which have been introduced at a fairly late stage. I hope she can provide some clarity on a number of questions.

First, was it always the Government’s intention to have these separate streams of funding, as she has described, or is this a way of expanding the IFR’s powers to charge the levy? I am unclear about why the change has happened now, because we have obviously been through a lot of consultation and the Bill has been in the other place for some time. It is not necessarily clear why these changes have come about at this stage, so I would appreciate an answer.

Lastly, when the Minister described the charges as non leviable, the natural question was, “Who picks up the bill?” Are we talking about taxpayers, and if we are, what are those costs? Exposure to risk would obviously be a major concern for taxpayers and, I suspect, a number of Government Departments following the spending review. I appreciate her comments about how the Government believe that the functions may not be used or required, but there needs to be an answer about the risk of those non leviable payments and what that might look like in the future.

I am grateful to the shadow Minister. First, it is certainly not about expanding, and we have been very clear that we do not want scope creep. He asks “Why now?” We have always maintained that we want the best legislation and the best outcome. We very much listened to the debate in the other place. We reflected on that, and we believe that this is just a simpler, less complex way of going about it.

On his last question, I can very much assure him that it is quite the opposite. By making these changes, the costs will not have an impact on taxpayers. We are clear about that.

I am still unclear on that point, but I am happy to have the answer in writing. Who will pick up the bill when the levy cannot be charged to clubs, and what will that bill look like? I am not at all clear about how that will play out in practice. I am not sure whether I am misunderstanding the Minister, and I am happy to have it in writing, but I am not clear what it means.

I say gently that I think the shadow Minister is misunderstanding, and I am happy to write to him. The amendment means that all functions can now be covered by the levy, whereas previously there were two funding mechanisms in the Bill. It is a technical change.

I agree with the Minister—my understanding of what she just said is the same—but that leaves a tiny bit of clarity still to be given. Will all the normal running costs of the regulator be met by the levy, and none by the taxpayer?

Yes, that is the intention.

Amendment 18 agreed to. Amendments made: 19, in clause 53, page 42, line 13, leave out “leviable functions” and insert “functions under this Act”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22. Amendment 20, in clause 53, page 42, line 14, leave out “leviable functions” and insert “functions under this Act”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22. Amendment 21, in clause 53, page 42, line 19, leave out “leviable”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22. Amendment 22, in clause 53, page 42, line 26, leave out subsection (4).—(Stephanie Peacock.) This amendment removes the definition of “leviable functions” so that the IFR may charge a levy for all of its functions under the Act.

I beg to move amendment 105, in clause 53, page 42, line 42, at end insert— “(6A) Once the IFR has established a levy under subsection (1) and made the required payments under section 96, the IFR must only fund its functions under this Act through its own revenue streams.

(6B) For the purposes of subsection (6A) the IFR’s ‘own revenue streams’ are any amounts payable to the IFR from regulated clubs under subsection (1).”

This amendment requires the IFR to be self funding through the industry levy, but after it has paid its initial costs and the Secretary of State’s establishment costs to the Treasury. The amendment would require the Government’s new regulator to be self funding through the industry levy, but after it has paid its initial costs and the Secretary of State’s establishment costs to the Treasury, so that it is entirely self sustaining. That is not unreasonable; taxpayers are already being squeezed by this Government, so it would be ludicrous to suggest that they should foot the bill for the Labour Government’s regulator. That is why I tabled the amendment, which seeks to place a clear financial obligation on the regulator to ensure that, after covering its start up and establishment costs, it becomes entirely self funding through the industry levy.

The principle behind the amendment is simple: if we are to create an independent regulator for football, its independence must extend beyond structure to include financial independence from the taxpayer. The clause gives the Secretary of State discretion to determine the mechanics of the levy, but it leaves unanswered an essential question: who ultimately pays—we have had a bit of discussion about that—and for how long? The amendment provides a clear and reasonable answer: the taxpayer may support the regulator’s launch, as might be expected, but once that is done, the regulator should stand on its own two feet.

Let us not forget the purpose of the Bill: the regulator is intended to be arm’s length, neutral and shielded from political interference. However, the Government have gone to great lengths to compromise that independence through their appointment, as we have discussed, and the principle would be fully compromised if the regulator remained financially reliant on the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, or the Treasury for that matter. Independence is not just about who makes the appointments, but about who signs the cheques.

If the regulator is to carry out its duties credibly—overseeing financial discipline, enforcing ownership standards and planning across the football pyramid for the long term—it must operate free from any perception of ministerial influence. That means being self funding. The idea that the British taxpayer should continue to fund the ongoing operations of this new body is simply not justifiable, particularly at a time when families are feeling the squeeze and public services are under pressure. If clubs need a regulator—and the Government have decided that they do—then clubs, not pensioners in Bexley or shop workers in Barnsley, should pay for that regulator.

The amendment would also introduce discipline into the regulatory model. It would ensure that the Government’s regulator lives within its means, plans sustainably and operates efficiently, just as it will expect clubs to. We must avoid the slow drift we have seen with other public bodies, where what begins as temporary state support gradually hardens into permanent public subsidy with no sunset clause or accountability.

By requiring the regulator to repay its start up costs and then operate independently, we would make a clear distinction between initial public investment and long term industry responsibility. It is not unreasonable to ask that football, having accepted the need for regulatory oversight, for which many have lobbied, now contributes to that oversight on a permanent and self sustaining basis.

That gives rise to a number of questions for the Minister. Is there a timeline for when the regulator is expected to be self funding, or will it continue to draw on the public purse for a number of years? What provision, if any, has been made to recover the taxpayers’ outlay once the regulator begins to collect levy income? I would be grateful, as would taxpayers across the country, for reassurances from the Minister that those issues are being addressed, and that the taxpayer will not be left to subsidise the industry without a clear exit plan.

My amendment would protect the principle of independence. It would safeguard the public purse and ensure that those who arguably benefit from oversight are the ones who pay for it. Football is told that it will get a strong, credible and financially sound regulator, but taxpayers deserve clarity, discipline and fairness in how that regulator is funded. I therefore urge the Committee to support the amendment and make the regulator accountable to the industry it oversees, not dependent on the Government that created it. Let us build something that is self sustaining, responsible, and fit for the future.

During our debate on the technical changes proposed by the Government, we discussed the removal of the non leviable functions. That means that everything will be levy funded, so there will be no cost to the taxpayer. We absolutely agree with the hon. Gentleman’s points about the regulator being self sustaining and self funding. The Government also agree that the regulator should not be able to borrow money at its own discretion, which is why it is already prevented from doing so in paragraph 37(2) of schedule 2, which sets out that the regulator cannot borrow money unless explicitly permitted to as part of the financial assistance from the Secretary of State. We expect that that would occur only if absolutely necessary and in extreme circumstances, and would be provided only subject to conditions set by the Secretary of State.

There is no need for the restriction to be duplicated. We absolutely agree that the regulator should be fully funded through the levy, and that is exactly what the levy is designed to do. I will come on to that in more detail when we discuss the levy under clause 53 stand part. The Bill ensures that the regulator’s source of funding for all regulatory functions is the levy. Any financial penalties it imposes through enforcement action can also be used to offset any litigation costs and reduce the burden on compliant clubs.

I appreciate that the Minister said that she will come on to that subject in a later debate, but can she be clear about start up costs and their recovery for taxpayers? How is it envisaged that those costs will be repaid? I appreciate the point she makes about levy contributions, but how will the start up costs that have been incurred now, along with the cost of the shadow football regulator, be recovered, if at all?

I would like to address that later, if possible. I have heard the question, and will make sure the hon. Gentleman gets an answer. For the reasons I have set out, I hope he will withdraw his amendment.

I appreciate the Minister’s comments, but it is very difficult to withdraw an amendment without clarity about the questions that we are posing. On that basis, I am afraid that we will not seek to withdraw the amendment.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

36|0|5|9|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Amendments made: 23, in clause 53, page 43, line 2, leave out “leviable functions” and insert “functions under this Act”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.

Amendment 24, in clause 53, page 43, line 4, leave out “its leviable” and insert “those”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.

I beg to move amendment 6, in clause 53, page 43, line 35, after “club” insert “and in particular that the starting point for calculation of the levy payment applicable to a particular club should be a percentage of annual revenue”.

This amendment would require the IFR to have regard to a football club’s percentage of annual revenue when calculating a levy payment. I encourage the Minister to say whether she thinks that the levy payment should relate to the income of clubs. Some clubs are clearly mega rich—multi million pound businesses, every year—but other clubs’ income is down in the few thousands of pounds. My amendment is probing, really, but will the Minister confirm whether clubs’ income is the basic building block on which the levy will be formulated?

I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East for tabling his amendment. The Government completely understand the importance of any charges on clubs being transparent and proportionate and offering value for money. That must be achieved while maintaining the regulator’s operational independence and flexibility to respond to industry developments in the future. I will come on to discuss the levy in detail, but I will set out the key points now for clarity, in relation both to this amendment and to how the Bill ensures the levy is affordable for clubs.

The regulator must set out in levy rules how the annual levy payments will be calculated. The Bill explicitly requires the regulator to have regard to the club’s financial resources and position in the pyramid. That would include revenue. It should ensure a proportionate approach where no club, big or small, is asked to pay more than what is fair and affordable. Premier League clubs are expected to shoulder the majority of costs, reducing the financial burden on smaller clubs.

It would not be appropriate to prescribe an exact methodology for charging the levy in legislation, as doing so would remove the regulator’s ability to explore other possibly more effective and proportionate methods of charging. That would be counter to the agile and independent regulator we want to create. For example, a club might have a relatively low organic revenue, but its owners might have very deep pockets. The regulator might want to take that into account to ensure that charges are fair, proportionate and relative to circumstances.

I also want to highlight that there is a statutory requirement for the regulator to consult industry on the levy. Every regulated club will be consulted. That transparency means that no club will be surprised by the changes asked of them. That will be sufficient to ensure the levy is fair and proportionate. For the reasons I have set out, I am unable to accept the amendment.

I accept the Minister’s explanation, and I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Before I speak on clause 53, I draw the Committee’s attention to a procedural matter. In preparing for the debate, officials identified some inconsistencies in the impact assessment published on the Bill’s parliamentary web page and gov.uk. It appears that as figures were updated during the development of the impact assessment, they were not reflected in the summary of costs on one page at the beginning of the paper, which was related to the compliance cost and operational cost. The figures are correct in the main body of the impact assessment, and the total cost that those figures added up to is still correct. The inconsistencies also featured in the version submitted by the previous Government. For full accuracy and transparency, we have now corrected it, and the impact assessment on gov.uk was updated last night. We have notified the Public Bill Office to ensure the parliamentary website is updated as soon as possible, and there will be an updated version in the Library shortly.

Having provided that clarification, I will now discuss clause 53, which enables the regulator to charge a levy to licensed clubs that covers the regulator’s running cost. That follows the precedent of other regulators such as the Financial Conduct Authority, the Competition and Markets Authority and Ofcom. The levy methodology is an operational assessment that the regulator is best placed to make independently. By making football clubs more sustainable in the long term, the regulator will be providing a service to the industry. It is only fair that as a wealthy industry, football, as opposed to the taxpayer, should cover the cost of regulation, as has been well discussed by the Committee this afternoon.

The cost of regulation would represent just a tiny fraction of football’s more than £6 billion annual revenue. The industry will also benefit from regulation, which will deliver a more stable pyramid of sustainable and resilient clubs, and so help protect the commercial value of English football. The legislation puts robust checks and balances on the regulator. It will be limited to raising funds to meet a set of tightly defined costs that are necessary for regulatory activity only. It is clear in the clause what the levy covers and how the money will be used, ensuring the regulator’s transparency. As I alluded to in the discussion on Government amendments 18 to 26, all costs can now be funded through the levy.

However, the regulator will not have a blank cheque. It will be subject to numerous safeguards including annual auditing by the National Audit Office, and its annual accounts will be laid before Parliament. That and other safeguards, such as the Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s responsibility as a sponsor, will provide the necessary transparency and scrutiny to deliver value for money.

In addition, as I set out when we discussed the previous group of amendments, the clause also requires the regulator to have regard to a club’s individual financial position when setting the levy charge. Specifically, that covers the financial resources of a club and the league in which it plays. That should ensure a proportionate approach where no club, big or small, is asked to pay more than what is fair and affordable. That will be aided by the requirement for the regulator to consult all licensed clubs, which I will speak to in more detail in the debate on the next group of amendments. In addition, once operational, the regulator will have a legal requirement to set out its levy charges annually and consult all regulated clubs on its methodology.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 53, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 54 Section 53: consultation and publication

I beg to move amendment 102, in clause 54, page 44, line 7, leave out subsection (2).

This amendment would remove the ability for the IFR not to consult on changes to the levy rules if the IFR considered them to be minor.

With this it will be convenient to discuss amendment 103, in clause 54, page 44, line 10, leave out “As soon as is reasonably practicable”

and insert “Six months”.

The amendment requires the IFR to publish levy rules six months before the chargeable period.

The clause sets out the consultation process that the Government’s new regulator must follow before introducing or amending the rules governing the industry levy that clubs will pay to fund the regulator’s operations, as we discussed on clause 53. The clause is designed to ensure that any such changes are not made in a vacuum and that the regulator consults the right people, provides a draft of the rules and gathers feedback before finalising anything. On the face of it, this is a welcome safeguard, but, as is so often the case with this Bill, the detail deserves much closer scrutiny.

Let us be clear: the industry levy is not a trivial matter. It is the mechanism by which clubs will fund the regulator, and the amount of levy and the method by which it is calculated or collected could have serious financial consequences, especially for clubs operating on tight margins, as we have discussed. We are talking about a compulsory statutory payment, not a voluntary contribution or a negotiated fee. Any change to the rules governing the levy must therefore be subject to robust scrutiny, proper stakeholder input and full transparency.

The clause requires the regulator to consult a named list of stakeholders as well as any others it considers appropriate. It also requires a draft version of the proposed levy rules to be published as part of the consultation. So far, so good. But—this is a significant but—the clause also includes a major loophole.

The clause states that the Government’s regulator does not need to consult at all if it considers the proposed changes to the levy rules to be “minor”. Crucially, the regulator itself is to determine whether such a change is minor. Why is the regulator being permitted to define what counts as minor without any external check, threshold or approval? That creates a dangerous conflict of interest where the Minister’s regulator becomes the judge and jury in its own process. What is minor to the Government’s regulator may be highly significant to lower league clubs, such as a League Two or National League club trying to manage a tight budget.

Once again, the Bill has a significant risk of regulatory mission creep. We must consider the cumulative effect of so called minor changes: one small rule adjustment may seem harmless, but several such changes made without consultation could over time significantly alter the levy framework, placing new burdens on clubs without ever facing proper scrutiny. That is how regulatory creep begins, and that is precisely what the clause should be guarding against, but, as drafted, it does not.

Would the Minister consider amending the clause to define “minor” changes more clearly, perhaps by setting out objective criteria or requiring approval from the Secretary of State, Parliament or an independent panel? Alternatively, would she consider a threshold mechanism where changes with a financial impact above a certain level must trigger consultation regardless of her own regulator’s view?

I suspect that the answer to those questions will be no, which is why I tabled amendment 102, which would remove the regulator’s power to skip consultation when it determines a change to be minor. The intent behind the exemption may be practical and be—to avoid unnecessary bureaucracy—but in reality it gives the Government’s regulator unilateral power to decide whether stakeholders should be consulted on changes that could have material financial consequences.

Crucially, the definition of “minor” is left entirely to the regulator’s own judgment, as I have said. There is no objective test, no threshold and no review. Will the Minister explain why the Government believe it is acceptable for a statutory regulator to decide, on its own authority, when it is allowed to bypass the requirement to consult clubs and stakeholders that will be legislated for by Parliament? In every other walk of regulated life, such exemptions would be expected to come with clear limits or external oversight, yet in this instance we are effectively giving the Government’s regulator the ability to mark its own homework.

Let us not forget that the levy is not an optional contribution but a statutory obligation. Clubs will have no choice but to pay whatever is set, which means that even small changes could have big consequences, particularly for those lower down the pyramid. What may seem minor to the regulator may not seem so minor to a National League club balancing its books.

Does the Minister recognise that cumulative so called minor changes could, over time, significantly increase the regulatory burden on clubs without ever triggering a formal consultation? That is the risk of leaving this loophole in the Bill. It is not just about what the Government’s regulator might do today; it is also about what a future regulator—possibly a more activist regulator, although I hope not—might decide in years to come. We need to close the door now before that risk becomes reality.

If clubs are to have confidence in the new regulatory regime, they must feel that major financial decisions will not be made without their involvement. Even the perception that the Government’s regulator could tweak the levy regime unilaterally using the exemption for minor changes could erode trust, particularly among the smaller clubs that are already concerned. Consultation must not be seen as optional; it must be the default, not the exception.

That leads me to amendment 103, which aims to improve the clarity of the Government’s regulator’s approach to any levy that it seeks to impose. The specific issue that it seeks to correct is that, under the Bill as drafted, the regulator must publish details of the levy as soon as is reasonably practicable before the start of a chargeable period. My amendment would require the Government’s new regulator to publish the levy rules at least six months before the beginning of the chargeable period to which they apply. It is about financial certainty, about clubs being able to plan and about not changing the rules on the eve of a new season.

We know that many clubs, especially further down the pyramid, operate on tight annual budgets. They finalise player contracts, ticketing strategies and community programmes months in advance. A late change to the levy rate or calculation method could throw all that into confusion. The amendment would help to give English football clubs the clarity that they need to prepare. It would ensure that levy changes are not imposed at short notice and it would enforce a principle that reasonable regulators should provide advance notice of costs.

What safeguards, if any, will the Government establish to ensure that levy changes are communicated to the affected clubs in good time? If the answer is that it will be left to guidance or good practice, that will simply be not good enough. Good intentions are no substitute for legislative certainty. Both amendments are modest, reasonable and—we believe—entirely consistent with the Government’s stated ambition to build a trusted and transparent regulator that works with clubs, not over them. We must get the process right.

Clubs must know when a charge is coming and how much it will cost them and their fans, and they must be given a chance to respond. That is what the amendments would provide—nothing more and nothing less. Removing the minor change loophole would ensure that no future regulator could bypass scrutiny at its own convenience, and the requirement to provide six months’ notice would guarantee that clubs are not left scrambling to deal with cost changes with no time to prepare. This is about good governance, fair process and fiscal discipline.

Clause 54 provides the procedural backbone for how the Government’s regulator will engage with the industry when amending leverage rules.

Let me provide some context. I will not name the team, but there is a team in the National League whose cash at hand in 2020 was £25,000, and by 2022 that had reduced to £9,802. We are talking about clubs with an incredibly tight financial structure. I completely agree with my hon. Friend the shadow Minister that changes may be minor to the regulator, but they will not be minor to such teams.

I thank my hon. Friend for that valuable contribution, which gets to the heart of the amendments and what we are seeking to do. As I have said, they are designed not to undermine the regulator but to give transparency and fairness to clubs, so they can prepare their finances accordingly.

As I was saying, clause 54 leaves too much discretion in the hands of the regulator, particularly through the vague and undefined minor change exemption. We cannot create a system in which financial rules that affect the entire English game can be altered without oversight simply because the Government’s regulator says that the change is small or minor. If we want confidence, we need consistency. If we want accountability, we need clarity. Let us ensure that the Government’s regulator consults not just when it wants to, but when it needs to.

I thank the shadow Minister for tabling his amendments. Amendment 102 would require the regulator to consult every regulated club, the Secretary of State, the Treasury and others that the regulator considers appropriate, for minor changes to the levy rules. Clause 54 imposes a statutory duty on the regulator to consult the Secretary of State, His Majesty’s Treasury and regulated clubs, as well as other appropriate stakeholders, on its levy rules. However, clause 54(2) sets out that consultation is not needed for minor changes to the levy rules. This is intended to allow the regulator to make immaterial amendments or corrections such as typos or minor rewording without excessive bureaucratic burden.

The amendment would add a layer of unnecessary process that is unjustified given the extensive consultation requirements on substantial changes. It is not in anyone’s interest, especially the regulator’s, to stretch the definition of minor, which is a well recognised legal term. If the regulator does not consult on a change that has made a material impact on a club, it could face a legal challenge through a judicial review. That will ensure that the regulator is accountable for what it considers minor.

I do not know whether the Minister has ever conducted a judicial review, but we could not get one done for £9,000.

I appreciate the hon. Gentleman’s point, but refer gently to my earlier comments. We are talking about typos and very minor changes. I give that example to show that the regulator is accountable for what it considers minor.

On amendment 103, requiring the regulator to publish the information on costs laid out in clause 54(4) six months before the chargeable period would create an operational challenge and would simply not work in practice. The regulator would have to estimate its costs for a chargeable period, having only half a year’s costs to base it on. That could lead to inaccurate levy charges, which could see the regulator underfunded or clubs needlessly burdened. The current requirement to publicise charges as soon as reasonably practicable strikes the right balance between adequate notice for clubs and operational flexibility for the regulator to ensure an accurate and appropriate levy charge.

For the reasons I have set out, I cannot accept the amendments.

I listened carefully to the Minister’s response, which was fairly limited. I do not have enough confidence in her replies to withdraw the amendments. We are concerned about the impact on clubs and about the loophole in the interpretation of minor changes. I am not clear on the regulator’s accountability to stop scope creep. I suggested a number of options that the Government might look to adopt instead and did not hear any response to them. On that basis, and linked to some of the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne, I wish to press the amendments to a Division.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

37|0|3|10|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Amendment proposed: 103, in clause 54, page 44, line 10, leave out

“As soon as is reasonably practicable”

and insert “Six months”.—(Mr Louie French.)

The amendment requires the IFR to publish levy rules six months before the chargeable period.—(Mr French.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

38|0|3|10|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Amendments made: 25, in clause 54, page 44, line 13, leave out “leviable functions” and insert “functions under this Act”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.

Amendment 26, in clause 54, page 44, line 14, leave out “its leviable” and insert “those”.—(Stephanie Peacock.)

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 22.

Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Clause 54 imposes a statutory duty on the regulator to consult the Secretary of State, His Majesty’s Treasury and regulated clubs, as well as other appropriate stakeholders, on its levy rules. This requirement to consult on draft levy rules will ensure that the views of clubs are considered as the regulator determines its charging methodology.

The statutory requirement in the clause to consult the Secretary of State and the Treasury will provide further scrutiny and assurance that the regulator’s proposed methodology is fair and proportionate. Allowing the regulator to propose its own charging structure within the strict safeguards outlined in clause 53, and with consultation requirements, enhances its independence and allows for greater scrutiny and accountability of the regulator.

The regulator can be held directly accountable for its charging decisions and the outcomes they produce. The levy is of course an operational matter that should be determined independently by the regulator, in consultation with those it will affect. The regulator will have the necessary information to design a levy based on a robust financial assessment of clubs to ensure that charges are fair and evidence based. Giving the regulator the discretion to set charges reinforces operational independence and mirrors the approach of other regulators, such as Ofcom and the Financial Conduct Authority.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 54, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 55 Duties to notify and consult the IFR Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

To achieve its objectives, which include a club financial soundness objective, a systemic financial resilience objective and a heritage objective, the regulator will need information from the relevant competition organisers. The clause places a duty on the competition organisers to provide that information, and in the event that they do not, they would be liable to be sanctioned.

A competition organiser must notify the regulator if there is a risk that the regulator may not fulfil its objectives. That is with regard to the club financial soundness objective or the regulator’s systemic resilience objective. In addition, the organiser will need to notify the regulator if it is in breach of a commitment it made as an alternative to a financial discretionary licence condition, or if a club has breached the rules of a specific competition run by the organiser.

The organiser will also have to consult the regulator if it proposes to change its own rules. That is necessary given the interaction between the regulator’s regulation and that of a specified competition organiser. The regulator wants its own regulation to be necessary and proportionate and not to overburden the clubs. It is therefore important to understand any changes in other rules that clubs need to abide by, given that they may increase or decrease the financial risk of clubs.

In all cases, the relevant information will act as an additional source of data to inform the regulator of risks within the industry and whether the regulator needs to impose additional regulation or proceed to enforcement and sanction to ensure the long term financial sustainability of the industry. I commend the clause to the Committee.

The clause sets out a series of duties that require various football stakeholders, including leagues and governing bodies, to notify and consult the Government’s new regulator in certain circumstances. At its core, the clause is intended to improve co ordination and to prevent regulatory surprises, which in principle is reasonable. We all agree that where the governance of the game affects financial sustainability or club integrity, the Government’s regulator should be aware and engaged.

I will focus on subsection (6), which is a far more consequential provision than it might first appear. I believe it strikes at the very heart of one of the most sensitive and important issues in football governance: the independence of sport from Government control. Subsection (6) imposes a statutory duty on specified competition organisers to consult the regulator when they either add or remove a relevant rule of a specified competition, or vary a relevant rule of a specified competition. I note the comments of the hon. Member for Sheffield South East about when the regulator is involved in a competition and when it is not, with regard to the FA Cup. Some clarity on that would be much appreciated.

In short, the provision means that competitions such as the Premier League, the EFL and the FA Cup would be required—based on the wording of this part of the Bill—to consult the Government’s football regulator every time they change or amend a rule deemed to be relevant by the regulator itself. That might sound innocuous, but let us be clear about what it means in practice: for the first time, a politically appointed regulator, accountable to the Secretary of State, who has received donations from that regulator, would be given a formal, statutory role in the internal rule making processes of English football competitions.

This is not a light touch oversight mechanism; we fear it might end up being a direct institutional influence. As we know, it is not compatible with UEFA’s requirements on the non interference of Government. UEFA statutes are clear that national football associations and their affiliated leagues and competitions must be free from political or Government control. The relevant rule is article 7bis (2) of the UEFA statutes, which states: “Member Associations shall manage their affairs independently and with no undue influence from third parties.”

Article 9 goes on to state: “A Member Association may in particular be suspended if state authorities interfere in its affairs in such a significant way that...it may no longer be considered as fully responsible for the organisation of football related matters in its territory”.

It is pretty clear that the FA will no longer be considered fully responsible for the organisation of football related matters in its territory should the Bill pass with this provision. Moreover, FIFA echoes that approach in its regulations, particularly in article 14 of the FIFA statutes, which ensures that member associations, such as the FA, remain autonomous and free from governmental or political influence. Article 15 of the FIFA statutes further requires members to be neutral in matters of politics and religion, to be independent, and to avoid any forms of political interference.

Subsection (6) brings us dangerously close to the line, if not across it. Unfortunately for the Minister, the Government seem to be on the wrong side of that line. I will press the Minister on that point, because however carefully the clause may have been worded in terms of consultation, in reality it inserts the Government’s new regulator into the core rule making processes of the football pyramid. Once that principle is established, the scope can grow.

We know that there are international concerns about scope creep, as I mentioned when speaking to amendment 97.

“UEFA is concerned about the potential for scope creep within the IFR. While the initial intent of the IFR is to oversee the long term financial sustainability of clubs and heritage assets, there is always a risk that, once established, the IFR may expand its mandate beyond these areas”.

Those are not my words.

Will the Minister confirm whether UEFA has been consulted on the drafting of the clause, and whether the Government have received written assurances that this level of regulatory involvement is compatible with UEFA’s independence rules? If she has, will she place a copy in the Library? If she has received any correspondence to the contrary, will she also place that in the Library so that the Committee has confidence ahead of Third Reading and can scrutinise the provision properly? What safeguards are in place to prevent this from being interpreted—either in Brussels or somewhere else—as a breach of sporting autonomy?

This is not theoretical—it is a real and dangerous risk for English football. Let us remember, in recent years, that other countries have faced disciplinary threats or warnings for perceived interference in football. We have seen federations sanctioned before. National teams and clubs have been threatened with exclusion from competitions. For example, Greece was briefly suspended from international football in 2006 after the Greek Government passed a law that interfered—that was the term used—with the autonomy of the Greek football federation, in violation of UEFA and FIFA regulations. In 1999, Moldova’s clubs and national team faced a ban from UEFA competitions, after it was deemed that there was political interference in the running of its football federation. In 2002, FIFA suspended Zimbabwe and Kenya from international competitions due to perceived Government interference in the football administrations of those countries.

Is the Minister really willing to jeopardise English football’s participation in UEFA tournaments by granting the regulator the power to scrutinise and potentially influence the internal workings of competitions, as discussed in this clause? Make no mistake: if the clause triggers disciplinary action or undermines the FA’s standing with UEFA, and it clearly creates the scope to do so, the consequences will be felt not only in Whitehall, but on the pitch, in the terraces and in the hearts of supports across the country.

Even if the regulator has no formal veto, and we accept that it does not, the mere presence of a legal obligation to consult creates an environment in which the Government’s regulator’s views cannot be ignored. That is not neutrality; that is co governance, and it erodes the long established principle that football is run by its institutions, not the state. Would the Minister therefore consider limiting the scope of the clause to only those rule changes that would have a demonstrable impact on financial sustainability, rather than every rule change deemed relevant? Better still, why not simply require notification, rather than consultation, if the Government are truly confident that they do not seek to exercise influence over the regulator or the leagues?

Much has been said during the Bill’s progress about the importance of oversight, sustainability and protecting fans. All of that is right, but we must also acknowledge that there are red lines. One of the most important is this: football must remain a self governing sport wherever possible, regulated in accordance with its own rules and free from political interference from the regulator. We do not want the English game to become a test case for UEFA sanctions. We do not want our clubs or our national team to be dragged into disputes between politicians and footballing authorities. We do not want a slow drift towards Government directed football in which Ministers, through their regulator, begin to shape the game from above. That is not oversight; it is control and it is a step too far.

Clause 55, especially subsection (6), opens a door that we believe should remain very much closed. We support the responsible regulation that we know is going to pass. We support transparency and accountability, but we do not and cannot support a regime that places the Government’s regulator at the heart of football’s competitive rule making. The Minister must clarify how she will make sure that her regulator will not inadvertently or deliberately influence English football in a way that UEFA or FIFA deem to be a breach of their rules. Otherwise, the Government risk doing irreversible harm to the integrity, autonomy and international standing of English football.

I thank the shadow Minister for his points. Clubs will be subject to a number of rules from different football authorities. Failure to comply with them may indicate that the club is in some financial difficulty and may prompt the regulator to assess the risk profile of the club. Changes in a competition’s rules may lead to clubs taking additional risks or may threaten the financial soundness of the system. The regulator therefore needs to be aware of such changes so that it is in a position to reassess the long term financial sustainability of clubs and whether, as a result of the rule change, additional regulation is needed.

The shadow Minister did accept that there is no veto in the clause. I reiterate once again that UEFA are happy with the Bill as drafted. He drew the Committee’s attention to a specific line in the Bill, but I remind him that it has not been changed from the previous iteration of the Bill.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 55 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 56 Part 6: overview and interpretation

I beg to move amendment 76, in clause 56, page 45, line 39, after “organisers” insert “or by a regulated club”.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 77, in clause 56, page 46, line 4, after “organiser” insert “or directly received by a regulated club”.

Amendment 78, in clause 56, page 46, line 17, after “organiser” insert “or a regulated club”.

Amendment 79, in clause 56, page 46, line 24, after “organisers” insert “or by any club participating in a competition organised by one of those organisers”.

Amendment 80, in clause 57, page 47, line 9, after “organisers” insert “or by a regulated club”.

Amendment 81, in clause 57, page 47, line 19, leave out from “revenue” to “in” in line 21 and insert “received by one specified competition organiser or regulated club in or in respect of that season compared to the relevant revenue received by that specified competition organiser or regulated club”.

Amendment 82, in clause 57, page 47, line 29, after “organisers” insert “, or by any regulated club participating in a competition organised by one of those organisers,”.

Clubs in the English football pyramid currently barter as a collective for funding from broadcasters, but it is not hard to imagine a future in which Liverpool, Manchester City, Arsenal, Chelsea—the hon. Member for Spelthorne has now gone so I can say that—or other big clubs decide that they are going to barter alone. That has happened in other European countries. In fact, Spain had to legislate to stop Barcelona and Real Madrid cashing in on their massive marketable machine that massively distorted the Spanish game.

These amendments are fairly simple. They build in a future failsafe to stop the threat of that happening. If it does happen, the revenue gained by those clubs will be taken into account in the redistribution of funds in the game. It seems like a logical failsafe to introduce to the Bill, which we hope will be accepted.

I thank the hon. Member for his amendments. We understand the intent behind them but believe that the drafting of the Bill sufficiently captures the current primary sources of revenue in the game. We will discuss clause 56 more fully during the clause stand part debate, but to summarise briefly, among other things, it defines which revenue streams are in scope of the backstop process. Revenue in scope is called “relevant revenue” and is limited in the Bill to revenue received by a league for broadcast rights to league matches.

Broadcast revenue is undisputedly the main source of revenue in English football, but we acknowledge that that may not always be the case. Football’s financial landscape is dynamic and its economic model may not remain static. That is why the Bill already allows for the definition of “relevant revenue” to be amended if necessary. The Secretary of State can amend the definition by making regulations, but only after consultation with the leagues, the regulator and the FA. That flexibility future proofs the definition of “relevant revenue” against potential changes in the structure of the industry while ensuring that the definition remains firmly rooted in the current reality.

We expect that, throughout the distributions process, the leagues will effectively represent the interests of their constituent clubs. However, the backstop process, including the final proposal stage, is ultimately about resolving distributions between the leagues. It is about how money earned by the leagues flows from one league to another, not between individual clubs. It is therefore right that, given how finances currently flow, it is revenue received by the leagues as a whole, not individual clubs, that should be considered. I am therefore unable to accept the amendments.

We recognise the numbers—although we Liberal Democrats now outnumber the official Opposition—so we will not press this to a vote. However, it is worth considering that, in future, we might end up in a situation where some of our bigger clubs start to try to negotiate on their own for their broadcast revenue. The Minister did not reassure me that that could not happen. As I understand it, we do not have legislation that would stop that. There is nothing in the game to stop that apart from Arsenal, Manchester United, Chelsea and Manchester City deciding to play together nicely.

Although we are not reassured, there is no point in forcing this to a vote. But we hope that the comments may be taken forward and taken into account by the regulator in future, and perhaps we will have this discussion again as and when those big clubs decide that they are going to kick up a stink and try to ruin the rest of football for everyone else. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

I beg to move amendment 124, in clause 56, page 46, line 3, leave out subsection (2) and insert— “(2) In this Part, revenue received by a specified competition organiser is ‘relevant revenue’ if— (a) it is revenue received as a result of the sale or acquisition of rights to exploit the broadcasting of football matches included in a competition organised by the specified competition organiser, and (b) it is not revenue that the specified competition organiser distributes to a club by virtue of a team operated by the club being relegated from a competition organised by the specified competition organiser.”

Clause 56 introduces the framework for the resolution process, which is a formal mechanism through which the Government’s new regulator may intervene to help to resolve disputes between football authorities, competitions and clubs in certain prescribed areas. The clause is important because it sets the boundaries of when and how the Government’s new regulator may be invited, or, in some cases, compelled to step into the room on issues that until now have been managed internally within the football pyramid.

We understand the intention behind this process. It reflects years of unresolved tensions in the game between different tiers of the pyramid, between governing bodies, and, most notably, between the Premier League and the EFL. Clause 56 and the following clauses in part 6 provide the bones of a system for dispute resolution, in the hope of reaching consensus where negotiation has failed. In principle, that has merit. However, we believe that the clause as drafted risks crossing a line—not into oversight, but into interventionism. It risks turning the regulator from a referee into a participant, and that risk becomes very real when we consider what types of decisions might fall within that process.

That is why I have tabled amendment 124, which would exclude parachute payments to the regulated clubs from the scope of the resolution process, as was the case in the Bill that the Minister supported during the previous Parliament. Clause 56 is not procedural, but foundational. It defines who can apply to trigger the resolution process, namely certain governing bodies and competition organisers, and what is meant by the term “relevant revenue”. In subsection (2), this is revenue received “as a result of the sale or acquisition of rights to exploit the broadcasting of football matches included in a competition organised by the specified competition organiser, or…from any other source specified, or of a description specified, in regulations made by the Secretary of State.”

In essence, the provisions allow disputes over financial redistribution to be brought before the Government’s new regulator, which may then facilitate a resolution or, in some cases, take further steps to impose one. The specific issue we have with the clause, which was introduced by the Government, relates to the parachute payments of financial support offered by the Premier League to clubs that are relegated to the EFL to help them adjust to the significant drop in broadcasting and commercial income. This is obviously an important point, given the wage bills and so on when clubs go down, but it is never far from being controversial. Some see the payments as being necessary to ensure financial continuity and competition in the Premier League on the way up, while others argue that they distort competition in the Championship on the way down, solidifying clubs as so called yo yo clubs that go up and down regularly.

Bringing parachute payments within the scope of the regulator’s resolution process, as clause 56 does, takes a significant step towards Government involvement in revenue redistribution among private members of the competition. That is not regulation; it is reallocation. In our view, it is an inappropriate function for a state backed regulator.

The amendment does not oppose the resolution process in principle; it supports it, and in fact returns the Bill to what the Minister previously supported. Can she tell us what has changed, and why she felt the need to make the change when she previously had no issue with this part of the Bill? My amendment seeks to make sure that the Government’s regulator does not intervene in areas that are already managed by mutual agreement between competitions.

Parachute payments are, by their nature, a Premier League solution to what is often a Premier League problem. They are not imposed on the EFL or funded by it, and although their knock on effects may be debated—I have my own views on that—they should not be subject to arbitration by a third party.

If we allow the Government’s regulator to adjudicate disputes over parachute payments, we risk setting a precedent that any form of commercial agreement, no matter how internal, can be referred for outside resolution. We believe that that would be a mistake, and would likely undermine the willingness of top flight clubs to continue sharing revenue in any form at all. If the Minister starts this process off on the wrong foot with clubs and this is not done in the right way, we fear that resentment would set in from day one. With the top flight already questioning—

Will the shadow Minister give way?

Yes, I will.

Does the shadow Minister agree that parachute payments are a very important financial factor in the EFL? From my experience as a Derby County fan—many things go back to this—I know that we ended up in administration because we chased and tried to compete with clubs that had parachute payments, and ultimately could not stay within the financial fair play regime. How does the shadow Minister see that being tackled? It is a fundamental flaw and it is driving clubs much closer to administration, and to the wall, in many cases.

I recognise the hon. Gentleman’s experience with Derby, and I understand his point. That is why I said there are a number of opinions, and this a very controversial subject. I have engaged with EFL clubs as part of this process, and we get a variety of opinions, even before we get to asking the Premier League clubs for their opinion, so I absolutely understand his point. This amendment is about trying to exclude parachute payments from this part of the Bill, rather than trying to take a decision on what parachute payment levels should be in any shape or form. That is the distinction we seek to make with the amendment, and I commend it to the Committee.

I thank the shadow Minister for the amendment, as it gives me the opportunity to speak to one of the key changes made in the new version of the Bill that this Government introduced. The amendment would take parachute payments out of the scope of the backstop, as they were in the previous Government’s Bill. The regulator needs to be able to consider all relevant revenue sources as part of the backstop process to get an accurate picture of any proposal’s impact on financial sustainability. That is why it was right to amend the definition of “relevant revenue” to ensure parachute payments could be considered as part of the backstop if necessary.

The shadow Minister pointed out that I supported the Bill when in Opposition, but I draw his attention to an amendment I put down then to this effect. We have had a clear and consistent view on this issue throughout the passage of both Bills through Parliament. We believe that allowing the regulator to make more informed decisions, rather than restricting what it can consider, will help to achieve the best possible outcome for the future of the game.

It is important to say that parachute payments will be reviewed only as part of the process if a number of steps are met. First, the backstop must be triggered. That can only happen in limited circumstances, most likely that there are five years since an agreement was reached between parties. We will discuss those tests in more detail when we debate clause 59. The regulator must consider that it cannot deliver its objectives unless it triggers the backstop. It must then also have clear evidence that parachute payments are causing sustainability issues to the wider pyramid—for example, they are identified in the state of the game report—and it will now have the ability to address that. If those steps are met, the regulator must have the ability to act. There was clearly a serious potential gap in the previous version of the legislation, which has now been rectified.

The other effect of the amendment is to remove the ability of the Secretary of State to change the definition of “relevant revenue” by making regulations. Football is a fast paced industry and the definition of “relevant revenue” might need to change as the industry changes in future, as we have discussed. If broadcast revenue ceases to be the primary source of revenue stream in the game, the definition will need to be amended to ensure that the backstop process remains a viable regulatory intervention.

There are already significant safeguards in place to ensure that this power is not used incorrectly. Consultation with the regulator, the FA and specified competition organisers is required before the power can be utilised, and any regulations will be scrutinised by Parliament under the affirmative procedure. On that basis, I do not accept the amendment, and I hope the shadow Minister will withdraw it.

This amendment would drive a coach and horses through the whole part of the Bill that deals with the proper distribution of football revenues. The shadow Minister is saying that it is quite reasonable that 80% of the money that the Premier League gives to other clubs should go to the handful of clubs who get parachute payments. It completely destroys competition in the Championship, and means that the clubs coming down often end up with multiples of the solidarity payments that the clubs who do not get parachute payments received. It is against the whole purpose and spirit of the legislation and the clause.

I know the previous Government would not listen to the idea of parachute payments being included; I thank my hon. Friend the Minister for listening to the concerns that have been raised by the majority of clubs, particularly in the EFL, and I hope that she resists any attempt to undermine the stand she has taken.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

39|0|2|10|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

I beg to move amendment 27, in clause 56, page 46, line 27, leave out “means an order under section 62(1) or (3)”

and insert “has the meaning given by section (Distribution orders)(6)”.

This amendment is consequential on the insertion of NC4. The amendment is consequential on Government new clause 4, which we will debate later. Although it depends on that later change, the amendment would change clause 56, which is why we are discussing it now. We will also discuss clause 56 in more detail later, but one of the things it does is set out key definitions of key terms used throughout the backstop provisions. One of those defined terms is “distribution order”, which is the order made by the regulator at the end of the backstop process. It is designed to resolve the questions for resolution if the leagues have not managed to do so during mediation. Currently, the Bill’s definition of “distribution order” refers to clause 62, but we propose to remove clause 62 and replace it with new clause 4. New clause 4 completely changes the final stage of the backstop process. I met the shadow Minister and the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Cheltenham, to discuss this ahead of the Bill Committee. It moves the backstop away from a binary, winner takes all model, and allows the regulator discretion to design a solution to distribution issues.

We will have a chance to debate that fully when we debate clause 62, so I will withhold some of my comments until we get to that point. This simple amendment just updates the definition of “distribution order”, so that it appropriately refers to new clause 4 instead of clause 62. It is vital that we make these sorts of consequential changes, to ensure that the legislation remains coherent. Therefore I hope that Members will support this amendment.

As the Minister said, we will come on to debate these issues later, but again, I just want to place it on the record that she has been really listening to concerns that have been raised about the pendulum nature of the previous backstop. This is a much better process, which we will come on to discuss in more detail. Thanks to the Minister, we will discuss it further, but it is a much better framework that we will now be putting in place for the regulator to decide on any disputes or failures to agree between the leagues.

Amendment 27 agreed to.

I beg to move amendment 28, in clause 56, page 46, line 42, leave out subsection (7).

This amendment removes the definition of “the question or questions for resolution” which is now superfluous.

With this it will be convenient to discuss Government amendments 29 to 51.

I begin by acknowledging the comments from my hon. Friend the Member for Sheffield South East. I appreciate him putting that on the record. Of course, we will have a fuller debate on the broader change later, so as I said, I will reserve my wider comments till we get to that point.

The backstop aims to ensure that where the industry cannot resolve the issue, revenue is distributed between the leagues in a sustainable way that furthers the regulator’s objectives. As I will set out in more detail when we debate clauses 57 and 58, it allows the leagues to apply to the regulator to intervene and help them to resolve specific issues that are in dispute between them. The issues that need resolving are referred to in the Bill as the “questions for resolution”. We will further discuss the process for triggering the backstop when we come on to debate clauses 57 to 59.

Put briefly, the triggering process requires a league applying to the regulator, showing that certain conditions listed in clause 57 are met, and putting forward a set of proposed “questions for resolution”. The other relevant league has a chance to respond to that proposal. The regulator will then consider the application and the response, and will decide whether to trigger the process. If it decides to trigger, it also decides exactly which questions must be taken forward and resolved through the backstop process. Therefore, the questions for resolution are set out at the very beginning and carry through, determining the scope of the whole process. They are the questions that the leagues discuss in mediation, as we will see when we debate clause 60, and they limit the scope of any regulator distribution order—something that we will discuss further when we come on to debate Government new clauses 3 and 4—to issues of financial sustainability.

Setting the questions for resolution is therefore a very important step that demands a clear statutory process and a rigorous approach by the regulator. That is even more important in the light of the proposed changes that Government new clauses 3 and 4 will make. Those new clauses propose a new model for the backstop—a staged regulator determination. They move away from the binary, winner takes all, final offer model and increase the regulator’s discretion to devise its own solution for distributions. Because of that increase in discretion for the regulator, it is important that the scope of the distributions process is well defined from the outset, so that all parties are clear about what the regulator will and will not rule on if the leagues ultimately cannot agree to an industry solution themselves.

These amendments therefore strengthen and clarify the process for—[Interruption.]

You’ve lost the room!

I have indeed—clearly.

These amendments therefore strengthen and clarify the process for setting the questions for resolution. They highlight the importance of a league proposing specific questions for resolution when it applies to the regulator. They emphasise that if the regulator agrees to trigger the backstop, it will not take a sweeping approach and try to rule on every possible aspect of distributions. It must set out specific questions that it will resolve, and its powers are then restricted to resolving those questions.

These amendments make it clear that questions must meet certain tests in order to be resolved through the backstop. Those tests are twofold. First, the regulator must consider that leaving the questions unresolved presents an apparent threat to the regulator’s objectives. Then they must consider that the questions could not be resolved within a reasonable time by the regulator exercising any of its other functions.

The amendments clarify that the regulator need not take forward all the questions proposed and that the regulator can modify the proposed questions. They will also require the regulator to take into account representations from the other league that accompany the application. That will give the regulator the flexibility to pick out which questions it is appropriate and within its remit to address, without forcing it to either accept every element of an application or reject the whole application outright.

The amendments also set out procedural requirements. They require the regulator to consult the FA before setting the questions for resolution, ensuring that the national governing body has a chance to raise any views about the scope of the backstop process. They will also ensure that the regulator transparently sets out what questions it has chosen and how it made that decision. The questions for resolution will then be taken forward into the mediation phase. That will ensure that all parties understand the specific aims of the mediation stage.

The Minister is setting out how important it is to get the distribution arrangements right. This is the part of the Bill that may be the most critical in ensuring that the pyramid is sustainable, which is the objective. It is great that the Government are working hard to get the backstop arrangements right, as she said. Does she agree that, once the regulator is in place, it will be important to have the state of the game report already in place—with an analysis of what is going wrong in the financial distribution and how it could be put right—before a distribution agreement is made and the backstop powers are used to bring that about?

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and he touches on something we will discuss later. It is important that the state of the game report takes place swiftly. That is an important part of the Bill. Of course, it is a backstop, and we are keen that a football led solution is the priority and that people get round the table. I often quote Dame Tracey Crouch, who was one of my predecessors as sport Minister, and obviously we know how involved she was in the Bill. In the previous Bill Committee, she made a short but very focused speech, which I encourage hon. Members to read, on how the backstop should be a backstop. I often quote that speech.

For the reasons I have set out, the amendments are vital for supporting our new backstop model, and I hope that they will be accepted. I commend them to the Committee.

Amendment 28 agreed to. Question proposed, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill.

Clause 56 is the first clause of part 6, which relates to financial distributions and the backstop mechanism in its totality. I understand the desire on both sides to apply appropriate scrutiny to a part of the Bill that could significantly impact the future financial landscape of football, and I hope through this debate to demonstrate that the approach taken in part 6 is the most proportionate and effective one.

These backstop powers have been introduced to help ensure that an agreement can be reached between the leagues on the distribution of revenue from the selling of TV broadcast rights. If the leagues cannot agree a deal, it will allow the regulator to step in as a last resort and impose one. A solution to this issue is vital to ensure the future financial sustainability of the football pyramid. The process has been designed to encourage an industry solution while providing the assurance that, should one not be reached, the regulator can ensure that one is put in place.

The Government have listened to industry, to members of both this Committee and its equivalent in the last Parliament, and to concerns raised in the other place. We have taken on board the points raised regarding the original distribution model in the Bill, and we have therefore tabled targeted amendments to improve the mechanism. As I have said more than once, I will set out the detail in a later group. We are confident that the regulator will have the powers necessary to ensure a timely, satisfactory distribution order, while not unduly inhibiting the ability of industry to resolve the issue itself.

Clause 56 sets out an overview of the backstop powers and outlines some key definitions that are important for clearly setting out the scope of these powers, including “relevant revenue”, which I will come on to in just a moment. Importantly, this clause also makes clear right at the outset in subsection (1) that the regulator can impose a distribution order only if the leagues are unable to reach an agreement during the backstop process. In other words, even after the process has been triggered, a regulator imposed solution remains a last resort, only to be used if industry fails to strike a deal.

One of the key terms defined in this clause is “relevant revenue”. It expressly includes broadcast revenue because this is the predominant source of revenue for the relevant leagues, and this is the revenue that underpins the financial flows between the leagues. This clause also allows the Secretary of State to specify other kinds of revenue to be included as “relevant revenue”. This is simply to future proof the policy; for instance, if broadcast revenue is no longer the main source of income for the leagues. However, there are safeguards on the use of this power. The Secretary of State must consult the regulator, the FA and the relevant leagues, and can use this power only when there has been a material change of circumstances. Any use of the power will be subject to the affirmative procedure in Parliament.

The previous Government’s version of the Bill explicitly excluded parachute payments from the definition of “relevant revenue”. Our version of the Bill no longer makes this distinction, allowing the inclusion of parachute payments where appropriate. This change was made to ensure that the regulator can consider all relevant aspects of revenue distribution as it makes a financial assessment of the game. Parachute payments can be included in the backstop only if the regulator considers that issues relating to parachute payments present an apparent threat to its objectives, such as the sustainability of the pyramid.

Another important definition in this clause is the “qualifying football season”. This determines which seasons can be in scope of the backstop. In effect, it limits the regulator’s power to only the next six football seasons, which prevents excessively long regulator orders or premature applications for seasons far in the future.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 56, as amended, accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Vicky Foxcroft.)

Adjourned till Tuesday 17 June at twenty five minutes past Nine o’clock.

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Gill Furniss, Carolyn Harris, Sir Desmond Swayne, † Martin Vickers

† Bloore, Chris (Redditch) (Lab)

† Brandreth, Aphra (Chester South and Eddisbury) (Con)

† Burton Sampson, David (Southend West and Leigh) (Lab)

† Chambers, Dr Danny (Winchester) (LD)

† Craft, Jen (Thurrock) (Lab)

† Dean, Josh (Hertford and Stortford) (Lab)

† Dixon, Anna (Shipley) (Lab)

† Evans, Dr Luke (Hinckley and Bosworth) (Con)

† Franklin, Zöe (Guildford) (LD)

† Irons, Natasha (Croydon East) (Lab)

† Joseph, Sojan (Ashford) (Lab)

† Kinnock, Stephen (Minister for Care)

† Morris, Joe (Hexham) (Lab)

† Owatemi, Taiwo (Lord Commissioner of His Majesty’s Treasury)

† Shastri Hurst, Dr Neil (Solihull West and Shirley) (Con)

† Stafford, Gregory (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)

† Wrighting, Rosie (Kettering) (Lab)

Claire Cozens, Harriet Deane, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Thursday 12 June 2025

(Afternoon)

[Martin Vickers in the Chair]

Mental Health Bill [Lords]

Clause 6

Grounds for community treatment orders

Amendment proposed (this day): 11, in clause 6, page 13, line 6, at end insert—

“(c) after subsection (6) insert—

‘(6A) Any person subject to a community treatment order must be informed orally and in writing at the time of the making of the order of their right to an independent mental health advocate under section 130A of this Act.’”—(Zöe Franklin.)

The amendment would ensure that people who are to be subject to a community treatment order would receive information about their right to advocacy.

Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following: Government amendment 30.

Clause stand part.

I will resist the temptation to go back to the start of my speech; I am sure that the Committee’s memories of it will have lasted over our short lunch break.

I was saying that although the Government’s reforms are, on the whole, positive, we must remain vigilant. The consideration of risks must be applied carefully and consistently to avoid unintended consequences such as deterring clinicians from using community treatment orders when they are genuinely needed or, conversely, enabling an overly cautious approach that restricts patients unnecessarily. We should also be mindful that some patients may find the process of extension and review stressful or confusing. Clear communication and patient involvement, as mandated, must be prioritised to uphold dignity and autonomy. Will the code of conduct aim to ensure a clear and definitive process for keeping patients and their advocates informed as to their rights in the process and what to expect?

The Committee must also address a key reason why this part of the law is being amended and why there is so much concern about the current state of mental health legislation: racial disparities. This concern is well documented. There is disproportionate use of CTOs on black men. We have known for years that black people, particularly black men, are more likely to be detained, more likely to be diagnosed with a psychiatric disorder and more likely to be subject to coercive interventions under the Mental Health Act 1983. Those things are clear for all to see, but the reasons are not so clear.

We should address the well documented racial disparities in the use of CTOs. The 2018 independent review of the Act makes it clear that black African and black Caribbean people are disproportionately detained under the Act and subject to CTOs. Despite representing a small percentage of the population, black patients account for a disproportionately high number of CTOs: digital data from the NHS in 2019-20 shows that they make up 13% of CTOs, compared with just 3% of the population. That is supported by research published in BJPsych Open, which found that black patients are roughly two to three times more likely than white patients to be subject to a CTO.

The Care Quality Commission has highlighted the disproportionate impact of CTOs on the black and minority ethnic community, raising serious concerns about trust and engagement with mental health services. What does not seem so clear is the reason why. Although we are observing clear disparities in outcome and treatment experiences among ethnic minorities in the UK health system, including in mental health care and beyond, the precise cause remains complex and not fully understood.

The patterns that we are seeing, such as disproportionate detention rates, difference in access and poor outcomes, raise serious concerns about care in the UK. However, it is important to recognise that correlation is not causation. These disparities may arise from a range of factors, including biological or genetic factors, socio economic inequalities, cultural differences, health status or presentation and geographical settings, and there is even the possibility of biases within the service.

To develop effective solutions, we must invest in rigorous and independent research that moves beyond correlation to explore the underlying causes and mechanisms. Only then can we decide on interventions that truly address the roots of inequality, rather than just the symptoms. To that end, what steps is the Minister taking to better understand what is happening with CTOs in the field of serious mental health specifically? What concrete action will the Government take to collect better and more granular data on the disproportionality?

It is not just about the numbers; it is about understanding the root cause. Will the Government commit to commissioning quantitative as well as qualitative research into the lived experience under CTOs of black patients in particular? Will they consult community organisations as part of that work? I worry that not fully understanding the cause of the problem will mean that, at best, we might slightly mitigate it and, at worst, we will compound it or create a new problem that is harder to treat.

Clause 6 represents a thoughtful step towards balancing patient liberty with patient safety and clinical necessity. It will strengthen safeguards, clarify criteria and promote regular oversight, all of which are crucial for the ethical and effective use of CTOs. However, in using CTOs, we must better understand what is happening in the real world. We must not jump to a simplistic cause of systemic bias without truly understanding that cause, and not simply the correlation. I look forward to hearing from the Minister on that point.

With that in mind, I turn to Government amendment 30, which will remove the review of CTOs. It was tabled in the other place by the Lib Dem Lords but received support from across the House. The amendment would remove subsection (3) from clause 6. Subsection (3) is designed to introduce statutory safeguards around the use and duration of community treatment orders. In the Lords and more widely, there is, rightly, much debate about CTOs and their place and use. When used appropriately, in a careful and considered context, they can provide a less restrictive alternative to hospital detention and enable patients to continue their recovery in the community. However, the key word is “appropriately”. That is why the Opposition have concerns about the removal of the subsection. It contains reasonable, proportionate safeguards that do not undermine the purpose of CTOs but strengthen their legitimacy, transparency and accountability.

Under the Government’s proposal, those safeguards—such as a 12-month maximum duration, regular six month reviews, and the requirement to consult independent psychiatrists before extending a CTO—would no longer be set out in statute. Instead, we are told that clinicians will be guided by a code of practice and existing professional standards. However, why rely on guidance when we can legislate for clarity and protection? Will the Minister explain why the Government prefer a non binding code of practice over statutory time limits and reviews, particularly as CTOs involve a significant curtailment of liberty? Does he believe that that is congruent with the principles now enshrined in the Bill?

The stakes may be too high to depend on discretion alone. CTOs are one of the few mechanisms in the health system through which someone can be compelled to comply with treatment in the community and can potentially be recalled to hospital, even if they are not in crisis. That makes clear oversight essential. The Government assert that tribunals will serve as a safeguard, with more frequent referrals. However, as many colleagues have pointed out, tribunals often defer to the clinical judgment presented to them, which risks creating a loop.

Forgive me, but will the Minister tell the House how many tribunals overturn or terminate CTOs at those reviews? Does he believe that they are robust enough to act as an effective check? Are they simply a procedural step? To that end, what steps is the Minister taking to better understand what is happening specifically in the field of serious mental health? What concrete action can we expect in order to better collect the data?

When the Government proposed the amendment that would remove subsection (3), they introduced important safeguards about the duration, review and oversight of community treatment orders. I acknowledge the Government’s position, and Ministers have been clear that they are responding to the concerns raised by stake holders—including clinicians who support patients with eating disorders, and clinicians in forensic settings—that a rigid time limit on CTOs might remove necessary support from those who are still benefiting from them. That position was reflected in the letter circulated on 11 December 2024 by Baroness Merron, following the debate in the other place. It says that a “strict time limit risks removing support for those patients who were benefiting from Community Treatment Orders.”

It continues: “This wouldn’t feel in keeping with the principle of treating the person as an individual.”

I understand that concern. We all want a mental health system that recognises nuanced personal need and clinical judgment. However, the Government amendment goes well beyond preserving flexibility. By removing subsection (3), it strips away a carefully balanced set of protections—not just time limits but essential oversight that will prevent CTOs from drifting on indefinitely, without structured review or patient involvement. Removing subsection (3) is a backward step. As things stand, CTOs can be renewed, year after year, with limited scrutiny. The evidence from the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act suggests that CTOs do not demonstrate reduced readmission rates. Yet many patients, especially those from racialised communities, remain under CTOs for far longer than may be clinically justified.

Subsection (3) did not ban long term CTOs. It simply said that if a clinician wanted to go beyond 12 months, they must consult the patient, their nominated person and other professions involved, review whether the order was still working, and get a second opinion from a GMC registered psychiatrist. That is not inflexible; it is good clinical governance.

The code of practice is not enough. The Government say that they will address concerns in the code of practice. In the same ministerial letter, we are told: “We will set out the expectation that Community Treatment Orders should end after two years...whilst highlighting that this should take into account clinical discretion.”

We all know that an expectation is not a guarantee. The code is important, but it is not binding. There is no requirement to follow it—only to “have regard” to it—and there are no consequences for ignoring it. Where is the accountability? The amendment deletes a provision that would have created a real legal framework for oversight and replaces it with possibly just a promise and a footnote.

Tribunal oversight is not a substitute. The Government’s letter also highlights a plan to increase automatic tribunal referrals. That is welcome, but tribunals are not a substitute for proactive clinical reviews. Patients often lack the means or confidence to engage in hearings, and tribunals can only act on the evidence presented to them. Subsection (3) was about making sure reviews happened automatically, in a transparent and collaborative way—not at the point of breakdown or challenge, but as routine best practice. If a code of practice expectation is ignored, what recourse does a patient have? Why is it acceptable for a CTO to continue indefinitely without any formal review of its effectiveness? Why is a second clinical opinion seen as burdensome in mental health, when it can often be standard practice in many other areas of medicine?

Given the maths of the Committee, we are unlikely to keep the subsection, but if the Government are determined to remove it, I urge them seriously to consider alternatives. For example, that could be a statutory requirement for annual review, especially after the first 12 months, mandatory consultation with the patient and key professionals before extension, or a duty to record and publish anonymised data on CTO use, disaggregated by duration, diagnosis, and ethnicity. If we are to “keep CTOs under review”, as the Government promised in their letter, why not put that commitment into legislation, with timelines, transparency, and lived experience input?

Returning to the issue of the disproportionate use of CTOs on black men, we have known for years that they are more likely to be detained. I gently ask the Minister what concrete actions the Government will take to collect better, more granular data on that disproportionality, not just in terms of numbers, but the root cause. As my noble Friend Lord Kamall rightly asked, what do we know, what do we not know and what do we need to find out? Those are vital questions, but research alone will not solve the problem unless we embed fairness and accountability into the system now.

The safeguards in subsection (3) are not bureaucratic red tape. They are vital protections to ensure that CTOs are used only when necessary, and that they are time limited, reviewed regularly and subject to independent scrutiny. If a CTO is working and genuinely benefiting the patient, then what harm is there in requiring a transparent, collaborative review process to justify its continuation beyond 12 months? Those safeguards would also ensure that patients and their advocates, including their nominated person, are part of the decision making. That is entirely in line with the broader ethos of the Bill: respect, dignity, and least restrictive care.

The Bill is about modernising mental health law. CTOs sit at a crossroads of care and coercion. That is precisely why they demand more scrutiny, not less. The clause, as originally drafted, struck a sensible, balanced compromise. To strip it away is not clinical freedom; it is a loss of legal safeguards for some of the most vulnerable people in our care. I urge the Committee to retain these statutory provisions. They strike the right balance between preserving the appropriate use of CTOs and protecting patient rights and promoting accountability. We owe it to those who are subject to the powers, who are often some of the most vulnerable, to ensure that their care is just, proportionate and based on evidence.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Vickers. I will speak in support of the clause and Government amendment 30, and I may touch on the amendment moved by the Liberal Democrats.

As we all know, community treatment orders were introduced in 2007 under previous legislation, with good intent at the time. There was too often a problem with revolving doors into in patient settings, in particular for patients with psychosis and schizophrenia. The intent behind the introduction of CTOs was to allow patients to be discharged into the community as long as they followed certain conditions, to provide ongoing contact with mental health services, and to provide support and help to prevent relapse. Under certain conditions, patients subject to CTOs could be recalled to a hospital under the Act. The provisions in the Bill are still in line with those underlying principles about the restrictions and the person as an individual.

The clause will amend the previous legislation, in particular to align the new risk criteria for detention, which we discussed in some detail under clause 5. It is important that there is consistency in the criteria for detention under a community treatment order, or indeed under detention in an in patient setting. Again, that supports the need to use the orders only where serious harm may be caused to the health and safety of the patients or the person—the negative likelihood of harm, as we discussed with regard to similar amendments to a previous clause. There is wide support for the use of the criteria for detention as an in patient as well as under the CTOs.

One of the concerns, as the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth has discussed, is possible overuse and, in particular, disproportionate use in relation to race and ethnicity. Black people are seven times more likely to be placed on a community treatment order compared with white people. The Committee has received extensive evidence highlighting those racial disparities and the injustice not only in the application of CTOs, as the hon. Member pointed out—we will come to racial disparities in due course—but in the disproportionate use of CTOs to provide supervision in the community.

The evidence from the Centre for Mental Health concerned the interprofessional variation among psychiatrists. Practice can vary even within the same area, so it is not just inter area variation. That suggests a potential lack of a standardised application of the use of CTOs in some cases, which is perhaps slightly more subjective. The use of the clear criteria, therefore, along with the code of practice, will, I hope, certainly help to address the racial disparity as well as the unwarranted interprofessional variation in the use of CTOs that we see in practice.

It is important that we consider the fact that people may be on a CTO longer than necessary, from the point of view of therapeutic benefit or, indeed, of the risk criteria. I commend the intent behind the amendment that was made in the other place, but there is a clear challenge in putting statutory limitations on the use of CTOs. We should allow clinical best practice, treat the person as an individual and apply the updated criteria in the Bill, recognising those individual cases.

The hon. Lady is making an excellent speech and an excellent observation, and she clearly understands the rationale for the amendment. I just wonder, given that the use of a CTO is currently a clinical decision, why we find ourselves facing this problem in the first place. Ensuring a review and putting it on a statutory footing would hopefully stop that, because despite clinicians’ best intentions, more of these have been rolled on. This provision is simply a mechanism to try to stop that. What are her thoughts about how to make sure that that is the case?

There is a big difference, because when we address clinical variation we usually do so through clinical guidelines, clinical best practice, training and many other non statutory levers, which are much more effective at driving out unwarranted variation. They also include feeding back data; the hon. Gentleman talked about data and encouraging NHS trusts and organisations to ensure transparency about which psychiatrists are overusing CTOs. That feeding back of data can be much more effective at driving out unwarranted variation, although that is not to say that we accept that there are people who are potentially on long CTOs that go through renewal.

The other point is that there are other mechanisms, as the hon. Gentleman acknowledged, such as the tribunals. Those review points need to be as effective as possible at ensuring that people are not unnecessarily being kept under community supervision when that is no longer necessary.

I will be seeking assurances from the Minister about what will be in the code of practice to ensure that any statutory time limit is really just a backstop that maximises the ability of clinicians to have some discretion, while using these other methods to ensure good practice, consistency in decision making and reductions, certainly in racial disparities, and as an urgent matter, but also in some of the intra professional variation that is not necessarily connected with racial discrimination. In that sense, I will support Government amendment 30 as long as the Minister gives a reassurance that we do not accept either the racial disparities in use or some of the lengthy uses, and that he is confident that the provisions in the code of practice will start moving us away from the current situation with the use of CTOs.

The hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth made some interesting points about research and evaluation. Having been the chief analyst in the Department of Health and Social Care, I am well versed in this. Obviously we have a generous settlement for all the research and innovation. The National Institute for Health and Care Research is world renowned for the research that it commissions. There is clearly quite a disparity in the views that this Committee has heard, with the likes of Mind perhaps at one end in saying that the only solution is to get rid of CTOs. I think the majority of us here see a role for them, but only if used in the right way.

In addition to the ongoing data collection and feedback to clinicians, which it was suggested the Minister might want to take away and consider with the NHS, the Department and NHS England—while perhaps also talking to NIHR about the research and evaluation in this area, as well as the research gaps that could inform future implementation of CTOs and help to underpin best practice—we might consider looking into such matters as what is driving the racial inequalities and interprofessional variation, so that we can ensure that future policymakers and legislators like ourselves are better informed and can make more evidence based policy decisions.

I am close to concluding, but I would like to touch briefly on Liberal Democrat amendment 11. Mental health advocacy is clearly critical, particularly for those who lack capacity as well as those who are compulsorily detained in an in patient setting. I hope and expect that with the use of CTOs as a method of discharge, the relationship with advocacy they may have accessed in the in patient setting would continue in the community. I acknowledge the spirit behind the amendment and hope to hear the Minister respond on how we will ensure that all those with complex mental health issues—particularly those who lack capacity and are detained in an in patient setting—will have access to appropriate advocacy.

I rise briefly to dilate on clause 6, on Liberal Democrat amendment 11 and on Government amendment 30. Those of us on the Health and Social Care Committee recently had a fascinating panel about the disparities for black and minority ethnic groups in maternity, and it does not end there, as we can see from the evidence raised by my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth and by the hon. Member for Shipley.

When CTOs were introduced—for good reasons—the elements of controversy that hon. Members have raised were not predicted. The overuse of CTOs, especially among black and minority ethnic patients, should give us all concern, although I have to say that there is some limited evidence of effectiveness in reducing relapse or readmission. Will the Minister give us the Government’s view on that and how they might seek improvement going forward?

What we are trying to achieve in the clause is to bring legislation in line with the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act, which recommended tightening the use of CTOs, or indeed abolishing them altogether for some groups. I support the clause because it brings in stronger safeguards, a clearer commitment and time limits to reduce the risk of indefinite or inappropriate use. It also improves patient involvement, because it requires a consultation and review, promoting shared decision making, and increases accountability because it aligns with the code of practice and introduces external oversight. It focuses on the reality, ensuring that CTOs are used only where truly needed.

I am slightly concerned about Government amendment 30, which will remove the detailed provision that would have introduced new statutory limits and review procedures for community treatment orders, specifically under subsection (3), and inserted new subsections (8) to (11) into section 17B of the Mental Health Act. The implication of removing subsection (3) is that essentially we will maintain the current legal framework, which does not impose a fixed maximum duration or the same level of structured review currently written into the clause. I am afraid that that would not bring in the safeguards and oversight mechanisms that would, at least to some degree, start to tackle the problems that hon. Members on both sides of the Committee have been talking about. It may be seen as taking a step back from what campaigners and professionals who are advocating for stronger patient rights and accountability on the use of CTOs would like to see.

I ask the Minister for the same reassurances that the hon. Member for Shipley asked for in this area. If the Government are to move Government amendment 30 successfully, we will need to see how they intend to deal with these issues going forward.

Liberal Democrat amendment 11 would ensure that people subject to a CTO receive information about their right to advocacy. That is an entirely laudable aim, but I ask Liberal Democrat Members to answer a few questions. First, how do they see the administrative burden on clinicians to ensure that both oral and written communications are documented? Secondly, what additional training do they think those professionals might need to ensure that the information is both consistent and correct? Thirdly, might there be delays in issuing a CTO if, for some reason, advocacy information is not immediately available?

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Vickers.

I turn to amendment 11, tabled by the hon. Member for Winchester. Under the Bill, English qualifying patients subject to the Mental Health Act 1983, including those on a community treatment order, will be covered by a new opt out approach to advocacy. That means that the relevant hospital manager must provide the advocacy provider with information about the patient so that they can arrange for an advocate to interview them to determine whether they wish to use advocacy services. Requiring oral and written information about their right to an advocate would therefore be unnecessary. I hope that that is satisfactory, and I encourage the hon. Member for Guildford to withdraw the amendment.

Government amendment 30 would remove clause 6(3) from the Bill on the basis that it is unnecessary. The requirement in section 118(2D) of the Mental Health Act for decision makers to have regard to the code of practice already ensures that they must take it into account when making decisions in relation to community treatment orders. Imposing a maximum duration of 12 months on community treatment orders, with the option to renew them after a review every six months, is also unnecessary. That is because the Bill already requires community treatment orders to be reviewed before renewal after the initial six months, again after the next six months and then yearly. The responsible clinician can renew the CTO only if there is a risk of serious harm without it and a reasonable prospect of it having therapeutic benefit for the patient.

The Bill increases professional oversight by requiring the community clinician to be involved in all decision making relating to CTOs. That aligns with Lord Scriven’s amendment, but, rather than that person being a General Medical Council registered psychiatrist, it is more appropriate that they be an approved clinician, meaning that they have specific training regarding the Mental Health Act and approval to make decisions under the Act.

We have also increased the frequency of tribunal reviews so that they will happen automatically at renewal periods following the initial six month period, after a further six months and after any subsequent 12-month periods. We are already providing a new power for the tribunal to recommend that the responsible clinician reconsider whether a CTO condition is necessary. Clause 6(3) would duplicate that.

I am grateful to the Minister for outlining so clearly what safeguards will be in place to ensure that there are no unnecessary extensions to CTOs beyond the period during which the patient is benefiting therapeutically or meets the detention criteria, which are being updated by the Bill. The answers that the Minister has given assure me that there will be significant review points. Does he, like me, think that these provisions will, in time, reduce some of the unwarranted variation and some of the excessive lengths? As the Bill is implemented in practice, we will see changes in the pattern of use of CTOs.

I pay tribute to my hon. Friend for her expertise and am pleased to hear that she feels reassured by my remarks. It is absolutely the Government’s ambition to bring more consistency and clarity to this area. A number of hon. Members have raised issues around racial disparities; I plan to come on to that. That is a specific focus, I know, for her and other colleagues. More broadly, this is about ensuring that the CTO system is proportionate, well regulated and managed on the basis of a patient centric system.

We therefore wish to remove clause 6(3), as we do not think that it is necessary. It duplicates some provisions in the Bill or, in the case of the review periods, conflicts with existing renewal periods, and under the current drafting it is not clear how the two would interact. Where there are differences, the current provisions are more appropriate, for example in requiring a community clinician to be involved in all decision making.

Let me move on to clause 6 in its entirety. CTOs allow individuals detained under the Mental Health Act to be discharged into the community, under specific conditions, to ensure continued treatment. CTOs aim to maintain contact with mental health services to provide support and prevent relapse. Patients on CTOs can be recalled to hospital under that Act in certain circumstances. The main purpose of introducing CTOs was to improve care for higher risk patients and to enhance public safety. We believe that community treatment orders remain necessary in a small number of cases to ensure continued treatment and to protect both patients and the public.

However, the independent review rightly noted that considerably more people than expected were being put on a community treatment order—about 5,500 people a year—and that there were racial disparities in the use of CTOs. Clause 6 therefore amends the community treatment order risk criteria in line with the new detention criteria set out in clause 5. It is now the case that, to be put on a community treatment order, the patient must be at risk of serious harm and there must be a reasonable prospect of therapeutic benefit for the patient.

We have touched already on the stark racial disparities in the use of CTOs and the Mental Health Act more generally, so I welcome these reforms. I appreciate that we will come to this point later in the Committee, but can the Minister set out what interaction the advance choice documents will have in reducing the number of CTOs, particularly for those groups that have seen them used disproport ionately?

My hon. Friend raises a very valid point that, as he says, we will come on to in greater detail. Right across our health service, in every aspect, early intervention is always better than trying to pick up the pieces after a crisis. That is the same for both physical and mental health. We believe that the advance choice documents will be a helpful tool in building an earlier understanding of the challenges that a particular individual faces and, on the basis of that earlier understanding, enabling earlier intervention. Giving the opportunity to patients, while they are in a position to do so, to set out what their advance choices are will enhance their autonomy and enhance trust in the interaction between the patient and the system. That trust piece is so important to the entire picture.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Mr Vickers. I was interested to hear what the Minister has just said, but I think it goes much further. Can he give me assurances that we will take time to look at what is driving so many young black men in particular into these mental health crisis situations? We need to look much further back, at the start of the process, where something is pushing young black men into mental health crisis and they are ending up in a position where they have to be placed in a facility and go through a whole period of attempting to recover. Can the Minister give me his thoughts on what the Government are doing to prevent that from happening in the first place, particularly with this group of men?

My hon. Friend is absolutely right, and we could go into the question he has just raised in a profound way, because the social determinants of ill health are such an important part of the picture. Many people in our communities are dealing with all sorts of incredibly challenging and traumatic issues in their lives, often driven by a whole range of social determinants. We have to recognise that there is a need to build capacity in the system as well.

I am pleased that the Government reconfirmed in the spending review yesterday the 8,500 additional mental health specialists in the system, a mental health trained specialist in every school, 24/7 mental health hubs being opened around the country and £26 million being put into opening mental health crisis centres around the country. The fundamental drive of the Government is to move from sickness to prevention. We want to build a preventive state, and the mental health part of that is vital, for the reason my hon. Friend has just elucidated.

The Minister makes an excellent point about the services that are required, but key to all this is the underlying research. Has research already been commissioned into this? If not, would he look at commissioning in the space of ethnic minorities, the impacts of CTOs and mental health? That might shine a light on what further services will be needed, the reasons, and preventive measures, which the Government rightly put at the front of the agenda.

We have piloted culturally appropriate advocacy models, which ran up to March 2025. An evaluation of the pilot will be published in the summer, and that will feed into the evidence base for the impact and deliverability of culturally appropriate advocacy at local level. We will use the learnings from our culturally appropriate advocacy pilots to inform our understanding of how to increase uptake of advocacy for community treatment order patients from black communities, who are disproportionately likely to be put on a CTO. A lot of that evaluation and investigation work is happening, and I am sure that hon. Members across this Committee will read the findings in the summer with great interest.

The change in the criteria for a CTO is intended to reduce the number of inappropriate community treatment orders being given, reducing restrictions on patients and helping to protect against the disproportionate use of coercion among racialised communities. Only those for whom there is a risk of serious harm and who will benefit therapeutically should be subject to a community treatment order, and it should be removed when it no longer provides benefit.

I want to touch on some of the questions that have been asked. The Opposition spokesman asked about the number of CTOs being overturned at tribunal. According to Care Quality Commission data from 2023-24, 129 discharges by tribunal took place following 4,438 applications against CTOs. I emphasise that people are often discharged without going to tribunal, so those numbers are not a full picture.

On evaluation, we are developing a monitoring and evaluation strategy for the Mental Health Act, as the Bill will become once—one hopes—it gets Royal Assent. It will be important to monitor new processes such as discharges and changes to CTOs to assess whether reforms are being delivered as intended and to monitor uptake among patients. There was also a question about racial equalities, but I think I have answered that. With those remarks, I hope that the Committee will support Government amendment 30 and that the hon. Member for Guildford will withdraw amendment 11.

I thank the Minister for his comments on our amendment 11 and the clarification regarding the fact that the Bill covers a lot of the issues we raised in that amendment. I am therefore willing to withdraw our amendment.

On Government amendment 30, I am grateful to the hon. Members for Hinckley and Bosworth and for Farnham and Bordon for their comments on the Government’s request to remove subsection (3). It is good to have consensus on these Benches on the important issues included in it. While I do appreciate the comments from the Minister about how he believes that the Bill covers these issues, I do feel that the subsection needs to remain and I would therefore like to vote on the Government amendment. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Amendment proposed: 30, in clause 6, page 13, line 7, leave out subsection (3)—(Stephen Kinnock.)

This amendment removes provisions relating to the duration and review of community treatment orders.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

The Committee proceeded to a Division.

The Ayes were 10 and the Noes were five, so the Ayes have it.

On a point of order, Mr Vickers. Just to be clear, I counted six Noes, and I think you announced five. Can we just check on that?

You are right—my apologies. The record will be amended.

Further to that point of order, Mr Vickers. I should say it was the Liberal Democrats who pointed it out to me; I do not want to take the credit from them.

8|0|10|6|divided:|Question accordingly agreed to.||0|0

Clause 6, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Grounds for discharge by tribunal

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7 will amend the grounds for discharge by the tribunal to align with the revised grounds for detention set out in clause 5. The tribunal must consider whether the patient continues to meet the criteria when deciding whether to discharge a patient.

These changes will provide decision makers with a clear and consistent set of considerations when assessing whether a patient continues to meet the detention criteria, and therefore whether detention or a community treatment order continues to be justified. The tribunal must consider all elements of the detention criteria, including whether there is a reasonable prospect that the patient is receiving therapeutic benefit from treatment and whether there is a risk of serious harm. The detention criteria ensure public and patient protection, while also protecting patients from lengthy and unnecessary detentions when they no longer pose a risk to themselves or others. I therefore commend clause 7 to the Committee.

I rise to speak on an essential aspect of our mental health system: the role of mental health tribunals, and the proposed changes to the grounds upon which they can discharge individuals detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. Each year in England and Wales, about 20,000 people come before a mental health tribunal. These individuals are not criminals, but patients—often vulnerable, often voiceless—detained in hospital or living under community treatment orders, sometimes against their will.

The function of the tribunals is clear: to act as an independent safeguard, to scrutinise the legality of detention, to test whether the continued deprivation of liberty is justified, and to ensure that care is being given within the bounds of both clinical necessity and human rights. Each tribunal consists of a legal judge, a psychiatrist, and a specialist lay member. Together, they form a check on the powers granted by the state to detain and treat people on mental health grounds. Therefore, tribunals are independent bodies that review whether a person should remain detained under the Mental Health Act.

Historically, while an imperative, there have been concerns that modernisation is needed. The criteria they used were broad and inconsistent with modern principles of least restriction and patient rights. The 2018 independent review of the Act recommended aligning tribunal powers with clear risk based criteria to ensure the detention is only maintained when absolutely necessary.

The clause seeks to change the criteria that these tribunals apply when making decisions about discharge. Specifically, it would align the discharge tests used by tribunals with the statutory conditions for detentions—those found in section 2(2) in the 1983 Act for assessment, section 20(4) for treatment and section 17A(5) for community treatment. On one level, this is pragmatic reform. It simplifies the legal framework and avoids confusion caused by duplicative or overlapping tests. It creates consistency between the reasons someone can be detained and the reasons their tribunal must use to determine whether they should remain so.

I would, however, caution the Committee not to treat simplification as neutral. While the administrative clarity is welcome, legal clarity can also narrow discretion. In tightening the grounds for discharge to mirror the detention criteria exactly, the clause may reduce the tribunal’s ability to consider the broader context, including, for example, the patient’s progress, their lived experience or the factors not strictly enumerated in statute. There is a risk that tribunals become passive reviewers of statutory boxes, rather than active assessors of individual liberty and clinical justification. Tribunals may ask whether the criteria are still met, rather than whether continued detention is truly necessary or proportionate.

Moreover, I believe—although the Minister may have to correct me—that the clause applies retrospectively, including to individuals detained under forensic sections or already living under CTOs. We must ask whether it is right to shift the legal test midway through someone’s treatment or tribunal process, potentially raising the bar for their discharge. I welcome the intent behind the clause to create coherence to improve the legal precision of our mental health law, but will the Minister reflect on its practical effects? Will it make discharges harder? Will it reduce the tribunal’s role to tick boxing? Will it truly serve the interests of the patient?

Mental health tribunals are not merely administrative bodies; they are guardians of liberty for people who are often too unwell to speak for themselves. Any change that touches their powers must be approached with care, compassion and rigorous scrutiny. I ask the Minister to clarify how the clause will affect discharge rates in practice. Will tribunal members retain discretion to consider the individual circumstances of the patient beyond the bare statutory criteria? How will that be monitored? Has an impact assessment been carried out on the proposed change?

Finally, in the Minister’s speech on clause 6, he said that he expects more people to be automatically referred. How many more does he expect the Government to see? I believe in his answer he said that 129 out of 4,000 were overturned. Is there any work to be done to see how many more automatic referrals would come in, how many more would be challenged, and what the impact of that would be? We must be mindful that mental health law is about not only treatment, but trust, autonomy and justice, so let us ensure that these reforms reflect that.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. I rise to speak briefly to clause 7, which in many ways is a tidying up of the other changes in the Bill to ensure alignment. In that sense, it is a necessary part of this legislation.

For too long, mental health tribunals, which have an important function, have been operating under criteria that are too broad. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth pointed out, that can lead to inconsistencies with modern clinical practice. It is therefore right that we move to clearer, more risk based criteria to ensure that detention is maintained only where absolutely necessary. There are obvious reasons behind that, such as to ensure greater consistency in tribunal decision making and strong safeguards to ensure that patients are only detained or kept under community treatment orders when absolutely necessary.

I want to pick up some of the arguments my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth was developing around the demands on the tribunal service. The Minister will be well aware of the challenges facing the court and tribunal system in this country. If, as anticipated, this will lead to an increase in the number of hearings—both in first instance and potentially in appeal—what assessment has been made as to the number of not only judges, but wing members that will be required to facilitate this process?

What has been determined regarding the capacity of the resources of His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service—in terms of not only physical hard standing, but the vital role that clerks and tribunal staff play in ensuring that hearings are done in a timely manner and the paperwork is completed consistently? Thirdly, what is the expectation of the sustainability of that workload as the Bill comes into fruition? I pick up on that in particular, because, given the transition arrangements that appear to be within the legislation, this will be a retrospective as well as a prospective change. I would be grateful if the Minister in summing up could address those issues.

It is a little bit dangerous for us to get into a numbers game, because I do not think it is particularly useful or productive to say, “As a result of the changes that we are making, we think it will decrease by x number or increase by y number”, because, by definition, we do not have a crystal ball and we cannot be sure. However, the impact assessment for the Bill— I do not have a copy of that with me right now—includes a range of scenarios and some predictions of the impact and associated costs that go with that. Those are important considerations that led us to the conclusion that we need a 10-year implementation period. It is not just about capacity in the communities and the community mental health services; it is also about capacity in the court system, the number of judges and the whole additional capacity and workload required for that, which is an important part of those considerations.

If the Minister will forgive me, I was not being facetious when asking for numbers; I was simply using it as an example. I am grateful to his officials for providing the numbers so quickly when I asked for them during the debate on clause 6. When he has the chance, could he write to Opposition Members setting out how that interaction works with the Ministry of Justice and what the numbers might look like? Forgive me if I have missed it, but I could not see it in the impact assessment. There is an implication not only for health, but for the justice side, which, as my hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley said, makes a difference. My question was more to make sure that we are pragmatic in our approach, rather than getting into hardcore numbers at this stage.

The numbers that I gave the hon. Gentleman earlier were things that had happened, rather than gazing into the future and reading the tea leaves, but I will do as he asks, and I will ask officials to take him up on the point about the capacity of the legal and judicial system, in particular the tribunals.

On the questions the shadow Minister asked about retrospective application, we are supporting the tribunal to make decisions about whether a person should continue to be detained or subject to a community treatment order by providing clear and consistent criteria that focuses on the need for there to be a risk of serious harm and a reasonable prospect that the patient is benefiting from their detention in order justify continued detention for treatment under part 3 of the Mental Health Act 1983.

As has been said, that will apply to everybody who is currently detained. The key point is the balance of two things: harm to the patient him or herself and harm to others, and therapeutic benefit. Those will be the guiding lights of this entire process. I hope that I have managed to respond; I did not have a huge amount of time to take note of all the points, because there were not very many speakers on this clause. If there is anything I have not addressed, we can of course do so in writing.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 7 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 8 Appropriate medical treatment: therapeutic benefit

I beg to move amendment 12, in clause 8, page 15, line 11, after “treatment” insert “including the setting in which treatment takes place,”.

This amendment ensures that the definition of appropriate medical treatment includes the setting in which treatment takes place.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 44, in clause 8, page 15, line 17, at end insert— “(iii) seeks to minimise the patient’s distress and promote psychological wellbeing and recovery from any childhood trauma;”.

Amendment 45, in clause 8, page 15, line 22, after “manifestations” insert “and seeks to minimise the patient’s distress and promote their psychological wellbeing and recovery from any childhood trauma.”

This amendment, along with Amendment 44, seeks to promote a therapeutic environment and culture which recognises a patient’s trauma. Clause stand part.

Clause 9 stand part.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. Amendment 12 attempts to ensure that the needs of patients in terms of setting and the design of their wards are considered in their treatment. We are particularly concerned that many people are being treated, as Lord Darzi’s report highlighted, in Victorian era former asylums, which cannot be conducive to effective treatment. Multiple sites have been designated as not functionally suitable.

The independent review of the Mental Health Act and the Care Quality Commission also found that many mental health wards are unsafe for staff and patients, and provide poor quality care in unsuitable buildings. One CQC inspection report found that the seclusion rooms had low ceilings that contained electrical wires overhead, creating a safety hazard, and staff could not see people clearly through the window panels because they were cloudy. Is the Minister confident that the mental health estate is adequate to fulfil the objectives of the Act? In particular, is he satisfied that the mental health estate is sufficiently safe in structural terms and designed appropriately for those using it, such as being free of ligature points and with sufficient in patient capacity for children and young people?

I will speak to clause 8 first, then work my way through the other provisions in the group. The clause will introduce a statutory requirement that medical treatment under the Act must have a reasonable prospect of therapeutic benefit for the individual. This is a significant and, I believe, welcome development, bringing the law into closer alignment with modern principles of person centred care and clinical justification. Again, the intention is clear: to ensure that no one is detained or treated under compulsion unless there is a realistic chance that they will benefit from the treatment. That is another laudable aim, and as a doctor myself, I fully support it.

Significant concerns have been raised that individuals, especially those with complex or treatment resistant conditions, have been subject to interventions where the purpose was therapeutic but the likelihood of benefit was minimal or uncertain. By introducing a consistent legal definition of appropriate medical treatment early in the Mental Health Act, and ensuring its application across both civil and forensic pathways, the clause marks a step forward in rights protection and clinical accountability. I welcome the shift away from vague references to appropriateness towards a test that is both objective and patient specific; however, several important questions remain, and I hope the Minister will address them.

The first is on defining a reasonable prospect in practice. While the term “reasonable prospect” is a flexible one, that flexibility cuts both ways. The explanatory notes clarify that clinicians do not need to conclude that the benefit is more likely than not, only that it is reasonably possible, but what guidance will clinicians receive to ensure that this threshold is applied consistently and fairly across the country? Will the updated codes of practice provide clear examples or scenarios, and will the guidance be subject to consultation with patients, carers and professionals?

When it comes to forensic patients, and equity and safeguards, I welcome the fact that the clause applies equally to part III patients, who are involved in the criminal justice system. Historically, this group has sometimes been subject to more coercive and less scrutinised care pathways. Will the Minister confirm that the same therapeutic benefit test will apply at every decision point—initial detention, transfer, conditional discharge and recall—so that forensic patients are not denied the safeguards enjoyed by civil patients?

When it comes to legal remedies and review, what mechanisms will be available to patients who believe that the reasonable prospect test has not been met? Will this be a justifiable cause in tribunals or courts? Will mental health tribunals be empowered to scrutinise the clinical judgments behind this test, and if so, what training will be provided to tribunal members?

While I welcome the statutory clarity that clause 8 brings, we must be mindful that legislative change is only the first step: implementation will be critical. I would hope the Government will publish a clear timetable for updating the codes of practice, as well as plans for training, auditing and evaluation. Without that, there is a risk that the reasonable prospect test becomes, again, a box ticking exercise rather than a meaningful safeguard.

Finally, I want to focus particularly on how the measure will apply to people who have long term, complex or non degenerative mental conditions where there may be limited, if any, prospect of clinical improvement through medical intervention. These include, but are not limited to, some forms of autism, learning disabilities and personality disorders, particularly those for which trauma informed approaches may be more appropriate than medical ones. What about acquired brain injuries, or individuals with treatment resistant psychosis or chronic conditions for which medication has been ineffective? Under the Mental Health Act, such individuals can be and are detained for prolonged periods, sometimes years, even when no clear therapeutic progress is being made.

Families, advocates and patients themselves frequently describe a sense of clinical limbo—being held under compulsion with little hope of change, because the system has no better option. Of course, that is one of the big reasons for the Bill in the first place, and it brings with it an entirely new set of problematic scenarios that need careful consideration. In short, the prize of clause 8 is that that limbo should no longer happen: detention and compulsory treatment should occur only when there is a reasonable prospect of actual benefit.

How will clinicians be expected to assess the prospect of benefit in cases in which a condition is not considered medically treatable in the conventional sense? For example, if a person with autism is detained during a crisis, but their underlying condition is not one that responds to medication, will the presence of social support or behavioural interventions be considered sufficient to meet the threshold of therapeutic benefit?

Will the Government clarify that detention is not justified when the primary issue is risk management, rather than therapeutic progress? There is a long standing concern that individuals are being detained primarily because of perceived risk, even when there is no viable treatment plan likely to improve their condition. Clause 8 provides an opportunity to set a clear boundary: that risk alone is not enough; there needs to be a reasonable prospect of improving the person’s mental health through treatment.

How will the new test interact with decisions around discharge and the renewal of detention? If a person has been detained and the anticipated benefit of treatment has not materialised, will the failure to have achieved a benefit trigger a presumption of discharge, or at least a fresh review of the justification for ongoing detention? Will there be specific guidance in the revised code that addresses how the new tests apply to conditions such as brain injuries? After a recent question, I know that the Government are continuing with the brain injury strategy, but has there been any work on how that can be incorporated?

Those are not mere technical questions; they speak to the ethical foundations of the Mental Health Act, which confers extraordinary powers to detain and treat without consent and to deprive someone of their liberty.

We are trying to future proof the Bill as much as possible. Does my hon. Friend think that the clause has enough future proofing to deal with mental health issues that we are currently unaware of, or issues whose nature or treatment we do not fully understand?

My hon. Friend is a shrewd surveyor of legislation, and even foresees the amendments that I have tabled, which may well expose and shine a little light on something that might make a difference. In essence, he is right: trying to future proof the Bill, while ensuring that it is robust and applicable, was at the heart of the first day’s debate and seems to be at the heart of today’s debate.

As I said, the Mental Health Act confers extraordinary powers to detain and treat without consent and to deprive someone of their liberty, but in exchange there needs to be a clear, evidence based justification for doing so. The clause goes some way to strengthening that justification, but only if the principle of therapeutic benefit is applied rigorously and not just diluted.

Let me turn to amendments 44 and 45, tabled in my name on behalf of His Majesty’s Opposition, which speak to what my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon just said. They seek to embed trauma- informed principles into the definition of “appropriate medical treatment” under the Mental Health Act. These amendments aim to ensure that medical treatment for mental disorder not only addresses symptoms but actively minimises patient distress, promotes psychological wellbeing and supports recovery from childhood trauma.

There is robust and compelling evidence demonstrating that childhood trauma is a causal factor in the development of a wide range of mental health conditions. The “Adverse Childhood Experiences Study”, by Felitti et al. in 1988, demonstrated a strong dose response relationship between the number of traumatic experiences in childhood and the likelihood of developing of mental health disorders later in life, including depression, anxiety, psychosis and substance misuse.

Neuroscientific studies such as Teicher et al. in 2016 have revealed how early maltreatment alters brain structures and functions critical to emotional regulation and stress response. A review of trauma and psychosis by Read et al. in 2005 identified childhood trauma as a significant risk factor for several mental illnesses, including psychiatric disorders. Furthermore, clinical guidance such as NICE’s 2018 recommendations emphasises the importance of assessing trauma history and incorporating trauma focused interventions into care. These findings are reflected in UK health policy, with the Department of Health recognising trauma informed care as essential for effective mental health services.

We also know from clinical studies that trauma history influences treatment outcomes, with trauma uninformed care risking re traumatisation and poor recovery. It is vital to stress that recognising trauma as a causal factor is not about excusing behaviour but about understanding behaviour. Such understanding enables clinicians and services to respond more compassionately and effectively, supporting genuine recovery and healing, rather than merely managing symptoms or controlling behaviour. Embedding trauma informed care in law is a progressive step that aligns with modern mental health best practice and respects the lived experience of many retained under the Act, the majority of whom have experienced significant trauma in their lives.

If the Government do not accept these amendments, can the Minister clarify what steps they will take to ensure that trauma informed approaches are embedded in mental health services? Will there be guidance, training or oversight in the mechanisms to ensure that patient distress is minimised and psychological wellbeing promoted?

On a point of clarification, I note that the amendments tabled by the shadow Minister specifically say “recovery from any childhood trauma”.

Why has he opted for the word “childhood”, rather than general trauma informed care? A number of female in patients in mental health units are recovering from past sexual trauma or domestic violence—I know such abuse is not committed exclusively against women, but it tends to be more prevalent in that group—and the mental health unit can potentially exacerbate that traumatic experience. I seek clarification on why childhood trauma has been made so prominent, as opposed to general trauma.

It is an excellent and eagle eyed point. I would point to the evidence base that I cited, starting from 1988 onwards. That is three and half decades’ worth of evidence that points to a causal factor. In my clinical background, I have seen patients that I think it relates to. Perhaps I will stand corrected, but I am not sure that domestic violence has been shown as a causal factor of mental health conditions.

We know that in the developmental stages that children go through, when their brains are developing and growing, as the 2016 study showed, there are intrinsic changes. That is why the Opposition chose to put that wording in. I agree that the definition could be wider, and we discussed that on the first day of debate with the Liberal Democrat definitions. I see the hon. Lady’s intent, but the main point is the evidence base. Maybe in the future that would be something, if we have evidence, that the Minister could consider taking forward. At this point in time, I think it is undeniable that childhood trauma makes a difference, and that is why the amendments specifically say “childhood trauma”, not anything wider.

Liberal Democrat amendment 12 seeks to ensure that the definition of appropriate medical treatment under the Mental Health Act explicitly includes consideration of the setting in which that treatment takes place. Let me begin by welcoming the intention behind the amendment. It reflects a view shared widely across the House and the mental health community that where treatment takes place is often as important as what treatment is offered. We know that the therapeutic environment, whether calm or chaotic, respectful or coercive, can have a significant impact on whether treatment is effective, trusted and ultimately beneficial to the patient.

It appears that there is commonality in what the Lib Dems and Conservative Members are trying to achieve; we are simply addressing it in slightly different manners. The Mental Health Act review emphasised the importance of therapeutic environments forcefully, particularly in relation to racialised communities, neurodivergent people and those with lived experience of restrictive environments. I commend the signatories to the amendment for keeping the principle front and centre; however, while I support the spirit and direction of the amendment, I have concerns about whether it is the right way or the right place to achieve the desired outcome.

First, the clause already requires clinicians and decision makers to take into account “all other circumstances” when determining whether treatment is appropriate. Arguably, that language already captures the setting in which treatment is offered, alongside other contextual factors such as the availability of support, proximity to family or cultural setting. Hon. Members might rightly intervene to say, “Hang on—surely that defeats the point of your own two amendments, given that there is a catch all?” But when it comes to priorities and placing things in legislation, legislation not only sets the law, it also sets the tone, direction and principle, as the Minister has said.

We have decided that there are four key principles, and have sought to place them in the Bill above all else. I hope that I spelt out earlier that, given the weight of evidence for the cause of severe mental illness, childhood trauma is pivotal. I therefore argue that it deserves the merit of attention above all else; yet the legislation should be open enough to cover more of the issues that the earlier amendment tried to deal with: those of homelessness, alcohol, bereavement and so on when it comes to mental health services.

Secondly, there is the question of legal clarity. By providing for the evaluation of treatment settings statutorily, in primary legislation, we risk creating uncertainty or grounds for challenge where services are constrained by reality. As we all know, the ideal treatment setting is not always available. Mental health services are stretched, and we must be cautious about creating legal duties that the clinician cannot fulfil, not for lack of care or competence but for lack of capacity or funding.

That leads me to my third concern: enforceability. Including the setting in statute creates a duty, but not a guarantee. Without parallel duties on commissioners or providers to ensure the availability of appropriate environments, we risk raising expectations that may not be deliverable, or at least not consistently across the country. That said, I do not believe that we should reject the underlying idea. Instead, we should find a route that is more workable and equally meaningful. I suggest that the Government, and indeed the drafters of the revised code of practice, make it explicit that appropriateness of treatment must be included in the therapeutic sustainability of the environment in which it is delivered.

The Opposition would be open to support the consideration of a reporting requirement on the Secretary of State to monitor and publish annual data on the availability of appropriate treatment settings, whether in hospital or community. That would provide transparency and enable Parliament to scrutinise progress, and allow for targeted improvements.

Finally, clause 9, “Remission or release of prisoners etc from hospital: treatment condition”, will replace the word “effective” with “appropriate medical treatment” in several key provisions of the Mental Health Act concerning prisoners and detained persons transferred to hospital. At first glance, that appears a sensible and necessary alignment with the wider reforms in clause 8, ensuring that the treatment condition tied to release or remission meets the more rigorous test of “therapeutic benefit”, rather than a more vague notion of effectiveness.

By insisting that the treatment be “appropriate medical treatment”—that is, a treatment with

“a reasonable prospect of alleviating, or preventing the worsening of, the disorder”—

the Bill seeks to prevent premature release or continued detention based on treatments that are not clearly beneficial or properly tailored to the individual need. That is particularly important given the complex needs and vulnerabilities of this population: prisoners detained on remand and those subject to immigration detention, who already face significant barriers in accessing high quality mental health care.

However, clause 9 raises several questions that I hope the Minister can address. First, how will this change affect decision making processes in practice? Will clinicians, tribunals and responsible authorities receive clear guidance on assessing appropriate medical treatment specifically in the context of release conditions for detained persons? That group often present with complex comorbidities and social challenges that complicate clinical judgments. Secondly, is there a risk that stricter tests could delay releases or remission unnecessarily? Although raising the threshold for treatment appropriateness is generally positive, we must be cautious to ensure that it does not inadvertently prolong detentions of individuals when no treatment is truly effective or appropriate but risks remain a concern. What safeguards will be in place to ensure that treatment decisions for those individuals are subject to robust reviews and independent scrutiny? Given that we are restricting the liberty of this population, transparent and accountable processes are vital to ensure that treatment conditions linked to release are both justified and in the patient’s best interests.

In summary, the amendments would strengthen the Bill’s commitment to ensuring that detention and treatment are clinically justified and therapeutic in purpose. That would align with the Bill’s overall goal of promoting patient centred, evidence based mental health care.

I rise to speak in support of clause 8, and I will briefly speak to the Liberal Democrats’ amendment 12. I have already flagged my concerns with the Opposition’s amendments 44 and 45.

Clause 8 introduces and puts front and centre the notion of therapeutic care for those detained under the Mental Health Act 1983. I strongly welcome clause 8, as drafted. For far too long, for people who have been deprived of their liberty and detained in a secure mental health setting, the main focus has been risk management and harm minimisation rather than therapeutic care.

The Lampard inquiry, which relates to my area of Essex, is ongoing. It highlights the issue of people being detained without any clear therapeutic plan or clinical justification. Does my hon. Friend agree that the clause will start to address some of the concerns raised by the inquiry?

I thank my hon. Friend for highlighting the Lampard inquiry, and highlighting the impact of the treatment that the inquiry is looking at on the lives of the patients who were subject to it. I do not wish to get ahead of the inquiry because it is still under way, but I have met with some of the families involved, and there is a feeling that there has been a complete breakdown of trust in the care of patients in our part of the world. That trust is difficult to rebuild, particularly for people in a locked mental health setting, who have no choice but to trust that the providers of their care are acting in their best interests. The lack of trust is almost harmful to their continued recovery. I thank my hon. Friend for raising that particular point.

As I was saying, for too long the focus in a locked setting has been on management of risk and harm reduction, rather than actually treating the condition that the patient may have. Clause 8 looks almost to reverse that. It advances the idea that therapeutic care is the aim of detention under the Mental Health Act and that it is fundamentally important, when someone is deprived of their liberty, that there is a therapeutic benefit to the patient, and it places that aim in a prominent position at the start of the Act, so that it is not buried further down.

Although I understand that the Minister will probably state that the clause advances the principle of “therapeutic benefit”, I believe it also touches on two of the other key principles developed by the independent review: the principles of seeing “the person as an individual”, and of “least restriction”. We can all appreciate that if someone is in a setting for their own therapeutic benefit, rather than just being contained because of the risk that they might pose to themselves or others, then they are being less restricted, in a way that is real and important to them, and will have the benefit of being seen as an individual. For some individuals who have spent a significant amount of time in a locked unit, the prospect of them receiving therapeutic care is very low, and the prospect of them receiving therapeutic care that leads to them recovering sufficiently to leave those units is about nil.

The talking therapies taskforce highlights that some of the most severely complex patients with personality disorder—the most severe 1.5%—make up nearly one third of the annual spend on in patient treatment costs. That group of people have very little prospect of receiving appropriate therapeutic care in an in patient setting. A system wide change looking at community based care, sometimes intensive community based care, would be much more effective than what they currently receive. The cost was looked at in areas in the south west—in Devon—and in London, and it was found that a third of spending from hospital trusts was going towards this very tiny group of people. That is not to say that we should always look at the cost of care, because that can seem reductive to someone as an individual, but clearly, these people are not getting effective treatment that is good value and makes sense for them.

I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on developing system wide and community based change for some of the most complex cases in an in patient setting. How does he see the clause interacting with that? Does he believe that providing therapeutic benefit for all patients in a secure setting will have a positive impact on that complex 1.5% group of patients?

I will speak briefly to amendment 12, tabled by the Liberal Democrats. I may have slightly misunderstood the intent of the amendment. It was my understanding that naming the setting where medical treatment takes place—putting it on an equal footing with the treatment—was aimed at looking at the impact on people with learning disabilities and autism. For that specific group, detention in a secure unit is often counter productive to their recovery. A review undertaken by Baroness Hollins found that there was no therapeutic benefit for long term segregation of patients with a learning disability, and that attempting to deliver a therapeutic benefit for some of those patients in a locked setting is all but impossible. Although I support looking at whether a specific setting is appropriate for certain groups of people, there needs to be heightened awareness of the impact that a locked setting can have on people with a learning disability or autism.

I spoke about this on Second Reading. If someone is sensitive to over stimulation and has an increased sensory need, need for routine and need for familiarity, taking them away from a place that feels safe and putting them in a ward with strip lighting—autistic people talk about strip lighting as being particularly harmful—that is noisy, unfamiliar and completely out of their routine can feel extremely harmful. Therapeutic care in that setting may never be effective enough for that group of people to be released. Not to read this against the earlier clauses that take autism and learning disability away from the definition of a mental health condition, which I strongly welcome, I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on capturing how, for this specific group of people, detention in a secure mental unit is probably more harmful to them than it is for the majority of the population.

I cannot, however, support amendment 12, because of the catch all nature of looking at the setting in which a treatment takes place. I speak as someone who has had lived experience of this issue and I have to say that quite often a secure unit is probably not conducive to anyone’s mental health; indeed, it is often a place of last resort, and I think that it poses a risk. If we have to take the accommodation into consideration, that might mean that it would never be an appropriate setting for someone to receive therapeutic care, even though we know that quite often it is the only setting where someone can be for a short period.

In conclusion, I very much welcome the idea of putting therapeutic care front and centre. I would welcome the Minister’s thoughts on how this idea applies to those with very serious and complex personality disorders, and those with learning disability and autism. However, this is a really important step change, not only in how we treat people with a severe mental illness in a locked setting but in how patients are viewed, and in the importance and value of their experience. I would like to express my own gratitude for it, reflecting the views of people with lived experience. It plays into the idea that if someone is in a secure mental unit, they are not just there because they are at risk to themselves or to other people; they are there because they are a person deserving of care, deserving of treatment, and deserving of improvement and recovery.

I will keep my remarks relatively brief. As my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth has pointed out, Members on this side of the House entirely support clause 8, mainly because of the change towards a therapeutic focus, which ensures that all compulsory treatment must have a clear clinical benefit. The clause is much more patient centred; it gives legal clarity and stronger safeguards than currently exist in the law.

I will also touch briefly on amendments 44 and 45, which my hon. Friend the shadow Minister tabled. The key point about amendment 44 is the promotion of the therapeutic environment, which is absolutely key to this. It aligns with the best practice in mental health care and supports recovery orientated approaches.

The key point about amendment 45 is the reinforcement of the compassionate, person centred care that we are all trying to achieve. It ensures that responses to symptoms or behaviours are not punitive but supportive, and complements amendment 44 by applying the same principle to clinical interpretation of patient behaviours, which ultimately will encourage understanding of trauma related behaviours, reduce risks of re traumatisation and promote the psychological safety in treatment settings.

I entirely support the view expressed by the hon. Member for Thurrock, my colleague on the Health Committee, that a requirement to consider other trauma factors could be added to the Bill, either now or at a future point. I would be interested to hear the Minister’s thoughts on that subject.

I will also touch briefly on amendment 12, which was tabled by the Liberal Democrats, on treatment centres. Like my hon. Friend the shadow Minister, I support the overall context of what the amendment tries to achieve, but I have some concerns about how clinical decisions might be complicated if disagreements arise over the suitability of a treatment environment; and again, additional resources might be required to ensure that appropriate settings are available and accessible. When the hon. Member for Winchester winds up for the Liberal Democrats on that amendment, I will be interested to see whether he can assuage my concerns in that regard.

Finally, we support clause 9. It brings the consistency that we want. The alignment, between the treatment standard for prisoners that would be used for non prisoner patients, adds clarity. Again, it is rights based, and I think it will reduce the possibility of misuse, thereby helping to prevent inappropriate or unnecessary hospital transfers.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers.

I rise to speak in support of amendments 44 and 45, which have been tabled by my hon. Friend the shadow Minister. These amendments seek to put patients at the centre of the Bill by promoting a safe therapeutic environment and recovery from any childhood trauma.

Clause 8 provides for a new definition of “appropriate medical treatment”, which requires that treatment to have “a reasonable prospect of alleviating, or preventing the worsening of…a patient’s mental disorder.”

Amendment 44 would introduce an additional criterion to the definition of “appropriate medical treatment” by establishing that an appropriate medical treatment should not only address the individual’s immediate health needs, but be designed with the intent to reduce psychological distress and actively support an individual’s recovery from the effects of childhood trauma. This recognises the long term impact that early, adverse experience can have on mental and emotional wellbeing and ensures that treatment approaches are trauma informed, compassionate and conducive to long term improvement.

People who present with serious mental health concerns need to know that they are receiving support and care in the right environment. They are at their most vulnerable, and having the confidence in their environment can make a world of difference. That is particularly pertinent for those who have suffered childhood trauma. It is important that we deal with the consequences of mental ill health, and adequately address the root causes. Among these, childhood trauma is one of the most serious and persistent factors contributing to long term psychological conditions. By supporting this amendment, we would create a more resilient system that is equipped to respond to the reality and prevalence of childhood trauma in our society.

I recently met with Alison, who heads up a fantastic organisation called WeMindTheGap. It is based in Wrexham, but it is now moving and expanding to cover parts of my constituency, Chester South and Eddisbury. It does a fantastic job supporting young people who have struggled in the conventional education system, are absent from school or have dropped out of the system. We discussed childhood trauma and the rise in the number of young people not currently in any kind of education. One of the points that Alison made that resonated with me is that absence from school is linked not just to deprivation, but many contributing factors, including difficult domestic situations, isolation and rural isolation.

Many of these challenges are the most severe ones linked to childhood trauma, and although there are many wonderful organisations stepping in to support young people at an early stage, for some the impacts of childhood trauma continue to affect psychological wellbeing into adulthood. Sadly, childhood trauma is a societal issue that we face, and it is more common that we might imagine. Therefore, a step to embed trauma informed care into the legal framework, specifically for childhood trauma, is a step in the right direction.

Childhood trauma can lead to self destructive behaviour in adults. There is, as my hon. Friend pointed out, evidence to show that it is a causal factor. We must recognise the long term impact of adverse childhood experiences on mental health. This amendment, by adding a new criterion to the definition of “appropriate medical treatment” to require that treatment to aim to minimise distress and to support recovery from childhood trauma, would embed trauma informed care into the legal framework.

Amendment 45, by inserting the words “seeks to minimise the patient’s distress and promote their psychological wellbeing and recovery from any childhood trauma”, would reduce the risk of re traumatisation. Responses to symptoms or behaviours must be supported; it is about helping people to move towards genuine recovery.

Childhood trauma is unique, and it presents symptoms that are different from other mental health illnesses. Therefore, having a dedicated, compassionate and person centred approach to care is incredibly important. Setting the right culture to support patients, recognising the trauma that they carry and ensuring that there is adequate support and provisions in the legislation and the legal framework, is the right approach. I am therefore pleased to support these amendments, which would strengthen clause 8.

I will start by commenting on amendment 12, which was tabled by the hon. Member for Winchester. We do not consider the amendment necessary, as section 13(2) of the Mental Health Act 1983 already requires an “approved mental health professional” to consider all the “circumstances of the case” before making an application for admission, which could include the appropriateness of the setting.

Clause 8 embeds the principle of therapeutic benefit into the Bill by providing a new definition of “appropriate medical treatment”. That requires that there must be “a reasonable prospect” of therapeutic benefit to justify detention for treatment, and that medical must be “appropriate in a person’s case”. We would expect a setting in which someone is going to be detained to be considered as a part of those considerations. The code of practice already states that patients should be offered treatment and care in safe, supportive and therapeutic environments, so that also addresses that point.

I turn to amendments 44 and 45. We recognise the significant impact that childhood trauma can have on a person’s psychological wellbeing throughout their life. Mental disorder is defined in the 1983 Act as “any disorder or disability of the mind”, and that is already broad enough to include the impact of childhood trauma.

Clause 8 requires decision makers to take into account “the nature and degree of the disorder”, what is “appropriate” in the person’s case and “all other circumstances” when considering whether medical treatment has a reasonable prospect of therapeutic benefit. That could include consideration of childhood trauma. Although we recognise that childhood trauma may be a factor for many patients, it will not be a factor for all patients. It is critical that consideration of appropriate treatment is tailored to, and reflects, individual experiences and needs. All treatment interventions should include the aim of minimising distress and promoting psychological wellbeing. As well as legislative requirements, it is vital that all aspects of care in in patient settings should be trauma informed and that patients are always put at the heart of effective, compassionate care. That expectation is set out in NHS England’s “Culture of care standards for mental health inpatient services” and will be further emphasised in the revised Mental Health Act code of practice.

I turn to clause 8 stand part. The clause strengthens the concept of therapeutic benefit in the Mental Health Act to ensure that patients are detained for treatment or placed on a community treatment order only when there is a reasonable prospect they will benefit from their treatment. The current criteria for detentions under section 3 of the 1983 Act is that “appropriate medical treatment is available”, and the definition of medical treatment focuses only on the purpose of the treatment. In practice, that means that clinicians may not consider whether the treatment under section 3 will be effective. If we are going to deprive people of their liberty, it is vital that detention is of therapeutic benefit to them, regardless of whether the patient is detained for treatment under part II or part III of the Act, so the new therapeutic benefit criteria apply to both.

Under the Bill, for treatment to be considered appropriate, there will need to be a reasonable prospect that the patient will benefit from it. The therapeutic benefit criteria will apply at the point of detention and renewal to patients detained under section 3 in part II of the Act, patients on a community treatment order when they are first subject to the order and at the point of renewal, and all part III patients.

The clause also retains the definition of the purpose of “medical treatment” in the 1983 Act: “to alleviate, or prevent a worsening of, the disorder or one or more of its symptoms or manifestations.”

A focus on therapeutic benefit will ensure that patients receive the care and treatment they need to support their recovery and enable discharge when it is safe for them to leave hospital.

There are a few questions to be answered. Given the nature of acquired brain injury—for example, the capacity of someone who has had a stroke can fluctuate—it is very hard from a clinical position to know where the benefit of treatment starts or finishes. We must future proof the Bill. We have an ageing population, so we will see more people with dementia, strokes and acquired brain injuries for various reasons. There is a natural tension there, but it is only going to get worse over the next 20 or 30 years. How do the Government plan to address that? It is a concern.

I was intending to come to the questions that the hon. Gentleman and others asked, but as he has asked that now, I can tell him that the revised detention criteria and definition of appropriate medical treatment do not exclude patients with uncertain treatment outcomes, as long as they have a psychiatric disorder. Treatment must offer a reasonable prospect of benefit, considering both its purpose and likely outcome. The introduction of the principle of therapeutic benefit is aimed at ensuring that care and treatment provided under the Act will promote recovery and facilitate patients to get better so that they can be discharged as soon as possible. That applies right across the board on the basis of the psychiatric disorder.

I will now turn to clause 9. Sections 50 to 53 of the 1983 Act provide for the remission of prisoners or other detainees with severe mental health needs back to their prison or other place of detention; or, where relevant, direct their release where no effective treatment for the mental disorder can be given. Those provisions differ slightly from the detention criteria in the Bill, because in practice this cohort of patients may refuse to engage with treatment or behave in a disruptive manner such that treatment cannot practically be given. Clause 9 standardises the type of treatment to “appropriate medical treatment” for consistency with the rest of the Act, which will allow the therapeutic benefit changes in clause 8 to flow through to transfer decisions. This change has no other practical or legal effect and is technical in nature.

The definition of a “reasonable prospect” has been raised. It is one where there is a reasonable possibility that a patient will derive some benefit from the treatment. This does not require the decision maker to conclude that it is more likely than not that the patient will benefit—it is about getting the balance right between legislation and trusting the professional judgment of experts on the ground.

On the question of what mechanism there is for patients who believe that the “reasonable prospect” test has not been met, that forms part of the detention criteria. Patients can challenge their detention via the tribunal or hospital manager hearing.

The Opposition spokesman asked whether the updated code will provide specific examples of how to interpret “reasonable prospect”. Yes—we intend to include case study examples in the code, and will be working with clinicians and mental health practitioners to identify and develop them.

I think I see where the Minister is coming from, but to take the example that he chose last time we spoke about this, there could be someone with a severe eating disorder. At the moment, there are in patients with an eating disorder whose care is seen as palliative. Part of the problem lies in how we decide what is a reasonable prospect of benefit and where the boundary lies. What should be done if someone forcibly refuses food? Where do we draw the line on putting in nasogastric tubes? I mention that not to get a specific answer from the Minister but to point out the difficult nature of the balance that the Bill is trying to achieve—where is the therapeutic benefit, and who is making the decision on it? With the system being patient centred, the patient may well challenge it and say, “That is not for me; I don’t want this treatment.” But as the Minister said two days ago, the Government take a slightly paternalistic view on overruling that when it comes to someone’s capacity.

So here lies the rub, and I would be grateful if the Minister could write to me if he cannot answer now. In the case of that example, which is live now, how do we balance the prospect of reasonable benefit—that would be evident in the case of someone with an eating disorder having food—with the reality of a patient feeling that they are not deriving any benefit from it from their perspective? If they wanted to challenge that, who would they turn to? I would have thought that a clinician would take the same position as the Minister—that they should have some treatment—but their capacity gives them the right to say “No, I won’t”.

In many ways, that is a question for clinicians, because they always have to make judgments in individual cases. In tragic cases such as eating disorders, at times it gets to the point where a person cannot be saved. If a patient is refusing to eat, it is notoriously challenging for clinicians to try to get that position reversed through talking therapies or other forms of treatment. Is about how we put in place legislation and a code of practice that give the system the best possible steer while recognising that clinicians make decisions on a daily basis in reacting to the circumstances that they face. I will take the hon. Gentleman’s point away and think about it, but I wonder whether there is a definitive answer to his question because of that interplay between the macro system and the micro challenges within that system.

My hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock raised several important points. She wisely said that the clause is about not just the principle of therapeutic benefit, but seeing the person as an individual and the principle of doing least harm. I thank her for those points, which are important for the Committee to take on board.

My hon. Friend asked about the impact of the therapeutic benefit provisions on the 1.5% of people with particularly complex needs. That is an important question, and to some extent touches on the intervention by the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth about what we do in those really challenging situations. Where hospital admission is needed, the fundamental principle is that we believe it must be therapeutic, the least restrictive option and for the shortest time possible. Section 131A of the Mental Health Act 1983 places a duty on hospital managers to ensure that the hospital environment suits the patient’s age and needs. Current efforts, including NHS England’s quality transformation programme, aim to address the root causes of poor in patient care by working with patients, families and professionals.

That is a roundabout way of answering the question, but fundamentally, the hospital manager has a duty to ensure that the environment suits the patient’s needs. Those needs will range from the most complex and challenging 1.5% of cases that my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock mentioned through to the cases of others who may have milder disorders or challenges. Needs must be met across that landscape, and the duty is on the hospital manager to ensure that they are. My hon. Friend may also be interested to look at the quality transformation programme, which seeks to address some of the challenges that she mentioned.

In the light of those comments, I hope that hon. Members will not press their amendments. I commend clauses 8 and 9 to the Committee.

I appreciate the Minister’s considered reply to the amendments. I just spoke in a debate in the main Chamber about NHS infrastructure and buildings. Although I understand that that is not specifically in scope of the Bill, it is another good example of how the Bill is only as good as the system that it works within.

I will happily withdraw my amendment, but it is good to hear that the Minister understands the importance of hospital infrastructure. When substandard Victorian era asylums are still being used for mental health care, not only is it inadequate for patients, but it affects the public perception of mental health and mental health treatment, which is an important aspect of the issue. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Does the shadow Minister wish to move amendment 44?

I appreciate the answer that the Minister gave, but we would like to probe the opinion of the Committee, given the principles that are enshrined in the Bill and childhood trauma is an example of something with a causal factor.

Amendment proposed: 44, in clause 8, page 15, line 17, at end insert— “(iii) seeks to minimise the patient’s distress and promote psychological wellbeing and recovery from any childhood trauma;”.—(Dr Evans.) Question put, That the amendment be made.

9|0|4|11|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Clause 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 10

Nomination of the responsible clinician

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Under clause 10, a responsible clinician is an “approved clinician”, which refers to a mental health professional, usually a consultant psychiatrist, who is approved by or on behalf of the Secretary of State for the purposes of the Mental Health Act and has statutory roles and responsibilities. The responsible clinician has overall responsibility for a patient’s care under the Act. Only they can make certain decisions, such as renewing a patient’s detention or placing them on supervised community treatment.

The clause seeks simply to clarify the current position on how a responsible clinician is assigned overall responsibility for a patient’s care, and makes no practical change to the role of a responsible clinician or to how they are appointed. It is intended to make clear the distinction between the definition and role of the “responsible clinician” and the new definition of a “community clinician”, who will have an increased role in managing patients on community treatment orders.

The responsible clinician would retain overall responsibility for the patient’s care, including in hospital, while the community clinician would be responsible for the patient in the community. The community clinician is involved in decision making around community treatment orders, which we will discuss in greater detail in relation to clause 22, alongside the responsible clinician. It is therefore important to explain how a responsible clinician is nominated. I commend clause 10 to the Committee.

I am grateful for the opportunity to speak to clause 10, which addresses the nomination of the responsible clinician under the Mental Health Act. As we have heard, the responsible clinician is a pivotal figure in the operation of the Act, holding substantial legal powers in relation to detention, treatment and discharge. The Government’s explanatory notes make it clear that the clause is intended as a clarification, rather than a reform, of how a responsible clinician is designated by formally acknowledging that they are nominated by managers of the relevant hospital. That may well reflect current practice, but in legislation as sensitive and consequential as this, particularly where it relates to rights and liberties of people with serious mental illnesses, even clarification warrants scrutiny.

I would like to raise a few points of constructive concern and seek reassurances from the Minister. First, although the clause is presented as technical, it alters the statutory language around who is responsible for nominating the RC from an implied clinical judgment to an explicit managerial nomination. Even if that reflects what already happens, there is still a de facto risk of blurring the lines between clinical decision making and administrative oversight. Can the Minister confirm that this change will not give hospital managers discretion to override clinical suitability in selecting the responsible clinician?

Secondly, the clause distinguishes the responsible clinician from the soon to be defined community clinician role, which the Minister touched on. Although that separation may be helpful, it might help to guard that from confusion. Will clear published guidance accompany this change to explain to professionals, patients and families how roles are differentiated and how nominations are made?

Thirdly, on the matter of transparency and accountability, will patients be informed when a responsible clinician is nominated for their care? Will there be a mechanism for a patient to raise concerns if they believe that their nominated clinician is not appropriate for their needs and, if necessary, to change them? If so, what will that mechanism be?

Finally, although I accept the Government’s assertion that the clause is primarily clarificatory, we should keep it in mind that the Mental Health Act should not be amended lightly. The responsible clinician is not merely an administrative figure; they are central to the person’s liberty, treatment and legal rights. Have the Government considered whether additional safeguards could be introduced, in either guidance or statute, to ensure that this clarification does not lead to unintended consequences or the dilution of clinical independence?

The clause may be a small piece of a much wider reform, but, as ever with mental health legislation, the details matter. They shape people’s experience of care and of coercion.

I thank the Opposition spokesman. The role and nomination of the responsible clinician are well established and represent current practice, and the clause seeks merely to clarify the current position in legislation in order to avoid confusion regarding the roles of the existing responsible clinician and the community clinician, who will have new roles under the reforms to community treatment orders. I therefore think that the answer to his question—whether the clause will somehow change the clinical role of hospital managers, or whether hospital managers will be able to move the goalposts in how the nomination process happens—is no. The measure is simply a continuation of a well established practice.

I think that challenging the nominated clinician would be a role for the independent mental health advocate. If a patient wishes to challenge any aspect of his or her treatment, that would be the role of the IMHA, once they are in place.

The issue of unintended consequences brings us back to the code of practice. I emphasise the two tiers—or three tiers, really—of consultation that will happen. First, there will be consultation with a wide range of stakeholders, including approved mental health practitioners, psychiatrists, clinicians and all the representative bodies. That will bring us a very well developed draft of the code of practice. We will then go to public consultation, which will be open to input from anyone who has a view, and then to Parliament. That will give us a fairly high degree of assurance that the code of practice will address any area where there is a risk of unintended consequences.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 10 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 11 Making treatment decisions Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11 will introduce a new clinical checklist that the patient’s responsible clinician must follow when making decisions about a patient’s treatment. This seeks to put the patient at the heart of clinical decision making. Specifically, the checklist will require that the clinician supports the patient to engage in decision making concerning their treatment. That could include nursing, psychological interventions, specialist care and medication. They must also consult with those close to the patient to consider the patient’s wishes, feelings, beliefs and values, including those expressed in advance, and avoid making decisions based solely on factors such as the patient’s age or condition.

Where the patient is too unwell and lacks the capacity or competence to make decisions concerning their treatment, the checklist will require the clinician to consider any wishes, feelings, views and beliefs that they think the patient might have had if they had had capacity. They might establish this by consulting with those close to the individual or looking at their advance choice document.

The checklist represents best practice, but sadly it does not represent standard practice. The independent review identified multiple incidents of patients feeling disempowered and unsupported to share their wishes and feelings, and unfairly ignored when they did. That can undermine the patient’s sense of self worth, their recovery and their trust in mental health services.

We consider the checklist fundamental to delivering the guiding principle of patient choice and autonomy. We therefore consider it necessary to put the checklist on the face of the Bill. That was the approach taken with the best interests checklist under the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which in many ways is analogous. That checklist has come to be widely recognised and highly regarded by practitioners. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Clause 11 will introduce new section 56A into the Mental Health Act 1983. The clause represents an important reform to the framework for how treatment decisions are made to detain patients under part IV of the Act. The clause effectively establishes a statutory clinical checklist. It imposes a duty on the approved clinician in charge of treatment to consider a set of factors before giving medical treatment to the patient—whether or not the patient consents, lacks capacity or is refusing treatment. It applies to all treatments under part IV and to patients of all ages, including children.

As the Government’s explanatory notes set out, that duty includes considering alternative treatment options, taking steps to assist and encourage the patient’s participation in decisions, giving proper weight to the patient’s past and present wishes, feelings, beliefs and values, including advance statements, avoiding the reliance on discriminatory assumptions such as those based on a patient’s age or behaviour, and consulting others involved in the patient’s life, such as families, carers, nominated persons or advocates. Importantly, where a patient lacks capacity, the clinician is still required to consider what the patient would want if they had capacity. We welcome the fact that it reflects a commitment to person centred care, even in the most complex clinical situations.

I recognise and welcome the intention behind the clause. The principle that patients should not be passive recipients of care but active participants in decisions about their treatment is well established in modern mental health practice. The clause gives that principle a stronger legal footing, aiming to embed it in everyday clinical decision making. The Government rightly acknowledge that many patients have felt, in the past, that their views and preferences have been overlooked. Proposed new section 56 is intended to prevent that and promote autonomy, dignity and respect, even where coercive treatment is being considered.

I note that clause 11 amends the existing provision on second opinions and treatment certification, such as sections 57 and 58 of the Mental Health Act. It would appear that clinicians must now confirm in writing that they have complied with new section 56A checklists. Could the Minister confirm that that is correct? If so, that is a welcome move towards accountability and transparency.

I want to raise a few areas where further clarification or strengthening might be needed. First, the clause still leaves substantial room for clinical discretion. Much of the checklist is qualified by what is “reasonably practicable” or “reasonably ascertainable”. That is understandable from a legal drafting perspective, but it raises questions about how robustly the duties will be applied in practice, particularly in under resourced or overstretched services. Can the Minister confirm what support will be given to clinicians, such as the statutory guidance or training, to ensure that new section 56A is implemented meaningfully and consistently across the system?

Secondly, although clinicians must now record that the checklist has been completed, the patient or their family currently have no direct route to challenge non compliance. There does not seem to be an appeal mechanism, so I wonder what or who might fulfil that role. It would be helpful if the Minister could set out the process. Is there a formal role for advocates in contesting whether the process was followed properly? If found wanting, are there sanctions for failing to comply? Is it perceived to be part of the integrated care board commissioning role, for example? Could the Minister say more about what resources are available to patients or carers who believe their views were not properly considered? Would the Government consider a statutory right to request a review where the checklist appears to have been bypassed?

Thirdly, I note that the clause applies only to patients treated under part IV of the Act. It does not apply to patients subject to community treatment orders, unless they are recalled to hospital, yet those patients may still face significant pressure to comply with treatment, often under the threat of recall. Forgive me if I am a little muddled, but I would welcome some clarification on the rationale for excluding CTO patients from these protections. Are the Government open to extending these duties to cover community settings, particularly as part of future of reform, especially as they did not accept the amendments tabled in the Lords?

Fourthly, the checklist applies to all ages, including children and young people. That raises important questions about how capacity, consent and participation will be judged in younger patients, and how the duty to consult parents or carers will be balanced with the rights of the child. Will specific guidance be issued to support clinicians applying this clause in cases involving children and adolescents?

Further still, while proposed new section 56A emphasises consultation and participation, the weight to be given to the views of others—whether an advocate, nominated person or family member—remains at the discretion of the clinician. That may be clinically appropriate, but it raises the question: how will clinicians be supported to navigate competing or conflicting views, and will they be required to provide reasons for how they have balanced those perspectives? I will not delve into it now, but when we come to nominated persons, there is a reason that this particular point is poignant. We need to understand how decisions are being made when there are challenges.

While I welcome the clear emphasis in clause 11 on patient voice, autonomy and dignity in treatment decisions, I must raise a matter of considerable concern and spend a little bit of time on it: the absence of any explicit reference to public safety or risk to others within the proposed new section 56A. It could be argued that this is not a minor omission. As legislators, we have a duty not only to protect the rights of the individuals in clinical care but to safeguard the wider public. While risk to the public is rightly a key consideration in detention decisions under sections 2, 3 and 20A of the Mental Health Act, it is not reflected at all in the new duties governing treatment decisions, even when the treatment may directly affect behaviour inciting compliance.

We sadly know that the stakes here are not hypothetical. When we were discussing clause 5, the Minister turned around and asked what the point was of over embroidering the Bill, especially if such duties already exist in these cases. I will tread carefully here, because there are both legal and emotional sensitivities, but there are good examples of why this really matters. A deeply troubling case, and one that continues to resonate when we talk about risk, public safety and clinical decision making under the Mental Health Act, is that of Nicola Edgington and whether the Bill does enough to address it.

In 2011, Nicola Edgington, a woman with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, walked into a police station and an A&E department in south east London. She told the staff that she was relapsing and desperately begged to be detained, warning them that she posed a danger to others. Despite her history—she had previously killed her mother during an earlier episode—she was allowed to leave hospital. Within hours, she murdered a complete stranger, 58-year old Sally Hodkin, and seriously injured another woman. Serious incident reviews concluded that the risk she posed to the public was severely underestimated. Professionals focused on her current presentation, not the pattern of risk, and key warnings were missed. She asked to be sectioned; she was not, and someone died.

Since that case, there have been some important reforms, including stronger guidance on the risk assessment, improved information sharing between agencies, and enhanced care co ordination through the care programme approach. Crucially, even today, there is still no statutory duty requiring clinicians to explicitly consider risk to the public when making treatment decisions under the Mental Health Act, including decisions about whether to detain or treat someone who is deteriorating.

That brings me to clause 11 and proposed new section 56A. The Government rightly propose a clinical checklist for treatment decisions—one that includes a patient’s wishes and beliefs, as well as views from family or advocates. These are welcome steps, but the checklist is silent on public protection. It recognises autonomy, but not risk to others. It includes past preferences, but not past violence. Should we not at this moment consider an explicit legal duty to assess and document the risk that a patient may pose to others when treatment decisions are made, especially for those with a serious history of violence or relapse?

The Bill seeks to modernise mental health law and embed dignity, but dignity and safety must go hand in hand. The public and the victims’ families deserve the reassurance that treatment decisions under the Act will always factor in public protection as well as patient preference. Could this be the moment to enshrine that balance in law?

We can fast forward to find more recent cases, although again, I will tread carefully here, given that there are proceedings and given the nature of the case. There is the harrowing case of Valdo Calocane, who killed three people in Nottingham—two students and a caretaker— in 2023. He had a well documented history of paranoid schizophrenia, previous violent incidents and non compliance with treatment. Despite prior detentions and involvement with mental health services, it appears that opportunities to enforce and maintain treatment seem to have been missed. The case has rightly raised serious public concern about risk management, information sharing and follow up within the system.

These are outlier cases, thank God, but they demonstrate the importance of maintaining a clear, structured consideration of risk, especially when treatment compliance is uncertain. I appreciate that the Government may argue that public protection is already baked in through other parts of the Act, especially the detention criteria in conditions for community treatment orders. But treatment itself, especially when administered under compulsion, is one of the key tools we have to manage risk. A framework that governs such a decision should acknowledge that reality.

I ask the Minister: why does proposed new section 56A not include a requirement to consider public safety or risk to others as part of a treatment decision making process? Could we not include a simple provision, akin to that of section 20A(4)(b), requiring that treatment decisions take account of the protections of others alongside patient wishes and clinical need. Alternatively, could the Minister confirm whether guidance under the revised code of practice will explicitly require clinicians to document how risks to others are assessed and managed when deciding on treatment, particularly in cases involving violence, psychosis, history of non compliance or a further patterning and escalation?

I believe it is possible, and indeed necessary, to balance the empowerment of the patient with a firm commitment to public safety. This is not about undermining autonomy. It is about recognising that in rare but high impact cases, the decisions clinicians make about treatment can have real world consequences beyond the individual. I believe the Minister already conceded that point on Tuesday when he rejected amendments 52 and 53 and new clause 24. He gave the example of eating disorders, and said:

“Patient choice is, of course, critical, and the changes that we are making recognise that when patients have a say in their treatment, they are more likely to engage. We also think that it is right that when those decisions put people at risk of serious harm, including risk to their own life, there is a duty to intervene.

We recognise that detaining and treating patients with capacity without their consent is a very serious step to take. However, we think that it is right that we intervene when someone is a risk to themselves, not just to other people.”––[Official Report, Mental Health Public Bill Committee, 10 June 2025; c. 96.]

The Minister seems to say that the Government do have a partially paternalistic role with an individual and, of course, the wider public. Perhaps he will therefore agree to look at this area and to bring some consideration of it to the Floor of the House on Report.

The clause is a welcome and important development, but I return to where I started: it reinforces the right of detained people to be heard, to be involved and to receive treatment that reflects who they are, not just what the clinical diagnosis says. It is vital, however, that the clause delivers not just on the appearance of autonomy, but on its reality. The Bill needs to put in place the training, the guidance, the oversight and the accountability mechanisms necessary to give the clause real full force for the patient and the public. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

I rise to speak in support of this important clause, which puts patient experience and individual choice at the heart of treatment. It is a brilliant focus on seeing the individual as a person, and ensuring that they have a strong role to play in deciding their treatment pathway going forward.

I very much welcome the development of a clinical checklist that includes looking at a patient’s past and present wishes and feelings. That is important because, when someone is in a mental health crisis, they might not be in the best possible place at that moment to articulate what their wishes are. Looking at how they may have acted in the past, or may have opted for treatment when not at a crisis point—including, I note, through the introduction of advance choice documents, allowing people to choose how they would like to be treated if they have lost the ability to make those decisions for themselves about the best way forward and, indeed, if they have to be detained—and taking their wishes into account, as well as their beliefs and values, is important in developing an individual treatment plan that allows them to be seen as an individual deserving of care, in order to achieve the best possible outcome for them. Across the House, we have noted the important fact that, when patients are involved in developing their treatment plans, they are much more likely to engage and have significantly improved outcomes.

I do not want to get ahead of the Minister, but I want to address a few points that the shadow Minister raised. I want to say this as someone with lived experience of severe mental illness; it is important to have someone on the Committee that can speak to that, so I probably should when I can. This clause speaks to the patient experience. There are other parts in the Bill that deal with potential risk to the public and risk of harm. In the first example the shadow Minister gave, he mentioned that the woman in question said that her wish was to be admitted to a secure unit. I would say that, under this clause, had they had regard for her wishes and how she wanted to be treated, that would have mitigated some of the risk.

I know that there are times when people will act in a way that may be at odds with the risk that they pose to the public, but these matters are properly addressed elsewhere in the Bill. What the clause speaks to, and what we should try not to dilute, is the patient experience.

I appreciate the hon. Lady’s insight, both as a politician and as a patient. I guess the Opposition are concerned that there is no explicit duty here, which is why legislating for that is so important. There was a huge number of inquiries about the case from 2011. There have been sufficient changes, but in 2023, as we saw in Nottingham, there was yet another case. There are still ongoing proceedings, so I will not comment too much on that, but this is an opportunity that the Committee should seriously consider.

This harks back to what I was talking about on Tuesday. It is another step—an escalation—in this concerning pattern of behaviour, and it is hard, from a clinician’s point of view, to work out whether something is going to happen. I see this as part of the checklist to make sure that consideration is there, or, if public safety is not there, that it does not fall into a statutory role as it would anywhere else. Those are my concerns. We have not put down an amendment, but I am interested in the hon. Lady’s thoughts on how that should be approached from both the politician and the patient side.

I welcome the hon. Member’s intervention. On Tuesday we discussed clauses on who can be detained and when, and earlier today we discussed the necessity of detention, and there was some debate about the amendment in the other place. Other bits of the Bill focus on when it is necessary to detain an individual for public safety and not just for their own treatment; I will not re litigate who should be performing that function, but earlier clauses deal with that.

The importance of this clause is the patient perspective. There is a significant stigma associated with severe mental illness. I have been reticent about my own conditions in the past because of that, and because of how I would be perceived. It has been particularly hard to be open about the fact that I might be subject to in patient mental health treatment; I probably see that as a likelihood in my future at some point, although I hope it is not and I work very hard every single day to avoid that. However, it is important that there is a part of the Bill that speaks to me as an individual. I speak to the Committee today as an articulate individual—I do not want to say intelligent; I will not blow my own trumpet—who can say what treatment option I would like.

It is incredibly important to recognise that people who are subject to detention under the Bill are individuals who have opinions on their treatment. I have lived with these conditions for the best part of two decades, and the biggest expert on them is me. If I was in a mental health crisis, I might not be in a place to articulate the best treatment for me, but right now I can say what works. I will not go into that, because it is private, but I know that the best course of care for me would involve someone taking advantage of my knowledge of my condition and working with me to allow me to get the care I need to get better.

The point is that the clause’s stand alone focus on the patient experience deals with some of that stigma. It puts the patient’s experience at the heart of treatment, it speaks to some of the issues mentioned about what happened in Essex, which is now the focus of the Lampard inquiry, and helps to deal with some of that. It sees us as individuals.

I commend my hon. Friend for her honest account of her personal experiences and thank her for bringing that experience into our discussion of the Bill. It is absolutely right that the welfare and wellbeing of individuals who are living their lives, at such distressing times as when they need mental health support, should be at the heart of the Bill. I want to acknowledge her contribution to the debate.

I thank my hon. Friend for her kind words.

That concludes what I was trying to get at: the importance of a clause in the Bill that is focused on patient experience. Understanding and acknowledging the sheer importance of that person’s experiences, and the value that brings to their care plan, cannot be overestimated. I hope that members of the Committee will support the clause, because it represents quite a sea change in how people subject to treatment under the Mental Health Act are treated.

May I say what a pleasure it is to follow my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock? I found her contribution incredibly insightful. She is a tremendous asset to the Committee and indeed to the parliamentary Labour party, we are fortunate to have her with us on the Committee.

The Opposition spokesman mentioned a number of cases, including Nicola Edgington and Valdo Calocane, so I will take the opportunity to express my condolences to those who were so terribly affected by those tragic events. We are in ongoing engagement with the families of Barnaby Webber, Grace O’Malley Kumar and Ian Coates, and it is appropriate that we take a moment as a Committee to reflect on the terrible tragedy they have gone through and to express our condolences to them.

The Opposition spokesman’s question was, broadly speaking, about risk and public safety. I will make a number of points on that. First, the clinical checklist does not bind clinicians to following the wishes of patients; it requires that clinicians consider them when deciding on the patient’s treatment, but, by definition, a checklist is not binding. If a preferred treatment is not clinically appropriate or feasible, clinicians must explain why and, where possible, discuss alternatives with the patient or their loved ones.

The purpose of the checklist is to ensure that the patient’s wishes play a more central role in clinical decision making, as we are aware that that is not always the case. However, the checklist does not bind the clinician to the patient’s wishes, nor does it prevent the use of compulsory treatment. We recognise that compulsory treatment is sometimes necessary to get a person well again, including by managing the potential risk that they might pose to themselves or others.

My other point is that there is not a binary choice between consulting and engaging with the patient, and enhancing and consolidating public safety; very often, the two go together. One of the learning points from the tragic Nottingham incident is that there was not enough consultation with Mr Calocane’s family. If there had been, there might have been opportunities to note his episodic behaviour and the fact that he was not always taking his medication. Had the family been better consulted, it would have enhanced public protection and safety. It is important that we do not say that family consultation and engagement with the patient are opposed to public protection—in fact, they are two sides of the same coin.

The Minister makes an excellent point, and that is part of the reason why the Opposition did not want to spring this question on the Government in an amendment or a vote, but rather to have the conversation first, because this is an important clause to get right. The two sides can be worked on in parallel when considering public safety more widely. Regarding safeguarding issues, as a GP dealing with children it is very common to share information with social services to allow them to have that central point, so that things are not missed.

The principle of the checklist is to ask whether we are thinking about the individual patient. We have heard from patient testimony that that has to be paramount— No. 1—and that is the prima facie reason for having these provisions in the Bill. But, as we are considering this clause, given some of the cases and some of the holes, should we not consider asking clinicians, in statute, to think specifically about the risk, and wider risk, and what could be involved in the treatment?

As the Minister rightly pointed out, if it was considered that certain individuals were not conforming with their medication regimen, or that there was a risk of them not doing so, or that they had a violent tendency when they relapsed, and had not met a threshold because they had never actually gone to prison or been through a court, but were known to police services, that grey area might pick something up if it were simply added to the checklist. I cannot think of many things, bar the patient—who is No. 1—more important than public safety. I put that point to the Minister to consider further in the light of those cases. I do not want to go into specifics, because it is not right to do so and he will be much closer to details than I am, but there is a widening principle over what we can do in this space.

I can absolutely confirm that the Government’s understanding of the way in which the system must function is that, if any risk at all to public safety is perceived, that must be documented. The risk to others and self must be assessed and documented, and that then informs the care and treatment plan. It is a basic expectation of the professional management of a particular patient that any risk identified to public safety and protection must be in there. However, I take the hon. Gentleman’s point on whether or not it should be in the Bill. I will come back to him on that, because I would be rather surprised if it were not made very clear somewhere that that is a basic expectation; if it were not, that would obviously need to be looked at, but I am reasonably confident that it is.

The hon. Gentleman asked whether the second opinion doctor would confirm that the checklist had been complied with by the approved clinician: yes, and that must be documented in the second opinion doctor’s certificate. He also asked whether we will support clinicians with statutory guidance. Yes, we will provide guidance on the delivery of the checklist in the code of practice.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 11 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

I understand that the Government intend the Committee to sit until 7 o’clock. I therefore think that it would be appropriate to take a short break.

Sitting suspended.

On resuming—

Clause 12

Appointment of doctors to provide second opinions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The clause will simply clarify existing legislation concerning the second opinion appointed doctor so that it more closely reflects current practice and terminology. It sets out the role of the regulatory authority in appointing a second opinion appointed doctor and the criteria that the second opinion appointed doctor must meet, and it updates terminology so that it is more in keeping with that used by practitioners. I therefore commend clause 12 to the Committee.

On a point of order, Mr Vickers. We did not actually cover clause 11. [Interruption.] Did we vote on clause 11?

Yes, it was agreed.

It happened—it was real!

It is a relief that we have not dropped clause 11, an important clause. Equally important is clause 12, on the appointment of a doctor to provide a second opinion. The clause will introduce the new framework for appointing second opinion appointed doctors under the Mental Health Act, which is indeed important.

I begin by acknowledging the Government’s efforts to clarify and strengthen the role of these doctors, who play a vital part in safeguarding the rights and wellbeing of patients subject to compulsory treatment. The emphasis on the independence of the second opinion appointed doctor is a positive step. Ensuring that that doctor is not the patient’s responsible clinician or treating doctor reinforces impartiality. Furthermore, the clear responsibility for this doctor to assess therapeutic benefit and to verify that clinicians have followed the clinical checklist, considering patients’ wishes and preferences and treatment alternatives, reflects an encouraging commitment to embedding autonomy and choice in the clinical discussions.

Having said that, I would like to raise some constructive points and seek clarifications on certain operational aspects that I believe are critical to the clause’s effective implementation. First, the Bill requires the regulatory authority, namely the Care Quality Commission in England and Care Inspectorate Wales, to appoint the second opinion doctor “as soon as reasonably practicable”.

The absence of a specific maximum timeframe could raise concerns about potential delays. Given the importance of timely second opinions in safeguarding patient rights, will the Minister clarify what safeguards are in place to prevent undue waiting times? Forgive me: I could not find it, but has any clear data been recorded on timings for second opinion appointed doctors? Has any consideration been given to whether a timescale should be implemented in legislation in order to ensure that there is no slipping through the cracks? That may be appear to be overkill; I defer to experts in the Department, but given the acute needs of some patients who will encounter the legislation, it is worth considering.

Secondly, the role of the regulatory authority is pivotal in the process. In England, that role falls to the Care Quality Commission, so it is worth spending a few moments reflecting on the CQC’s role not in general terms, but specifically in relation to mental health settings. Strangely, I speak today from a position of both continuity and change. Having been a Government Member during a period when there was reform of the CQC and it was under active discussion, I now speak for the Opposition, but with an equally strong commitment to ensuring that reforms are delivered and that people with mental health needs receive care that is not only safe, but dignified and therapeutic.

It is no secret that mental health services, particularly in patient units, have faced significant challenges in recent years. Some high profile failures in care, including abuse and neglect in mental health hospitals, have understandably shaken public confidence. As a regulator, the CQC has struggled at times to respond quickly or decisively enough. In some cases, failings persisted despite earlier inspections raising concerns. We need to be honest about the fact that the pace of regulatory response has not always matched the urgency of the risk, particularly for detained patients, who are among the most vulnerable people in our society and our care system.

Two recent independent reports—the Dash review, which began in May 2024 just before the election, and the follow up work by Sir Mike Richards on its findings—have offered a candid but constructive diagnosis of what went wrong inside the CQC. They have identified serious weaknesses: a sharp reduction in inspection activity; delays in publishing reports; an overcentralised system that dilutes expertise in specialist areas such as mental health; and a lack of transparency that sometimes makes it difficult for families and professionals alike to understand how services are monitored.

Both reports were also forward looking, however. They have informed a programme of reform, which began under the previous Government and is, I hope, continuing under this Government. What has changed? The CQC has started to take action. It now has a renewed commitment to sector specific expertise, which should help mental health, with dedicated inspection teams for mental health returning. The backlog of unpublished reports has been significantly reduced and the CQC’s digital systems are starting to be overhauled. Perhaps most importantly, the regulator is beginning to work on increasing transparency in order to engage better with service users and staff in mental health settings.

These changes are welcome, but fragile. Reform takes time and momentum can easily be lost. Context matters when we are considering giving an organisation more work in primary legislation, which is why I have raised the issue and given a potted history.

The Bill gives us the opportunity to ensure that the rights and safety of people subject to detention or treatment under the Mental Health Act are properly safeguarded, but legislation alone will not guarantee good care. The role of the CQC as a proactive and trusted regulator is essential. That means ensuring that inspections are sufficiently frequent, especially in settings in which patients are detained and find it hard to raise concerns; ensuring that de escalation, restraint and seclusion practices are being scrutinised not just in policy, but in practice; ensuring that the voices of patients and families are actively heard in regulatory processes; and ensuring that any concerns that are raised, whether by whistleblowers, staff or external professionals, are acted upon promptly.

I do not say all this to assign blame. Indeed, many of the problems that the CQC has faced have been years in the making, and I accept that some of them arose while I was on the Government Benches. However, I am saying this now because I believe that there is cross party agreement that regulatory failure is not an option for mental health services. As we look ahead to implementing this legislation, I hope that the Committee will keep it in mind that a reformed Mental Health Act must be matched by a reformed regulatory framework that is resourced, responsive and rooted in the lived experience of those it is designed to protect.

We know that the CQC has undergone significant changes and is under new leadership after the concerns, complaints and issues. Do the Government have faith in the CQC? I ask the Minister to provide assurances that both the CQC and—

Order. I think the shadow Minister is straying somewhat from the clause.

Forgive me, Mr Vickers; I will get to the point a little more briefly, but the whole point is that the person has to be appointed through the CQC. The CQC will make that decision, because by definition it is the body that makes such decisions. If it is not resourced properly or if it has problems, regulatory or otherwise, we will find ourselves in a very difficult position, which is why I am raising the issue. I am happy to curtail my speech.

I would be grateful if you curtailed it and stuck to clause 12.

You have actually caught me at a perfect point, Mr Vickers. The concept of therapeutic benefit is central to the second opinion doctor’s assessment. However, in clinical practice, interpretations of therapeutic benefit can vary considerably. How do the Government propose to ensure consistency and fairness in such assessments? Will there be clear and standardised guidance for the training of doctors giving a second opinion, to avoid subjective discrepancies?

The introduction of the clinical checklist is a welcome enhancement, especially the requirement to consider patients’ past and present wishes and available treatment alternatives. However, it is essential that the checklist is not just a mere bureaucratic box ticking exercise, as we have discussed. What mechanisms will be in place to monitor compliance with the checklist? What recourse will patients have through the assigned second doctor?

Finally, I note that the clauses following clause 12 move towards tailoring safeguards around patients’ capacity or competence. That seems more humane and targeted than a one size fits all approach, but this added complexity may increase administrative burdens on second opinion doctors and treating teams. Have the Government considered the potential impact on workload? Are there plans for adequate training and support to manage the transition effectively?

In conclusion, clause 12 represents an important evolution in protecting the rights of patients undergoing compulsory treatment. The Opposition recognise that progress has been made. However, the effectiveness of the reforms hinges on clear operational frameworks, adequate resources and a robust regulator. I look forward to the Minister’s response to my questions and hope that the Government will take them on board to strengthen the Bill.

On the Opposition spokesman’s question about a specific timeframe, the wording of the clause— “as soon as reasonably practicable”— is a sufficient and fairly strong steer to the system that avoids the need to tie our hands with a specific timeframe.

Consistency, training and monitoring are going to be important elements of the code of practice. We need to ensure that those questions are answered and that those are put in place.

On the hon. Gentleman’s question about the CQC, we are grateful to Dr Penny Dash and Professor Mike Richards for their recommendations, which the CQC has accepted in full. We are greatly encouraged by the reforms it has made so far, and we particularly welcome the appointment of Dr Arun Chopra as the CQC’s first chief inspector of mental health, which will improve the voice of mental health patients and help to better uphold their rights. We are confident that those changes will ensure that the CQC is better placed to regulate mental services.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 12 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 13 Medicine etc: treatment conflicting with a decision by or on behalf of a patient Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause 14 stand part.

The power to give compulsory treatment is sometimes necessary to get a person well again, but unfortunately some clinicians can too easily resort to this course of action without considering alternatives. Compulsory, and sometimes forced, treatment can cause distress and trauma to the patient, and some say that this has caused them to lose trust in mental health services.

One individual told us that she was forcibly treated with a medication, despite its having caused serious side effects in the past. Sadly, her appeal to staff to offer her an alternative that had previously proven effective was ignored, and she was forcibly treated without any explanation as to why. That situation might have been avoidable if staff had only stopped to listen to the individual and consider other options.

Clause 13 seeks to shift the culture around administering compulsory medication to patients under the Mental Health Act, while maintaining the power to do so. Under the clause, a “compelling reason” will be required to overrule a patient’s refusal of a medication, whether that refusal is made with capacity at the time, in advance or by a representative, for example through a lasting power of attorney. A clinician will be able to overrule a decision to refuse medication only if they cannot identify a clinically viable alternative or one that is acceptable to the patient.

The aim is to encourage clinicians to take the time to consider alternative medications, for example by speaking with the patient or those close to them, or consulting their advance choice document. That will potentially avoid the need for non consensual medication. Many clinicians already care for patients in this way, but others do not.

Where the clinician thinks that there is a compelling reason to treat compulsorily, a second opinion doctor, appointed by the regulator, must confirm this, as well as other matters, before treatment can go ahead. This marks a significant shift away from the current system, in which compulsory treatment can last three months before a review by a second opinion doctor is required. We believe that the measure will help to cement the desired cultural change that we all aim to achieve. The clause is critical to making the patient’s voice more central to their treatment.

Clause 14 will ensure that where a person does not or cannot agree to their treatment under the Mental Health Act, they receive the safeguard of a second opinion doctor appointed by the regulator. Currently, if a patient lacks capacity or competence to consent, a second opinion appointed doctor is to assess whether their treatment is appropriate, three months after the treatment course began. Although that is an important safeguard, it happens too late in a patient’s treatment course.

Clause 14 will shorten the timeframe for that safeguard so that it occurs after two months, rather than three. The timeframe within which the patient’s responsible clinician must review and provide a certificate indicating that the patient is consenting to medication is also being shifted from three months to two months. By introducing scrutiny at an earlier point in the process, we will better protect those patient groups who may be very unwell and highly vulnerable. That is particularly true for patients who lack capacity to consent. For those reasons, I commend clauses 13 and 14 to the Committee.

I am grateful for the opportunity to scrutinise clauses 13 and 14. Clause 13 will make significant amendments to how medical treatment is administered under the Mental Health Act 1983 in circumstances in which a patient refuses, or is deemed to have refused, that treatment. The clause points us to significant questions about autonomy, capacity and compulsion. I hope that we can explore those issues in a way that does justice to the patients affected and to the clinicians working under the framework.

Under current law, in particular section 63 of the Mental Health Act, a patient detained under the Act can be given medical treatment for their mental disorder without their consent, even if they have capacity to refuse. That includes in situations where the patient has made a valid and applicable advance decision, or where a donee under a lasting power of attorney, a court appointed deputy or indeed the Court of Protection itself has indicated that the treatment should not be given.

That power is curtailed only for certain treatments, such as electroconvulsive therapy, which falls under section 58A, and some surgical procedures under section 57, where either consent or a second opinion is already required. We will be debating those separately. Moreover, in the case of psychotropic medication under section 58, treatment can typically be given for up to three months without any second opinion, even if the patient objects.

The clause will introduce a proposed new section 57A, significantly shifting the landscape. It will extend safeguards to cases in which a patient has capacity but refuses treatment, a valid and applicable advance decision refuses treatment, or a refusal is issued by a donee, a deputy or the Court of Protection. In such cases, treatment could be given only if a second opinion appointed doctor certifies that the treatment is clinically appropriate; there is a “compelling reason” to give it, such as no acceptable alternative; and the process has followed a newly required clinical checklist.

This is a clear move to give greater legal weight to patient choice and prior decision making, echoing the long standing principles of the Mental Capacity Act 2005. It would also mark a significant tightening of powers under section 63, making it harder to override refusals of treatment, and in effect it would end the practice of giving compulsory medication in the first three months without external oversight, at least where a refusal or conflicting decision exists.

It is worth touching on the interaction between the Bill and the Mental Capacity Act. We have talked about that framework before, but it allows for advance decisions to refuse treatment and recognises the authority of donees under a lasting power of attorney, court appointed deputies and the Court of Protection to look at best interests. Historically, however, the Mental Health Act 1983 has operated in parallel, and at times in conflict, by allowing compulsory treatment for mental disorder, even in cases where patients have capacity. By inserting proposed new section 57A, the clause attempts to bridge that gap by preventing certain treatments from being administered where they would conflict with an advance refusal or decision.

That represents a welcome shift, but there are some concerns to which we need to turn our attention. For example, the “compelling reason” threshold is undefined in statute and could allow significant variation in interpretation. There is a reference to the checklist in section 56A, but—forgive me—I do not believe that that quite covers the definition. There is also a risk that, in practice, time pressures or institutional cultures may erode the intended safeguards, in particular if urgent treatment provisions under section 62 are overused, so I will discuss those a little further in detail.

I recognise that the intent behind clause 13 is to place the principle of autonomy and choice at the heart of mental health care—that is a welcome and overdue shift—but given that it introduces the concept of compelling reason to override a refusal of treatment, will the Minister clarify how “compelling” will be interpreted in practice? Will statutory guidance define the term to ensure consistency, or will it be left to the discretion of individual clinicians and the second opinion appointed doctor?

Secondly, the clause strengthens the role of the SOAD, requiring not just clinical oversight but legal and ethical judgment, including engagement with advance decisions and decisions of legal proxies. What training and support will be provided to SOADs to equip them for the expanded roles? How will the Government ensure that the system is properly resourced to avoid delays?

Thirdly, will there be a clear right of appeal or review for patients or their legal representatives when an SOAD certifies treatment in the face of an objection? I am conscious that there are real world examples. For instance, let us take the case of a patient with bipolar disorder who is detained under the Mental Health Act. When they are in a stable state, they might clearly and calmly refuse a particular medication because they have experienced harmful side effects from it in the past—the Minister even used that as an example. At that point, they have capacity and their decision is valid. However, during a later episode of acute illness, they might temporarily lose capacity, and in that window the clinician would potentially override their earlier decision, even if it was made with full understanding.

This amendment aims to protect such refusals, but unless the law is clear about how to treat prior capacitous decisions during periods of incapacity, there is a risk that well considered patient choice could still be sidestepped. This problem will get only more common, given the number of people with dementia and acquired brain injuries.

Fourthly, the clause enhances safeguards, which is crucial, but it could result in unintended harms. What assessment has been made of the risk that necessary treatment may be delayed or denied in complex cases, especially where SOAD access is limited or where there is disagreement about whether an advance decision is valid or applicable? Although I support greater emphasis on patient autonomy, we must consider those at the greatest risk of harm. Do the Government believe that clause 13 strikes the right balance between protecting liberty and ensuring prompt, effective care for the most acutely unwell? Have they any concerns about what that could mean for public safety? Has an impact assessment been carried out on what that could mean in the real world and the implications, given the recent high profile cases that we just talked about?

Clause 14 shortens the period before a second opinion is required for certain types of treatment from three to two months. That is a positive step in principle, and ensures that patients who either lack capacity or have not consented are not left too long without independent oversight. It also allows, where clause 13 applies, for a single certificate to be issued by the second opinion appointed doctor, which covers both standard review under section 58 of the Mental Health Act and the more complex safeguards in proposed new section 57A. That may help to reduce duplication and administrative burdens.

The table on page 25 of the explanatory notes gives an overview of how that might work, but I would welcome reassurance on a few points. How will the distinct legal tests, such as assessing a patient’s capacity, rather than determining a compelling reason for overriding an advance decision, be kept clear and robust in one single combined certificate? What safeguards will be in place to ensure that streamlining does not weaken the new protections in clause 13?

Let us imagine that a patient has made an advance decision to refuse a particular antipsychotic medication—let us call it medication A. They are detained under the Mental Health Act, and the clinical team wants to give them medication A anyway. Because the patient lacks capacity and the proposed treatment goes against a valid advance decision, the special safeguards under proposed new section 57A apply, yet at the same time it has been nearly two months since the patient started treatment, so a second opinion under section 58 is also needed to check whether any medication is appropriate more generally. Clause 13 allows for those two approvals—one for the general treatment under section 58 and one for treatment despite the patient’s known refusal under proposed new section 57A—to be combined into one certificate.

The concern is that, in streamlining, the different legal and ethical issues might be collapsed into a broader decision, making it harder to see whether the patient’s advance refusal was properly considered and whether the decision to override has met the compelling reasons test. Can the Minister specify how that might work, given that there will now be one certificate? Clinicians and reviewers might unintentionally treat the refusal as just another case of lack of capacity, rather than the serious, rights based objections that require extra scrutiny.

On the issue of practicality, with the review period being brought forward by a month, are the Government confident that a second opinion system is resourced to meet the demands without compromising quality? I could go on, but for the sake of the Committee, I will not.

I rise to speak in support of clauses 13 and 14. I have talked briefly today about the ongoing Lampard inquiry. There are two examples that are now public. Patient A was detained under the Mental Health Act for more than five years without a clear therapeutic plan and was subjected to prolonged seclusion and chemical restraint. The inquiry found that, despite the family raising concerns, there was a lack of clinical oversight and a failure to review detention and treatment status regularly. Patient B, a young man detained for over two years, experienced frequent use of rapid tranquillisation and segregation. The patient’s condition deteriorated, and that was documented, but there was no change to his care approach and no treatment review at all.

I welcome the clauses, but I put to the Minister how vital it is that we ensure that these reviews happen. There is a three month review process at the moment, but in those two cases it did not happen. I also welcome shortening the time to two months. It is vital that the three pronged approach that is outlined in the Bill happens. We have heard that no one size fits all—individual care is so important. Establishing the capacity and competency of an individual is vital. Every patient is different and they should be treated appropriately.

It is important to have appropriate review mechanisms in mental health care. Shortening the review process to two months for patients ensures that the therapeutic and clinical treatment remains appropriate. Hopefully, it also helps to lead to the desired quicker recovery period for the patient, but if not, it helps to adapt the treatment if a stronger or different type of treatment is required. The key is looking at ways to get people out of care as quickly as possible. Reviewing care regularly is really important. I welcome clauses 13 and 14.

I rise to talk briefly about clauses 13 and 14, which I generally and genuinely support. Clause 13 addresses a long standing ethical and legal tension: how to balance the need for treatment with a patient’s right to refuse it, especially when they may have made advance decisions or have legal representatives.

Let me expand the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth made about the level of potential appeal around the compelling reasons test. If the patient he was talking about continued to have an episode where it was believed that they did not have the capacity to act and they did not have a legal representative or family members who could advocate on their behalf, has the Minister given any thought to there being an external or independent person who could advocate on behalf of that patient during that period of incapacity and who is not a medical professional? In the current drafting of the clause, that seems to be a potential loophole. When someone regains capacity, they could potentially instruct legal counsel, but that may be too late if the treatment they have received has had an adverse impact on their life. I would like to hear more on that element, if possible.

Clause 14, on treatment in other circumstances, makes three key changes to section 58 of the Mental Health Act, as my hon. Friend mentioned. Again, I have some questions about the shortening of the period from three months to two months. Clearly, a reduced period for assessment is to be welcomed, and we do welcome it. However, we need to understand what would happen if, for some reason, the second opinion appointed doctors are unavailable and therefore the treatment is delayed. What might be the legal consequences for a patient who did not receive an assessment within two months? As the hon. Member for Southend West and Leigh mentioned, people are currently not being assessed within three months. What would happen if the assessment was not received in two months and what legal recourse would be open to them, either through the Bill or through any civil court interaction?

Defining “compelling” will be an important part of the code of practice. We will include case studies and examples to help to put flesh on the bones of that and to illustrate it. But it is important to emphasise that a clinician would only be able to overrule a decision to refuse medication if they cannot identify a clinically viable alternative or one that is acceptable to the patient.

On training and the capacity in the system, it is important to note that we plan to switch on the new safeguards impacting the second opinion appointed doctor service only when we are confident that there is sufficient capacity in the system to deliver those safeguards.

On the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Southend West and Leigh made, we absolutely must ensure that the reviews are happening. That will be a really important part of the enforcement process.

The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon asked about legal recourse. The independent mental health advocate will be an important part of having recourse—for want of a better phrase, they will be somebody to really give back up to the patient. There is then the legal process, if there is a tribunal or court. Ultimately, someone can go through the court system if there is a dispute about a particular issue. However, one would want to ensure that there had been an objective assessment, through routes such as the independent mental health advocate or through professionals in the system really looking at the issue. Of course, the second opinion appointed doctor plays a crucial role in that.

I would be grateful if the Minister could comment on the certificates being combined. There is a concern, if we go from two certificates to one, that the reason why two certificates were chosen in the first place could be lost, especially if the certificates are competing. There could be an incumbent preponderance towards one decision, when there were actually two conflicting decisions in the first place. I understand that this is about trying to reduce the administrative burden and having all the information in one place. Equally, however, it does make clinicians think twice, especially when they are supposed to be independent, about what is happening and why.

The content of the Bill, in this context, has been produced on the basis of engagement with the second opinion appointed doctor service and clinical experts. That was partly around the decision to shorten the period to two months, as that allows time for medication to take effect, so that the appropriateness of the medication for the individual can be properly assessed. Is that what the hon. Member is talking about—that there might be confusion about whether or not medication should continue to be administered?

I am frantically trying to find the exact point in the explanatory notes—I think it is in either paragraph 114 or paragraph 115—about where the second opinion comes together. There is a reference to having a combined certificate. That seems to be a practical solution, but I worry about the crossover relating to who may or may not be affected. If the Minister wrote to me on that point, it might be easier to move the Committee on.

I will do that.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 13 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 14 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 15 Electro convulsive therapy etc Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Clause 17 stand part.

Amendment 13, in clause 18, page 27, line 22, at end insert— “(1A) Regulations under subsection (1) may only be made to provide for circumstances where— (a) the treatment is immediately necessary to save the patient’s life, (b) obtaining a second opinion would cause a delay that places the patient at a significant and imminent risk of death or serious physical harm, and (c) the treatment is reversible.”

The amendment limits the power to dispense with a second medical opinion for urgent electro convulsive therapy to exceptional, life threatening cases, introduces periodic reviews of its use, and ensures transparency by prohibiting retrospective application. Clause 18 stand part.

I will discuss a number of issues concerning the topic of urgent electroconvulsive treatment. Clause 15 makes a small practical change to the current protocol around administering electroconvulsive therapy. Currently, where the responsible clinician wishes to administer electroconvulsive therapy and the patient lacks capacity or competence to consent, the second opinion appointed doctor must certify, among other things, that it does not conflict with an advance refusal or the decision of an attorney or deputy.

We have heard from stakeholders that it would make much more practical sense and save the second opinion appointed doctor time if that was established before they were invited to assess the patient. Therefore, the clause makes it the role of the responsible clinician to ascertain if treatment is in conflict with an advance refusal or the decision of an attorney or deputy before they secure the second opinion appointed doctor. I commend the clause to the Committee. It improves the patient’s right to self determination by minimising the circumstances under which urgent treatment can be given compulsorily under section 62 of the 1983 Act.

I turn to clause 17. Currently, section 62 of the 1983 Act sets out four main scenarios under which the normal treatment safeguards do not apply, allowing urgent compulsory treatment to be given without such safeguards. The clause removes from section 62 the power to give medication compulsorily where its purpose is to alleviate the patient’s serious suffering. The act of forcibly treating an individual can be a highly traumatising and distressing experience. The clause recognises that, where someone is well enough to make a capacitous or competent refusal to treatment, they are also well enough to decide the level of suffering that they are willing to undergo.

The clause is critical to improving the patient’s autonomy over their care and treatment. It does not affect the clinician’s ability to administer compulsory treatment where it is immediately necessary to prevent the patient from behaving violently or being a danger to themselves or others, to prevent their serious deterioration or to save their life.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Winchester for tabling amendment 13. Its intention is largely already met by the Bill—that is, a second opinion doctor’s certificate can be dispensed with only in the following limited circumstances: first, the regulator determines that there will be a delay in appointing a second opinion doctor due to exceptional circumstances; and secondly, urgent electroconvulsive therapy is immediately necessary to save the patient’s life. The Bill also requires that those exceptional cases are monitored and reported on by the regulator.

This process prevents the treating hospital retrospectively requesting a second opinion doctor after treatment has commenced. Although those policies are not achieved by the amendment, they appear to meet objectives outlined in the explanatory notes. This process was included in the Bill following a recommendation made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, and an amendment was tabled in the other place. For those reasons, I ask the hon. Member for Winchester not to press the amendment.

I turn to clause 18. Currently, a patient’s approved clinician can overrule a refusal of electroconvulsive therapy and administer it compulsorily, so long as that is considered urgent under the 1983 Act. The clause introduces the need for a second opinion doctor, appointed by the regulator, to certify electroconvulsive therapy before it can go ahead. The second opinion doctor must examine the patient to establish whether the circumstances are truly urgent. If feasible, they must also consult a nurse and the patient’s nominated person, drawing on the valuable perspectives that each brings. It is important that this new protocol occurs within a tight timeframe, to ensure the patient’s safety and to prevent unnecessary suffering. That is why there is the power to impose, by way of regulations, duties on specific bodies and professionals to ensure that treatment is certified by the second opinion doctor within a particular period.

Where exceptional circumstances result in a delay in appointing the second opinion doctor, the clause permits the patient’s approved clinician to certify the use of life sustaining electroconvulsive therapy. The hospital must inform the regulator each time that happens, and efforts should continue to appoint a second opinion doctor as soon as possible. In recognition of the seriousness of the situation, the clause requires that those exceptional cases be monitored and reported on by the regulator.

This clause is another important shift towards increasing the power of the patient over their care and treatment, within parameters that still enable the use of compulsory treatment where that is absolutely necessary.

I rise to speak to clauses 15, 17 and 18 and Liberal Democrat amendment 13.

Clause 15 will amend section 58A of the Mental Health Act 1983 in regard to ECT. It is worth understanding the law as it stands. At present, if a patient lacks capacity to consent to ECT, treatment may be administered only if a second opinion appointed doctor certifies that the treatment does not conflict with any valid advance decision, or a decision made by an attorney, a deputy or the Court of Protection. That acts as an important safeguard, ensuring independent scrutiny of patients’ prior wishes or of proxy decisions before such an invasive treatment can proceed.

This clause will shift the responsibility. Under the Bill, the initial determination about whether ECT would conflict with any advance decision or proxy decision is moved from the second opinion appointed doctor to the patient’s approved clinician. Only if the clinician finds no conflict would the SOAD then be involved to certify that the patient lacks capacity, that the treatment is appropriate and that the clinician’s decision aligns with proposed new section 56A safeguards. The Government’s explanatory notes clarify that that reflects the unique nature of ECT: if a valid refusal exists, treatment must be prevented outright. The clinician therefore acts as a gatekeeper before SOAD involvement. Clause 15 marks a significant shift in the role of the SOAD with respect to ECT. The whole point is to transfer the responsibility to ensure that treatment does not conflict with advance decisions or refusals.

That contrasts with the approach under proposed new section 57A, under which the SOAD must certify the presence of a valid decision before compulsory treatment. The rationale, as explained in the Government’s notes, is that for ECT, the mere presence of an advance refusal should prevent treatment, whereas in the case of other compulsory treatments, the content of the advance decision is integral to deciding whether treatment can proceed.

I recognise the rationale for the change and the introduction of a clinical checklist—I assume that we are talking about new section 56A—but I have some questions for the Minister. Does shifting the initial responsibility to the approved clinician risk reducing the independent oversight currently provided by the SOAD, especially given the invasive nature of ECT? How can we be confident that clinicians will rigorously check for and respect valid advance refusals or proxy decisions? What practical safeguards will be in place to ensure that clinicians have full and timely access to any relevant advance decisions or proxy appointments? Will there be a standard process for verifying those, especially where records may be fragmented?

The SOAD’s role is now more focused on assessing appropriateness of treatment and capacity but, it appears, without responsibility for confirming the absence of conflicts with advance refusals. Will the SOAD therefore be empowered with sufficient information to make the judgment confidently? How will the clinical checklist be implemented and monitored across services to ensure consistent application? Can we be assured that it will effectively embed the principles of therapeutic benefit and least restrictive option, especially when dealing with ECT? What mechanisms will be available to family members or advocates who believe that a patient’s prior wishes, or proxy decisions, are being overlooked? Will there be accessible avenues by which to raise concerns or seek timely review?

Clauses 17 and 18 build on the framework by tightening safeguards around urgent treatment and urgent ECT specifically. Clause 17 removes the power to administer urgent treatment on the basis of alleviating serious suffering for patients with capacity, thereby strengthening patient autonomy. Clause 18 introduces proposed new section 62ZA of the Mental Health Act, which ensures that, where urgent ECT is proposed against a capacitated patient’s refusal—or conflicts with advance decisions—an SOAD must certify the treatment, providing an additional layer of external scrutiny. Together, these clauses represent a progression towards respecting patient choice.

However, the exceptional provision allowing an approved clinician to certify urgent ECT in the absence of an immediately available SOAD, as set out in proposed new section 62ZB, poses a potential tension. While necessary in rare circumstances, it risks undermining the independent safeguard that clause 18 seeks to establish. I think the Minister was hinting towards this, but it would be helpful to clarify it: what precise criteria will define the exceptional circumstances? Do they already exist? What mechanisms will ensure that this backstop power is strictly limited?

The Minister spoke about the transparency of reporting, which is welcome. Are there any further changes there, or will that simply continue as is already in practice? Finally, how will the Government ensure that ECT patients are adequately supported with information, advocacy and mental health resources to truly understand the information they receive and the choices they need to make, given the nature of ECT?

Amendment 13 to clause 18 seeks to circumscribe tightly the circumstances in which regulations can be made to allow urgent ECT without a second opinion. The amendment limits that to cases where

“the treatment is immediately necessary to save the patient’s life,”

where

“obtaining a second opinion would cause a delay that places the patient at a significant and imminent risk,”

and where “the treatment is reversible”. It also calls for periodic reviews of such treatments and prohibits retrospective application of any such regulations.

I commend the spirit behind the amendment, which rightly aims to strengthen patient safeguards by ensuring that the exceptional backstop power—where an approved clinician may act in the absence of a second opinion appointed doctor—is only used in the most urgent, life threatening situations. However, while the amendment’s intent is commendable, I would like to raise some points for further consideration.

First, the criterion of

“significant and imminent risk of death or serious physical harm”

may prove challenging to interpret in clinical circumstances. Perhaps the Lib Dem spokesperson could give a clinical example or case study to illustrate how it might work? Mental health crises and the urgency surrounding ECT can be complex and multifaceted. Would overly rigid definitions risk delaying treatment in situations where prompt intervention could prevent severe deterioration? How does the hon. Member propose to ensure clarity for clinicians while allowing necessary clinical discretion?

To supplement this amendment, I wonder if the Government have considered: clear statutory guidance on what constitutes exceptional circumstances, or whether they already exist; a mandated rapid response protocol to expedite second opinion appointments in urgent cases, reducing the need to rely on the power; or even a requirement for an independent audit of all the backstop powers? The Minister seemed to suggest that this is all in place, so I am happy to stand corrected if that is the case.

I am by no means an expert, but I understand the spirit and nature of what is intended with the amendment. I look forward to the Liberal Democrat spokesperson addressing some of those questions.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. I start by recognising the extremely difficult circumstances that the provisions deal with. I will speak to clauses 15, 17 and 18 and the Liberal Democrat amendment.

I welcome the additional safeguards set out in these provisions by the Government, particularly clause 15 and the role it plays in ensuring that the approved clinician can decide whether a referral for a second opinion appointed doctor is required. I note that there is a slight contrast, as the Opposition spokesperson touched on, with 57A, but I believe that recognises the unique circumstances of ECT, and that is important.

Clause 17 is important because of the way in which it—like these clauses generally—respects patient choice, embedding the central principles of choice and autonomy into this form of treatment and building on the framework set out earlier. I also note that clause 18 inserts a particular safeguard on certification that is really key to ensure that ECT therapy is administered according to strict safeguards. That is key in the context of the type of therapy that we are talking about.

I commend the spirit of amendment 13 and the intention behind it, and I really welcome the positive cross Bench engagement on this issue. It is one of the most challenging circumstances and types of therapy that a patient will experience, but I echo the Minister’s points that such provisions have been covered elsewhere, particularly the changes in some of these clauses.

To make a brief point about invasive treatment generally, I note that we are talking specifically about ECT, but I would be very grateful if the Minister could set out what consideration the Government have given to additional safeguards on nasogastric tube feeding, for example, which is another type of extremely invasive treatment. While I would not seek to draw an equivalence between the two, I would be grateful if the Minister could touch upon that in his response.

I rise to speak to clauses 15, 17 and 18 and Liberal Democrat amendment 13 to clause 18. I note the hon. Member for Winchester is not here; I do not know whether he intends to push amendment 13 to a vote but, just in case he does, I shall speak to it.

As colleagues across the Committee have said, ECT is a very controversial treatment, particularly when administered without consent. Under current law, it can be given to patients who lack capacity, but concerns have been raised about insufficient safeguards, especially where the treatment may conflict with prior decisions or a legal representative’s view. Clause 15 responds to recommendations from the 2018 independent review of the Mental Health Act and aims to ensure that ECT is used only when absolutely necessary, with independent oversight and respect for patient autonomy—something that everyone in this House can agree with.

I have a couple of questions for the Minister on clause 15. Clearly, the Opposition support the intention of the clause, but I would like to ask him about the challenges in interpretation. For example, determining whether a decision conflicts with an advance directive may be complex, so has he or his Department given any thought to how we might deal with some of those potentially complex, conflicting points of view?

Likewise, clause 17 updates section 62 of the Mental Health Act, allowing for urgent treatment without consent in specific circumstances. Once again, I welcome this provision because it gives some new legal clarity, supports clinical judgment, safeguards capacity and, most importantly, protects life and health. However, without strict oversight, there is a risk that the urgent treatment exception could be overused. What discussions has the Minister had with both his Department and, more importantly, campaign groups and mental health professionals to ensure that the urgent treatment exemption is understood and put forward in a way that satisfies both those undertaking the treatment and those receiving it?

Clause 18 also changes section 62 of the Act, which I again support; I mention this clause only because I wish to talk briefly about Liberal Democrat amendment 13. Like other Members, I believe that this amendment is extraordinarily well intentioned, but I have some questions about its wording. Specifically, subsection (c) says “the treatment is reversible”, but I do not necessarily know what the legal or medical definition would be of a reversible treatment. I cannot think how ECT could in any way be reversible, so paragraph (c) of the amendment would potentially mean that nobody could receive ECT. I do not fully understand how it could ever possibly be reversible. I think I have made that point as strongly as I possibly can but, if the Liberal Democrats are going to move the amendment, I ask for some understanding of what definition—either legal or medical—is being used for paragraph (c).

On the point about situations in which just the approved clinician provides certification, because of potential delays in appointment of the SOAD, such certification by the approved clinician can only occur in a very narrow set of circumstances, when the regulator has determined “that there will be a delay in appointing a second opinion doctor,”

and the treating clinician considers urgent and compulsory electroconvulsive therapy to be life sustaining. Our intention is that certification will be documented in a statutory form, to be set out in regulations, to ensure that there is an administrative record of the decision. Each time ECT is administered under an approved clinician’s certificate, it must be reported to the regulator so that such instances can be closely monitored and reported on publicly. While an approved clinician can approve treatment in those limited circumstances, there is still a duty on the regulator to appoint a second opinion doctor. Once that occurs, the approved clinician certificate ceases to apply. My hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford made an important point about how these provisions highlight choice and autonomy, and I thank him for putting that front and centre.

On additional safeguards, with particular reference to nasogastric interventions, there are already regulation making powers in the Mental Health Act to subject treatments such as the one he mentions to new safeguards. We have always intended to engage with stakeholders to determine which treatments should be subject to which safeguards. That is an ongoing and important piece of work.

The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon asked what happens when a decision conflicts with advance choice. There will be an important process of arbitration around that. The advance choice, as articulated by the patient, is vital and should in principle take primacy, but there are certain circumstances in which a compulsory treatment is necessary. Nothing in the Bill removes the ability to carry out those compulsory treatments, albeit subject to the safeguards that we have debated. Ensuring that the urgent treatment exemption is understood by everyone will be an important part of drafting the code of practice, as will ensuring that the code of practice addresses that important point about maximising and universalising awareness and understanding of the urgent treatment exemption.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 15 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 16 Review of treatment Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

The purpose of clause 16 is twofold. First, it seeks to maintain the status quo around when the responsible clinician must report to the regulatory authority on the patient’s treatment and their condition. Currently, the Mental Health Act requires that the responsible clinician give a treatment report to the regulatory authority when they renew the patient’s detention. However, changes to clause 28 that increase the frequency at which the clinician must renew a patient’s detention would have unintentionally increased the frequency of treatment reports for patients under certain sections. Clause 16 will prevent that, thereby avoiding unnecessarily placing additional burden on clinicians or the regulator.

Secondly, the clause will give the regulatory authority the power to request a report on a patient’s treatment and their condition, where they are consenting to treatment. That will expand an important safeguard to individuals who are potentially vulnerable and may benefit from additional oversight. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

The clause will amend section 61 of the Mental Health Act 1983 on the review and treatment of detained patients. The 1983 Act requires approved clinicians to provide reports on the treatment and condition of detained patients, particularly where patients do not consent to treatment. Those reports are integral to the scrutiny and safeguarding of the patients’ rights. The Act sets out timing requirements for such reports, which generally coincide with detention renewals, helping regulatory authorities such as the CQC in England and the Healthcare Inspectorate Wales to oversee treatment appropriately. I imagine that you are expecting me to continue my speech on the CQC, Mr Vickers, but I will spare you; you are august in your understanding of the health inspectorates, so I will not put the Committee through that.

The clause updates the timing and scope of the reporting requirements, and we welcome the fact that it will introduce a more structured reporting schedule. It will require reports to be provided after six months, then every six months and then every 12 months, as well as for the reports to be provided within two months of those periods. The clause also explicitly includes part III patients—those under forensic orders—especially those transferred from guardianship or those whose community treatment orders have been revoked. Importantly, the clause grants regulatory authorities the power to require reports not only from non consenting patients but where patients are found to be consenting under certain treatment sections. That enhances the regulator’s oversight role, allowing it to request additional information should concerns arise.

We acknowledge that the intent behind these changes—to align reporting practices across different patient groups and to strengthen regulatory oversight—could improve consistency in monitoring, ensure that concerns about treatment are promptly addressed and, ultimately, enhance patient safety and rights. However, several questions arise. How will the increased power for regulatory authorities to require reports, including from consenting patients, be balanced to avoid placing excessive administrative burdens on clinicians? Will the changes to the timings of reports, particularly the delay of the first report to three months for certain cohorts, risk any gaps in early detection of treatment issues? What safeguards or limits will exist to prevent potential overuse of the power to request additional reports? Could that put further strain on mental health services and regulatory bodies that are already stretched?

How clear and workable are the definitions distinguishing different patient groups, such as part III patients transferred from guardianship or those with revoked community treatment orders? Might that complexity lead to inconsistent application? The clause distinguishes those groups because it assigns them different reporting schedules and rules. For example, part III patients transferred from guardianship and CTO revoked patients after 6 months have a specific reporting timetable—every 6 months, then 12 months. In contrast, CTO revoked patients within six months of their hospital order and other part III patients retain their existing, presumably different, reporting periods. That layering risks creating complexity. The Bill uses technical terms, and references to a patient being transferred from guardianship under section 19 or to a community treatment order being revoked are not immediately clear and may not be uniformly interpreted by all clinicians and regulatory staff.

Why is that a potential problem? If these terms or categories are not clearly defined and communicated, or if the practical implications are not straightforward, there is a risk that clinicians might misclassify a patient’s status, leading to incorrect timings or absence; regulatory authorities might struggle to apply the rules consistently; and patients might inadvertently fall through gaps in reporting. For example, let us imagine a patient who was initially under guardianship, which means that someone was legally responsible for their care, but who was then transferred to a hospital order under part III of the 1983 Act. If the clinician or regulator is unclear whether the patient fits into the “transferred from guardianship” category for the revised six month reporting cycle, they might apply the wrong schedule, and thereby delay important reviews or misunderstanding opportunities for intervention.

Concern about definitions is really about ensuring clarity and practicality and making sure that everyone involved in patient care and oversight understands precisely which patients fall under which reporting categories, so that the intended protections and reviews happen without there being confusing gaps.

The classification of which part III patients the clause applies to is at the heart of the shadow Minister’s question about ensuring that everything is co ordinated and we do not have conflicting reports and timeframes. I think that that classification is clear, but to recap, the changes will apply to the following patients detained under part III of the Act: patients who have been transferred from guardianship to hospital, and patients whose community treatment order has been revoked and more than six months has passed since their original hospital order was made. That classification is important. It is also important to bear in mind that the clause is all about maintaining the current frequency. We are not really injecting a new reporting rhythm; it is about maintaining the current frequency, but having that clarity around the classification of patients, as I outlined.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 16 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 17 and 18 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 19 Remote assessment for treatment Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

I will discuss the clause and review of treatment. Under the Act, the regulator, the CQC, is responsible for appointing individuals to provide independent second opinions on the administration of certain treatments. As part of that, the appointed person may visit, interview or examine the patient to make their determination of whether treatment is appropriate. The clause permits the use of remote interview and examination for the purpose of any second opinion functions, which relate to treatment under part IV or 4A of the Mental Health Act.

Allowing interviews or examinations to occur in person or remotely is expected to result in more timely involvement of second opinion appointed doctors, an important safeguard. In turn, patients will have access to a greater diversity of second opinion doctors, as opposed to only those in the local area.

We understand that remote interview or examination may not always be appropriate, compared with the in- person option. That is why the clause only permits the use of remote where it is considered appropriate by the second opinion appointed doctor, taking into account the patient’s preferences and other factors. We will provide specific guidance on the circumstances under which remote may be appropriate, and where we discourage its use, in the Mental Health Act code of practice. I commend the clause to the Committee.

I welcome the Government’s recognition that modern technology can play a valuable role in improving care in the mental health system. The move to allow remote interviews and examinations for second opinion appointed doctors, through live audio or video links, reflects the realities of healthcare today and the potential for greater flexibility and efficiency. In particular, the so called hybrid model, as set out in the explanatory note, could help speed up access to important second opinions and reduce delays in treatment decisions. That is especially welcome given the well documented pressures on mental health services and the vital role of second opinions in safeguarding patient rights.

While the intention is laudable, however, I have a number of concerns to go through, because I believe that the House must consider them carefully. First, the clause leaves the clinician significant discretion to decide whether a remote assessment is appropriate, but it does not set out clear criteria or safeguards for how that decision should be made. Given the serious nature of second opinion assessments, which often authorise treatment without consent, we must ensure that the discretion does not lead to inconsistent or inappropriate use of remote methods.

Secondly, mental health patients are a diverse group, and many face particular communication challenges. For example, a patient who has experienced a stroke may have speech impediments or difficulty understanding complex questions. Others may have conditions such as autism or dementia that make remote communication difficult or distressing.

This was a really big topic in the other place, particularly as there are several esteemed colleagues who are part of the speech and language therapy fraternity, so it warrants a bit of attention. For example, we need to look at access to speech and language therapists. We also think about how these important communications needs will be assessed and accommodated. Will there be a statutory requirement for a clinician to consider patients’ communications abilities and preferences before opting for a remote interview? I am concerned that, without such safeguards, patients may be subjected to assessments that do not fully capture their conditions or views, undermining the quality and fairness of the process. The Minister—I think—hinted that this may be covered in the code of practice. I hope it is.

Thirdly, the clause does not specify the role of patient consent or objection to remote access. Should patients have the right to request an in person interview if they find remote contact unsuitable? This is not simply a matter of convenience; it is a question of whether we ensure the dignity, respect and meaningful participation in decisions about their own care. There is much debate in primary care about the role of video calls versus seeing a person face to face, and I would be interested to understand where the Government sit on that point.

The Bill lacks any specific provision for regulatory oversight or standards to govern the use of remote assessments. How will the regulator—presumably the CQC, but I would be grateful for clarification on that point—monitor whether remote assessments are being used appropriately, given the vulnerability of these types of patients? What mechanisms will patients or their advocates have to raise concerns or complaints if they feel remote assessment was not adequate or, even worse, harmful?

Finally, while technology can bring great benefits, it should never become a default substitute for face to face contact in mental health treatment decisions, especially where the stakes are so high. I assume the Minister appreciates that. Will this be set out clearly in the code of practice? Whose job is it to enforce that? Will there be a right to request an in person interview, should the patient choose to? Has an equality impact assessment been undertaken to ensure that remote access does not disproportionately disadvantage those who suffer with communications difficulties or other vulnerabilities, or is that something that the Minister will implement in the code of practice? I would be grateful for some clarifications on those points, because it is really important to get it right when it comes to difficulties in communication, especially in this patient cohort.

I rise to address three broad points on clause 19. I entirely understand where this is coming from—it is to improve accessibility, efficiency and flexibility in delivering assessments. It reflects the broader observations from the independent review and aligns with the NHS digital transformation goals. However, I have three specific concerns.

My first concern is about the risks around the assessment quality. I suspect we have all experienced virtual meetings or consultations with clinicians. Subtle cues can often be missed in a virtual hearing, particularly when it is on the sensitive issues we are dealing with in the Bill. I am concerned that we will miss those subtle signs that doctors would pick up on in a face to face assessment; they can easily be lost through the medium of a virtual assessment.

My second concern is about the consistency in clinical judgment of when to use these virtual assessments. I suspect we all have experience through constituency or personal work of general practitioners who, since the covid-19 pandemic, have moved to more online and virtual assessments. Some patients enjoy that and like the flexibility; others would rather see a clinician face to face, but are not always offered that option. We must ensure a consistent approach to these assessments across the country.

My third concern is about digital exclusion. The assumption is that individuals will be able to access this readily and be comfortable with the technology. Many will be able to, but a significant number will struggle with it. We must ensure that those individuals are not forced down a route of having a virtual appointment or assessment, when that would not allow them the satisfaction of the consultation they sought. It is important that patients are put at the front and centre, and that any change to the assessment process is made with them in mind.

I want to pick up on a few points made by my gallant and learned hon. Friend the Member for Solihull West and Shirley. He talked about people who, like many of us, have seen the benefits of assessments online. There could well be benefits from clause 19 for that. He also talked about how some people did not find that an appropriate way to have their assessment. My understanding is that if someone has a physical ailment, they might be pushed strongly down a route to have an online assessment for whatever reason, whether that be at a primary care setting or at a secondary care or acute setting, but that if they wanted to see a doctor—for example, a GP—physically to talk about their ailment, although it might take them a little bit of time, they had the right to do so.

My concern about the clause is the suggestion that in certain circumstances, some patients would not have the right to a face to face assessment. The Minister talked about where things will be taken into account, where it is appropriate and where “it would be discouraged”. “Discouraged” is not the same as “it will not happen”. We need clarification, either within the Bill or very strongly in the code of conduct, so that a patient has the right to a face to face consultation. I would be very keen to hear the Minister’s thoughts on that.

We are very much on the same page in looking to harness the power of technology wherever we possibly can to shift from analogue to digital, but recognising the importance of putting the patient’s needs and disposition first. Telemental health is welcomed by many service users and has become an established part of delivering mental health care in a range of settings and scenarios. We expect the use of a hybrid approach involving both in person and remote interview and examination to improve the efficiency of the second opinion appointed doctor service, and therefore to be of benefit to all patients.

We understand that remote interview or examination may not always be appropriate compared with in person options. That is why the clause permits the use of remote only where it is considered appropriate by the second opinion appointed doctor. We will provide specific guidance on the circumstances under which remote may be appropriate, and where we discourage its use. All of that will be in the Mental Health Act code of practice. Many of the answers to the questions asked by the shadow Minister and by the hon. Members for Solihull West and Shirley and for Farnham and Bordon asked are contained in that. We are going to develop detailed guidance in the Mental Health Act code of practice, which will clarify and specify very clearly where this should be implemented and where we would discourage it.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 19 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 20 Capacity to consent to treatment Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

With this it will be convenient to discuss new clause 5—Report: statutory competency test for under-16s— “Within 12 months of day on which this Act is passed, the Secretary of State must undertake a review of whether a statutory competency test for under-16s in determining their ability to make a relevant decision would be expedient for the purposes of this Act or the Mental Health Act 1983.”

This new clause requires the Secretary of State to undertake a review of whether a statutory competency test for under-16s would be expedient for the purposes of this Bill and the Mental Health Act 1983.

Clause 20 will make changes to wording under the Mental Health Act regarding the patient’s capacity and competence to consent to treatment so that it reflects the terminology used as standard by clinicians. While this amendment is not expected to create a practical change, it ensures consistency with other sections of the Mental Health Act and the Mental Capacity Act 2005.

As for new clause 5, it is our assessment that, were we to bring about legislative change which sought to introduce a statutory test of conscience for people under 16 in a single setting—that is, under the Mental Health Act—this could have unintended consequences for how competence is assessed, both in mental health settings and other linked areas of decision making. This could create additional confusion for clinicians and impact the ability of children to exercise choice and autonomy over their care and treatment in mental health and other settings, and cannot be justified. We therefore do not consider a statutory test under the Mental Health Act, or a review of that issue, to be necessary. We will consult on the guidance for assessing competence for under-16s in mental health settings in the revised code of practice, with the intention of providing further clarity to decision makers.

For those reasons, I commend clause 20 to the Committee and ask the hon. Members for Winchester and for Guildford not to press new clause 5.

Clause 20 addresses a central principle in healthcare, ethics and law: the right of individuals to make informed decisions about their treatment, and the conditions under which that right can be overridden.

Let me begin by recognising the objective of clause 20 as both important and welcome. It replaces the outdated and potentially ambiguous language in the Mental Health Act 1983—language that speaks of whether a patient is “capable of understanding the nature, purpose and likely effects”

of treatment—with a clearer legal standard based on whether a patient has capacity to consent, in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005.

This reform aligns the Mental Health Act with how capacity is already understood and applied across health and social care, and it harmonises part IV of the Act with part 4A, which already uses that language in the context of community patients. So far, so sensible. However, as the Opposition, our role is not only to acknowledge the intention, but to ensure that the implementation matches the ambition, and that patients’ rights are not merely affirmed in law but upheld in practice.

What do these changes actually do? Under clause 20, we see a wholesale substitution of terminology. For example, in sections 57 and 58 of the Act, which deal with certain serious treatments such as neurosurgery and ECT, the language shifts from “capable of understanding” to having or lacking capacity to consent as defined in the Mental Health Act. It also explicitly incorporates advance decisions to refuse treatment under section 25 of the MCA, the role of a donee of lasting power of attorney, and the authority of a deputy appointed by the Court of Protection. This is a welcome acknowledgement of patients’ rights to plan ahead and to have their wishes respected, even when they later lose capacity.

While the Government’s explanatory notes suggest that this is not expected to create practical change, I think we should pause and ask: what if it does? We are told that clinicians interpret “capable of understanding” as meaning “having capacity” under the Mental Capacity Act. But the MCA test is precise: it requires the person to understand the information relevant to the decision, retain that information, use or weigh it as part of the decision making process, and communicate their decision. So are clinicians routinely applying this test fully, or are they relying on informed judgment?

Can the Minister confirm, for example, whether NHS trusts have audited how consistently the MCA test is being applied in mental health settings? I was a clinician and am now an MP, so I understand the intent behind it, but the legal clarity—now with my MP hat on—is really important to ensure that we truly are interpreting the legislation we pass in this House for this country in the correct way when we are acting as clinicians.

When it comes to advance decisions in acute settings, clause 20 provides that an advance decision to refuse treatment must be both valid and applicable, as per section 25 of the Mental Capacity Act, but in the real world of psychiatric in patient care, clinicians may encounter such decisions during a crisis, when patients are at serious risk of self harm or suicide. How will the Government support clinicians in determining validity and application quickly, safely and lawfully? I assume— I think the Minister hinted at this—that that will be part of the code of practice.

On the power to override consent, perhaps most crucially the Mental Health Act allows for treatment without consent, even when the person has capacity, if they are detained under the Act. Again, we touched on this in relation to amendments discussed on the first day. That is a profound legal power. Does the clause change it in any way, or does it simply confirm that capacity is assessed, but not necessarily respected, under compulsion? If the Government intend the law to remain as it is—that patients with capacity can still be treated without their agreement—they may well need to specify and set that out. I urge Ministers to consider how we communicate that reality to patients, whose sense of agency and trust in the system may otherwise be undermined.

I turn to the matter of Gillick competence for children under 16. The clause clarifies that the standard for under-16s is Gillick competence, not capacity under the Mental Capacity Act. This reflects the long standing legal test established in the 1986 case of Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority. Under Gillick, a child can consent to their own medical treatment if they have sufficient understanding and intelligence to comprehend what is proposed.

The Gillick test has advantages. It allows for a case by case assessment, not a rigid age threshold, and respects the emerging autonomy of young people. However, there are also risks: it can lead to inconsistency between clinicians and does not offer the same structured framework as the MCA. What safeguards will be put in place to ensure consistency and rigour in applying the Gillick test? Will the Government commit to updating the code of practice with guidance on assessing Gillick competence specifically in mental health contexts?

I turn to deputies, attorneys and verifying authority. The clause references lasting powers of attorney and deputies—that is right and proper—but we need to ask how a clinician will verify that a donee is acting within the scope of their authority. Will the Government consider a national standard protocol to support clinicians in checking LPAs and court orders, particularly in urgent situations? For example, could this be part of the checklist, which we have already discussed, or is it implied that it will be part of that in the first place?

Many of those concerns were shared in the other place. They were partly addressed in the letter for Baroness Merron, which is worth reviewing. It sought to clarify a number of concerns raised on Second Reading in the other place. I welcome the tone of the letter and the Minister’s stated willingness to listen. In particular, I acknowledge the recognition of the “challenges…to decision makers” that may be presented by “the complex interface between the Mental Health Bill and the Mental Capacity Act”, and I welcome the Government’s commitment to engage with clinicians and stakeholders during the revision of the code of practice. That is important.

However, the letter also raises some further issues that deserve scrutiny. First, the Minister says: “Both Acts provide appropriate procedural safeguards to ensure that the individual’s Article 5 human right to liberty and security is protected during their detention. The nature of the safeguards provided under the two Acts are different”.

That is undeniably true, but therein lies the concern: where the safeguards differ, so too may the thresholds, the review mechanisms and the practical experience of those subject to detention. In cases in which a person might meet criteria under both Acts, what clear guidance will clinicians be given on how to decide which legal framework to apply and how to ensure that the individual receives the most appropriate and proportionate protection?

In the same letter, the Minister addresses the potential unintended consequences of reforms to section 3 of the Mental Health Act, namely that “people with a learning disability and autistic people, who lack capacity, could, in certain circumstances, be detained under the Mental Capacity Act rather than the Mental Health Act”.

The Government’s stated intention is to prevent that outcome by strengthening community based services. The letter states that “the proposed changes to Part 2, section 3…will only be commenced when we are assured that there are strong community services in place.”

In the absence of clear statutory criteria, that could be seen as moving the target, so will the Government publish a set of benchmarks or a public readiness test? The Minister has said that the implementation will take place over 10 years, but a readiness test with criteria setting out how that will apply would help us to deal with a lot of the issues that we have talked about during the passage of the Bill.

Clause 20 is definitely a step forward in legal clarity, and the Opposition support the principles behind it. We want to ensure that capacity is not only assessed but assessed properly, that advance decisions are not only recognised but respected, that children’s rights are not only preserved but protected, and that patients’ voices are not only heard but heeded wherever possible.

Liberal Democrat new clause 5 calls for a review into whether statutory competence tests for under-16s should be introduced for the purposes of the Bill and the Mental Health Act 1983. I acknowledge the principle of where it is trying to go: it reflects a deeply important issue. How we assess and support the ability of children and young people to participate in decisions about their mental health care, particularly when that care involves complex, sometimes coercive interventions, is of paramount importance, and I know it will come up later in the Bill.

At present, as I have outlined, we rely on the long established principle of Gillick competence, which allows children under the age of 16 to consent to treatment if they are judged to have sufficient understanding and intelligence to comprehend the proposed intervention. This principle is embedded in case law and has been repeatedly reaffirmed in medical ethics and judicial practice. It provides a degree of flexibility that many clinicians value, especially when dealing with young children, whose maturity and understanding often varies case by case. That said, I understand the case that the hon. Member for Guildford is making in the new clause. There are legitimate questions about whether the current reliance on Gillick competence is always applied consistently across services, particularly in mental health contexts, where decisions may involve not just consent to treatment but the implications of detention or long term care.

We have touched on some of those issues, but I could go further. Are clinicians across the country being supported with adequate tools and training to assess the context appropriately? Do families and young people understand the rights and protections that they have under the system as it is, and therefore would changing it make things even more complex? Are there safeguards or protocols that we ought to consider in mental health contexts that may differ from those relating to general physical health?

I urge caution before introducing a statutory competency test, given that even introducing a formal review may unintentionally suggest moving towards rigid, one- size fits all thresholds that could undermine the current child centred, flexible approach. There is also a risk that such a framework could raise the bar for children to participate in their own care decisions, rather than empowering them, particularly for those on the cusp of adolescence, who already navigate stigma and disempower ment within the mental health system.

Although I am not opposed to reviewing the current practice, I suggest that we could take a different route—one that builds on existing legal and clinical principles without undermining them. Instead of a statutory review, I propose including the issue in the examination when we come to the code of practice. That would allow for a review of current clinical practice around Gillick competence, an assessment of the training tools and support available for professionals, and consideration of whether guidance or illustrative frameworks can be included in the code to help decision making for under-16s in the mental health context. Again, I think the Minister seemed to suggest that that is coming, but it is worth stating in this House on the record that we want that to happen.

I welcome the thinking behind the new clause, and I share the concern that young people need strong and clear safeguards, but I gently suggest that the best way forward would be to enhance guidance, clinical standards and meaningful consultation, rather than to introduce a new statutory requirement. I hope that my comments to the Liberal Democrats are clear, and that I have adequately set out my concerns about clause 20 to the Government. We will not divide the Committee.

It is an honour to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Vickers. I will speak briefly in support of clause 20 and comment on some of the issues surrounding new clause 5. Clause 20 aims to update wording in the Mental Health Act 1983 in regard to a patient’s capacity and competence to consent to treatment. That is in line with terms that clinicians use in practice across the piece. It provides consistency with the Mental Capacity Act 2005.

Although the clause is not expected to create practical change in clinical care, it does something vital that I would like to draw out. These changes bring forward the recognised and well established ways that we give people the power to inform their future care and treatment if they get ill in the future. As my hon. Friend the Member for Thurrock so eloquently put it earlier, the ability to plan ahead for one’s care speaks to the heart of what we are trying to do with the Bill, namely to put people at the centre of it, but allow dignity in treatment and authority over one’s own healthcare. That is an important point to draw out in this clause.

Let me turn to new clause 5. The shadow Minister teased out a lot of detail around the Gillick competence test, which is used not just in one setting, but across multiple settings. I completely understand the need to ensure that our young people are empowered to make decisions, but the new clause may have the unintended consequence of making it harder for young people to be involved in their own treatment and have control over what they want to do with their health. We are not quite in the place where we need that statutory test.

It would be helpful to tease out from the Minister a little more about the plans to review the code of practice, which he mentioned in his opening remarks. What does he hope to see when we consult with clinicians on this? How can we be confident that clinicians will feel empowered to allow young people to take some control in their healthcare?

I rise to speak in favour of new clause 5, which would require the Secretary of State to undertake a review into whether the statutory competency test for under-16s would be expedited under the Mental Health Act. It has been great to hear so many contributions from colleagues on the Committee about the challenges that young people face when discussing their mental health and wellbeing and being involved in decision making around their health.

As my colleague Baroness Tyler noted in the Lords, and as the hon. Member for Hinckley and Bosworth noted in his early comments, the consistency with which Gillick competency is interpreted in the case of young people is a bit of a grey area. That is the key reason why we have tabled this new clause. We want young people to be empowered to be involved with decisions around their mental health. It is not hard to imagine how traumatic it must be for an under-16 to refuse treatment when they fully understand and object to it, yet be overridden because no one is quite sure how to assess their competency robustly. We believe that, at the very least, we owe it to young people to ensure that our legal framework is coherent, fair and protective of their rights.

The new clause would allow the Government to lead that conversation in a measured and consultative way. A statutory review would bring much needed evidence and direction to a complex but critical issue. I am disappointed that the Minister will not consider the new clause, but I will withdraw it for expediency. However, it has been good to hear the commitment from the Minister to consulting on and reviewing this issue. The Liberal Democrats look forward to hearing more detail on it in the future and to being part of that conversation.

One theme raised by hon. Members on both sides of the Committee is the need for clarity and safeguards so that clinicians are clear on how best to assess competence. The Mental Health Act code of practice already provides guidance on establishing competence in under-16s. We will consult on the guidance for assessing competence in mental health settings in the revised code of practice, with the intention of providing further clarity to decision makers. That will include engagement with key stakeholders and clinical decision makers with experience of assessing competence in children.

We think it is better to focus on improving the practical application of Gillick and assessment of competency rather than reinventing the wheel, with the risk that that might cause confusion. The Department will work with NHS England, Social Work England and other partners to develop appropriate training for staff on the reforms. Once the code of practice has been updated, professionals working under the Act will be required to undergo training to maintain their competence and awareness of the Act.

I cannot resist the opportunity to probe the Minister on something so important. He said that NHS England will predominantly look at this, but changes are happening there. Will he ensure that Gillick competence and the assessment of capacity will be at the heart of this? It is unclear now, given that it will take two years for NHS England to be abolished, who will take that on. Will he ensure that that is given due attention, as we have with physical health?

Absolutely. We must ensure that we act rapidly as soon as the Bill gets Royal Assent by launching the consultation process on the code of practice. It will be vital that the question of the practical application of Gillick and the need for clarity is universalised right across the system.

The shadow Minister asked about the interface between the Bill and the Mental Capacity Act. We recognise the complex nature of that interface, which presents challenges for decision makers. We will continue to consider this interface as we implement our reforms, and we will engage with stakeholders to understand what support and guidance could help to improve application of the interface when we consult on the new code of practice.

My hon. Friend the Member for Croydon East made some powerful and important points about the risk of unintended consequences if we try to reinvent the wheel on this. She is absolutely right. She asked what we want to see in the consultation on the code of practice. For me, the two key areas would be clarity and ensuring practical application of Gillick, by understanding the case law and the complexity of the interface between the pieces of legislation. It is about ensuring that we get that clarity. We cannot do that in an ivory tower. We have to do it with Social Work England and a range of partners with practical, hands on experience to ensure that the code of practice is the bible for addressing these important issues.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 20 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 21 Care and treatment plans

I beg to move amendment 48, in clause 21, page 30, line 28, at end insert— “(ab) containing steps to alleviate social and financial stressors contributing to the patient’s risk of requiring detention in future; and”.

This amendment would require social and financial stressors be addressed in care and treatment plans.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 14, in clause 21, page 30, line 39, at end insert— “(iii) the discussion of the person’s finances and financial situation.”

This amendment ensures that the care and treatment plan includes matters relating to the patient’s financial circumstances. Amendment 15, in clause 21, page 30, line 41, at end insert— “(4A) The information authorised or required to be included in, or attached to, a care and treatment plan by virtue of regulations under subsection (3) must include provision to protect the patient’s housing and accommodation during and immediately after they are subject to a care and treatment plan.”

This amendment ensures that protection of housing and accommodation are considered as part of care and treatment plans. Amendment 23, in clause 21, page 30, line 41, at end insert— “(4A) Where a patient has autism or a learning disability, the care and treatment plan must— (a) identify specific crisis prevention strategies appropriate to the patient's individual needs; (b) identify suitable crisis accommodation options in the event that the patient's current placement becomes unable to meet their needs; (c) specify how the patient's sensory needs will be met; (d) specify communication approaches appropriate to the patient's needs; and (e) record the views of the patient’s family members or carers, where appropriate and with the patient’s consent.”

This amendment would ensure that care and treatment plans for patients with autism or learning disabilities include specific components addressing their particular needs, including crisis prevention strategies and identification of suitable crisis accommodation options. Amendment 50, in clause 21, page 30, line 41, at end insert— “(4A) For the purposes of preparing a plan under this section, a discharge planning meeting must be held.

(4B) A meeting under subsection (4A) must include— (a) the patient; (b) the patient’s nominated person; (c) any independent mental health advocate acting for the patient; (d) a representative of the integrated care board; (e) a local housing officer; (f) a local authority social worker; (g) a representative from the Department for Work and Pensions; and (h) any other person or agency involved in the patient’s care or likely to support recovery in the community.

(4C) A care and treatment plan under this section must include— (a) actions agreed by relevant agencies to support the patient’s recovery; (b) provisions to address clinical, financial, housing, and social needs; (c) steps to reduce the likelihood of readmission or further detention under this Act; and (d) a record of any points of disagreement and how they are to be resolved.

(4D) Where an agency listed under subsection (4B) fails to attend a discharge planning meeting, the responsible clinician must take reasonable steps to obtain their input in writing and record it in the plan.

(4E) For the purposes of subsection (4A) to (4D), the Secretary of State must issue guidance on best practice for discharge planning meetings and multi agency collaboration.’”

This amendment would require the clinician preparing a care and treatment plan to hold a multi agency planning meeting to inform it, and specifies what must be included within the plan. Amendment 16, in clause 21, page 31, line 26, at end insert— “(g) following the patient turning 18 years of age during the course of a care and treatment plan.”

This amendment ensures that individuals turning 18 during a care and treatment plan have their plans reviewed to maintain continuity of care while transitioning from child to adult services. Amendment 17, in clause 21, page 31, line 29, leave out from “so” and insert— “(a) consult the persons mentioned in subsection (5)(f), (b) ask whether there are children in the family and take actions to respond if the children need help or protection from harm.”

This amendment seeks to deliver earlier identification of children who might be in need of information, support, or protection from potential harm. Clause stand part.

I hope the Committee will forgive me if I take some time to address the various amendments in this group. Amendment 48 would ensure that care and treatment plans do not stop at clinical intervention and address the underlying social and financial stressors that contribute to the cycle of poor mental health, and crucially, to avoidable future detention under the Mental Health Act.

We know that treatment is not just medication and monitoring. For many, the tipping point for crisis is social and financial stressors. The relationship between debt and mental health has been well documented. Nearly half of those behind on their bills experience mental health problems. Those experiencing mental ill health are three times more likely to be behind on at least one key payment—such as rent, energy bills or credit cards—compared with those without mental health problems. Social stressors are likely to be even more severe for people from racially diverse communities and the LGBT community, and disabled people. Including these stressors in care plans will help to address disproportionate detention rates and support more equitable care.

Just as the reason behind a crisis is multifaceted, treatment must also be multifaceted. We cannot ever seek to address anyone’s poor mental health without considering the variety of stressors that may be contributing to it. For treatment to be effective, it must offer support for stressors, be they social or financial, which can be a real driving factor behind many mental health crises. I hear from my casework about the delays and frustrations for those trying to liaise with the Department for Work and Pensions—if it wants to give someone the best chance at recovery, we have to look at such issues. As I said, these stressors are often magnified for people from racially diverse communities.

Amendment 14 seeks to ensure that economic stressors, which are often overlooked, yet are central to mental health and recovery, are explicitly addressed. Financial problems are a major contributor for people experiencing a mental health crisis and can make it much harder to recover from one. Last year, nearly 21,000 people in England alone were struggling with problem debt while in hospital for their mental health, and, sadly, an estimated 100,000 people in problem debt attempt suicide every year.

Tools exist to help support people when they are in a mental health crisis. Those include care and treatment plans, the documents health professions use to map out a patient’s support need when they have been detained under the 1983 Act; and advance choice documents, a preventive tool through which people can set preferences for care in the event that they experience a mental health crisis. But those tools are underused and currently do not consider someone’s financial circumstances by default. Ensuring that people’s finances are taken into consideration when they are in a mental health crisis will help to prevent further illness, reduce waiting lists and help people return to daily life, including work, more smoothly.

We were pleased that Baroness Merron agreed that care and treatment plans would include

“interventions aimed at minimising financial harm”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 22 January 2025; Vol. 842, c. 1783.]

Can the Minister confirm that commitment? Will he let us know when the Department plan to bring forward necessary regulation; whether requiring that financial difficulty be identified will be included in the regulation; and any more detail about the specifics of what interventions are being planned?

Amendment 15 is similar to our amendments 1, 51 and 4, which we tabled previously, and is designed to ensure that everyone—not just those with learning disabilities or autism—has the protection of housing and accommodation during and immediately after they are subject to a care and treatment plan. We discussed earlier in Committee that appropriate housing is absolutely crucial for people’s wellbeing and cannot be viewed as separate from effective and safe care. I will not delve further into that because I know we are pressed for time.

Amendment 23, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire (Ian Sollom), would ensure that care and treatment plans for patients with autism or learning disabilities include specific components addressing their particular needs, including crisis prevention strategies and identification of suitable crisis accommodation options.

The Care Quality Commission tells us that over half of delayed discharges stem from housing shortages; that crisis for autistic and learning disabled patients continues due to no sensory or communication planning; and that staff often go untrained. This amendment directly tackles that, demanding plans that proactively prevent a crisis, secure appropriate accommodation and adapt to each person’s neurological needs. It reflects the real world failings in current practice, particularly around crisis escalation, communication breakdowns, inappropriate detention and long term hospitalisation. I would be interested to know whether the Minister accepts that the amendment directly responds to recommendations from multiple inquiries, including the CQC’s reports, which found that failure to adapt care to neurodivergent patients’ needs was a key safeguarding issue.

Amendment 50 directly addresses one of the biggest ongoing failures in the mental health system: poor or non existent discharge planning. It formalises what should already be happening—joined up, multi agency, patient centred discharge planning—and sets a clear statutory framework to hold services accountable. Social and financial struggles can play a major role in someone’s mental ill health and block their recovery. Patients should be viewed not just as a collection of symptoms, but in their whole context. Addressing someone’s housing insecurity, their debt or family breakdown should not be viewed as separate considerations, but as a core part of supporting someone to live happily, healthily and independently. For example, we know that if a child is being discharged into a home where they are left entirely unsupported as a young carer, or a young woman faces harassment from an abusive ex, or a man who has lost his job is placed back into a life dominated by bailiffs, creditors and the threat of eviction, their mental health will continue to be put in jeopardy.

Convening all the different agencies that are relevant to someone’s social and financial needs—whether that is their benefits, the support they receive for a disability, the respite care they desperately need, or so much else—is therefore crucial to ensuring that the support they receive under their care and treatment plan reflects the whole person and their needs. It would help to ensure that people are not left without support, due to different parts of the system refusing to accept responsibility. Crucially, it would help to address the underlying social and financial stressors that are central to driving many acute mental health crises.

Amendment 50 is not about creating new burdens; it is about making existing legal responsibilities work together. Right now, too many patients are stuck in hospital not because they are ill, but because no one has brought housing, benefits and community services to the table. The amendment makes that table mandatory. It ensures that patients have a voice, that agencies are present and that there is a written plan, not just verbal intentions. It is the kind of joined up working that the Government say they support, so let us please put it in the Bill.

Amendment 16 ensures that individuals turning 18 during a care and treatment plan have their plans reviewed to maintain continuity of care while transitioning from child to adult services. This practical and essential amendment would strengthen continuity of care for young people transitioning to adulthood—a time when the risk of falling through the cracks between child and adult services is at its highest. Transition from child and adolescent mental health services—or CAMHS, as most of us will know it—to adult mental health services is one of the most fragile points in a young person’s care journey. National studies and inquiries consistently show that many young people experience a cliff edge in support at 18. There is often no overlap or co ordination between CAMHS and adult services. The eligibility criteria for adult services differ, meaning that some young people are left without any support at all after CAMHS discharge, which leads to increased risk of relapse, disengagement, self harm or crisis readmission.

Reports such as the Care Quality Commission’s “Growing up, Moving on” and the Health and Social Care Committee’s inquiry into children and young people’s mental health in 2018 have repeatedly called for structural reform to address that failing. The Children and Young People’s Mental Health Coalition told the Joint Committee on Human Rights that it

“is imperative that the Mental Health Bill strengthens safeguards against children and young people being placed in inappropriate settings.”

Amendment 16 would not require a new layer of bureaucracy or an overhaul of care planning. It simply creates a trigger: if a patient turns 18 during their care and treatment plan, the plan must be reviewed. This is not a burdensome amendment. Again, it is not about creating new processes; it is about using the existing care and treatment planning process to protect young people when they are most at risk of falling through the cracks. We have known for years that the CAMHS to adult mental health handover is failing way too many people. The amendment would create a statutory moment of review. It is a basic safeguard, long overdue, and vital if the Bill is to live up to its promise of putting patients at the heart of planning and care.

Finally, amendment 17 seeks to deliver earlier identification of children who might be in need of information, support or protection from potential harm. This small but important amendment is designed to help ensure that the children of patients detained under the Mental Health Act are identified and have access to support or safeguarding from any harm, if needed. Research suggests that up to 45% of psychiatric in patients may be parents of dependent children, and it is estimated that more than one in 10 children are living with an adult with a severe mental illness. That is as many as three children in every class.

Living with an adult with a severe mental illness can have a huge impact on children if they do not receive proper support. Children with parents who experience mental ill health are themselves more likely to experience mental illness, including anxiety and depression, psychosis and borderline personality disorder. Research has also found greater risk of premature mortality. We are also seeing an increase in the number of children suffering serious harm or even dying where parental mental illness was a core factor. The last five annual reviews by the national child safeguarding practice review panel have all highlighted parental mental illness as a recurring theme in such cases. The Association of Directors of Children’s Services recently reported that parental mental illness has for the first time overtaken domestic abuse as the most common factor in children’s social care assessments. That is why it is so important that children are identified and supported at the earliest opportunity.

When it comes to mental health professionals identifying children of parents with a mental illness, we are way behind countries such as the Netherlands and Norway, both of which have introduced statutory requirements for mental health professionals to consider whether adults with mental health problems have children. I will conclude my remarks there, but—

Hear, hear!

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that interjection, and I thank the Committee for considering these amendments. I hope the Government will either consider agreeing to them or give me an overview of how they will already be addressed in the detail of the Bill.

It is an honour to speak again in the Committee’s debates on the Bill. I really welcome clause 21, in that it introduces care and treatment plans, as well as a statutory requirement that all those patients formerly detained under the Act should have such a plan, apart from those who were only on short detention. It also brings England in line with Wales.

The clause fits with the fundamental purpose of the NHS. One of the founding principles in the NHS constitution is: “The patient will be at the heart of everything”.

The constitution states: “NHS services must reflect, and should be co ordinated around and tailored to, the needs and preferences of patients, their families and their carers.”

It goes on to say: “Patients, with their families and carers, where appropriate, will be involved in and consulted on all decisions about their care and treatment.”

Even though freedoms have, in a way, been taken from people through detention under the Act, it is so important that such detention should not remove all their choice, autonomy and ability to express preferences, whether that is simply over things in daily life, such as when they wake up, get up or go to bed. It is about making it really clear that patients can continue to express preferences and make choices over things that may give them a better quality of life, even while they are detained.

The hon. Lady makes an excellent point. This is especially relevant when capacity fluctuates in some patients, which we expect to see more often with the kind of dementia that will potentially come forward —for example, some of the new illicit drugs that are available can cause significant problems. Does she agree that having that flexibility is key? That is why the clause will help to ensure that the patient is empowered at all those different moments, and that there is a robust statutory framework to hold them to account. We do not want them to slip through the net, because if they do, by definition, not having these treatment plans up to date and in place may lead them to other parts of the Act, and we are trying to avoid that in the first place. That is the problem with having CTOs, or the concern that she mentioned in our sitting this morning, which has also been raised by charities. Does she agree?

I agree that it is really important to put it on a statutory footing. Obviously, other provisions such as subsection (5) of proposed new section 130ZA will ensure that it is regularly reviewed. There is no point in having such a plan if it is not regularly updated to ensure that it reflects trigger points, which the hon. Member for Guildford raised. When circumstances change for the patient, that is obviously an important point at which to reconsider their care and treatment.

I want to go back to the Wessely review. The clause is such a fundamental part of realising all four of its principles. If I may, I will briefly read from the review: “We must improve choice and decision making, both prior to and within a setting of compulsion…We believe that improving patients’ and service users’ ability to make decisions about their own care and treatment is essential to upholding dignity.”

The report recommended that where a patient has capacity, the care and treatment plan should record their wishes and preferences, whether expressed at the time or in an advance choice document.

Care and treatment plans are a central component of the Bill, and I hugely welcome their inclusion. The clause sets out in some detail who will work with the patient to put together the care and treatment plan. Importantly, it recognises the need to involve a wide range of people, in a spirit of co production, which is so important for people who have complex mental health issues. The plans will also involve family members and carers—people many of us have been speaking to during this Carers Week—who often have key insights into the everyday needs and preferences of patients who do not have capacity, as well as of other patients who do.

The plans can also ensure that care is much more culturally competent and appropriate, perhaps by recognising people’s religious requirements. They can also ensure additional support with communication preferences, for example if English is not the patient’s first language, if the patient needs signing or if the patient needs other things to help with communication. I have done a lot of work over many years to look at how we support patients to express preferences and share decision making, and those are things that are in the best interests of patients and that ensure that they get higher quality care.

The hon. Member for Guildford made points about the scope of the plans. The definition of relevant information is already quite broad. Indeed, the Bill suggests that, as well as things that may be particular to care and treatment, and discharge, there will be things about the patient’s life in the community, employment, accommodation and housing. I think it is expected that those things will be included, but perhaps the Minister can elaborate on Baroness Merron’s clarifications and respond to Liberal Democrat Members’ points about finances and housing.

Part of the clause relates to information sharing, which is vital. There are issues with the lack of join up, particularly when people are drawing on health services as well as social care, community services and in patient services. It is important that whatever is in the care and treatment plan can be shared with relevant professionals and other organisations, so that the patient and their family do not have to repeat things to different professionals in the multidisciplinary team. Those provisions are very important.

I welcome some of the sentiments and concerns behind the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Guildford, which seeks to ensure that those various facets are in scope of the plans. As I say, I think it is already recognised that there may be a variety of trigger events. Certainly from my own professional work, I know the challenges of the transition from children’s services to adult services. Obviously, education, health and care plans have a longer period of transition— up to 24—which mitigates some of the risks of a cliff edge change in circumstances. I am sure that in this case mental health services will work closely together to ensure that they operate in the interests of the patient.

I have spoken to young carers who find themselves having to provide care to parents who may be suffering with mental health issues. The hon. Lady made the point well about the need to safeguard the dependants of people who may have fluctuating conditions or different abilities, depending on their mental health conditions, to safeguard their dependants. However, many of those things are already within the scope of the Bill, and I am sure that the Minister will say how they will be addressed. I support clause 21 and see the care and treatment plans as central to the Bill.

Clause 21 will introduce a statutory duty to provide care and treatment plans for most patients detained under the Mental Health Act in England. It is, in the Government’s own words, a cornerstone of the reform package, so it warrants thorough scrutiny.

Under the current legal framework, there is no universal statutory requirement for a written care and treatment plan for detained patients. Although the care programme approach is widely used in England, and the Mental Health (Wales) Measure 2010 provides a statutory framework for care planning in Wales, provision in England is more variable. There is also the section 117 duty to provide aftercare for some patients, but there is no legal requirement to produce a personalised plan that spans care, treatment and discharge planning from the point of detention.

Clause 21 attempts to fill that gap. We welcome its aim of ensuring that all eligible detained patients in England have comprehensive, personalised and reviewable care and treatment plans in place. We particularly support the requirement for the plans to address both clinical and social needs such as housing and employment. The aim to embed transparency and collaboration will ensure that patients and those close to them are meaningfully consulted when it is practicable. The ambition to create a consistent national framework, which will improve the quality and equity of care, is also commendable, as is the recognition that restrictive interventions, including compulsory treatment, should be clearly justified in the plans.

Nevertheless, I have several important questions for the Minister. We have talked about the draft regulations; I assume that these plans will be encoded in them. Does the Minister have an idea of when the draft regulations are likely to be published? Given the interest in the plans, that is important. Much of the substance of what a plan must include, including how often it will be reviewed and how much information can be disclosed, is left to regulations. Without sight of it, how can Parliament be confident that the framework will be robust, enforceable and fit for purpose? I trust the Minister, but what if he is shuffled away and we get a different Minister? We may not know.

I turn to timeliness. Will the Government consider setting a clear deadline in regulations, for example within seven or 14 days of detention, for the creation of a care and treatment plan? The benefit of personalised planning can be realised only if plans are produced promptly.

That point leads me to enforcement and accountability. What happens if a care and treatment plan is not produced or is not updated appropriately? Will patients and their advocates have any legal recourse? What oversight mechanisms are being developed to ensure compliance?

Proposed new section 130ZA(6) of the Mental Health Act requires consultation with the patient and with their family or advocate, but only where practicable and appropriate. Can the Minister explain how that will be interpreted in practice? Would the Government consider strengthening the consultation duty to require a recorded justification when a consultation does not occur? It seems to me that in most cases it should happen, so providing a justification when it does not would allow accountability and ensure that it is being put in place.

How will the plans integrate within existing frameworks? Many detained patients already have a CPA plan, or a section 117 aftercare plan. How will the Government ensure that these new statutory plans complement existing requirements, rather than duplicating them?

On forensic patients and privacy, the clause allows for the inclusion of information about victim and public protection arrangements in plans for patients detained under part III of the Act. I completely understand why that is, but it raises a question: how will the Government balance the patient’s right to privacy, rehabilitation and focus with safety? We support the principle that everyone detained under the Act deserves a clear, person centred plan that outlines not only why they are detained, but how they will move forward, recover and return to life in the community.

I turn briefly to the Liberal Democrat amendments. I assume that many of the points will be addressed in the regulations, so I will not go through all the individual applications, because I think that there is space there and the plan would be able to pick things up. However, I completely understand what the hon. Member for Guildford is trying to achieve. The thrust of all the amendments that the Liberal Democrats have tabled has been accountability and making sure that we consider all points. I just hope to make sure that the Bill is practicable, and I hope on behalf of His Majesty’s Opposition that we can strike a balance between accountability and practicability and ensure that we have both.

The Minister clearly has support from both sides of the Committee for getting this right. I look forward to hearing his answers and hearing about how Members can work together to ensure that.

I thank hon. Members for this useful and insightful debate on care and treatment plans. I will begin by discussing amendments 14, 15 and 48. I reassure Members that the scope of the new statutory care and treatment plan has been made purposefully broad, so that wider matters relevant to a person’s mental health recovery, such as financial support and social care needs, are captured. We recognise that they can play a significant part in a person’s mental illness and can increase the risk of people with mental illness, learning disabilities and autistic people experiencing crisis leading to detention under the Act. Consideration of those issues can be critical to providing a comprehensive and effective programme of care and support.

As was promised by Baroness Merron and referred to by the hon. Member for Guildford and my hon. Friend the Member for Shipley, the required contents of the care and treatment plan, which we publicly consulted on, will be set out in regulations. More information on what we intend to include in relation to financial matters, housing and accommodation needs, and other issues can be found in the relevant policy paper in the parliamentary Libraries.

We will provide guidance in the revised code of practice that will set out that in patients receiving acute mental health care should be offered financial support, among other interventions, aimed at meeting the person’s holistic needs. To ensure that a person’s wider needs are identified as early as possible by mental health professionals, we intend to encourage individuals to include this information in their advance choice document.

I turn to housing and accommodation protection, which are referred to in amendment 15. Where a person is detained in hospital and is receiving housing benefit, or their housing is paid for via universal credit, there are provisions already in place that allow for them to be temporarily absent from their property for a limited duration. We will use the code of practice to set clear expectations on mental health staff around care planning, including consideration of accommodation and housing needs. We will also highlight existing provisions that protect a person’s living arrangements while they are in hospital.

I turn to amendment 23, which was tabled by the hon. Member for St Neots and Mid Cambridgeshire. Under the Bill, all patients will receive a statutory care and treatment plan, excluding those under short term sections. The patient’s statutory care and treatment should be created by the clinician in consultation with the patient and those who care for them, such as family members and carers. The clinician is expected to make reasonable adjustments to meet any communication needs, so that they can participate as fully as possible in making the plan to ensure that their wishes and feelings are reflected.

It is already our intention for care and treatment plans to cover information relating to a patient’s communication or sensory needs, if it links to their mental health recovery. That includes their wishes and preferences, information pertaining to their family or carers, and arrangements relating to their safe and effective discharge, which may include crisis planning. We will of course provide detailed guidance in the code of practice to ensure effective care planning for people with learning disabilities and autistic people that takes into account their specific needs.

I turn to amendment 50. Last year, the Government issued statutory guidance under the National Health Service Act 2006 on discharge from all mental health and learning disability and autism in patient settings. That guidance underlines best practice on discharge planning and multi agency collaboration between NHS bodies and local authorities, in line with statutory duties to co operate under the 2006 Act. We intend to make the discharge plan a required part of the patient’s statutory care and treatment plan, and that will be made explicit in regulations. The scope of the care and treatment plan is broad, allowing for consideration of the patient’s holistic needs as part of their discharge plan. Under the Bill, the plan should be prepared and reviewed in consultation with the patient and others, such as their advocate, carer or family members, where appropriate and practically achievable.

Statutory guidance on discharge planning sets out that it should start on admission of the person to hospital, if not before. All detained in patients are supported by a multidisciplinary team responsible for their care and treatment. Discharge planning should involve input from other agencies and the community team responsible for the individual’s ongoing care and treatment once discharged. Where a person is eligible for section 117 aftercare, planning should involve commissioners and local authorities too—

I beg to move, That the debate be now adjourned.

Order. The Minister must finish his remarks first.

I did not know that, Mr Vickers. Thank you for clarifying that point.

To promote a patient centred approach to discharge planning, we would prefer to avoid mandating in law which professionals should be present at discharge planning meetings. To formalise best practice, the Bill requires that the responsible clinician consults with another professional who has been involved in the patient’s treatment before discharge can take place.

I turn to amendment 16. We agree that a young person turning 18 is at an important transition point in their care and treatment, which usually involves the young person being transferred to adult services. Under the Bill, the responsible clinician is already required to review a person’s care and treatment plan following any change in their condition or circumstances that they consider significant. The transition to adult services clearly represents a significant change in circumstances, which rightly instigates a review of the patient’s plan by the responsible clinician. We intend to make that expectation explicit in the code of practice. In line with existing care standards and guidelines, we will also underline the importance of planning in advance of a patient’s transition to adult services and of collaboration between clinical teams, as well as other measures that seek to minimise disruption to the young person’s care and treatment journey.

We support the intention of amendment 17. However, there are existing provisions, both within the Bill and across other legislation and guidance, that aim to safeguard children and young carers. For example, statutory guidance on working together to safeguard children already sets out the importance of health and social care professionals acting proactively and in collaboration with other agencies to identify and respond to children in need, including where a parent requires mental health support. There is also an existing statutory duty on local authorities to assess the support needs of young carers.

The Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill contains provisions that will strengthen multi agency working with children and families, helping to ensure that local authorities deliver on their child protection duties. We also plan to reflect key requirements in the revised code of practice to ensure that children and young carers are safeguarded.

We understand that sometimes, when a person is detained, young carers are not appropriately identified. To address that, we plan to encourage individuals to use their advance choice document to ensure that the appropriate services are made aware. Under the Bill, carers should be consulted on the preparation and review of a patient’s care and treatment plan, where appropriate. We will include guidance in the code to ensure that young carers are appropriately involved and supported. We therefore believe that an additional duty would be unnecessary.

Clause 21 will introduce statutory care and treatment plans for all patients detained under the Mental Health Act, including patients under community treatment orders and those who are subject to guardianship. Only those who are subject to extremely short detention periods, such as those lasting a matter of days, are excluded.

The clause sets out in broad terms what the plans should cover, and provides the Secretary of State with the power to specify the contents in regulations. Setting out the requirements in primary legislation and further details in regulations will ensure that every patient’s care and treatment plan is comprehensive and that there is consistency across plans, which we know is not currently the case.

Under the clause, the clinician must prepare and review the plan with the patient and their close contacts, such as family members, carers or their nominated person. That helps to ensure that the patient’s wishes, feelings, beliefs and values shape the plan, thereby increasing the likelihood of their engagement with it. To help to ensure that the plan is kept up to date, the clause specifies important trigger points at which the patient’s clinician should review the plan with a view to potentially revising it.

Beyond providing a clear strategy for how the patient will be supported towards their recovery, it is envisaged that the plan will provide an important audit trail of key decisions made by the patient’s responsible clinician. To embed those new statutory requirements in practice, the clause will place requirements on the managers of a hospital, or the relevant authority, to monitor compliance with the duties. Sir Simon Wessely described statutory care and treatment plans as the cornerstone of the proposed reforms, delivering on each and every one of the guiding principles.

For the reasons that I have outlined, I hope that hon. Members will not press their amendments and will support clause 21.

I thank the Minister for going in detail through the points raised in our amendments. It is good to hear how each of them is being addressed through the code of practice and in the Bill. I am reassured, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 21 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Taiwo Owatemi.)

Adjourned till Tuesday 17 June at twenty five minutes past Nine o’clock.

Written evidence reported to the House

MHB31 NHS Confederation

MHB32 British Psychological Society

MHB33 Professor Emma Wolverson

MHB34 Money and Mental Health Policy Institute

MHB35 Mind