Public Bill Committees

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: Sir Roger Gale, Dr Rupa Huq, Emma Lewell, † Sir Jeremy Wright

† Argar, Edward (Melton and Syston) (Con)

† Brackenridge, Sureena (Wolverhampton North East) (Lab)

† Chambers, Dr Danny (Winchester) (LD)

Daby, Janet (Lewisham East) (Lab)

† Foody, Emma (Cramlington and Killingworth) (Lab/Co op)

† Irons, Natasha (Croydon East) (Lab)

† Johnson, Dr Caroline (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)

† Joseph, Sojan (Ashford) (Lab)

† Kyrke Smith, Laura (Aylesbury) (Lab)

† Morgan, Helen (North Shropshire) (LD)

† Prinsley, Peter (Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket) (Lab)

† Robertson, Dave (Lichfield) (Lab)

† Robertson, Joe (Isle of Wight East) (Con)

† Smyth, Karin (Minister for Secondary Care)

† Stafford, Gregory (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)

† Twist, Liz (Blaydon and Consett) (Lab)

† White, Jo (Bassetlaw) (Lab)

Sanjana Balakrishnan, Rob Cope, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 23 June 2026

(Morning)

[Sir Jeremy Wright in the Chair]

Health Bill

Clause 1

Abolition of NHS England

Question (18 June) again proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

I remind the Committee that with this we are considering clauses 2 and 3 stand part.

Casting my mind back to before the weekend, we had a wide ranging debate on clauses 1 to 3 but, I think, substantial agreement about the central proposition to abolish NHS England. I pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Lichfield, who succinctly put his finger on the key issue: it is fundamentally right that people and their elected representatives should be able to hold Ministers to account for the performance of the health service. It is also right that Ministers should have the tools to make the changes that are needed. The abolition is a necessary result of restoring that principle.

The debate raised a number of questions, a substantial number of which we will address during the course of the Committee as we reach the relevant clauses. However, I will pick up a couple now. I reassure the right hon. Member for Melton and Syston that the Government do take the impact of this process on staff seriously. We will treat people with the care, respect and fairness that they are owed through this process, now and in the months ahead. I am also committed to consulting recognised trade unions and I have a joint partnership forum to support ongoing engagement. More broadly, we recognise that change of this type is never easy, but we will need to go through the process quickly, which means, of necessity, proceeding in parallel with the legislation on the detailed internal design work for the new Department. That is in the interests of staff, patients and the public.

The hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham raised the issue of whether the Bill was the cause of delays to the workforce plan. To be clear, it has not been, and we will publish that imminently. She also asked about the opportunity costs for other programmes, and I assure her that the Department, NHS England and Ministers are clear that we are here to deliver the 10-year health plan and other changes that make a difference to patients. We can, should and will do several things at once, and the Bill will help us with that by providing clarity of roles, greater freedom to local organisations and other positive changes.

To take just one example of the real impact, we are already saving on agency costs, and this is the first time in many years that the Department has not had to go back to the Treasury for a further injection of cash mid year. That is getting a grip on the system. I add that the opportunity costs of not acting are very clear to the public, to staff and to patients in every single staff or patient survey that is issued. Those are the opportunity costs of not doing something; that is why we are acting. Clauses 1 to 3 are a necessary requirement for an NHS that is more effective for patients, delivers better outcomes across the country and achieves the initiatives that are expected of us.

This brings back memories of being in probably this same Committee Room a few years ago. I made this point during the previous sitting, but is the Minister able to commit that before the Bill leaves the Commons, a full and detailed statistical breakdown of the costs and benefits will be published, given their absence from the impact assessment?

I can tell the right hon. Member that we expect that NHS England coming into the Department will deliver up to about £1 billion in annual savings by the end of the Parliament, driven primarily by reductions in headcount, calculated using the average staff costs—about £77,000 per staff member in the Department and £94,000 per staff member in NHS England—including all pension and employer costs, which I think should help contribute to those numbers. As I think he knows, we will publish all accounts in the usual way.

I commend the three clauses to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 1 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clauses 2 and 3 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 4 Reducing inequalities

I beg to move amendment 13, in clause 4, page 3, line 22, leave out lines 22 to 29 and insert— “1C Health improvement and health inequalities duty (1) In exercising any functions relating to the health service, Secretary of State must have regard to the need to— (a) improve the health of persons in England, (b) reduce inequalities between the people of England with respect to their ability to access health services, and (c) reduce inequalities between the people of England with respect to the outcomes achieved for them by the provision of health services.

(2) Health inequalities ‘between the people of England’ means health inequalities between persons, or persons of different descriptions, living in, or in different parts of England.

(3) ‘Health inequalities’ means inequalities in respect of life expectancy or general state of health which are wholly or partly a result of differences in respect of general health determinants.

(4) Under subsection (3) ‘general health determinants’ are— (a) standards of housing, transport services or public safety; (b) environmental factors, including air quality and access to green space and bodies of water; (c) employment prospects, earning capacity, and any other matters that affect economic security; (d) access to public services; (e) the use, or level of use, of tobacco, alcohol or other substances, and any other matters of personal behaviour or lifestyle, that are or may be harmful to health; (f) any other matters that are determinants of life expectancy or the state of health of persons generally, other than genetic or biological factors.”

This amendment would amend clause 1C of the National Health Service Act 2006 to introduce a duty on the Secretary of State to have regard to health improvement and health inequalities.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 29, in clause 4, page 3, line 22, leave out lines 22 to 29 and insert— “1C Health improvement and health inequalities duty (1) When considering whether or how to exercise any functions, the Secretary of State must have regard to the need to— (a) improve the health of persons in England, (b) reduce health inequalities between persons in England, and (c) reduce inequalities between persons in England with respect to their ability to access health services and to the outcomes achieved for them by the provision of health services.

(2) Health inequalities ‘between persons’ living in England means health inequalities between persons, or persons of different descriptions, living in, or in different parts of England.

(3) ‘Health inequalities’ means inequalities in respect of life expectancy or general state of health which are wholly or partly a result of differences in respect of general health determinants.

(4) ‘General health determinants’ are— (a) standards of housing, transport services or public safety, (b) environmental factors, including air quality and access to green space and bodies of water, (c) employment prospects, earning capacity and any other matters that affect levels of prosperity, (d) the degree of ease or difficulty with which persons have access to public services, (e) the use, or level of use, of tobacco, alcohol or other substances, and any other matters of personal behaviour or lifestyle, that are or may be harmful to health, and (f) any other matters that are determinants of life expectancy or the state of health of persons generally, other than genetic or biological factors.

(5) In subsection (1)(a), the reference to improving the health of persons includes a reference to mitigating any detriment to health which would otherwise be occasioned by the exercise of the Secretary of State’s functions.

(6) In subsection (1)(b), the reference to reducing health inequalities includes a reference to mitigating any increase in health inequalities which would otherwise be occasioned by the exercise of the Secretary of State’s functions.”

This amendment would amend clause 1C of the National Health Service Act 2006 to introduce a duty on the Secretary of State to have regard to health improvement and health inequalities, reflecting the duties placed on combined authorities and CCAs in the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026. Amendment 34, in clause 4, page 3, line 29, at end insert— “(c) reducing inequalities between the people of England with respect to hospital transportation access.”

This amendment would create a duty for the Secretary of State to have regard for reducing inequalities in England with respect to hospital transportation access when exercising functions in relation to the health service. Amendment 30, in clause 4, page 3, line 29, at end insert— “(2) In discharging this duty the Secretary of State must have regard to the need to involve all departments of government in reducing health inequalities, and must take reasonable steps to ensure that other all departments consider the impact of their policy proposals on health inequalities.”

This amendment would require a whole government approach to addressing health inequalities by requiring the Secretary of State to involve all departments in the discharge of their duty in relation to health inequalities and took reasonable steps to ensure other departments consider the impact their policies might have on health inequalities. Clause stand part.

New clause 19—Health improvement and health inequalities strategy— “(1) Within six months of the passage of this Act the Secretary of State must publish a health improvement and health inequalities strategy.

(2) In preparing the strategy under subsection (1) the Secretary of State must consult all bodies which they consider appropriate.

(3) The strategy under subsection (1) must include— (a) long term targets related to health improvement and the reduction of health inequalities in England, (b) provision for the establishment of a public authority with functions for additional monitoring and reporting on progress towards the targets set by subsection (3)(a), and (c) any other provisions the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(4) All Ministers of the Crown must have regard to the strategy under subsection (1) in carrying out their functions.

(5) Within 12 months of the publication of the strategy under subsection (1), and every 12 months thereafter, the Secretary of State must prepare and publish a report on the implementation of the strategy.

(6) ‘Health inequalities’ means inequalities in respect of life expectancy or general state of health which are wholly or partly a result of differences in respect of general health determinants.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to publish a strategy for health improvement and the reduction of health inequalities.

I apologise for being a little delayed, Sir Jeremy. I am moving the amendment on behalf of my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke on Trent South (Dr Gardner). It would place a clear duty on the Secretary of State to have regard to health improvement and health inequalities when exercising functions.

Between 2011 and 2021, the UK was one of only five high income countries where healthy life expectancy fell. Over the same decade, we faced a cost of living crisis, the covid-19 pandemic and economic decline across the post industrial regions. We cannot shy away from the fact that ill health is rising. Economic inactivity due to sickness is at its highest level since 2012, and we witness a widening disparity in health outcomes. People living in the most deprived areas of the UK, on average, live just 52 years of healthy life. There is now a 16-year gap in life expectancy between the richest and poorest parts of the UK. Even within individual constituencies, the life expectancy gap can be as wide as seven years between local postcodes.

The purpose of the amendment is to ensure that decisions taken at the highest level of the health system consistently reflect the reality that health outcomes differ sharply depending on where someone lives, the conditions that they live in and their opportunities to achieve good health. The amendment would require the Secretary of State to have regard to the need to improve the health of persons in England. The intention is that this duty would include the need to reduce inequalities in health. That is in addition to the duties that are already in the clause, relating to inequalities in access to and outcomes of healthcare.

At present, the Bill brings together old duties on the Secretary of State and NHS England to reduce inequality in access to and outcomes from NHS services. Those are too narrow and do not reflect the wider determinants of health that the Government have pledged to tackle through their 10-year plan. The amendment would strengthen the duty to reflect the wider cross Government goals for health improvement and health inequalities. That would make an important statement of the Government’s commitment to improving health and tackling health inequalities, and would set in train an important step towards achieving them.

The amendment also provides a clear definition of “health inequalities” and “general health determinants”. Health inequalities means inequalities in respect of life expectancy or general state of health, which are wholly or partly a result of differences in respect of general health determinants, including housing standards, environmental factors, public transport, economic factors and other wider determinants of life expectancy. The amendment has been drafted to mirror the wording of the newly enacted section 45 duty on combined authorities in relation to health improvement and health inequalities under the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026.

Accepting the amendment would ensure consistent focus on the mission of creating a fairer country where everyone lives for longer, from the top of Government to regions and neighbourhoods. By setting this out explicitly, the amendment would ensure that future Secretaries of State cannot overlook the wider conditions that shape health outcomes. In sum, the amendment would require that when decisions are made, the Secretary of State must consider their impact on health improvement and on distribution of health across the population.

The amendment is supported by the Health Equals coalition, including 27 organisations that wrote an open letter to the Minister on 15 June. Those organisations range from the Health Foundation to the King’s Fund, Ramblers UK and the Wildlife Trusts, showing the breadth of support from across the sector. The cross party Health and Social Care Committee also recommended that the clause be amended in this way.

Embedding this duty in legislation would strengthen accountability and ensure that the reduction of health inequalities is treated not as a secondary consideration, but as an integral part of how the health system is led and managed. If accepted, the new duty would ensure clear alignment at national and local levels about the importance of prevention.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship once again, Sir Jeremy. I will speak generally about the amendments on health inequalities, and specifically about some points that the group of amendments homes in on.

On the general principle of dealing with health inequalities, the sentiment behind amendment 13 is important, and I support hon. Members’ motivation for tabling it, but I question exactly what “persons of different descriptions” means. Does it relate to protected characteristics, which employment law deals with, or to geography? I suspect that it is both, and I wonder whether there are more considerations than those two. It would assist us if the amendment were clearer on that, notwithstanding the fact that clarification may be made during the debate or to the amendment itself if it is accepted later. I have concerns about what “persons of different descriptions” means. Certainly, in everyday English, every individual could be described as a person of a different description, so the phrase does not have any particular legal meaning.

If the phrase means something equivalent to protected characteristics, I wish to say something about health inequalities affecting those of different ages. I am the Member for Isle of Wight East, which, of course, has an older population. I want people of all ages to have equal access to health and social care, and inequalities in access to be levelled out and removed, but it is not only older people who find accessing health services difficult, not least for reasons of physical access; the entire population within an area with an older age demographic is affected. The Isle of Wight has a small local authority. We are fairly unique, in that we are surrounded by water and have a higher age profile, which, taken together with other challenges, makes health equality a challenge for the entire population, not just older people. The issue is aggravated by other considerations, primarily relating to geography.

Amendment 34, tabled by the hon. Member for Winchester, refers to hospital transportation access. That can mean a lot of different things in different places. I support at least the aim of putting more pressure on the Secretary of State and the Department and encouraging them to recognise and eradicate inequalities in hospital transportation access. For my constituents, accessing specialist services means crossing a body of water, which is not only a physical barrier—a ferry has to be taken—but a cost barrier, because ferries cost money. I understand where the hon. Gentleman is coming from, given the challenge in my constituency, but of course other places have different but challenging hospital transportation issues.

Amendment 30, tabled by the hon. Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Layla Moran), the Chair of the Health and Social Care Committee, refers to cross departmental working to ensure that health inequalities are taken into consideration. I think this is key. Of course the primary responsibility for health inequalities rests with the Department of Health and Social Care, but it is by no means the only Department with that responsibility. The more we think about the various inequalities that exist in this country, the more we realise that other Departments have considerable responsibility. We hear from politicians—of all parties, but particularly the Labour party in government—about better joined up working between Departments, but without something more concrete in Bills such as this one, that will remain one of those aspirations that many talk about but few actually achieve.

The most obvious Department to help achieve the reduction in health inequalities is the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government, given its responsibility for local government funding. Of course, local government has primary responsibility for delivering social care and public health within its area. It is a well known feature of the system we have in this country that healthcare is free at the point of use and delivered effectively by central Government, while social care is a combination of different provision but private funding and local government have the largest role to play, and too many people fall through the gaps in those fundamentally different ways of funding two parts of the system. Unless MHCLG is bound into the way we reduce health inequalities, even with the best intentions of the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care, it clearly will not be delivered in a comprehensive and holistic way.

I refer again, as an example, to my area, which has a higher age demographic but a small unitary authority with a lower funding base. It is a matter of public record that the funding decisions made by the current Government at the beginning of this year have meant an effective reduction in funding for my local authority, notwithstanding its responsibility for an older population and the existing challenges in delivering social care. That is an argument that I and my constituency neighbour, the hon. Member for Isle of Wight West (Richard Quigley), are making to the Government in an ongoing conversation about how we can resolve that issue. We are having that conversation with MHCLG, notwithstanding the fact that it has a very direct impact—the biggest impact, in my view—on health inequalities in my constituency and the effectiveness of the Government’s 10-year health plan and their intention to improve the general health of the population. That is the probably the key departmental relationship that will be relied on to deliver the reduction in health inequalities.

The Department for Transport also has responsibility for this. If we refer to its responsibilities for reducing health inequalities outside the context of this argument, people might scratch their heads and wonder what we are talking about. but as soon as it is brought into a real life example within this debate, it makes sense that the Department for Transport has some responsibility for reducing health inequalities. However, we will not achieve all we want to unless that responsibility is made more obvious and specific, named somewhere in some Bill. We have an option to achieve our intention to have joined up decision making, and to ensure that every decision in any Department that has the potential to impact health inequalities is considered, whether in a formal impact assessment or just in the ordinary day to day decision making and mindset of the relevant Ministers, Secretary of State or departmental officials.

I will finish by talking about the use of data. Clearly, there are different uses of data when assessing where there are gaps—in this case, gaps or issues around health inequalities. Different Governments can and do use different data, and they reassess and re evaluate the sort of data that they want to rely on; this Government will, and do, use slightly different data from the previous Government, but I want to raise the issue of different Departments in the same Government using different data.

My detailed knowledge of the way in which data is used within the Department of Health is probably too scant for me to say anything particularly meaningful in the context of this debate, but I will use an example that again relates to my local area and to health inequalities: MHCLG’s use of data to assess local government funding to deliver adult social care and children’s services. Both pockets of money clearly relate to health inequalities and their removal. Amendment 30 tries to tackle that by placing a duty on the Secretary of State to

“have regard to the need to involve all departments”,

But even then, within one Department, MHCLG, different data is used to assess the connectivity and remoteness, of, for example, the Isle of Wight when funding the Isle of Wight council and the way it delivers adult social care and children’s services. I have yet to find a logical explanation why the remoteness of the island on which I live, the challenges of which are known in terms of cost, remoteness, crossing water and recruiting people to work in schools, hospitals, care homes and so on, should be dealt with differently when dealing with children’s services or adult social care.

Using one dataset to decide funding from one pot of money, and another for another pot of money seems quite arbitrary—or at least not joined up. If that happens within one Department, there is greater scope for it happening across different Departments—indeed, it is certain that it will. By my reading, that is what amendment 30 is designed to address. Whether this is the right place for that, and whether it will actually achieve anything, I am not sure, but it is certainly a debate that needs to be had. It may well be that here is better than anywhere else in terms of including it somewhere in law.

It is a pleasure to speak to clause 4 and this group of amendments. Health inequalities are commonly defined as the systemic differences in health status and distribution of health resources between different population groups. There are limits to how far the state can equalise health in a free society, but I am sure all Members would agree that the service should not preside over differences in access to health resources. Unequal access runs contrary to the vision of the NHS as a comprehensive service, available to all and based on clinical need, not ability to pay. Those principles are violated when people without fixed addresses struggle to access general practice, or patients in rural areas, such as my constituency, miss out on treatments—for example, specialist cancer treatments—that are available in more urban areas.

The Health and Social Care Act 2012 inserted section 1C in the National Health Service Act 2006, placing a duty on the Secretary of State to consider the need to reduce inequalities in the benefits that people obtain from the health service. As the explanatory notes to the 2012 Act made clear, the intention of that was to “include consideration of the need to reduce inequalities in access...and the outcomes”.

Clause 4 of this Bill takes that which was understood and makes it more explicit.

The Minister will be pleased to hear that I support updating that duty—she is smiling. The word “benefits” in the original section is a nebulous and subjective term. The wording introduced by the clause is less imprecise and requires the Secretary of State to consider the whole health pipeline. None the less, I have some questions about the lens that clause 4 and its predecessor, section 1C of the 2006 Act, invite the Secretary of State to look through, particularly in relation to other statements made by the Government.

In the Government’s policy paper “ICBs as strategic commissioners”, they say that increasing the commissioning responsibilities of integrated care boards will result in them being “better placed to support innovation”

and “design new models of care”.

Innovation can produce disparities; that is true in healthcare as well. If one ICB decides to innovate and produces a better service, that area will have a better service than another, and the Secretary of State will have the job of undoing that. That could be done by spreading the innovation across the whole of the country, but if the innovation is expensive or difficult to roll out, it could in effect be quashed. Does the Minister recognise that empowering health leaders to innovate and do things differently could widen inequalities, at least in the short term? Is she willing to accept that?

A problem with using inequalities as a stand alone metric is that it does not really tell you whether things are getting better or worse; it must be taken into consideration alongside a wide range of other metrics. An often forgotten fact is that disparities can be reduced by levelling down as well as by levelling up. Fixating on determining the size and cause of disparities can, in some cases, come at the expense of eliminating them. I recently tabled a written question to ask the Government if and when they plan to “set an explicit target to close the Black and Asian maternal mortality gap.”

I note that the Minister stood on a manifesto pledge to close that gap. The Government response to my question indicated that they are waiting for Baroness Amos to finish looking at the drivers of inequalities before they do anything. It is possible to produce tomes on the nature of disparities; I suggest that energy would be better spent on addressing them.

Amendment 13 would require the Secretary of State to consider health inequalities arising from differences in general health determinants. I understand the sentiment behind the amendment, as statistically, those with lower earning capacity, limited access to green space or unhealthy lifestyles have comparatively worse health outcomes, but would placing a duty to take stock of that on the Secretary of State make the health service any better for such groups, or for the population as a whole?

What would be the practical purpose of the amendment? As somebody said to me yesterday evening, do we have a section in education legislation stating that the Education Secretary has to consider that their job is to ensure that people are educated? Do we have clauses in defence Bills saying that the Defence Secretary must consider the defence of the realm? I cannot be sure, but the amendment seems to be a statement of the blindingly obvious, so what effect would it have? Does the Member who tabled the amendment think that the Secretary of State will not consider those factors—essentially, that he will not do his job properly? Do they not have confidence in him or in future Secretaries of State?

Under the amendment, the Secretary of State would need to consider inequalities arising from people’s employment, environmental conditions and lifestyle choices, which his Department has little to no control over. If poverty is the problem, the solution is employment and welfare policy, which is not in his gift. If poor environment is the problem, the solution is environmental policy. If a well informed adult chooses, despite knowing the detriment it may cause them, to consume unhealthy food or an excessive volume of alcohol, or not to exercise, what can and should the Minister do about it in a free society?

Amendment 13 would risk distracting from the focus of clause 4, which is, as I see it, to ensure equal access to health resources regardless of a person’s standing in society. What is the practical effect of making it a duty on the Minister to do these things? Will it cause a whole load of bureaucracy? Will the Minister have to produce impact statements for every new hospital? If, for example, one opened on the Isle of Wight—my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East was talking about that—would we need to consider what effect it would have on smokers, people who do not exercise or people who have a lower earning capacity, and produce an endless list of assessments? It would take a lot of money and effort and not really add anything. The amendment would also risk the Government getting bogged down in litigation, as people who disagreed with the Government’s or the ICB’s decision would spend their time litigating the question whether something that may or may not even be relevant was considered properly.

Members will not be surprised to hear that my thoughts on amendment 29 are similar to those on amendment 13. I do not doubt for a minute that its supporters have the best intentions, but this type of public sector equality duty language does not do anything to improve public services. Too many arms of the state have been so concerned with disparities that they have become incompetent at getting on with the job that they are actually meant to be doing; they are distracted by trying to measure all these different equalities.

Amendment 30 would require the Secretary of State to involve all Departments in reducing health inequalities and take all reasonable steps to ensure that all other Departments “consider the impact of their policy proposals on health inequalities.”

Is this spreading the bureaucracy and the impact assessments more widely? If the Government decide to buy a new submarine, do they have to consider what effect it would have on people who smoke on the Isle of Wight? It does not make sense to me. It is a statement of the obvious that members of the Cabinet and Government have to work together to deliver better health for the country. Of course that is true, but what would be the practical effect? The Minister may be able to tell us.

New clause 19 would require the Secretary of State to publish a health improvement and health inequalities strategy within six months, and an annual report thereafter. Again, that would invite more glossy brochures from the Government, using the precious time of civil servants. The new clause seeks a cross Government approach by mandating that all Ministers of the Crown must have regard to the strategy when carrying out their functions. Again, it is basically stating what their job is.

My hon. Friend hits the nail on the head. Although all these amendments come from a very good place, they are so obvious that they should already be happening, and are too obvious to be enshrined in some overriding duty in a Bill.

I agree. The amendments include, in many cases, a statement of what someone’s job is. Does the Member who tabled them think that the Secretary of State is not doing his job and therefore needs to be told what his job is? That could create a whole load of bureaucracy detracting from the actual job in hand.

Amendment 34 concerns transport access. I understand that that is a problem for many people in rural areas, such as my constituency. They often have a harder time, as the distance they need to travel is longer and public transport services are infrequent. Healthwatch, which will be cancelled by this Bill if the Government get their way, has heard from patients who struggle to book transport online, and whose transport turned up several hours early or was cancelled with little or notice at all. Those problems are well documented.

I visited Lincoln county hospital, which has a unit for renal dialysis, where I heard that although transport is provided for individuals having dialysis, which is good, it often does not turn up when it should or does not pick people up at the time that it is supposed to. More concerning is the fact that if they need a transplant and transplant assessments, most have to go to Leicester to have that done, which is several hours’ drive from some parts of Lincolnshire. Most disturbingly, I heard concerns that some people would choose not to go through the transplant programme, and a factor in that decision would be the ability to get to the transplant centre to have the significant amount of testing and follow up that needs to be done. Clearly, that is not equal access, so I urge the Minister to look at that.

Imposing a duty on the Secretary of State to consider reducing inequalities is a good thing, but it does not magic up the resources necessary to fix them. In exercising his functions, it is a problem the Secretary of State is already capable of addressing. I am sure the Secretary of State, like the Minister, is a good person and wants people to be able to access the services. If Members believe the Government are failing in that regard, I would advise that adding another legislative duty is not likely to bring about the change desired. If we are being honest with the public, we must challenge the premise that every disparity is evidence of a policy failure. The duty placed on the Secretary of State should be to ensure that care is of an equally high standard across the board.

It is an honour to serve under your chairship, Sir Jeremy.

The hon. Member for Isle of Wight East highlighted extremely well the difficulties of accessing hospital services on an island, but it can be a problem anywhere, including in rural constituencies. Winchester is about 60% rural. Since I was elected, an issue that I have had a great deal of correspondence about—even protests and petitions—has been the cancellation by Hampshire county council of bus services, particularly from rural villages such as Colden Common. People need buses for a variety of reasons—obviously to get to work and school—but the No. 1 issue concerning people is that of mainly elderly people using the bus to access hospital and GP services. They are really worried. It is causing a huge amount of stress that they will not be able to access hospital and GP services and not be able to remain living independently in the village that they have lived in for years.

One of the new hospitals in Hampshire is due to be built in south Basingstoke. Extraordinarily, the consultation on the location of the new hospital did not include consultation with the South Central ambulance service. When moving an A&E department and maternity service to another location, it seems blindingly obvious that the ambulance service should be heavily involved in deciding where a new hospital may be located, given that it is primarily responsible for ensuring that people can get there in a timely manner. Although there is obviously a need for local councils to ensure their constituents can get to a local hospital, it is important that we have some kind of obligation. I assume it would have been an obligation that when setting up the location of new hospital services, the ambulance services must be consulted and engaged with to get their input.

On amendment 13, the shadow Minister asked why my hon. Friend the Member for Stoke on Trent South felt the need to table amendment 13. One can only assume it is because health inequalities have continued to widen for far too long. In a 20 or 30-minute drive across my Wolverhampton North East constituency, life expectancy drops by seven years. I accept that tackling health inequalities is not just about health; it is about a wider web of societal issues, including educational, employment and housing inequalities. That very long list is beyond the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care.

Amendment 13 will put the tackling of preventable ill health and health inequalities at the centre of national decision making by ensuring that the Secretary of State must consider not just NHS treatment but wider social and economic factors. Will the Minister assure the Committee that future Secretaries of State will not overlook the wider social and economic factors that drive ill health and unequal life expectancy, and that there will be a responsibility to work across Departments to tackle that wider and growing inequality?

I am grateful to all hon. Members who tabled amendments in this group, some of which have not been spoken to. I will address the central points that Members have rightly highlighted. I am grateful to the Chair and members of the Health and Social Care Committee for their report and recommendations for the Bill.

Before I turn to the detail of the amendments, I will set out what clause 4 does. As my hon. Friend the Member for Wolverhampton North East highlighted, the wider determinants of health inequalities are important. On the point that the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East made about the Labour party, they absolutely run through our DNA. Clause 4 restates and reaffirms our commitment to tackling health inequalities. It reformulates section 1C of the National Health Service Act 2006, aligning it with the duty imposed on NHS England by section 13G of that Act. It makes plain the need to achieve greater equality between the benefits that people receive and the provision of health services—for their ability to access those services and for the outcomes achieved. Importantly, “outcomes” includes the safety and effectiveness of health services and the quality of the experience undergone by patients. The clause will ensure that the Secretary of State must have regard to reducing inequalities in respect of all those benefits.

The wording of the revised duty more directly encapsulates the benefits that must be taken into consideration and obtained from the health service to support action that reduces or prevents inequalities. Fundamentally, the clause underpins our commitment to improving the health of the population and tackling the stark inequalities that blight the health of communities up and down the land, which have got worse over the past 14 years. That is central to this Government’s ambition, which is why we highlighted it in the 10-year health plan.

We also recognise that this is not a matter for the Department of Health and Social Care alone, which is why we are already working across Government to address the root causes of health inequalities and the barriers to accessing health and care services. We are ensuring that our action on health is embedded in policies that shape people’s daily lives, from the homes they live in to the air they breathe.

Before the general election, I was the Liberal Democrat housing spokesperson, and one thing that came up regularly was how important housing is, and not just for obvious physical conditions—mouldy houses can cause breathing issues. Temporary accommodation is devastating for the long term health outcomes of the people who are placed in it. Does the Minister agree that working with MHCLG to improve housing—particularly social housing—is critical to achieving the Government’s objective?

The hon. Lady pre empts my next comments. I absolutely agree with her, and so do the Government. That is why we are improving living conditions through the new decent homes standards, which set standards across all rented sectors. Awaab’s law requires social landlords to act promptly to fix housing hazards. Since coming into government, we have launched the warm homes plan, the Keep Britain Working review and the homelessness strategy. In April, we published a renewed women’s health strategy, marking a decisive shift to ensure that women and girls receive the care, respect and outcomes that they deserve. Last November, we published England’s first ever men’s health strategy, to improve the health and wellbeing of all men and boys. Within the Department, we are reviewing the Carr Hill formula and the Advisory Committee on Resource Allocation to ensure the funding matches need.

However, there is much more to do. The Minister for Public Health and Prevention, my hon. Friend the Member for Washington and Gateshead South (Mrs Hodgson), will continue to engage with key stakeholders, including representatives of Health Equals. I have a meeting with representatives of that body this week.

I sympathise entirely with the motivation underpinning amendment 13, which was moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket, and I commend hon. Members for working on this important agenda, but I am not convinced that the amendment is necessary. I note that it draws on the duty that was recently placed on combined authorities by the English Devolution and Community Empowerment Act 2026, with a view to creating a similar duty for central Government.

Fortunately, I can reassure hon. Members that the Secretary of State already has a duty to secure improvement in the health of people in England, and the power to take such steps to improve public health as they consider appropriate. We would not want to narrow the definition of the existing duty, because health inequalities come from many causes, as has been discussed. As I have said, we are already working across central Government and local government to address those wider inequalities, including in housing and air quality, and by getting more people into work.

The hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham said that innovation might expand inequalities across our country, but we have seen a shocking expansion in the inequality gap across our country. That is what we are seeking to reverse, as we have made clear in our 10-year health plan, and the Bill will ensure that that happens. That is why we say that we will take the best to the rest; we are not about taking people down.

Finally, I turn to amendment 34 in the name of the hon. Member for Winchester. He has spoken before about his constituents’ experience, and I have spoken with him about the new hospital programme, his constituents’ reliance on transport to access hospital appointments, and the difficulties experienced in more rural areas, which the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East also mentioned. That is why, in our 10-year health plan, we are very clear about our strong commitment to rural and coastal communities—we are the first Government to do that.

We agree that reducing inequalities in hospital transport is important. The Bill already places a duty on the Secretary of State to “have regard to the need to…reduce inequalities between the people of England with respect to their ability to access health services”.

Inequalities in access to transport to receive care fall under the scope of that duty. As such, the amendment is superfluous.

I also offer the reassurance that NHS England has been implementing a range of actions to reduce inequalities in patient transport, including the speeding up of reimbursement for patients eligible for the healthcare travel costs scheme. I also inform the Committee that the cancer plan included a commitment to provide up to £10 million a year to pay for the travel costs for cancer care for children and young people, and their families, as people have long campaigned for.

Some important issues have been raised in this debate, and I am sure that we will return to them. In the meantime, I ask my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket to withdraw the amendment. I commend clause 4 to the Committee.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 4 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 5 Patient involvement and choice

I beg to move amendment 59, in clause 5, page 4, leave out lines 2 to 4 and insert— “(1) In exercising functions in relation to the health service, the Secretary of State must act with a view to enabling patients to make choices with respect to aspects of health services provided to them, including to make choices as to the provider of those services.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), the Secretary of State must ensure that patients who are referred for a service to be provided outside a hospital setting (‘out of hospital services’) are offered a choice of provider of that service from among the providers available in their integrated care board area and, where relevant, in neighbouring areas, in accordance with regulations made under section 14Z45B.

(3) Regulations under section 14Z45B must provide that, where an out of hospital service is to be provided to a patient, the integrated care board must— (a) offer the patient a meaningful choice of at least two providers capable of providing the service, which may include NHS bodies and independent sector providers approved to provide that service under arrangements with the integrated care board; (b) provide the patient with information to support an informed choice, including for each available provider— (i) indicative waiting times; (ii) the location at which the service would be provided; (iii) the quality ratings or outcomes data applicable to that provider for that service where such data is available; and (iv) whether any costs would be incurred by the patient in travelling to or receiving the service at that provider; (c) not exclude from the list of available providers any provider approved solely on grounds of commercial interest or organisational type; and (d) take all reasonable steps to give effect to the patient's choice within a clinically appropriate timeframe.

(4) For the purposes of this section, ‘out of hospital services’ means services— (a) provided in community, primary care or ambulatory settings rather than in a hospital inpatient or outpatient department; and (b) which the Secretary of State specifies by regulations as being within the scope of the choice obligation under subsection (2), and may include diagnostic services, audiology and hearing aid care, podiatry, dietetics and nutrition, physiotherapy, ambulatory cardiac monitoring and such other services as the Secretary of State may specify.

(5) In specifying services under subsection (4)(b), the Secretary of State must have regard to— (a) the potential for the expansion of choice to reduce waiting times for the relevant service; (b) the availability of sufficient independent and NHS providers to make genuine choice meaningful; and (c) the desirability of ensuring access to choice for patients in all parts of England, including in rural and deprived areas.

(6) The Secretary of State must publish, and lay before Parliament, within 12 months of the date on which this Act is passed, a statement setting out— (a) the out of hospital services for which choice obligations under subsection (2) will initially apply; (b) the timetable for extending the choice obligation to further services; and (c) the support that will be made available to patients, in particular those with limited digital access or literacy, to exercise the choices to which they are entitled under this section.

(7) The Secretary of State must review and update the statement required by subsection (6) at intervals of not more than two years.”

This amendment strengthens the new patient choice duty inserted by Clause 5 from a general aspiration into a specific, enforceable right to choose between providers for out of hospital services.

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

This group is about how patients can exercise choice. When the national health service was founded in 1948, patients could select their own GP, but it was difficult to change things and exercise choice elsewhere in the system. The health service has come a long way since then. Successive Governments believed that they could make state institutions more responsive by treating the public, to some extent, like customers. Today, patients can choose their GP, hospital, consultant and different types of end of life care and mental health service, but choice is about more than just selecting among providers.

Every medical practitioner knows that choice is important for care, because patients need to choose which type of care that they receive. When patients receive elective care—planned procedures and treatments that are not emergencies—there is often more than one option, and different options carry different trade offs. Those might be surgical options or radiation therapy for people with a basal cell carcinoma, for example—they may decide to have it removed or to have radiotherapy. They can make different types of choices, and the right one depends on the patient, their condition and their individual preferences. Clinicians can or should provide information so that the patient can make a fully informed choice, but the patient knows their preferences.

That is why choice and patient involvement is so important. It was first enshrined in the NHS constitution published in 2009, which set out that patients have a right to make choices about their care and the right to the information necessary to support those choices. The successor Government amended the National Health Service Act 2006 so that the Commissioning Board—now NHS England, which the Committee has agreed to abolish—had a patient choice duty.

Clause 5 will impose an equivalent patient choice duty on the Secretary of State. As I mentioned, NHS England is being abolished, so the clause is a necessary continuity measure. In addition, it will not be possible for the Health Secretary to improve the health service unless he focuses on patient choice. Choice can reduce bottlenecks, and people may pick providers for which demand is weaker so that they can be seen more quickly, relieving pressure on the more stretched hospitals. When people can choose based on rankings, waiting times, reputation and so on, providers have an additional incentive to improve quality. Money follows the patient, and no signal is greater than individuals voting with their feet. Choice can reduce geographical disparities in access. It allows patients to leapfrog underperforming local providers and access the same standard of care available to those in other areas.

As in many other policy areas, when Government give people the freedom to choose, we tend to end up with better outcomes across the board. Notwithstanding those points, I am concerned that the clause is not sufficiently robust, because, when put under the microscope, it has a weak legal threshold. It requires the Secretary of State to promote the involvement of patients and to act with a view to enabling patients to make choices, but what does that look like in practice? If a patient—or a set of patients represented by a charity—identifies that choice is not being offered in one particular area, what is their legal recourse? A view refers to a person’s thoughts, not to a specific obligation. If we are to legislate, the measure needs to have teeth, or it is just a statement of someone’s job, as we said earlier. Unless there are breakthroughs in mind reading technology, how would we prove that the Secretary of State did not think about patient choice while closing a hospital, downgrading the NHS app or squeezing out a specific type of provider?

Members cannot legislate just for today’s Government; they legislate for future Governments who may interpret legal duties in different ways. The amendment, therefore, would strengthen the patient choice duty in the clause from a general aspiration into a specific and enforceable right to choose between providers for out of hospital services. Integrated care boards would have a legal duty to offer patients a meaningful choice of at least two providers from their area and, where relevant, in neighbouring areas. The latter part is important for those located in rural areas and for those with uncommon conditions.

My amendment would prohibit ICBs from limiting patient choice of provider based on commercial interest or organisational type. That would safeguard against ideologically motivated directions, which can undermine patient choice. The Minister is a sensible person, but some of her detractors, and future Ministers, may not be. They may view choice and private sector provision as part of a grand conspiracy. We cannot provide them with the tools to undermine many years of progress. For that reason, I hope that Members will support the amendment. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s choice.

I rise to support my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham on amendment 59.

The amendment fosters competition. That is not ideological; the Government themselves have accepted, in clause 5, that competition and choice are important. As my hon. Friend said, this is about ensuring that patients have real choice, and not just something that the Secretary of State has thought about. If one provider has a waiting list of 30 weeks, for example, while another can see patients in just four weeks, patients should clearly be given the opportunity to choose the faster option. By expanding patient choice and making better use of the available capacity, my hon. Friend’s amendment has the potential to reduce bottlenecks without necessarily increasing overall NHS spending—that is a good thing.

Importantly, the amendment allows patients to choose between all approved providers, including NHS bodies and independent sector providers. It prevents integrated care boards from excluding suitable providers simply because of their organisational type. I think all Committee members believe in provision that is free at the point of use, but that can come from a number of different providers, including the independent sector.

Does the hon. Member recognise that there are circumstances in which independent provision within a district has the effect of disabling the NHS service? A pertinent example is the ophthalmology world. Services have become difficult to deliver in NHS hospitals because large numbers of NHS staff have chosen to work in the independent sector. That makes the comprehensive provision of a service in an eye department difficult, as the staff are all off operating on cataracts.

I do not recognise the characterisation that the hon. Gentleman puts forward. He is essentially saying that, by allowing the private sector to carry out operations and procedures, we are somehow making the NHS unsustainable. The follow on from that logic is that we remove all private sector providers and practice so that every single doctor, nurse and therapist is working in the NHS. I do not think that he is arguing for that situation, but it is the logical progression of his argument.

When I met surgeons, they said that one reason they like working in elective independent sector hospitals is that they can do more operations on a given day. The shadow Secretary of State visited a provider of cataract treatment yesterday. It is able to perform more treatments on a given day, partly for organisational reasons. The NHS, which is quite frustrating for surgeons, could learn from that. Does my hon. Friend agree?

My hon. Friend is absolutely correct. I do not want to go down the cataracts route, but she and the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket have both mentioned them. Clearly, cataracts are a relatively low complexity, high volume type of operation. My hon. Friend is absolutely right to say that some providers can do five or six operations per list, while other places are doing two or three. That is often about the private sector being able to move more quickly, which is obviously better for patients, as well as for clinicians, who want to do the surgery that they have trained for.

Unlike the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket, I think that competition can play an important role in driving improvement. When providers must attract and retain patients, they have a stronger incentive to deliver timely, high quality services, and to innovate in how they provide care. In that sense, competition is not an end in itself but a means of improving outcomes and responsiveness for patients. If both sides of the Committee support clause 5, because we are interested in choice and competition, amendment 59 is the logical extension of that.

The amendment is also clear about where the new obligation choices would apply. It covers a range of out of hospital services, including diagnostics, audiology, hearing aid care, dietetics, physiotherapy, ambulatory cardiac monitoring and so on. By clearly defining the services in scope, it provides a realistic and workable road map for implementation.

As I said, the amendment is not about ideology—I think we all agree about choice and competition—but about ensuring that patients receive timely care and have a meaningful choice about where that care is delivered. By fostering healthy competition, making full use of the capacity in the system and putting patients at the centre of the decision making process, it offers a practical route to improving access and raising standards of care. For those reasons, I support it and commend it to the Committee.

I am grateful to the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham for bringing this discussion before the Committee. We almost went down a cataract rabbit hole, but I think the points were well made. I will outline the Government’s general approach to choice and then move on to the amendment.

I recognise that hon. Members from both sides of the Committee are committed to protecting and upholding patient choice in our system, as are the Government. That is why clause 5 introduces new duties that require the Secretary of State to promote “the involvement of patients, and their carers and representatives”

in decisions relating to the prevention or diagnosis of their illness, and their care or treatment. That applies when the Secretary of State is exercising health functions.

The clause also requires the Secretary of State to “act with a view to enabling patients to make choices”

about the health services provided to them. The Government are committed to involving patients and carers in decisions about their care. We know that supports a better experience of care and, in many cases, better outcomes. Furthermore, if they want to be, patients should be active participants in decisions about their own care, rather than passive recipients of services.

I appreciate the sentiment of the amendment in the name of the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, but I do not think it is necessary. It turns a general duty into one with more prescriptive detail, which risks adding complexity. Details on service types and operational details currently sit in secondary legislation, which allows them to be updated and amended as services evolve. I reassure the hon. Member that we will protect and maintain all the existing rights and duties set out in the choice regulations.

In any future consideration of expanding patient choice, which this amendment requests, I hope the hon. Member would agree that we would need to build up and test the evidence base to ensure that any changes were effective and meaningful for patients, before legislative changes were made. I am not sure what problem the hon. Member is trying to solve.

The Government are committed to protecting patients’ rights to choose. It is absolutely right that the duty to involve them in decisions will remain a central principle of the new health system and that patients are empowered to make informed, meaningful choices. I believe that the clause, unamended, does just that. For that reason, I ask the hon. Member to withdraw the amendment, and I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

1|0|3|9|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Clause 5 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 6

Promoting innovation

I beg to move amendment 58, clause 6, page 4, line 10, leave out from “promote” to end of line 11 and insert— “(a) innovation in the provision of health services and in the arrangements made for their provision; (b) take steps to ensure the timely adoption and spread of clinically effective innovations across the health service in England; (c) identify and seek to remove barriers to the uptake of innovation by NHS bodies, including procurement barriers, regulatory barriers and cultural barriers to change; (d) promote access to innovation so that patients in all parts of England, and patients from all socioeconomic backgrounds, have equivalent access to effective new technologies, medicines and care models; and (e) have regard to the economic and industrial benefits to the United Kingdom of developing and deploying healthcare innovation in the NHS.”

This amendment would further define the meaning of promoting innovation in health services in England.

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

In healthcare, as in many parts of life, innovation is the way in which new ideas, products and services are developed to solve problems and improve patient outcomes. Here, the entire country has a record to be proud of that goes back a long time. Dr John Preece, a GP and research fellow at the University of Exeter, was the first general practitioner to use a computer in a patient consultation. He co designed a model with IBM in 1969, and his work led to the creation of the electronic patient record, the forerunner of the electronic patient record that we will discuss later. Innovators working with NHS England have also been seeking to reduce single use plastic in gastrointestinal procedures, improving outcomes for haemodialysis patients, as well as improving the environment.

In February, the shadow Secretary of State, my right hon. Friend the Member for Daventry (Stuart Andrew), and I met the scientist Professor Hanna and his team at Imperial College. It was a fascinating visit; Professor Hanna is looking at a breath test for pancreatic cancer. Outcomes for pancreatic cancer and other cancers of the upper GI tract are very poor, but he discovered that, before the cancer is detectable in any other form, volatile organic compounds are present in the breath. He has developed a machine that an individual can breathe into that will detect those compounds in order to detect the cancer early and potentially treat it. It is estimated that that will improve the pancreatic cancer survival rate threefold, although from a low base, from 7% to 21%. That will make a huge difference.

It is exciting how widespread that could become. If people travel to the continent, in particular to France, they have to carry a breathalyser, which costs just a few pounds, in their car. Professor Hanna is talking about how his technology, once it has been proven, could be developed on that scale so if someone was concerned about their symptoms, they could go to their GP or pharmacy and procure a breathalyser test to reassure themselves or to acquire a referral.

Innovation has the potential to save lives, which is very impressive. In a technological form, many people, including me, wear watches that tell them what their heart rate is and that monitor their exercise. There is so much available now that was not before, so we need to encourage innovation because it will improve our healthcare and survival rates.

Members will have seen many reports about the productivity challenges facing the NHS. In sectors like manufacturing and software, new technologies allow organisations to significantly increase their output per worker, but that is difficult in healthcare: nurses can make use of new equipment and better techniques, but taking care of a human will always remain labour intensive. Breakthroughs like robotic assisted surgery are impressive, but not necessarily frequent. The NHS has to offer increasing salaries to attract workers from other sectors, even if productivity is growing more slowly than in other parts of the economy. That is why innovation is so important: it is one of the ways that the health service can improve outcomes and productivity at the same time.

Currently, NHS England has a legal duty to promote innovation. That is set out in section 13K of the NHS Act 2006, which was it was inserted by the Health and Social Care Act 2012. As the Government are abolishing NHS England, that duty will disappear. The Government have chosen for clause 6 of the new legislation to place the duty on the Secretary of State instead. If innovation is encouraged and supported across the health service, it can unlock better outcomes and higher productivity, which is good for the Government, taxpayers and patients.

Does the shadow Minister accept that, in order to encourage innovation within the health service, we need to do whatever we can to support clinical academics? It is within the academic departments of universities, where people are working in hospitals and teaching in medical schools, that we see the most fruitful innovations.

The hon. Gentleman is right, but there are pressures and challenges for clinical academics, which he will be aware of. I am sure the Minister, in summing up, will tell us what she is doing about those.

We need to support innovation in all parts of the health service, not just in university hospitals. One of my concerns is that there has been a drive towards a hub and spoke model. There are good reasons for that, and there have been some good outcomes for patient care, but in some cases it restricts innovation in the peripheral parts of the model; it can disincentivise innovation and make it more difficult. We need to consider how we support innovation in all areas of the NHS.

One of the challenges of recruiting staff in Shropshire relates to exactly that point: some areas of the health service are perhaps less exciting to work in than others. Ensuring that innovation is driven across every NHS site and every region will help us understand the recruitment and retention problems that have plagued some of the country’s more rural areas.

The hon. Lady is absolutely right. When I was a very junior doctor, whether one wanted to work in a small hospital in the countryside or a large teaching hospital in a big city mostly related to whether one wanted to study a specialist, narrow field of medicine or a wider, broader field of medicine with a variety of different conditions. During my career, I have seen consultants make choices that meant they had to move from their district general hospital to a teaching hospital in order to make progress—in one case, a consultant was told he would not get a professorship unless he moved. The hon. Lady is right: we need to carefully consider how we support innovation.

I have concerns with the clause as it is drafted. Section 13K of the NHS Act 2006 gave NHS England the power to award prizes in support of innovation. Clause 6 ensures the Secretary of State has that power, but there is a big difference between an arm’s length body of technocrats awarding prizes and a political office holder awarding prizes, because then the prizes come out of taxpayers’ money and Governments are particularly short of that—not because they are not taking higher rates of tax, but because they are squeezing the economy.

There is a risk that those awards, and funding for innovation more broadly, become exposed to political cycles. When Governments face a fiscal straitjacket, Ministers are often quick to slash discretionary spending, even though it provides a long term return on investment. There is also a risk that prizes will be awarded on the basis of who shouts loudest. Certain charities will want the Government to focus on awarding innovations in cancer care, for example; some unions will want the Government to focus on awarding innovators who achieve greater equity in service delivery. There is little doubt that Ministers will have a tough time batting away lobbyists calling for more funding to incentivise this or that type of innovation.

Clause 6 also gives the Secretary of State the power to set up a committee to provide advice on awarding prizes. It is right that the Health Secretary should solicit expert advice when determining which trusts, teams or individuals deserve incentive payments, but does that require the power to set up what is effectively a whole new quango? The Government created more than 25 arm’s length bodies and advisory councils in their first six months. Does the Secretary of State require the power to pay members of the advisory committee when there are many experts in their field who can give their time charitably? I notice there is no requirement for any prize committee to include the chief scientific officer or representatives from ICBs. It is ultimately an unchecked spending power.

What my hon. Friend describes is the real nub of the Bill. If we are to abolish NHS England and move most of its functions to the ICB level or to the Department of Health under a Secretary of State, it would be utter madness for us to, at best, move one set of bureaucrats from NHS England to the Department of Health and therefore gain no extra efficiency, or at worst, as seems to be the case in this clause, not only transfer the NHS England bureaucrats, but create a whole new set of bureaucrats and committees to continue the functions already performed under NHS England.

We need to understand whether the Bill is really about making our NHS more efficient by removing levels of bureaucracy, as was the stated intent of the Minister and the previous Secretary of State, or whether it is simply a political power grab where we keep all the bureaucrats and the inefficiency of the current system.

My hon. Friend, as ever, puts things very succinctly. Much of what is said about the Bill is different from what it seems to mean in practice. We have heard the Government talk about the decentralisation of power so decisions are made locally, but in the oral evidence session, even the union rep said that the Bill is more of a centralisation of power. I agree that creating new bureaucracy to replace old bureaucracy—particularly if that involves redundancies—does not help to save money or to make the system more efficient.

I tabled amendment 58 to make the duty on innovation more robust. It would make clause 6 specifically require the Secretary of State to promote innovation in the provision of services, ensure that innovations are spread and adopted across the NHS, tackle barriers to innovation and consider the wider economic benefits of innovation. That is important, because when we talk to people in the life sciences industry, they tell us that one of the biggest challenges is the roll out of innovation. They can develop innovations in the UK, but it can take a long time to get them on to the shop floor, which is a disincentive to innovating in the United Kingdom. That process needs to move more quickly.

As currently drafted, the clause does not make it clear what innovation is for or whom it is meant to benefit. Amendment 58 would make it clear that innovation should be to benefit patients, no matter their location or socioeconomic status. I welcome the principle of keeping innovation on the statute book, but innovation is an organic process, and it does not begin in the Department of Health and Social Care or in NHS England—that is a fundamental principle that I think the Government fail to understand across many areas. Innovation begins with the frontline workers: the scientists, the technologists and the people who have ideas about better ways to care for patients. I am encouraged that the Minister understands that.

The Government’s vision for ICBs is that they will have more responsibility and more freedom to innovate—although we will discuss whether the legislation actually delivers that later in the Committee’s consideration—and I hope that vision extends to other areas of health policy. The clause is not disagreeable, but it must be made more robust. If Committee members agree, I hope they will support amendment 58.

I gently suggest to all Committee members that it would help me tremendously if they could stand at the beginning of the debate on a group if they wish to be called.

I will speak in support of clause 6 and against amendment 58. I work with a great many rare disease groups as part of my work as a Member of Parliament. Those people have specific health needs, and innovation is key to developing ways of dealing with their needs and to making their lives better, so innovation is at the heart of what we do.

We have many great institutions. In my region of the north east, I will mention Newcastle University, which is doing a huge amount of research into a range of rare diseases and is working collaboratively with other institutions, particularly in partnership, to address those health needs. The clause allows the Secretary of State the breadth to encourage that innovation and to help to make it into a viable spin off. We too often lose the benefits of the innovation that we create, and it is adopted in other countries.

Amendment 58 would put this important clause in danger of being too prescriptive, and sometimes, if we prescribe particular things, we lose the ability to do other things. I support the clause, and I do not support amendment 58.

The clause, and amendment 58, deal with innovation. Although the NHS is responsible for some great healthcare innovations, not only in this country but around the world, unfortunately, it is often an example of a complete failure to innovate, or even to use fairly basic technology that has been around for a long time—I am thinking of using computers for patient records, as paper records have lasted for far too long. Promoting innovation is clearly a good thing—it is essential—so I support the amendment. I will speak about the details in a moment.

I want first to refer to a rather puzzling provision in clause 6:

“The Secretary of State may make payments as prizes to promote innovation in the provision of health services in England.”

An explanation of what is meant by “prizes” might assist not only the Committee but the public more widely. It is a rather odd word and does not sit hugely comfortably with the serious issue of promoting innovation in the NHS and healthcare in this country. It rather more conjures up the idea of a lottery or a game show. Are these payments to be unlimited? What are they for? Where is the pot of money? We know something of the way in which the Secretary of State may make those payments, because the clause sets out that they may “establish a committee” to give advice about dishing out prizes and that they may pay money to those people who sit on the committee to help the Secretary of State decide who deserves a prize and who does not.

At a time when the Government and the Minister talk about efficiencies and saving money and when excellent organisations such as Healthwatch, which delivers its work for a surprisingly limited amount of money, are to disappear, it is rather remarkable to see these provisions without greater context, although I do wonder what context would suggest that a prize is a useful way of promoting innovation. Are there to be any restrictions in the way the prize money is spent? Are there any categories in which a person or organisation falls within the potential pool of prize winners and any categories where they do not? For example, could a prize winner be an individual? Does the Minister envisage money being paid to individuals? Perhaps more likely, could a non NHS organisation, like a GP practice—notwithstanding the fact that they are very important for delivering NHS services—win a prize? If a GP practice were to benefit from prize money, if indeed they could, would there be any restriction on how that money is spent? Might there be a giving of prize money with one hand and the taking of money with another, which would make the prize simply a cut in some sort of other payment and nothing more than a gimmick? If not—if prize money is to be genuinely additional money—is that actually the best way of distributing money? When an organisation—take again the example of a GP practice, or set of practices, or primary care network—demonstrates innovation, that innovation may have led to more efficient use of the money it already has. Is it therefore sensible to give it yet more money, or will it maybe lead to an oversupply of payments in one area and a dearth of supply in others?

Of course, innovation, and the environment that leads to innovation, does tend to thrive in a competitive environment, but I have some concerns without further context about whether incentivising competition through prize money is the way to go. Certainly, if we asked the great British public the straightforward question, “What is the best way to achieve greater innovation in healthcare?”, it would take them a long time to say, “Set up a committee and pay those committee members to advise the Secretary of State on dishing out prizes to those who show innovation.” I suspect we would have to go a long way to find a member of the public who came up with that idea, and it would probably take just as long to find someone to back the idea without further explanation, but perhaps we will get some clarity when the Minister speaks.

Turning to amendment 58, there is consensus that innovation is a good thing and that the Department and the Secretary of State should promote it. The advantage of the amendment is that it provides more detail on what innovation means and how it should be targeted, promoted and delivered.

For example, the amendment would require that the Secretary of State must

“take steps to ensure the timely adoption and spread of clinically effective innovations”.

The NHS can be excellent at innovating, but the adoption and take up of those innovations across the health service can be frustratingly slow. Indeed, there are numerous examples where it does not happen at all. Expressly referencing the taking of steps to ensure the spread and adoption of effective innovations is a strong, meaningful and necessary amendment.

The amendment would also require that the Secretary of State must

“identify and seek to remove barriers to the uptake of innovation”.

Sometimes, the reason why innovation does not spread is not lethargy, apathy or neglect, but because there are various structures within the NHS and procurement and regulatory barriers that, although not set up or designed to restrict innovation, nevertheless have a tendency to do that. The focus of the amendment is on identifying and seeking to remove such barriers to allow that uptake of innovation.

I note that the amendment mentions “cultural barriers to change”. In my previous career working for a national health charity, part of my role was to roll out specialist nursing services, working in partnership with NHS organisations and others operating in the health and social care space. We embedded new practices that might be described as innovation. In fact, a lot of it was not overly innovative in thought or practice, but it was innovative for certain corners of the country where those practices were not happening.

For example, on the adoption of electronic record keeping systems, certain trusts used a number of them that did not speak to each other. There was a cultural barrier—if by culture, we mean work culture—in that some NHS trusts were very good at embedding and adopting an electronic patient record system that was uniform across the trust, or, where more than one system was operating, the systems were interoperable and spoke to each other. In other NHS trusts, there was a cultural issue of wanting to leave teams alone and not disrupt their working practices, even if the imposition of a new system would have delivered efficiency and better patient outcomes.

I think this is the first time we have had a Robertson on Robertson intervention. It is a pleasure to break that duck.

The hon. Gentleman is making a powerful point about the need to change culture to embed innovation across the NHS. There is an example that we always come back to: fax machines. Fax machines were used in the NHS for far too long. It was mandated in 2018 that the use of all fax machines had to be stopped by the end of March 2020, yet in 2023, the NHS still owned 600. That mandation came up against a cultural barrier and it did not work, because 600 of them survived for three years after that.

In amendment 58, I see more mandation and nothing on culture. The problem with the amendment is that, by trying to mandate innovation too closely, we would miss the cultural point. We could undermine the Secretary of State’s power to say that all parts of the system are fair game for them. Would the hon. Gentleman like to respond to that point?

I thank my namesake for his intervention. I do not completely understand what he says, because the amendment refers to cultural barriers. He is absolutely right that we have to be careful when we mandate things, but the strength of the amendment is that it has a broad application and does not seek to mandate specific detail. I accept that it has more detail than the Bill, but its strength is that it gives some direction without being overly detailed. I again draw his attention to the fact that it asks the Secretary of State and the Department to identify and remove cultural barriers.

I will not keep the Committee too long. We need to look closely at what the clause is trying to achieve, both on innovation, which I support, and on the prizes. My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East asked a number of pertinent questions about the prizes, and I want to expand on that before I talk about the amendment in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham.

We have no idea what scale of prize we are talking about. Is it thousands of pounds, tens of thousands of pounds or millions of pounds? Will the prizes be given to individuals or to organisations? Will they be given to NHS bodies? I think not, or at least not exclusively, because the clause suggests that they could be for research. Will they be given to the private sector—I know that Labour Members have antibodies against the private sector—or to university research functions? It is very unclear who the prizes will go to.

Even more interestingly, proposed new section 1CC(3)(b) says that prizes may relate to “work done at any time (including work before the commencement of this section).”

So they could be given for something that happened prior to the Bill coming into force, but we have no idea how far back that could go. Are we talking months, years or decades? There is no clear outline about who will get the prizes, how much they will be, what innovations or technologies they will be for, or the point in time that is being referred to.

Then the clause says that the Secretary of State may set up a committee. I have been in enough Bill Committees to know that civil servants do not write something into Bills unless they have an idea of what they want to do with it. I would be very interested to hear from the Minister what sort of committee it will be, how many people will be on it, how much remuneration they will receive and how they will establish themselves and fulfil the function that the Secretary of State gives them. If we do not know that, the proposal is so open ended that I would have real concerns about letting it go forward in the manner in which it is currently written.

My hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight East suggested—I do not think he was joking—that the word “prize” made this sound like a game show. That is part of what we need to understand. Will the Secretary of State set up a competition in various areas of healthcare, technology, disease or treatment? Will they say, for example, “We want to find the best technology for dealing with cataracts”? Will a call go out for people to submit bids and say, “We have produced this amazing new laser treatment,” in order to win the prize? Or will it be entirely open ended? Will people come into the Department of Health and Social Care to this new committee and say, “We have created this amazing piece of innovation—give us some money for having done so”? It is so unclear in the Bill. As I say, I am absolutely certain that the Minister knows the answer to those questions because this clause and subsection would not be in the Bill if she had no idea what she was hoping to achieve by them.

My hon. Friend is describing something a little like “Dragons’ Den”, which is a very good TV programme—perhaps it will be televised or livestreamed. How will the Government ensure that there is no conflict of interest?

My hon. Friend’s point is correct. There is so little detail in the clause about how these prizes will be awarded and how the committee that will award them will be set up that we have no idea how conflicts of interest will be dealt with. That is another reason that the Minister needs to explain to the Committee how this is going to work. My hon. Friend mentions “Dragons’ Den”. I see her as the Deborah Meaden of our Committee, so I look forward to seeing that play out—I will not say what that makes me.

What I see from amendment 58, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham— I hope I am not misrepresenting her—is once again an attempt to codify, clarify and strengthen what is fairly woolly wording within the Bill. In particular, her amendment rightly emphasises the importance of “timely adoption and spread of clinically effective innovations”.

Timeliness is so important to patients. We need innovation quickly. Again, it worries me that the prizes could be given for innovations that could have happened weeks, months, years or decades ago, according to the wording. We also need to ensure that innovation is not in isolated pockets, either in terms of geography or type of service. We need something that is consistently delivered across the healthcare system.

By highlighting the need to address things such as procurement, the regulatory sector and cultural barriers, my hon. Friend’s amendment would support a more proactive and enabling environment for innovation to flourish, not one that shuts it down, as some Labour Members have suggested. Crucially, paragraph (d) of the amendment represents a significant and commendable commitment to fairness and inclusion by prioritising equal access to new technologies, medicines and models of care regardless of geography or socioeconomic background. It would help to tackle long standing inequalities and move decisively towards ending the postcode lottery that we often see in care quality.

The focus of the amendment would ensure that innovation benefits all patients, not just those in the most advantaged areas. It would ensure that rural and coastal communities are aligned with the urban. As someone who represents a semi rural seat, I see those inequalities in service delivery, quality of care and innovation. The large towns in my constituency receive far more money and get far better services than the surrounding villages.

I have many concerns about the clause as it currently stands, and I hope that the Minister will be able to clarify some of the Opposition’s questions. I entirely endorse amendment 58.

I am grateful to hon. Members for bringing this discussion to the Committee. We heard about the excitement in our constituencies around innovation—my hon. Friend the Member for Blaydon and Consett mentioned Newcastle University at the start and the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham mentioned her visit to Imperial College. Those visits are inspiring. Other universities and centres of excellence are available, but they made the case for why this is so important to the Government’s approach to innovation. I will talk about that and then turn to the amendment.

The Government are fully committed to innovation. It is absolutely central to our ambitious priorities to digitise health and care, support prevention and early diagnosis, and enable a shift to neighbourhood care, to growth in our economy, and to regaining our place in the world as a centre for innovation, which was lost under the Conservatives over those 14 years. That is why clause 6 places a clear duty on the Secretary of State to promote innovation in the provision of health services, including in how services are arranged and delivered.

The clause also incorporates the Secretary of State’s existing power to incentivise innovation and research through the payment of prizes, as we have discussed. That is a flexible tool that will allow him to stimulate breakthrough ideas and reward innovation across the life cycle, including an early stage report.

On some issues that have been raised, the Conservative party knows that Ministers have to act reasonably as this transfers from NHS England, and we would obviously want to tailor a committee to the matter in question, including membership. The clause will allow that flexibility. The equivalent duty was on NHS England; I understand that it has not actually been used over the past five years, but it was previously suggested as a way of promoting innovation.

In practical terms, the Secretary of State already supports innovation in a number of ways, for example through the work of the Health Innovation Network, supporting workforce developments in schemes such as the clinical entrepreneur programme and providing funding support for developing and evaluating promising innovations.

The Minister talked about the flexibility of the committee, and my hon. Friend the Member for Farnham and Bordon explained why it is helpful to have some direction. Could the Minister explain why there is no stipulation for the chief medical officer or the chief scientific officer to be part of the committee?

I am happy to come back to the hon. Lady if I am not correct in this, or if there is another reason, but in the existing duty and under NHS England, the committee’s membership needs to reflect the matter in the question. If there is anything to add to that, I will certainly come back to her. We are also committed to spending more on innovation, raising the NICE threshold to ensure that patients have access to more innovative medicines on the NHS. That is action, not just words.

The Government commend the intent behind the amendment tabled by the hon. Lady, and she spoke well about that. As a clinician, I recognise her support for innovation, but we recognise that barriers remain to the systematic spread of innovation. That is a long term problem that existed under previous Governments as well, and we seek to rectify it. The ministerial foreword to the “Life Science Sector Plan” published last year says: “We are clear eyed about the challenges. For too long, the journey from discovery to delivery has been too slow, too fragmented, and too often held back by outdated systems.”

That is why we need to remove barriers at every stage of the journey; however, the amendment is the wrong way to do that.

The experience of supporting innovation in the NHS suggests that we need flexibility in our approach to tackle emerging barriers as they arise. Specifying several areas of focus in the Bill would limit that flexibility; those are better set out in published strategies and guidance, which is what we are doing. The amendment could also cause unintended consequences. It would create a one size fits all approach, requiring all of England to have equivalent access to innovations. While tackling unwarranted variation is of course vital, we should continue our focus on providing access to innovation that best meets local needs.

Instead of over defining what we mean by innovation in legislation, we are taking practical measures to drive it on the ground. We are already building the 10-year health plan and the life sciences sector plan to deliver an ambitious set of actions, which address the areas raised by the amendment including procurement, aligned regulation and the alignment of our NHS innovation policy with sector growth policy. That echoes our approach elsewhere in the Bill of devolving power to local levels and giving more opportunity to systems and organisations to innovate, and more agency to use their resources to do so.

The NHS has a strong record of developing and adopting new treatments, technologies and models of care. The clause will build on that record, signalling the Secretary of State’s clear commitment to promoting innovation, and it will do so in a flexible way that will allow us to respond to challenges as they emerge. For that reason, I ask the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham to withdraw her amendment, and I commend the clause the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

2|0|5|9|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Clause 6 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 7

Education and training

I beg to move amendment 33, in clause 7, page 4, line 31, at end insert— “(2) Training under subsection (1)(a) includes training in general health determinants as defined by section 107ZB of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009.”

This amendment would place a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that the health and care workforce is adequately trained in the wider determinants of health such as housing standards, exposure to air pollution, occupational risk, and use of harmful substances like tobacco.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 50, in clause 7, page 4, line 32, at end insert— “(4) After subsection (2) insert— ‘(2A) The Secretary of State must publish independently audited forecasts of the NHS’s workforce needs every five years.’”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish independently audited forecasts of the NHS’s staffing needs every five years. Amendment 54, in clause 7, page 4, line 32, at end insert— “(4) The Secretary of State must exercise functions under this section with a view to ensuring that managers in the NHS, who have appropriate clinical training, must also undertake clinical care.

(5) The Secretary of State must record the proportion of direct clinical care provided by those with professional qualifications both in terms of the proportion of their areas and full time equivalent by pay grade, and the Secretary of State must increase the proportion.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to ensure that NHS managers who are clinically trained must continue to undertake clinical care. Clause stand part.

New clause 44—Medical training places— “The Secretary of State must double the number of medical school training places to 15,000 by 2031-32.”

This new clause would put a duty on the Secretary of State to double the number of medical school training places. New clause 45—Data collection: clinically trained staff— “(1) The Secretary of State must collect and publish data on the numbers and proportion of NHS staff are qualified to deliver nursing and clinical care who delivering nursing care, or clinical care of any kind, and those who are not.

(2) Information under subsection (1) must be collected according to HCAS pay scales.

(3) Information under subsection (1) must include numbers of nursing and midwifery staff.

(4) Information under subsection (1) must be published quarterly.

(5) The NHS and ICBs are under a duty to comply with any requests from the Secretary of State for data for this purpose.

(6) Information under subsection (1) must include the proportion of time spent delivering clinical care as a proportion of the individual’s total working hours.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to collect and publish data on the numbers and proportion of clinically qualified staff who are delivering clinical care, broken down by HCAS pay band.

As the Committee knows, my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West (Dr Cooper) is one of the five medical doctors in the parliamentary Labour party. It is a great pleasure to move the amendment, which she tabled.

The amendment is about education and training. My hon. Friend would like us to consider whether there should be an additional subsection after proposed new subsection (1)(a), which is about ensuring that “there are sufficient people with appropriate education and training to meet the workforce needs of the health service”.

My hon. Friend would like to include within that specific training about wider health determinants, which, as we discussed earlier this morning, consist of things like housing, air quality, occupation, and substance abuse—tobacco, alcohol and so on. Her opinion is that that needs to be specifically incorporated into the legislation.

I shall speak briefly to the amendment that was just moved by the hon. Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket. I do not mean this rudely, but it is a relatively motherhood and apple pie amendment. The onus would be on the Secretary of State to recognise that smoking, exposure to air pollution, occupational risk and harmful substances are bad, but I think we all agree on that. If the Secretary of State, or any future Secretary of State, does not already recognise that, I would be pretty surprised.

I have a number of issues with the amendment, the first of which is that it expands some central duties without clear limits. Potentially, it could be a gateway to what I would describe as interventionism. Perhaps, too, it lacks some of the prioritisation or proportionality that I would like to see in the Bill—as I have said, however, I think that otherwise the training element is pretty good.

Moving to amendment 50, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, I entirely support it. This amendment would be extraordinarily useful, because the NHS publishes independently audited forecasts of the workforce every five years, but the amendment would lead to better long term planning. Regular, independently audited forecasts would help the NHS to anticipate staffing needs, plan training and recruitment, and use resources more effectively and with more efficiency.

Amendment 50 would also increase transparency and trust. One of the key things that we will need to do as a Parliament when the Bill becomes an Act is to convince the public that, when this new world of how the NHS is going to be managed and operated comes in, they can have confidence that the treatment they get is the best that it can be and that those who are being trained and working in the NHS get the training that they require and are being established as some of the best in the world.

Independent audits would make such forecasting more credible and give reassurance to the public and the stakeholders that the workforce planning is evidence based and not potentially politically influenced, which is one of the big problems about having the Secretary of State in charge of everything throughout the Bill. The key thing must be improved patient care. Accurate workforce predictions will ensure that we have the right number of healthcare professionals available. We will see a reduction in shortages and more consistent, high quality care.

I support amendment 54, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, because it ensures that clinically trained managers maintain patient facing roles, making better use of scarce clinical expertise and improving workforce efficiency. It strengthens accountability, like amendment 50, by tracking and increasing the proportion of care delivered by qualified professionals, helping to optimise staff deployment and reduce pressure on frontline services. I have some concerns about amendment 33, but amendments 50 and 54 have my support, and clause 7, hopefully amended, will also have my support.

I rise to support clause 7 and amendment 33, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Worthing West. Having worked in the NHS for many years, I have seen that education and training, especially mandatory training, is absolutely necessary. Some may argue that health staff have too much training, particularly mandatory training, but this amendment specifically concerns training “in the wider determinants of health such as housing standards, exposure to air pollution, occupational risk, and use of harmful substances like tobacco.”

We may have staff, especially those working in mental health, who have training in some of those areas, but staff in A&E, where patients first present, may not have that training, and may be missing that curiosity. We have heard many incidents involving families living in mouldy houses or people exposed to air pollution. It is important that staff have the curiosity to consider where a patient has come from when they turn up at A&E, or, when planning a discharge, where they are being discharged to.

In the last few years, we have seen many internationally trained healthcare workers join our health sector who may not be familiar with the social and housing situation in this country. Whether this is to be a part of their initial training as nurses or doctors, or through mandatory training at work, the amendment is important because it could help to prevent illnesses and identify them earlier through professional curiosity. I support amendment 33.

I declare an interest as a member of the NHS workforce and an NHS consultant paediatrician. In England, around one in every 17 working people is employed by the national health service. That is quite a shocking statistic. It is the largest employer in the country and, indeed, in Europe. It has grown significantly over time, in part because the needs of the population have changed. Life expectancy is longer, which is something to be cherished—that is a good thing—but it brings challenges to the health service, as people are more likely to be living with multiple chronic conditions rather than easily treatable ailments. They require more tests, medicines and clinical care. Demographic change requires a larger NHS workforce, particularly in secondary care.

The previous Conservative Government not only recognised the scale of that challenge but took swift action to increase staffing levels across the board, adding more than 42,000 doctors and 55,000 nurses, health visitors and midwives. Conservative Ministers also supported the pipeline responsible for producing the next generation of medical practitioners. They funded 1,500 additional medical school places and opened five new medical schools, including in Sunderland, Lancashire, Chelmsford and Canterbury, and one just outside my constituency in Lincoln. Emergency care became the fastest growing specialty, with the number of emergency care doctors doubling. That is what support for the NHS workforce looks like.

Conservative investments in the workforce helped to improve survival rates for cancer, increase the number of GP appointments and deliver the fastest vaccine roll out in Europe. Under existing legislation, the Secretary of State has a responsibility to ensure that there is an effective system for planning and delivering education and training to current and potential staff. Health Education England has been rolled into NHS England, so it is ultimately NHS England that has the duty to ensure sufficient and appropriately trained staff to meet NHS workforce needs. Now that NHS England is to be abolished, it is right that this duty is to be given to the Secretary of State through clause 7, although to some extent it is a statement of the obvious that that is part of his job.

The job of members of this Committee is to improve the Bill, not just wave it through, and that means recognising that the existing legislation had some inadequacies. Clause 7 states: “The Secretary of State must exercise functions…with a view to ensuring”

several things about the workforce. It is not a cast iron requirement; the Secretary of State must just think about it, but actually he should not just think about his job; he should get on with it. I have a bit of a bee in my bonnet about legislation that creates obligations that are easy to proclaim and that are virtuous but are difficult to measure. Such legislation makes legislators feel good about themselves because they are writing nice things into legislation, but they are not really robust. What does “sufficient people with appropriate education”

mean? What is “sufficient”?

One reason concerns are particularly acute is the Government’s shambolic record on workforce planning. They came to power saying that they had a plan, but their workforce plan has still not been published, almost two years since they came into office. I heard the Minister say “imminently”, but I had a written answer last week, I think, saying “imminently”. I appreciate that “imminently” is probably better than “soon”, but what does it really mean, and how soon can we expect the plan to be published? Does she mean that it is coming this week or next? Can she guarantee that it will be published before the summer recess? Has the Prime Minister’s resignation yesterday put all this up in the air once again?

The Royal College of Radiologists has said that the shortfall in clinical radiologists has grown from 29% to 32% since 2024, and the Royal College of Nursing has released data showing that the growth in the nursing workforce slowed last year to its lowest level in eight years. Newly qualified midwives are finding themselves with no jobs to go to in the health service, despite the fact that there is a maternity staffing crisis in some areas. Will the Minister explain the reason for the delay? She said earlier in this sitting that it was not NHS England, but what is causing the delay?

We were told that stakeholders wanted more time to have conversations, test ideas and work together. One would think that after the many months of deliberation, Ministers would have put together an exceptional workforce plan, but the Royal College of Nursing, the British Medical Association, of which I am a member, Unite the union and several other organisations wrote to the Health Secretary earlier this month to urge for the plan, which they have but which has not been published, to be “paused”, because they are “concerned that the current direction falls significantly short of the scale of workforce growth required to meet patient need and relies too heavily on assumptions about the current state of NHS services, productivity and technology that are not borne out of frontline experience.”

I recently tabled a question asking who had been given advanced sight of the workforce plan, and I received confirmation that the royal colleges and unions have been involved. As I mentioned, I am a member of the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. We now have a situation where a workforce plan is being delayed, and it has been brought before other organisations for discussion rather than elected Members of this House. It is taking far too long. In the meantime, things are going backwards. It is simply not good enough. Ministers are now about to roll out a plan that has mortified seemingly everyone who has seen it, while expecting members of the Committee to rubber stamp a rather flimsy legal duty.

In May, the Financial Times reported that plans drawn up under this Government would see recruitment cut back. The article reads: “A workforce plan being finalised by health officials says the NHS in England will have to use technology to get by with hundreds of thousands fewer staff than envisaged under the previous Conservative government.”

Is that clinical staff? Are we going to have fewer doctors? It is not clear because we have not seen the plan and it has not been published. A draft of the plan seen by the newspaper said that the NHS “does not need anything like the…numbers…set out in its 2023 workforce plan.’

Will the Minister confirm whether those press reports are accurate? She previously said that her plan “will ensure that the NHS has the right people in the right places with the right skills for patients when they need them”.—[Official Report, 13 January 2026; Vol. 778, c. 737-738.] Does that mean fewer people and more AI?

The Chair adjourned the Committee without Question put (Standing Order No. 88).

Adjourned till this day at Two o’clock.

The Committee consisted of the following Members:

Chairs: † Sir Roger Gale, Dr Rupa Huq, Emma Lewell, Sir Jeremy Wright

Argar, Edward (Melton and Syston) (Con)

† Brackenridge, Sureena (Wolverhampton North East) (Lab)

Chambers, Dr Danny (Winchester) (LD)

† Daby, Janet (Lewisham East) (Lab)

† Foody, Emma (Cramlington and Killingworth) (Lab/Co op)

† Irons, Natasha (Croydon East) (Lab)

† Johnson, Dr Caroline (Sleaford and North Hykeham) (Con)

† Joseph, Sojan (Ashford) (Lab)

† Kyrke Smith, Laura (Aylesbury) (Lab)

† Morgan, Helen (North Shropshire) (LD)

† Prinsley, Peter (Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket) (Lab)

† Robertson, Dave (Lichfield) (Lab)

† Robertson, Joe (Isle of Wight East) (Con)

† Smyth, Karin (Minister for Secondary Care)

† Stafford, Gregory (Farnham and Bordon) (Con)

† Twist, Liz (Blaydon and Consett) (Lab)

† White, Jo (Bassetlaw) (Lab)

Sanjana Balakrishnan, Rob Cope, Committee Clerks

† attended the Committee

Public Bill Committee

Tuesday 23 June 2026

[Sir Roger Gale in the Chair]

Health Bill

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Members may remove their jackets and, because of the health warning—exceptionally—if Members or civil servants wish to remove their ties, they may do that as well. Please understand that that is not a precedent.

Clause 7 Education and training Amendment proposed (this day): 33, in clause 7, page 4, line 31, at end insert— “(2) Training under subsection (1)(a) includes training in general health determinants as defined by section 107ZB of the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009.”—(Peter Prinsley.) This amendment would place a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that the health and care workforce is adequately trained in the wider determinants of health such as housing standards, exposure to air pollution, occupational risk, and use of harmful substances like tobacco. Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

I remind the Committee that with this we are discussing the following: Amendment 50, in clause 7, page 4, line 32, at end insert— “(4) After subsection (2) insert— ‘(2A) The Secretary of State must publish independently audited forecasts of the NHS’s workforce needs every five years.’”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish independently audited forecasts of the NHS’s staffing needs every five years. Amendment 54, in clause 7, page 4, line 32, at end insert— “(4) The Secretary of State must exercise functions under this section with a view to ensuring that managers in the NHS, who have appropriate clinical training, must also undertake clinical care.

(5) The Secretary of State must record the proportion of direct clinical care provided by those with professional qualifications both in terms of the proportion of their areas and full time equivalent by pay grade, and the Secretary of State must increase the proportion.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State to ensure that NHS managers who are clinically trained must continue to undertake clinical care. Clause stand part.

New clause 44—Medical training places— “The Secretary of State must double the number of medical school training places to 15,000 by 2031-32.”

This new clause would put a duty on the Secretary of State to double the number of medical school training places. New clause 45—Data collection: clinically trained staff— “(1) The Secretary of State must collect and publish data on the numbers and proportion of NHS staff are qualified to deliver nursing and clinical care who delivering nursing care, or clinical care of any kind, and those who are not.

(2) Information under subsection (1) must be collected according to HCAS pay scales.

(3) Information under subsection (1) must include numbers of nursing and midwifery staff.

(4) Information under subsection (1) must be published quarterly.

(5) The NHS and ICBs are under a duty to comply with any requests from the Secretary of State for data for this purpose.

(6) Information under subsection (1) must include the proportion of time spent delivering clinical care as a proportion of the individual’s total working hours.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to collect and publish data on the numbers and proportion of clinically qualified staff who are delivering clinical care, broken down by HCAS pay band.

Before the lunch break I was saying that, in essence, clause 7 states what the Secretary of State’s job is. It moves the function of planning the workforce from NHS England to the Secretary of State, which is a reasonable thing to do. I talked about the previous Government’s record on opening new medical schools and how that has helped with the number of clinical staff.

We also talked about workforce planning. The Government are due to produce a workforce plan, but it is not clear when it is due to come out. It was due to come out at the end of last year, but it did not; it was then due to come out in the spring, but now it is the summer. Given the Prime Minister’s resignation, it is not at all clear when it will come out. Will the Minister let us know whether it will come out before the summer recess, this week or whenever?

I quoted some of the concerns of the Royal College of Nursing, the British Medical Association, of which I am a member, and others. Those concerns include the workforce plan. Those organisations have seen what we have not seen, so they have been asked to comment on something that we have yet to see. That brings me to new clause 44, which is in my name.

Before the general election, Labour promised that it would double the number of medical school places. The now Chancellor of the Exchequer promised to double the number of medical school training places, as did the now Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology. Once the general election had passed and Labour was in government, the promise was reiterated. At oral questions in October 2024, the now former Health Secretary said: “This Government are committed, as we were in opposition, to doubling the number of medical school places”.—[Official Report, 15 October 2024; Vol. 754, c. 683.]— but there has not really been any progress.

During a debate this year on the junior doctors’ foundation programme, I asked the Minister for Care whether the Government’s intention was still to honour that pledge. He said: “Yes, that is the Government’s intention.”—[Official Report, 22 April 2026; Vol. 784, c. 133WH.]— only to later submit a written correction stating that the Government had never committed to doing so. Are they going to, or not? It is not clear.

Labour promised to double the number of medical school places, but now that pledge appears to have been airbrushed out of history. Can the Minister please explain why she and her colleagues deemed the workforce pledge essential before the election but not after it? Can she tell us whether it is Government policy? In essence, my new clause 44 asks Members on the Government Benches to vote for what they promised before the election and have promised since.

New clause 44 is very simple: it stipulates that the Secretary of State must double the number of medical school training places by 2031-32. That is what Labour promised, so it should be fairly easy for Labour Members to vote for it. I hope that the Committee will support the new clause, which only requires Ministers to do what their party promised before it came into government.

If the Government are not keen on committing to clear targets, they can at least commit to full scrutiny of their workforce plans. Of course, there is a risk that the House has been misled. Either the promise was made or it was not. The Minister for Care said that it was promised and then submitted a written correction to say that that was inaccurate and that it was never Government policy, but if it has been stated by the Secretary of State at the Dispatch Box, representing the Government, then it is Government policy. Can the Minister help to clarify that point? If the House has been misled by either her former boss or the Minister for Care, perhaps she can clear that up for us. Perhaps the vote will help.

Does the shadow Minister agree that if we doubled the number of medical students, we would simply not be able to accommodate those people as young doctors unless we also doubled the number of training places? After five or six years, those medical students become young doctors. If we are to correct any problem with the medical workforce, it is insufficient to simply state that we will double the number of medical students.

The hon. Gentleman is right. When all the new doctors that the Government have promised have been trained, they will need jobs and postgraduate medical training, and there are issues with that. Nevertheless, the Government asked the public to vote for them on the basis that they would double the number of medical school places. Many of the hon. Gentleman’s colleagues produced little videos to that effect, which can be viewed on Twitter. They toured the newsrooms saying, “Please vote for us, we’re going to double the number of medical school places.” They suggested that there would be a revolution in Government to make sure that there were enough doctors. This is important—more doctors would help.

All new clause 44 does is ask the Government to commit to doing what they have said that they will do—or to say that they will not. Either way, we have had the Secretary of State saying one thing and a Minister saying the opposite and then correcting it, so we need clarity. The public deserve that. The Minister herself said that they would double the number of medical school places so that we have the doctors that our NHS needs. If they do not double the number of medical school places, it follows that they will not have the number of doctors that the NHS needs. Presumably that is in their workforce plan, but it needs to be cleared up.

Amendment 50 would put a duty on the Secretary of State to publish independently audited forecasts of the NHS workforce every five years. The logic is straightforward: if the Government believe that their plans are sufficient, they can be compared to an impartial assessment of the workforce. The previous Government published a workforce plan in 2023, setting out how to tackle existing and future workforce challenges over several years. That included doubling the number of medical school places. Yet three years later, this Government are on course for a new plan that is reportedly far less ambitious—we will find out in a minute.

The workforce affects whether patients can be seen on time, maternity wards are safely staffed and elderly patients get the dignity they deserve. It is the difference between the NHS meeting the challenge of an ageing population or slipping into decline. If Labour Members are confident that the Minister’s workforce planning is robust, I expect that they will support my amendment, which requires an independently audited forecast. If they are not willing to support it, that suggests that they know this Government cannot be trusted to deliver the workforce that patients need.

Amendment 54 and new clause 45 were also tabled in my name. Amendment 54 would require the Secretary of State to look at the amount of clinical work that NHS managers undertake. As a clinician, I have increasingly noticed that highly qualified clinical practitioners come in, become the person on the ward who can be relied on, and then go off because they get promoted to a nine to five job that is easier and pays more, but does not deliver clinical care.

The chief medical officer, for example, still delivers clinical care, and the amendment probes the Government to consider how many nurses and clinicians in hospitals are delivering clinical care. I asked that in written questions, and the Government did not know the answer. It is materially important information, particularly when looking at the Dash report, which talks about an explosion in the number of people who are clinically trained but not providing clinical work—instead, they are creating guidelines and monitoring whether other clinicians are doing the work. If more of those people were engaged in clinical activity, that might improve the quality of both the guidelines and care, because more junior staff would have senior staff around to help them.

I strongly support the argument that clinical staff, even if they progress into a senior role, should carry out some sort of clinical practice. Does the hon. Lady agree that that is what went wrong over the past few years, especially when NHS England was created? Many senior clinicians who were moved into management posts had no contact with clinical areas. That is what this Government are trying to fix by abolishing NHS England.

I am talking predominantly about clinicians working in trusts who are trained and very experienced, but then move to work in the same trust but in a more managerial role that does not involve clinical care. I am not saying that every single person needs to be delivering clinical care—there may be exceptions, of course; people do have career changes—but I encourage the Government to reflect on the number of posts being created that take people away from the clinical arena, and on the effect that that has. When the Minister is presented with the number of nursing or midwifery qualified staff working in a particular department, that may not reflect the number who are delivering clinical care and, by their own admission, the Government do not know which is which.

Amendment 33 would place a duty on the Secretary of State to ensure that the workforce is trained on the wider determinants of health, such as housing standards, air pollution and the use of harmful substances. In my many years as a paediatrician, I have yet to meet a nurse, doctor, surgeon, porter or care co ordinator who does not know that damp and mould are bad for people’s health, and I have yet to meet a fellow employee who does not know that air pollution causes asthma, or that tobacco use increases the risk of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, cancer and a whole host of other ailments.

Considering the many pressures on NHS workers, I do not believe that mandating a new programme on health determinants is a good use of time. I fear that it is rooted in the agenda of creating more and more mandatory training, and I would actually encourage the Minister to look at rationalising mandatory training to that which is absolutely necessary. Control of the curriculum for such staff is dealt with separately, so I object to amendment 33.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. Clause 7 says—I abbreviate: “The Secretary of State must exercise functions…with a view to ensuring that…there are sufficient people with appropriate education and training to meet the workforce needs of the health service, and…there is an effective system in place for the planning and delivery of education and training of people to meet those needs.”

That is all very nice—who couldn’t agree with that?—but amendment 50, tabled by the shadow Minister, would add a means by which the public, in the interests of transparency, could make an assessment of that by requiring the Secretary of State to publish independently audited forecasts of the NHS’s workforce needs every five years. That seems entirely sensible, it is something that I am sure any Government would want to do anyway, and it would add meaning, assessment and transparency to what is already in the Bill.

New clauses 44 and 45 would do something similar in relation to the number of medical school places. As the shadow Minister said in response to an intervention, new clause 44 seeks to do only what the Government have already said they want to do. Hopefully, the Minister can give us some clarity on whether that is still the Government’s intention and, if it is, what aversion she has to including it in the Bill.

Separately, new clause 45 seeks to establish a benchmark of data collection. Of course, duties and requirements placed on a Secretary of State, such as those in clause 7, can be delivered only if we start with the proper collection of data and, in the interests of transparency, publish it. For that reason, I also support new clause 45.

I thank hon. Members for bringing this discussion before the Committee. The Government are committed to ensuring that the NHS has the right people in the right place and with the right skills to care for patients when they need it. We will be publishing our 10-year workforce plan imminently. I cannot give the shadow Minister any more details on that at the moment, but it will set out the action to create a workforce that is ready to deliver the transformed service set out in the 10-year health plan. High quality education and training for the NHS workforce will be fundamental to that, and clause 7 is in keeping with that commitment.

Before turning to the clause, I will address some of the issues raised during the debate and in the amendments. I understand the intention behind amendment 50, but I cannot accept it. The 10-year workforce plan will set out the staffing needs of the NHS for the next 10 years. That goes further than the amendment calls for and will be updated every two years in line with our manifesto commitment to publish regular, independent workforce planning. It is only because the Government have set such a clear direction for the service through the 10-year health plan that we can credibly set out a sustainable approach to staffing the NHS over the long term.

As hon. Members will understand, workforce planning is a complex topic. It is closely related to the wider service planning, which is why we have engaged so widely with independent experts to develop our forthcoming workforce plan. To divorce the process of workforce planning from service planning in the way that is suggested by amendment 50 would not produce a more reliable or useful set of forecasts. However, it would reduce the potential for innovation and reform of the kind that is needed and which the Government have set out so clearly in the 10-year plan for the NHS. I can only conclude from listening to Opposition Members that they really did learn absolutely nothing from their time in office or, indeed, from the problems with their workforce plan, which focused on headcount but notably did not reform care, did not look at new patterns of care, did not look at retention or training, and created some of the bottlenecks and problems that we have had to deal with.

Our commitment will be guided by the workforce plan, which is why we cannot accept new clause 44. Decisions on training numbers must be guided by workforce need, and that will have to be considered as part of the forthcoming plan. Adding to the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket, whatever the Government’s position on the number of medical school places that will be required in the future, fixing a number in primary legislation would be unhelpful as it would limit our ability to adjust target training numbers subsequently to reflect any changes in workforce need.

I was asked about correcting the record. The last Government did double places in their 2024 workforce plan, and I commend the movement of medical schools across the country. If the former Secretary of State is reported in Hansard as having said something contrary to the correction of the record by my hon. Friend the Minister for Care, we will of course pick that up.

Amendment 54 and new clause 45 look to reduce flexibility and increase bureaucracy for a workforce that is simply trying to deliver what is best for patients. On amendment 54, I think we can all agree that we need strong leadership and management to deliver national priorities, including the 10-year plan’s three shifts. Having a clinical voice in management positions is vital and many of our board level and senior leaders are also clinicians. While some choose to carry on with clinical practice, others might prioritise their managerial role, and it is right that they should have that flexibility. Prescribing that all NHS managers with clinical experience must also undertake clinical care risks reducing board capacity and expertise, including clinical leadership, and disincentivising opportunities for management experience at a time when the NHS has seen a reduction in the number of managers per NHS staff from 2010 to 2025. We do not think that simply prescribing that requirement would benefit clinicians, managers or, crucially, the wider health service, so we oppose the amendment.

New clause 45 would require the collection of further data on the proportion of time spent on clinical care. Detailed statistics on the number of staff working for NHS provider trusts broken down by profession and pay band are already published by NHS England on a monthly basis. Adding requirements to that is not simple. There is not a centrally held collection of data about NHS staff time, and setting one up would have costs both centrally and for NHS trusts to collect specific data. It is also not easy to separate out clinical care meaningfully. Clinicians spend time in supervision, education, safeguarding, quality improvement and clinical leadership, and the amount of time they spend on different activities can vary from month to month. The new clause risks putting more burdens on NHS staff if they are being asked to record what they are spending time on beyond existing procedures. We therefore cannot accept it.

I turn to amendment 33, which was moved by my hon. Friend the Member for Bury St Edmunds and Stowmarket, on workforce training. It would require the Secretary of State to intervene in the content and design of healthcare programmes. Standards of proficiency, conduct and performance of registered professionals are the statutory responsibility of independent healthcare regulators, although universities and practice partners develop the specific content and design of programmes to meet those standards. It is vital that the independence of regulators and universities is maintained to respect their expertise in designing standards and curricula that ensure public safety.

We have published our 10-year health plan setting out major NHS reforms, including moving from sickness to prevention. Supporting healthcare workers to address the wider determinants of health will be essential to delivering that shift. That is why we are providing the “All Our Health” e learning on critical public healthcare topics for people working in the health and care sector, and revitalising the “making every contact count” approach to ensure that every contact that a person has with the healthcare system supports a shift to prevention.

I assure colleagues that our upcoming 10-year workforce plan will set out plans for ensuring that we train the staff we need so that we have the brightest people and the right skills to support patients. For those reasons, I ask my hon. Friend to withdraw the amendment.

Finally, I turn to clause 7. The Secretary of State already has an overarching duty in relation to the education and training of the NHS workforce. Currently, that duty is partially delegated to NHS England. NHS England also has a duty to ensure that there are sufficient numbers of appropriately trained healthcare workers across England. Clause 7 will simply merge those existing duties into a single, robust education and training duty on the Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State will be entirely responsible and accountable for exercising relevant functions with a view to ensuring that there is an effective system for the planning and delivery of healthcare education and training, and that we have enough healthcare workers with the right training to meet England’s health service needs. Bringing those duties directly under the responsibility of the Secretary of State will reduce bureaucracy, streamline oversight and enable the Government to provide national strategic leadership across the NHS workforce.

I reassure colleagues that accountability will not be diluted. Bringing these responsibilities into the Department will create clearer, stronger lines of accountability with the education and training of the NHS workforce. Ultimately, the Secretary of State will continue to be accountable to Parliament for the health service in England, including for the planning of education and training and ensuring sufficient numbers of trained healthcare workers. I commend the clause to the Committee.

I am happy with those assurances, so I beg to ask leave to withdraw amendment 33.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Amendment proposed: 50, in clause 7, page 4, line 32, at end insert— “(4) After subsection (2) insert— ‘(2A) The Secretary of State must publish independently audited forecasts of the NHS’s workforce needs every five years.’”—(Dr Caroline Johnson.) This amendment would require the Secretary of State to publish independently audited forecasts of the NHS’s staffing needs every five years. Question put, That the amendment be made.

3|0|4|11|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Clause 7 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8

Directions to exercise Secretary of State’s functions

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 8 will give the Secretary of State the power to direct integrated care boards to exercise his or her functions. This power, similar to that currently employed by NHS England, will promote subsidiarity by enabling such functions to be delivered at the lowest appropriate level. The clause builds on the existing section 7B of the National Health Service Act 2006, which allows the Secretary of State to direct ICBs but only in respect of public health functions.

With our plans to abolish NHS England, the Secretary of State will again have broad powers and responsibility relating to the health service, and so this power encompasses a wider range of functions. Unlike the delegated frameworks set out under sections 65Z5 and 75 of the 2006 Act, which are entered into voluntarily, any integrated care board directed under this power would be obliged to carry out the stated functions.

I reassure the Committee that, while the ICB will be legally responsible for how it discharges a function, overall accountability will remain with the Secretary of State. Furthermore, the Secretary of State might also use directions to place restrictions on the onward delegation of any functions, preventing delegation where it may be inappropriate. Finally, any directions must be published, ensuring transparency and allowing proper accountability.

This measure will empower the Secretary of State to assign functions to ICBs where most appropriate. It aligns with and facilitates our broader direction of travel towards flexibly planned and delivered local services. I therefore commend the clause to the Committee.

Clause 8 is essentially about the control that the Secretary of State has over ICBs. When we discussed the clause abolishing NHS England, we talked a lot about the balance between democratic accountability on the one hand and independence from political interference on the other.

The Government suggest that the Bill is a decentralising Bill. What this clause does is essentially to recentralise by default. As the Minister has just said, the Secretary of State can change what the ICB is doing if they think that it is inappropriate. What does “inappropriate” mean exactly, and how will that power be used? It may be used very infrequently—perhaps the current and previous Secretaries of State think that the power would be used infrequently—but equally it could be used in response to considerable pressure from MPs, lobbyists and campaign groups. Instead of issuing directions sparingly, we may end up in a position where the Secretary of State is issuing day to day instructions.

The Government want ICBs to take greater responsibility for commissioning decisions, but then they want to be able to undermine them by direction from the Health Secretary. The Health Secretary will never have as good a grasp of the situation in the local geographic area as local leaders, but he has the power to tell them what to do and issue blanket instructions with different characteristics. That will be inherently inefficient. ICB leaders will be under pressure, knowing that if they make a particular decision they can be removed or be told to do something different. They have the job and they have the power, but they haven’t really—all at the same time.

There is also the plan, as the Minister outlined, to make directions something that the Government publish. The clause says that directions must be published by the Secretary of State, but only “as soon as reasonably practicable”.

The intention behind requiring the prompt publication of directions is to reduce the surface area for back room pressures, but the lack of a clear timeframe makes it rather a weak measure.

We currently have a Government who seem open to greater use of the private sector, whether in financing projects or in delivering out patient care. Well, our Prime Minister resigned yesterday, and there is no guarantee that the Government of the right hon. Member for Makerfield (Andy Burnham) will take the same approach. Will the Minister confirm whether the powers in clause 8 could be used by a Health Secretary to instruct ICBs to stop using a specific type of provider?

I would not dispute the idea that the Secretary of State needs to be able to exercise some control over the health service now that NHS England is being abolished, but the clause seems contrary to the Government’s stated vision for health management. I am not sure whether it is in the best interests of patients.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir Roger. I agree heartily with the shadow Minister, and a couple of other things concern me about clause 8.

On the one hand, the clause appears to bring more centralisation, but on the other hand it pushes things down to an ICB level at the same time. I am worried that if we have individualisation of ICBs, we will only exacerbate the disparity of services across regions. I would be interested to understand from the Minister how the Secretary of State’s functions will allow the independence of ICBs and, where an ICB understands its local population well, ensure that patients do not end up in a postcode lottery based on which ICB area they happen to live in.

The danger here is that if the Bill does not deal with those problems and close regional gaps, it is not immediately clear from the clause how the Secretary of State could intervene to ensure that ICBs have the autonomy to make decisions based on their local populations and ensure at the same time that patients do not receive a worse service just because they happen to live in one ICB area rather than another.

I recognise that this is a subject of some debate; we may discuss it further when we come to the part of the Bill on ICBs. The abolition of NHS England and transferring all its functions to one body has a consequence, which is that the Secretary of State retains that accountability and power. We are keen to have that power clear but flexible in order to empower local systems. That remains the intent.

The power is necessary for the Secretary of State to update national commissioning standards, for example. The ICBs will have wider roles as strategic commissioners. We expect them to take on formal responsibility for a number of services delegated by NHS England. That allows us to issue a common set of commissioning standards, on the point made by the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon about variability in different places. There need to be common standards across the piece: eligibility criteria, the treatments the provider should use, and national reporting requirements. ICBs having those standards means that there will be a reduction in unwarranted variation in some of these events.

The shadow Minister raised the timetable. The Opposition will recognise that there needs to be flexibility for the Secretary of State and Ministers to respond to unforeseen or changing events. That is why it is purposely broad, because the range of events that can impact the NHS is clearly very broad. We cannot predict the future.

The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said that the Bill needs to deal with all these problems. The Bill needs to give enough flexibility to the system and devolve as much power to the system. The Bill needs to make sure that the powers are in the right place, but it is for the local systems to respond to their local needs within that framework. They will be held accountable, for example through the NHS oversight framework and through ICBs’ normal accountability frameworks.

The Minister is talking about flexibility. I understand that if a Minister is responding to an unforeseen circumstance, he or she may be very busy, but where a direction has been made, it should not take very long for a member of staff to publish it, because it will already have been written and sent. I understand that a Minister might take a day or so to sign it off because they are so busy, but it should not take months. The addition of a deadline is therefore not an unreasonable request.

With due respect to the hon. Lady, it is not a matter of the Minister being busy, whether that is me or anybody else. It is about the operational running of a £200 billion organisation with 1.5 million staff treating millions of people every day. I am sure we all remember from our own experience incidents and unforeseen events that have happened in the local system, and sometimes very tragic events that have required the Secretary of State to take action. We are trying not to increase the number of reports and documentation and to rid the system of bureaucracy by putting something out in that timeline.

Will the Minister give way on that point?

No, I have finished.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 8 accordingly ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 9 Secretary of State’s power to provide assistance Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Clause 9, which will insert new section 12DA into the National Health Service Act 2006, will give the Secretary of State a clear statutory duty to provide financial, staffing or other practical assistance in connection with the health service. The power may be used to support persons providing, or proposing to provide, services as part of the health service or which are beneficial to the interests of the health service. It may also be used to support public authorities where the assistance relates to education or training for people employed, or considering becoming employed, in activities connected with the provision of health services. The assistance may include financial assistance, the services of civil servants or other resources of the Secretary of State, and it may be provided on agreed terms, including terms about payments by or to the Secretary of State.

The clause will support the wider purpose of the Bill by enabling a small centre to act in a supportive and enabling way towards the wider system. Where appropriate, the Secretary of State will be able to provide assistance directly to those delivering or supporting health service activity. The clause is needed because the existing statutory framework does not include a clear power that enables the Secretary of State to provide practical support across the full range of health service activity. Relevant support may be financial, practical, staffing related or connected with education and training.

Without this clear power, there is a genuine risk of confusion about the basis on which such support may be offered, particularly where the Secretary of State is acting to facilitate the delivery of services by others. The power is permissive and facilitative: it does not require the Secretary of State to provide assistance, and it does not require any person or body to accept it. The power is also limited by its connection to the health service and matters relevant to education, training or activities considered beneficial to the health service. Its exercise remains subject to ordinary public law principles and public financial controls. For those reasons, I commend the clause to the Committee.

In a system as large as the NHS, covering an area as diverse as England, it is necessary that the Government be able to deal with unexpected situations. The pandemic may be half a decade behind us already, but the Committee will remember that the previous Government had to act quickly and part with a lot of money in a short time. In such instances, it is essential that Ministers have the power to provide financial assistance. It is not only about crises, however; ordinarily, there are occasions when a Government will want to roll out a new prevention programme or address deficiencies in care in particular areas. I know that health policy is always evolving, and the case for flexibility is clear. The Health Secretary may need to be able to provide financial assistance in pursuit of supporting the health service.

I am sure that hon. Members are familiar with the existing legislation. Section 12D of the National Health Service Act 2006 gives the Secretary of State, NHS England, an ICB or the local authority the ability to make direct financial payments as an assistance to persons or bodies. Clause 9 would new section 12DA of the Act, under which the Secretary of State would be empowered to provide assistance to any person or body carrying out, or proposing to carry out, activities that they deem beneficial to the service.

This is where semantics are important. The existing legislation allows the Secretary of State to make payments, but clause 9 is different: it would allow the Secretary of State to provide financial assistance and to make available persons employed by the civil service or any other resources that the Secretary of State has. This is a remarkably open ended power that would allow the Secretary of State to spend taxpayers’ money while bypassing standard scrutiny. When NHS England spends money, there is transparency: the public can see how much has been spent on different types of care, ranging from hospitals to public health programmes. The public can see how much money has gone into trusts, into the independent sector and into procurement.

Transparency builds trust in the system and disincentivises wasteful spending. Where will parliamentarians or the public be able to see the financial expense of civil servants, or literally any other resource that the Secretary of State may offer in support? For the first time, the Health Secretary will have the power to insert politically directed civil servants into elements of the health service that are not under public ownership.

As clause 9 is drafted, the Secretary of State could provide civil service labour to private or mutual health providers that work within the NHS. Will the Minister elaborate on how that would be used, and how it would be beneficial to the taxpayer and the health service? The number of civil servants taking home more than six figures has increased under this Government. Their time should be focused on delivering public services, not propping up providers, especially ones that are private businesses.

It is also unclear where the legal liability lies under such arrangements. If something goes wrong and the human resources provided by the Secretary of State are responsible, is the Secretary of State responsible or the entity into which those staff have been inserted? Can the Minister clarify that?

It may be politically beneficial in the short term to provide state support, but it can be costly to the public purse and damaging to markets in the long term. By allowing the Health Secretary to issue assistance in the form of free civil servant labour, clause 9 effectively creates a new type of off the books subsidy. How can Members of the House or NHS providers tell whether assistance is operational support or a de facto subsidy? It could undermine the idea of a level playing field for firms contracted to deliver NHS services.

There is also the question of when assistance crosses from operational support into running a provider or firm. We do not necessarily want to be in a position where the Bill is used to bail out failing private firms with NHS contracts. I return to the phrase “any other resources of the Secretary of State”.

It is difficult to understand why the legislation was written in this way, allowing financial assistance, the provision of labour, and then the use of absolutely any other resource at the Health Secretary’s disposal. As with several other provisions in the Bill, it seems another sign that the legislation was rushed. Instead of circumscribing power tightly where it is needed, the Bill gives huge sweeping powers while claiming that it decentralises.

The Minister has described clause 9 as a discretionary power intended to support the effective functioning of the health service and its workforce. Although that may be what she sought to achieve, that is not the reality. The clause paves the way for arbitrary and unaccountable deployments of state resources, and that should concern all hon. Members.

I endorse the comments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham.

I am particularly concerned about subsection (2)(a) of proposed new section 12DA. On examination, this provision raises significant concerns about the control of public expenditure and the efficient use of resources within the health service, and I find it rather vague. There is no definition of the terms used, no indication of scope and no express limitation on how the power is to be exercised.

When read together with subsection (1) of proposed new section 12DA, the effect, as I read it, is to allow the Secretary of State to provide funding to an extremely wide category of recipients. That includes not only public bodies and established NHS providers but, as my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham has said, private entities, charities, individuals and any person engaged in activities that the Secretary of State considers to be beneficial to the health service.

That breadth is not accompanied by a corresponding statutory safeguard. The clause does not set out criteria for eligibility, priorities for funding or principles to guide decision making. It does not impose limits on the sums that may be disbursed, nor does it require any structured process for allocating funds. There is no express provision for transparency, such as publication of decisions or reporting obligations to another body such as Parliament. That absence is significant.

Control over public expenditure ultimately lies with Parliament, yet the clause delegates a wide and flexible spending power to the Executive with little direction as to how that power is to be exercised. While it may be said that Treasury rules, audit requirements and general public law principles continue to apply, those are external controls and they do not substitute for clear statutory discipline within the provision itself.

The practical consequences of such a broad power need to be considered. The NHS is already under considerable financial strain; as we all know, demand is rising and resources are constrained, and there is a continuing need to ensure that funding is allocated in a way that delivers measurable improvements in outcomes. In that context, certainty, prioritisation and efficiency are essential. By framing this power in such open terms, the clause risks undermining those objectives. It will create the possibility of fragmented funding decisions, with resources distributed across a wide range of initiatives without clear and consistent frameworks, and it may lead to duplication of effort or to supporting projects with benefits that are uncertain or difficult to evaluate. Without clear criteria or structured oversight, it will become more difficult to ensure that funding is directed to the areas of greatest need.

There is also a risk that such a provision will contribute to systemic pressures. The health service already absorbs a substantial proportion of public spending, and there are long standing concerns about whether additional funding consistently produces the corresponding gains in efficiency or performance. A broadly defined power to provide financial assistance, unconstrained by detailed statutory controls, will reinforce that pattern, and may enable the continued allocation of funds without sufficient assurance that those funds are used in a disciplined and effective manner.

The clause’s reliance on what the Secretary of State, and I quote, “considers to be beneficial” further amplifies my concern, because that is an inherently subjective test. Without defined criteria, decisions may lack consistency and be even more difficult to scrutinise. Even where decisions are taken conscientiously—I would never suggest that the current Minister would do anything otherwise—the absence of clear standards will increase the risk of perceived unfairness or imbalance in the allocation of public resources.

There are also implications for existing funding and procurement frameworks. The health service operates through established mechanisms designed to promote fairness, competition and value for money. The broad power in this clause to provide direct financial assistance could cut across those arrangements by enabling selective support outside those structures. That may create inconsistencies between providers and reduce confidence in the integrity of any allocation process.

In concluding the debate on this part of the Bill, the Opposition have helpfully made most of my arguments for me. The hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham opened with reference to the pandemic and the unusual circumstances in which we have found ourselves. It is obviously important that this Government learn the lessons from that pandemic in the round, that we are prepared and that, as NHS England is abolished, those powers come back to the Secretary of State so that we can respond to any eventuality that comes before us.

As the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said, there are existing standards and rules of procurement. Any spending that happens through the Department and the NHS will be publicly recorded and published in the Department of Health’s consolidated accounts. Those come before Parliament, so there is direct transparency through the parliamentary process in the usual way and, as we all know and as the hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon said, Treasury rules apply.

The point about the use of civil servants has been made. Again, it is really important that we recognise that we are bringing together NHS England, NHS staff and civil servants in the Department. It is right that the Secretary of State, in whatever eventuality comes before him or her, is able to deploy the right person for the right job, be they a civil servant or someone currently under NHS staff terms and conditions, to support that work going forward. The clause is necessarily flexible and broad to provide for those eventualities, and to enable the necessary assistance to be deployed. I commend clause 9 to the Committee.

Question put and agreed to. Clause 9 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 10 Secretary of State’s duty as respects variation in provision of health services

I beg to move amendment 53, in clause 10, page 6, line 21, leave out from “interests” to end of line and insert “of patients”.

This amendment would only allow the Secretary of State to vary the balance between the public and private sectors in the NHS where it is in the interests of patients to do so.

With this it will be convenient to consider clause stand part.

This is perhaps the oddest provision in the Bill. Since time immemorial, the Labour party has accused its political rivals of wanting to privatise the health service. In the early 2010s, the then shadow Ministers indulged the idea that the Health and Social Care Act 2012 was a Trojan horse for privatisation. Several years later, after the Minister had herself joined the House, claims continued. The then leader of the Labour party urged the previous Government to “undo the very damaging privatisation of so much of our NHS”. —[Official Report, 23 October 2019; Vol. 666, c. 960.] In the 2019 election, the public were even presented with a dodgy dossier—not Labour’s first—that purported to show that the NHS was on the table in negotiations for a trade deal. We now have a trade deal and the NHS is still intact.

Even though Members know full well that no sensible opposition party is advocating for abandoning our NHS system, they keep saying that Governments have been selling off the health service through the back door. Today, private providers deliver only about 10% of NHS care and the system continues to be free at the point of use.

That brings us to the deep irony of today’s debate. After years of peddling the NHS privatisation myth, the Labour party has introduced legislation to make privatisation possible. The Health and Social Care Act 2012 inserted a safeguard against privatisation, section 12E, into the NHS Act 2006. That section prohibits the Secretary of State from exercising his functions for the purpose of “causing a variation” in the proportion of services provided by the public or the private sector.

Clause 10 substitutes the text in that section and makes two small but significant changes. The first change is to expand the type of providers beyond public and private to “different kinds of legal entity”.

That is probably a good change, because it encompasses the mutual and voluntary sectors, which do have an important role to play in health provision going forward.

The second change is what has caused alarm. The Secretary of State cannot alter the provider mix unless they deem it to be “in the interests of the health service.”

Could the Minister set out some scenarios when it would be deliberately beneficial to privatise provision or, indeed, when it would be beneficial to deliberately nationalise provision? I cannot recall an instance where Ministers needed to privatise an entire service to ensure patients did not lose access to care.

In February, the Minister of State for Secondary Care told the House that lessons had been learned from private finance initiatives. Yet the Government announced that 80% of neighbourhood health centres will be privatised through public private partnerships. The Government are able to use these partnerships to loan money outside their limits, but it tends to be more costly than public sector borrowing. Essentially, it is borrowing, but not borrowing on the balance sheet.

What is the effect of these private initiatives? I remember receiving my own office on being promoted as a doctor to consultant. It is quite an exciting moment; before that, resident doctors share an office. I had my own space, my own desk, my own computer and a big whiteboard for notes. When I asked whether I could place the whiteboard on the wall, I was told I could not—it was £800 to stick it on the wall under the private finance initiative contract.

So my great big whiteboard sat there, propped against the wall. Periodically, I would move a piece of paper, knock the bottom of the whiteboard and it would tip and fall on me when I was sat at my desk. I did suggest putting it up myself, but that would also incur a charge through the PFI contract—for modifying things without getting them to do the modifications—so I just had to sit there with it propped up against the wall, ad infinitum.

The Government are on the hook for more than £100 billion of payouts, simply for the use and maintenance of PFI facilities. The Labour scheme was a shambolic waste of taxpayers’ money that could have been spent on improving care. When my hon. Friend the Member for Hinckley and Bosworth (Dr Evans) asked the Minister about public private partnerships, she told him she was “very proud of the capital investment under the last Labour Government”.—[Official Report, 4 March 2026; Vol. 781, c. 386WH.] But is clause 10 simply a mechanism for Ministers to develop further private finance initiatives? If Government spending is under pressure, may Ministers seek to shift provision even if it proves more costly in the long run?

There is another side to the conundrum of clause 10. Instead of a Health Secretary intent on privatisation, what if we get one intent on squeezing out private sector provision? Who our new Prime Minister will be, we do not know, but one of the candidates has called for the country to abandon 40 years of neoliberalism. Perhaps the Minister could elaborate on what that means, since the tax take as a percentage of GDP is the highest it has been in 40 years. To me, it signals a potential hostility towards choice and competition. We do not want to be in a situation in which the decision is made to alter the provider mix in service of ideology, rather than in the best interests of patients.

I am aware of several private firms that provide services to the NHS and are concerned that clause 10 could be wielded against them. If a future Health Secretary decided to reduce private provision on the basis of ideology, what would happen to the 10% of planned activity that is currently delivered by for profit entities? NHS providers could not feasibly handle such a surge in demand, waiting lists would increase further, and patient choice would suffer. It would also be expensive. If private providers fear that the NHS is no longer a reliable customer, and that they may suddenly lose their contract if this clause is invoked, they will charge a risk premium on their services—that is what firms do when they face shifting regulatory goalposts. That would only damage the public purse.

Under clause 10, it would be legally possible for the Health Secretary to alter the provider mix. As a result, it would be worth it for several types of providers and ideologically motivated groups to spend vast sums of money hiring lobbyists to convince Ministers that their sector deserves favourable treatment and that they serve the interests of the NHS. Organisations would invest less in resources and more in influencing the rules, which is not a good outcome either.

All those issues are compounded by the fact that clause 10 is imprecise. What does the Minister define as “the interests of the health service”?

I am not trying to catch the Minister out; I just want to illustrate the problem with legislation drafted in such terms. It is difficult to prove that the Health Secretary has not acted in what they thought were the best interests of the health service. What could that refer to? It could refer to the interests of patients, to the interests of NHS staff or to the financial stability of the health service—it is entirely subjective. What is the health service there for? It is there for patients, which is why I tabled amendment 53.

Amendment 53 would revise clause 10 to specify that the Secretary of State must not alter the provider mix unless doing so is in the interests of patients. I would like to place patients at the centre of the Bill’s changes, in recognition that we do not have the numbers on the Committee to change the clause altogether. My revision would make it harder for the Health Secretary to justify altering the provider mix if it harms patient access or reduces their choice. It would make NHS providers less fearful to know that the Health Secretary would be subjected to a better defined legal threshold.

The shadow Minister has outlined a couple of hypotheticals for the future, when we have a different Prime Minister and a different Secretary of State. One might go down a route of more privatisation, another down a route of removing the private sector from health service provision. My concern is more practical and for the here and now: if the clause stands part of the Bill, it must be because the Government have some desire to do one of those two things now. Would it not be a good idea to hear from the Minister which of those two options it is?

It does raise questions about the point of new section 12E. That provision was not there before; there must be a reason for adding it. Either the Government want ideologically to reduce the amount of private provision in the NHS, or they want to increase it. The clause gives them the power to do both.

Labour politicians very often tell the public that the NHS is being privatised. Data has shown that that is not happening, but that did not matter; they found the myth politically advantageous and repeated it ad nauseam. Now, the Minister and her colleagues are in office—they have the levers of power—and are proposing to change the law to make it easier to change the provider mix. That is not only ironic but deeply misguided.

I tabled amendment 53 to require any changes to the provider mix to be in the interests of patients. If the Minister is unwilling to support that, will she offer a compelling explanation why? Clause 10 has alarmed stakeholders across the health sector and the political spectrum. That really ought to tell us something. I look forward to her response.

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Sir Roger. I have concerns similar to those of the shadow Minister about clause 10. Proposed new section 12E allows Ministers to vary the proportion of activity by provider, and I am interested in the rationale behind that. The powers to retain the provider mix were put in place because of concerns that the NHS would be privatised by the back door, so the requirement to maintain the mix is there for a reason.

As we heard earlier when discussing ophthalmology, there are risks to using private provision for certain NHS activities, as there can be unintended consequences—a bit like the deregulation of buses. In ophthalmology, private providers do thousands of cataract operations very efficiently, but the less exciting and more critical work of preventing people from going blind, which is done in NHS hospitals, is under threat because so many people want to work in easy and profitable areas. I am concerned that that will occur in more areas of the NHS if the Bill allows more privatisation. Although I do not have an ideological problem with the NHS contracting out to private providers—that has worked well to bring down elective waiting lists, for example—the provisions to protect the mix are important.

I am not sure that amendment 53 really moves us forward; it just requires the Secretary of State to consider who benefits from the change in mix.

It is true that the situation in ophthalmology is now quite serious, but is the hon. Lady aware of the problems in radiology and pathology? Some hospitals are unable to recruit histopathologists or significant numbers of radiologists, who provide key services, because the personnel necessary to run those services have been attracted into a private system, although they are contracted to the NHS. That jeopardises the ongoing services for urgent and emergency care.

The hon. Gentleman outlines an unintended consequence of the NHS contracting out to private providers. There are ways to get the pricing of those services right, but the clause could introduce that unintended consequence.

Why is this proposal included in the Bill, and what does the Minister see it being used for? Is there a risk that a future Government might use it to bring much more privatisation into the NHS? The general public consensus is that that would be a bad thing. What safeguards can she put in place to ensure that does not happen?

I will respond to that question before picking up the other comments. If I do not address all the Committee’s comments, I will come back to Members.

Everyone would expect this, but let me be clear: this Government are absolutely committed to a free at the point of use, taxpayer funded service. We also think that unless it is reformed and changed, it is an existential problem for the British public, who will not continue to support the service. As Members know, one Parliament can never bind another one, so I cannot predict what a future Government will do. There is talk from some of our Reform colleagues about an insurance based system. There are people who were in the Conservative party but have moved over who think that, so obviously I cannot—

Will the Minister give way on that point?

I will make some points, and then I will be happy take the hon. Lady’s intervention if I do not address what she was going to say.

The hon. Member for North Shropshire outlined some of the history. This clause seeks to strike a balance. The governing principle behind it is that the decisions of the Secretary of State must not vary the proportion of providers by the type of legal entity that they are. Decisions must be taken according to what serves the health service and the people who depend on it. The clause permits, by way of exception, the balance between sectors to be varied purposefully, but only where doing so would be in the interests of the health service. That would, for example, prevent the Secretary of State from deliberately choosing to grow the proportion of NHS services delivered by private providers for solely ideological reasons.

I understand the concern that drives the amendment. It is that the exception might be relied on to support the convenience of those already providing the service, without taking into account what is best for patients, as the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham said. That is not the Government’s position, and the clause does not lead to that outcome. The test that it creates is whether the interests of the health services are served.

As the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham also said, the definition of the health service—as defined under section 1 of the National Health Service Act 2006—is not separate from the people it exists to serve. It is defined as “a comprehensive health service” for “the people of England”, directed at improving their health and at the “prevention, diagnosis and treatment” of illness. A decision to rely on the exception must be justified by reference to that duty; one taken merely because it was easier or more convenient for existing providers or any other group, with no such justification, would be unlawful. The protection that she seeks is, in substance, already secured by the clause.

The amendment would also create another difficulty. Section 1 of the 2006 Act reaches the entire population and includes the prevention of illness before anyone becomes a patient at all. The “interests of patients” reaches only those already receiving care, which is a narrower test than I think the hon. Lady intended, and would allow a Secretary of State who was so minded to provide a landscape that ignores vital preventive health and wellbeing concerns. I hope that she will take from my remarks an assurance that the clause already meets her concerns.

The hon. Lady also highlighted the example of PFI—a subject of much discussion over many years—and of being unable to change her whiteboard. That is absolutely one of the lessons that needs to be learned from the way in which some past PFIs were procured and dealt with. For example, as a new Government, we outlined proposals for a new model of public private partnerships for neighbourhood health centres, among other things. The previous Government could also have learned the lessons and done something about that, but they chose instead to completely halt the building of any kind of facilities. That is one reason why we are in such a shocking state at the moment. The new proposal outlines, as I think the Opposition know, an 80:20 funding route, exactly to make the point about which is the most efficient way forward. That will absolutely drive measures for growth and create more jobs in the sector.

I want to take the Minister back to her rejection of the amendment of my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham on the basis that—I paraphrase—she felt the definition of “patients” was too limiting because it would not count people who had not entered the health system at that point. The clause itself, however, refers to the benefit for the health service. Is the Minister suggesting that the health service, as defined in the Bill, includes what happens before people enter what I would describe as the health service? Is it something before that point? She seems to be saying that our definition is too narrow, but her definition in the Bill must apply to those who have entered some kind of formal setting. Or is the health service wider than that?

I refer the hon. Gentleman back to my comments. The health service is defined under section 1 of the NHS Act 2006 as not being separate from the people it exists to serve. It is defined as “a comprehensive health service” for “the people of England”, directed at improving their health and at the “prevention, diagnosis and treatment” of illness—so, yes.

At this juncture, I will explain a number of other features of the clause. In particular, I draw the Committee’s attention to the fact that it builds on section 12E of the 2006 Act to cover the Secretary of State’s health functions, powers and duties. It recognises that, with the abolition of NHS England, the Secretary of State has a far more substantial role to play—as a commissioner of services, for example—than previously. I also put on the record that whenever the Secretary of State takes a decision in this space, the general NHS procurement requirements and other statutory duties will continue to apply.

Finally, the NHS relies on privately owned providers, as well as charities and community organisations, to provide a range of important NHS funded services across the country. As such, it is important to ensure that, where there is a mixed market provision between public and private for providers of a particular service, the Government’s powers are not used to distort the provision and potentially discourage important investment from outside the NHS. Conversely, they should not be used purposefully to favour independent providers over NHS providers for reasons unrelated to the quality or efficiency of NHS funded healthcare.

If I heard the Minister right, she said that the clause did not provide for changes on the basis of ideology. However, it says that changes are not to be made “unless the Secretary of State considers that to do so is in the interests of the health service.”

A Secretary of State whose ideology is that the private sector is bad, good or whatever else could well believe that it is in the interests of the health service to be private or not private. How does the clause prevent an ideologically driven Secretary of State from changing the health service on the basis simply of his ideology, rather than of patient or clinical need?

The hon. Lady tempts me to delve into the politics of future Secretaries of State. They will respond according to the manifesto on which they are elected by the British public. That is the point of a democratically accountable public service. I think that the clause strikes that balance, as I have said. For those reasons, I hope that the hon. Lady will withdraw her amendment. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

4|0|3|10|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Clause 10 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 11

General power to direct integrated care boards

I beg to move amendment 47, in clause 11, page 8, leave out lines 15 to 30.

This amendment prevents the Secretary of State from removing the Chief Executive of an integrated care board.

With this it will be convenient to discuss clause stand part.

Clause 11 is particularly interesting. In August 2025, Alan Milburn was asked about the abolition of NHS England on the Health Foundation podcast. He said that the Government wanted to see a model that was “more delegated…more devolved” and “more diverse”, which necessitated the centre being smaller. Considering that he is a former Labour Health Secretary and a non executive director at the Department of Health and Social Care, I do not doubt his understanding of what the Government wanted to achieve.

When the former Health Secretary, the right hon. Member for Ilford North (Wes Streeting), announced the 10-year plan to the House, he also talked about dissolving power. He spoke of a “brave new world of devolution of power, resources and control”.—[Official Report, 3 July 2025; Vol. 770, c. 469.] That was repeated in the Government publications that accompanied the Bill: “Empowering ICBs as strategic commissioners will support putting patients at the centre of care by devolving decisions to a local level where different services can better integrate… Reforms to the NHS FT model will give providers more flexibility to design and deliver healthcare around local needs.”

Between the announcement of the abolition of NHS England and the publication of the Bill, Ministers articulated a vision for a more decentralised system. There is expert consensus that decentralisation boosts performance, reduces health disparities and fosters innovation. After listening to remarks this morning, I have no doubt that Members are clued up on the importance of innovation to the health service, but a problem—a philosophical contradiction—at the heart of the Government’s reform programme and the Bill is that Ministers talk about decentralisation while these provisions constitute a recentralisation of power.

Currently, ICBs are accountable to NHS England. Under sections 14Z61 and 14Z62 of the National Health Service Act 2006, NHS England is able to direct an ICB when it has failed to carry out its functions, is failing, or is at risk of failure. If failure were to occur, NHS England can, among other things, direct another ICB to assume its functions. It can direct the ICB or its chief executive to carry out a function in a particular way or within a particular timeframe, or it can fire the ICB’s chief executive and direct the board on their replacement.

Clause 11 would replace those sections of the 2006 Act with new powers exclusively for the Secretary of State. It is important to note that those new powers are broader in scope. Not only does the Secretary of State gain the power to direct ICBs that are failing or at risk of failure, but, through a new general power, they will be able to direct ICBs to carry out their functions. The explanatory notes point to several benefits of that power. The Health Secretary will be able to exercise “oversight of ICBs” and could

“set standards that ICBs must meet when exercising their commissioning functions… Directions can capture a level of detail that could not be included in primary or secondary legislation”.

That is pertinent to clinical pathways for particular services. Directions could also reduce “unwarranted variation”, including by “ensuring nationally consistent standards”.

These changes could bring material benefits. If the Secretary of State—rather than an arm’s length body—has oversight, the Government could be more responsive to issues that emerge in the health system. The Department said in its memorandum to the Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee that the new general power for the Health Secretary to direct ICBs is “necessary to ensure” that they are carrying out their functions correctly.

As we heard in the evidence session, there is variation in the system that leaves some patients in an unenviable position. James Cooper from Together for Short Lives said that

“19% of ICBs currently commission end of life care for children at home 24/7, provided by nurses and specialist consultants.”

What about the other 81%? Mr Cooper also said that ICBs were

“not taking on their full functions and implementing national guidance”,––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 44, Q72.]

and he was clear that he wanted more. I am curious to know why NHS England has failed on that, given that it does have some powers over ICBs. Is the issue that NHS England has been asleep at the wheel, or that its powers are not strong enough? Will the Minister share her thoughts on that?

I return to the philosophical contradiction in the Bill. This reorganisation was meant to be about devolving power away from the centre, yet power at the centre—with the Secretary of State—is being strengthened, because ICBs, which are the devolved units in the system, are deemed to be underdelivering. From the Department’s perspective, is there such a thing as good and bad variation? It may be troubling to see that waiting times are better in some ICBs than in others, or that some ICBs commission around the clock end of life care for children when others do not, but is that not inevitable in a system in which commissioners are empowered to allocate resources based on an assessment of the needs of their own population? A decentralised system without variation surely cannot exist in the real world.

In their policy paper, “ICBs as strategic commissioners”, the Government are clear that they want to encourage ICBs to innovate and

“design new models of care”.

However, that will also create new variations across the health system. Those are not always bad, but I am not sure how the Government can achieve greater autonomy for ICBs, lower health inequalities and reduced variation across the system simultaneously, especially when the Secretary of State has strong powers to intervene. There is a lack of coherence, and at least one objective will surely have to give. There is a difference between taking back control and taking control of absolutely everything.

I recognise that there are safeguards in clause 11 against the Health Secretary making directions relating to the employment or treatment of a particular individual. Likewise, the Secretary of State will not be able to issue directions that contravene National Institute for Health and Care Excellence guidance. Those are sensible guardrails, but they do not go far enough.

Clause 11 gives the Secretary of State power to fire and hire ICB leaders as he sees fit. Should a political office holder be able to wield such power? NHS England was operationally independent, but the Secretary of State is not. This Government have shown themselves to be highly political on health, not least by not taking any reorganisation advice from Lord Darzi, but also on clinical matters such as puberty blocker trials and their shambolic handling and delaying of the RSV vaccinations. The Secretary of State must be able to act if an ICB is failing, but should the power to fire and hire healthcare leaders be in the hands of politicians?

I remind Members what Jon Restall of Managers in Partnership said in our evidence session. His verdict on the Bill was:

“On the whole, it is probably more of a centralising measure.” ––[Official Report, Health Public Bill Committee, 16 June 2026; c. 79, Q122.]

When we discussed clause 8, I highlighted the risk of a chilling effect. If ICBs are operating under the spectre of political intervention, they are less likely to engage in the innovation and risk taking that Ministers seem to want. If ICB leaders step out of line by doing something that the Government dislike, they do not just face interference or micromanagement; they are staring at a P45. We have sought to address that by tabling amendment 47, which would amend clause 11 so that the Secretary of State did not have the power to remove the chief executive of an ICB.

The former Health Secretary, my right hon. Friend the Member for Godalming and Ash (Sir Jeremy Hunt), said that the health system has too many targets. In our evidence session, he said that abolishing NHS England makes sense only if the intention is not to increase control and impose more targets. The centre is responsible for 18 monthly operational targets for hospitals and 44 quality and outcomes frameworks for GPs. My right hon. Friend wrote yesterday in a newspaper:

“Every new health secretary is told by No 10 to ‘grip’ the service. Every time, the response is a new target.

The result is learned helplessness… They are micro managed to deliver ‘improvement trajectories’, leaving them little time for the innovations that boost productivity.”

That is a sobering assessment. It is why Members should be concerned that clause 11 paves the way for more command and control issued from Whitehall.

Once organisations are judged by certain metrics, they, not the broader quality of service provided, become the primary objective. As is often said, when a measure becomes a target, it may cease to be a good measure. Could the Minister reassure Members that the Health Secretary’s new powers of direction will not be used to lay additional targets upon additional targets on providers?

The powers in the Bill for taking control of everything risk the creation of a politicised service in which those who shout the loudest get preferential treatment. Several groups have indicated their desire for the Secretary of State to issue directions to reduce variation in service, but what about those we have not heard from? We have debates in the House about screening for some conditions and treatment of others. What about all the conditions we do not hear about—the ones that do not have a celebrity campaign behind them?

How many Members on the Government Benches have heard of corticobasal degeneration, Wiskott Aldrich syndrome, Lafora body disease, Friedreich’s ataxia or maple syrup urine disease? Are ICBs failing to deliver appropriate care for people with those conditions? Who is publishing the data for us to know? How will we ensure that celebrity campaign groups to the Secretary of State do not distort the priorities of the health service, which should be clinical need, not the ability to pay or have a celebrity shout for you? If the Minister is not able to answer the question today, would she be willing to write to me on that matter?

The Government set about abolishing NHS England with a vision to devolve power away from the centre. It was a laudable vision that the Opposition were willing to row in behind, but the legislation before us is far from that vision. The Government are giving more responsibility to ICBs and expecting more from them, while at the same time giving the Health Secretary more powers to micromanage them, all while under immense pressure to cut their running costs by 50%.

In a report published on 1 May, the NHS Alliance said:

“Trust and ICB respondents indicated that we are likely to see an increase in services being reduced or closed this year. More than a third (35 per cent) stated that their organisation cut services in 2025/26, with 64 per cent saying they expect to do this in 2026/27.”

The Government are cooking up a disaster. More responsibilities, more micromanagement, less money and cuts to frontline services—that is not what the Government promised, nor the vision they described, but it appears to be what they have achieved.

I am sure this will elicit a smile from the Minister, but once again I remind her of past comments. During the passage of the Health and Social Care Act, she said:

“Politically we might disagree with the centralisation of the NHS and the diktat as opposed to the permissiveness. I am definitely on the more localised, permissive side.”—[Official Report, 14 September 2021; Vol. 700, c. 223.]

On another occasion, speaking again on the legislation, the Minister said:

“As I said in Committee, this is fundamentally another NHS reorganisation Bill. It is a restructuring of the NHS and a centralisation of power within the NHS. It does not nothing to achieve integration and nothing to improve accountability to the public, to patients and to communities… It is clear that centralising control in the NHS is very much the wrong approach. Local representatives need much more power over local services, and accountability needs to be much better at a local level.”—[Official Report, 30 March 2022; Vol. 711, c. 941.]

I appreciate that Ministers may be frustrated after the election, pulling levers only to find that they are not attached where they thought they were, or even to anything at all, but I find it hard to reconcile what Ministers previously said, given the strength and universality of those comments, with what they have sought to do in this Bill.

I understand the Government’s intention in clause 11, but it is unnecessarily sweeping. Ministers promised to let go of the steering wheel, but in practice they have installed a larger one. The hon. Member for North Shropshire hit the nail on the head when speaking during the Bill’s Second Reading:

“This Bill focuses on shuffling responsibility around Whitehall and gives the Secretary of State the role of chief micromanager.” —[Official Report, 1 June 2026; Vol. 786, c. 909.]

The gap between what was promised and what is being offered has left the British public wondering: did the Labour Government really believe that power was too concentrated, or that power was concentrated in the wrong hands? I hope the Minister will enlighten us.

I mentioned in Committee last Thursday that the Liberal Democrats are worried about the risk in the Bill of political capture and the Secretary of State’s ability to meddle in day to day operations. As I am sure the Minister is aware, speaking at the NHS ConfedExpo this month, Sir Jim Mackey, the chief executive officer of NHS England, warned that the Bill may give Ministers too much control and that there has to be operational freedom; otherwise we will grind to a halt.

I want to probe the process by which we got to this point. Originally, there was discussion about whether the seven NHS regional teams should become independent arm’s length bodies to mitigate such a risk. NHS leaders argued that this would mitigate the risk of direct political control of the service and pointed out that the 10 regional strategic health authorities had played a useful role in running the service efficiently before the creation of NHSE. That proposal was rejected by Ministers, and it is not entirely clear why. I am interested to hear the Minister’s view on that.

It is now being reported that a fresh attempt is being made to argue that regional teams should be hosted by an NHS organisation—probably an ICB—to protect their employment terms and, as staff would remain public rather than civil servants, provide some brake on political control. Can the Minister shed any light on all this? Does she recognise the importance of maintaining operational freedom in NHS decision making?

We have discussed the reality that current Parliaments cannot bind future ones, and I take that point on board. However, current Parliaments do set precedents and establish the legal frameworks within which future Governments initially operate until they change the law. With the potential for more extreme Governments, there is a risk of discrimination and political considerations entering what should be clinical decision making—for example, decisions on whether to place a trust into special measures or what services are offered, such as sexual health, IVF, outreach to migrant communities and so on.

We are concerned not about the current Secretary of State, or indeed the shadow Secretary of State, but about the risk of those sweeping powers being placed in the hands of an extreme Government. If we imagine for a moment that an incoming Government decided that they did not approve of diversity on an NHS board, for example, and replaced an executive with their own candidate, that would be a horrifying situation. I think we would all agree on that. It would be useful to include safeguards now and set a precedent that such action would not be acceptable under this Bill. Notwithstanding the fact that a future Government could come along and change that, they would have to be transparent about their reasons for doing so.

The former Health Secretary, the right hon. Member for Ilford North, claimed that he was taking powers back into DHSC in order to give them away to the system, but this Bill has a lot on taking those powers and very little on giving them to the system. How can we be sure that that will actually happen on the ground, and that ICBs, hospital trusts and other health trusts will have the opportunity to flex their local muscle and ensure that services are best shaped for the local population? The NHS Alliance has called for an operationally independent regulatory function in DHSC to oversee NHS organisations, or for an independent panel to make appointments. Will the Minister consider such practical changes to ensure that political capture is not an unintended consequence of the Bill?

I rise to support amendment 47, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham, and to ask a few questions about clause 11. I completely understand the thinking behind the clause. The Secretary of State for Health and Social Care is probably the most politically impotent of all Secretaries of State: as my hon. Friend said, they pull levers and not much seems to happen, because they do not have the control over the health service that the public think they do—or indeed, that Members of Parliament think they do, judging by the number of us who stand up and demand that the Secretary of State do things in our local areas.

I understand the Government and the Secretary of State’s desire to change some of that, but there is concern about the potential politicisation of NHS leadership. Integrated care boards were established in various forms under the Health and Social Care Act 2012 precisely to remove politicisation to ensure that decisions in our healthcare service were made for the benefit of patients on the basis of clinical evidence and the needs of the local population, not on the whim of any Secretary of State or Minister. More importantly, ICBs were brought in to make sure that local health systems, local authorities, clinicians and communities made decisions based on local need.

Those politically independent ICB chief executives were expected to exercise professional judgment, make difficult decisions about priorities and resources and sometimes deliver messages that Ministers, and indeed local Members of Parliament, found uncomfortable. If those leaders know that their continued employment ultimately depends on the confidence of the Secretary of State, there is a real risk that the independence of their judgment will be weakened and that patient safety will diminish.

The amendment tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham tackles a core question: should an ICB chief executive focus solely on what is best for patients and the local health economy, or should they have to consider whether their decisions may attract ministerial displeasure? Even if the power is rarely used, and even if, as my hon. Friend said, there are currently some guardrails in the clause, its existence will change behaviour—it must do. Leaders will become more cautious, perhaps more risk averse and potentially less willing to challenge national policy when local evidence points in a different direction.

ICBs have benefited from the ability to speak truth to power. A system in which senior NHS leaders fear dismissal by Ministers risks discouraging precisely that kind of honesty. Do not get me wrong: there are good ICB chief executives and bad ICB chief executives, ones who understand their role well and ones who feel that they do not need to engage at all with their local communities. I have a very good ICB in what is currently Surrey Heartlands, soon to be a larger organisation, and an ICB that does not do the job as well—I will not name it, but any student of geography will be able to work out which one it is.

Secondly, excessive ministerial power blurs the lines of accountability. The Minister, in her defence, has argued that Ministers need powers because Ministers are accountable. I get that argument, but one of the most important principles of effective public administration is clarity of responsibility. If the Secretary of State gains extensive powers to appoint and dismiss local NHS leaders, it will become increasingly difficult to know who is actually responsible for outcomes. When performance improves, Ministers will claim credit; when performance deteriorates, local leaders may be blamed. If Ministers possess the power to select and remove those leaders, they will inevitably become more directly responsible for those management decisions, so far from increasing accountability, this might dilute it by creating uncertainty about where true authority lies.

Thirdly, there is a constitutional concern. Whether one likes it or not, the previous Act created a balance between democratic accountability and operational independence. Parliament rightly determines the funding, priorities and legislative frameworks, and Ministers rightly set national policy, but operational decisions have been made by healthcare professionals and the statutory bodies established for that purpose. That distinction exists for a good reason. No Secretary of State, regardless of ability or commitment, or indeed their own background in the health service, can personally manage every NHS organisation in England, and I do not think they should. The more powers we concentrate at the centre, the greater the temptation for Ministers to become involved in operational matters that are better addressed through professional expertise and local knowledge. My hon. Friend’s amendment seeks to preserve that distinction in a singular and precise way. It recognises that Ministers should govern the NHS and be held accountable at the top by us as Members of Parliament and our constituents, but should not seek to manage every aspect of it.

Fourthly, there is a practical problem. Supporters of ministerial intervention often point to examples of failure and ask what should happen when an ICB is underperforming. That is a fair question, but the answer is not that the Secretary of State must personally possess dismissal powers. A range of mechanisms already exist: ICB boards have governance responsibilities; NHS England has oversight powers; professional regulators oversee the conduct of clinicians; there are provisions in employment law for procedures when it comes to misconduct and capability issues; and auditors and inspectors can identify failings. It would be far better if the Bill strengthened those provisions to ensure that accountability was brought forward, rather than giving the Secretary of State the ability to fire and hire as he or she sees fit.

Of course, none of those mechanisms of accountability will disappear if amendment 47 is adopted. The amendment would not create any kind of immunity from accountability; it would simply ensure that accountability is exercised through the established governance structures, rather than through direct ministerial intervention on a chief executive. Indeed, one might ask whether a Secretary of State is really the best person to assess the performance of an individual ICB chief executive. Such judgments often require detailed understanding of local service pressures, workforce challenges, demographic factors, financial constraints and so on. Those are matters better evaluated by individual organisations with operational expertise than by politicians operating at national level.

Fifthly, I think the clause as drafted would present a risk to recruitment and retention. The NHS already faces significant leadership challenges. Senior leaders are expected to manage enormous budgets, oversee complex organisations and make difficult decisions under intense public scrutiny. If we create a system in which their tenure can ultimately depend upon ministerial whim, we may deter talented individuals from seeking those positions. As my hon. Friend said, the NHS needs leaders who are willing to innovate, take calculated risks and make difficult long term decisions. It does not need a culture in which leaders are constantly looking over their shoulder, wondering whether a politically controversial but clinically necessary decision could threaten their position. Strong organisations attract strong leaders when governance arrangements are stable, predictable and professionally driven. They do not attract them through uncertainty and political intervention.

Sixthly, we need to consider the precedent being established. Powers granted to one Secretary of State are inherited by the next, as the hon. Member for North Shropshire said. Members may trust the intentions of the current Minister—I certainly do. They may also believe that these powers would be exercised responsibly—and at the moment I think they would be. However, legislation must be judged not on how it is going to be used by one individual, but on how it could be used by any future holder of the office. Therefore, the question is not whether the current Secretary of State or Minister would misuse the power, but whether Parliament wishes to establish a framework in which future Secretaries of State possess the ability to remove local NHS leaders whose decisions, views or priorities may conflict with their political objectives. That is a much more serious question.

Finally, we must remember what ICBs were trying to achieve, even if we do not think that they have achieved it or performed in the way that we wanted them to. If we go back to the principle of why they were set up, they were designed to encourage collaboration rather than some sort of command and control structure. They were intended to bring decision making closer to patients and communities. They were established to support long term planning across local health systems. Those objectives, I am afraid, are very difficult to reconcile with a model in which local leaders remain subject to direct ministerial dismissal. Partnership working flourishes when organisations have confidence in their independence and responsibilities. It is weakened when authority is increasingly concentrated at the centre.

For all those reasons, I believe that amendment 47 in the name my hon. Friend the Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham raises an important principle. It is not about protecting poor performance or shielding individuals from accountability; it is about ensuring that accountability is exercised through proper governance structures rather than political control. Expanding ministerial powers to hire and fire local NHS leaders risks undermining all of those principles.

We have a clear political and—as I think the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham said—philosophical division here. This Government believe in democratic accountability, in politics and in good government. I understand that both Opposition parties were architects of the 2012 Act, which created this huge, independent body to run what has become a £200 billion service that clearly has not worked, and that they want to hold on to some of that, despite not opposing the Bill on Second Reading and, actually, not really opposing the abolition of NHS England—I think we will keep returning to that—but we believe that, ultimately, the Secretary of State needs to be accountable for the service, which is not working as the British public deserve or expect.

The hon. Lady asked me to go into good variation and bad variation. Our drive has been to understand the variation. I know from Members of Parliament who have come to me in the past two years, and we understand from looking in detail at the variation across the service, that there is often no rationale for the variation. Local people do not understand why services work better in one part of their county, even, than in another. The hon. Member for Farnham and Bordon alluded to that when he mentioned some places in his area that are working better than others. That is why—and I personally wanted to drive this very strongly—we are getting more information out, releasing the outcomes framework and releasing information to all Members of Parliament about where and how the current data shows their local systems are performing. That is what local people need, and in my view good local parliamentarians, of whom there are very many, should be able to go back to talk to their local systems and chief executives about why that is—not to berate them, but to understand it. There might be a very good cause for the variation; there might be structural reasons or geographical reasons, and they might be long standing reasons. That is what we seek to do in order to regain the trust and confidence of the British public, and that is why we are publishing those documents.

I stand by my comments that my approach is more local than centralised. This is about changing the culture, which we seek to do by making that happen more locally. I absolutely get the points about operational freedom and the balance that we will seek when we release the operating model, which is being worked on in the Department, as we bring the new system into being, alongside the Bill.

However, we want to be very clear that when an ICB has failed or is at risk of failure, and that failure is significant, it is right that the Secretary of State has the tools to minimise the impact on patients and the public and to act swiftly to put things right. The public rightly expect that, in such circumstances, Ministers will take the necessary steps to protect patients, taxpayers and the public. In some cases of significant failure, that may include directing an ICB and removing the chief executive.

I am sure that all Members here today will agree that effective performance management of ICBs will continue to be essential once NHS England is abolished, not only to support the provision of a quality service, but to reassure the people served by ICBs that when things go wrong, they will be put right.

I could not agree more with the Minister that when there is an obvious failure, either in a local system or in a trust, we would hope that the Secretary of State will intervene. She will know from our experience in Shropshire that, when a system is failing or underperforming, that intervention is welcome. But the Bill gives the Secretary of State power to intervene even when things are going well, which is quite an extension of power. Will the Minister comment on that?

I thank the hon. Lady for that intervention, and I will come on to the power.

As hon. Members are aware, NHS England currently holds similar powers, so it makes sense for these powers to be held by the Secretary of State once NHS England is abolished. I want to be clear—I hope that this will address the hon. Lady’s point—that our intention is to use these significant failure powers rarely and not as a first port of call. It is far better to work closely with ICBs and their leaders to spot issues and work collaboratively to resolve them before they have the opportunity to become significant, but it would be irresponsible not to have the power to intervene as a last resort.

I want to address the other elements of clause 11. The first part of the clause establishes a general power for the Secretary of State to direct integrated care boards about the exercise of their functions. Using that power, the Secretary of State could direct a singular ICB, a group of ICBs or all ICBs, depending on the scope of the direction. This power is a necessary step in restoring democratic control over the NHS. The public rightly expect Ministers to be able to set priorities, drive improvements and set out how they expect the NHS to operate. For example, we expect to use the power to set up and update national commissioning standards.

The power is particularly relevant given the wider commissioning responsibilities ICBs will have in their role as strategic commissioners following the abolition of NHS England. By setting standards for all ICBs, the power will help reduce the unwarranted variation in the way that ICBs discharge their functions. It is also an important tool for enabling Ministers to respond to changing events. The lack of such a power has slowed the ability of NHS England to respond to unforeseen challenges within the health system.

I can also give the Committee an assurance that the clause includes a considered set of limits on the scope of the power. The Secretary of State will not be able to direct ICBs to appoint a particular individual, issue a direction about the services to be provided to an individual, or direct the use of a drug treatment or diagnostic technique where that is inconsistent with NICE guidance or recommendations. Equally, to maintain transparency in the health system, directions made under the general power to direct ICBs as to the exercise of their functions will be required to be made in writing and to be published as soon as reasonably practical. The power will enable the Secretary of State to uphold the standards that patients expect and deserve, while also protecting the principles of fairness and impartiality at the heart of the NHS.

We have already addressed much of the second part of the clause, but I should note that we have purposely placed the powers to intervene in cases of significant failure outside the general power of direction over ICBs. That is because it is important to be clear that those powers are expected to be used only rarely and in situations where an ICB is failing or at risk of failing.

I hope the hon. Member for Sleaford and North Hykeham feels able to withdraw her amendment. I commend the clause to the Committee.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

5|0|3|11|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Clause 11 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Ordered, That further consideration be now adjourned. —(Emma Foody.)

Adjourned till Thursday 25 June at half past Eleven o’clock.

Written evidence reported to the House

HB61 Just Fair

HB62 Provider Public Health Network

HB63 Nuffield Trust

HB64 Dr Mary Guy, Research Fellow, Trinity College Dublin

HB65 Association of Anaesthetists

HB66 Sickle Cell Society

HB67 Healthwatch England (supplementary submission)

HB68 Henry Burkitt, Managing Director, Oxygen Strategy (re: clause 58 (NICE compliance period))

HB69 A coalition of six homelessness charities: St. Mungo’s, Homeless Link, Groundswell, Single Homeless Project, Crisis and Pathway

HB70 Healthwatch York

HB71 Patient Experience Library

HB72 Association of Optometrists

HB73 Care Quality Commission (CQC)

HB74 Healthwatch Redbridge

HB75 Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health

HB76 National Children’s Bureau on behalf of the Health Policy Influencing Group (HPIG)

HB77 Specialised Healthcare Alliance (SHCA)

HB78 The College of Optometrists