Cabinet Office

Motion made, and Question proposed,

That, for the year ending with 31 March 2027, for expenditure by the Cabinet Office:

(1) the resources authorised for current purposes be reduced by £1,308,765,000 as set out in HC 1855 of Session 2024-26,

(2) further resources, not exceeding £1,235,318,000, be authorised for use for capital purposes as so set out, and

(3) a further sum, not exceeding £2,178,228,000, be granted to His Majesty to be issued by the Treasury out of the Consolidated Fund and applied for expenditure on the use of resources authorised by Parliament.—(Dame Angela Eagle.)

I call the Chair of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy.

I thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting this debate, which could not be more timely given the crucial NATO summit next week in Ankara. I was hoping that we would be inundated with contributions from across the House, but sadly it looks as though we might be limited to one or two.

Keeping the country safe is the first responsibility of any Government. The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, which I chair, has undertaken a huge amount of work during this Parliament to examine the Government’s approach to protecting the UK’s national security interests. From critical national infrastructure to the defence of our very democracy, our Committee has been working hard to highlight areas in need of vital improvement.

There is no one “National Security Department”, of course, but the Cabinet Office co ordinates the Government’s approach to national security and is the home of the national security secretariat. The Cabinet Office’s main estimate states that it plans to spend about £1.1 billion on day to day running costs and £600 million on investment projects, of which around £200 million in day to day costs and £25 million in investment will go towards keeping the country safe. However, national security is, at its core, a whole of Government responsibility, and it is therefore often difficult to get a handle on how much is being spent on the UK’s security and resilience—a point that I made to the Backbench Business Committee.

In an era of unprecedented uncertainty and hybrid warfare, the case for increased spending on security and resilience could not be stronger. We see a proliferation of threats not just from hostile state actors, but from organised proxy groups and radicalised individuals. Take the cyber attack on Jaguar Land Rover in August 2025. The New York Times now reports that it was Russian in origin, and the evidence suggests that the Kremlin was either directly responsible for it or responsible for facilitating it through proxy actors. The impact was severe: it cost the British economy £2.5 billion, directly cost Jaguar Land Rover £485 million in the quarter and affected more than 5,000 firms. It was so significant that it impacted our quarterly growth figures.

Threats are increasingly facilitated through the weaponisation of emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence and quantum. Those who would seek to destabilise our democracy, our safety and our way of life have more opportunities than ever before to do so, and they know that. Meanwhile, the Government and NATO allies have already acknowledged this reality with their commitment to spend 5% of GDP on defence by 2035, with 1.5% of that being earmarked for security and resilience.

Does the hon. Member believe, like I do, that the Russian hybrid warfare we are seeing in the UK at the moment is further fuelling disinformation, including online? We know that the arson attack on the Prime Minister’s car was directly linked to Russian state operatives. If there was ever a moment when we needed to stipulate a specific budget, now is that moment.

That is such an important point, and I do not think that we as a Chamber have given it enough airtime. If we think about what would happen if any other premier of any other country was attacked like that—their home attacked and their car set on fire—the reaction from the media was quite muted. Now that it has become more obvious what happened, despite all the nonsense that circulated on social media at the time, it is important that that conversation happens.

We are at a crucial juncture, as the hon. Member suggested. We are running out of time to ensure that we are prepared for a worst case scenario of increasing Russian aggression, both conventional and hybrid. At a time when the United States’ security presence in Europe is being questioned, the threat from China looms ever larger, and the UK finds itself in a difficult position as a middle power in the midst of global strategic competition between the United States and China. As such, it is imperative that the Government are robustly held to account in delivering their spending commitments on defence, security and resilience.

I commend the hon. Member for his introduction and his wise words, ever mindful of modern warfare and the way it is going, and the changes that the Government and we as a nation need to be prepared for. When it comes to resilience and drone technology and how to use that to the betterment and the safety and security of this country, does he believe that we need to be at the top of that tree to ensure that we can protect our people across this great United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland?

The hon. Member is absolutely right. The nature of our security is so multifaceted now in a way that it would not have been 30 years ago. Globally, we are beginning to get our heads around—I am sure the Government recognise this—how we need to pivot and reset ourselves into a very different defence and security posture, because our defence is as much on our mobile phone and our laptops, and to our way of life and our democracy, as it is at our borders, and that is crucial.

My Committee was encouraged to hear from the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster that the Government believe that they are on track to hit the target of 1.5% of GDP on security and resilience by 2035 by 2027—well ahead of time. But they have also been evasive on exactly what the spend will entail. Like any target, there is a risk of money being merely shuffled from one pot to another—an administrative exercise rather than genuine additional funding. My Committee recommended that the spending is prioritised on investment in systems that can help build long term resilience, in addition to spending on maintenance of basic civil infrastructure.

When we questioned the Minister, we sought to clarify what new resilience projects and capabilities the 1.5% would entail. We were given, I am afraid to say, only vague answers. Disappointingly, the Government’s response to our report on the national security strategy failed to elucidate much further. We recognise that there are reasons for being protective about certain information and not disclosing too much detail, but we seek more specificity in exactly how the Government are making critical infrastructure in the UK more resilient through this spending.

In fact, I recently met the high commissioner of Canada who explained that they are investing hundreds of millions in large scale infrastructure projects in their part of the High North, be it railways, road networks or deep sea ports. They are all planned to boost resilience across the nation.

I, too, was recently in Canada with the Business and Trade Committee, and there was significant talk about the infrastructure projects that people have invested in. Beyond that they talked about the “Canada Strong” policy, which is about supporting industries in Canada, and ensuring that money being spent for the benefit of public good is spent with Canadian companies. Does my hon. Friend agree that the procurement reforms made by the Cabinet Office in March are some of the most significant that we have seen in a generation, and should benefit British industry?

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. I have not been to Canada in recent decades, but I am hearing that its approach should be of real interest to us, including how it is prioritising certain sectors and has identified certain capabilities. Although people are protective about what those capabilities might be, I would certainly welcome conversations behind closed doors with Ministers about what we are looking to do in a similar vein.

It is striking that the Canadians are outlining their major projects and how they will spend their money, but they are also focusing on their capabilities. Here we have suffered from a lack of long term commitment to investing in national security and preparedness. Our Government must also clearly outline what additional capabilities they are committed to developing through the target spend, prior to the start of the NATO summit next week. We need a national conversation about our nation’s defence and security. Over the last 18 months my Committee has heard repeatedly about the need to get the public on board when it comes to increased spending on defence, resilience and security. With the public purse under such strain, our constituents must understand why spending on such areas must be prioritised.

I also recently met the ambassador to Canada—this goes back to the point raised by the hon. Member for Stafford (Leigh Ingham), who stated that one reason for the infrastructure in the High North was so that there was something sovereign to defend. That is incredibly important. The ambassador also explained how, when selling that to the general public, when most people talk about defence they think about different toys—bullets and ships—whereas in Canada was talking more about investing so that they have something to defend that is about their country, jobs, industry and everything else. Does the hon. Member agree that we should also get that important message out to UK residents?

As if on cue, the hon. Member’s point is one I am just about to develop. The strategic defence review called for a national conversation, and during our inquiry on societal resilience we heard much about how our allies are engaging their citizens with that essential work. The UK is, I am afraid, a little behind the curve. Beyond the Baltic and Scandinavian nations, whose security and resilience is well documented, other nations are also moving up a gear. Their Governments engage significant numbers of military reserves, volunteers, firefighters, private defence organisations and NGOs in that conversation. In certain countries, everyone between the ages of 18 and 65 has a role in resilience—every single person. Some countries conduct wargame exercises on civilian defence, to identify weaknesses in their systems. Less obvious countries such as the Netherlands and Canada are making painful choices that are necessary to ensure that societal resilience can be strengthened. The situation warrants a reset of our whole approach to resilience and security, but to do that we must bring the public with us through a national conversation.

It has been my huge pleasure to serve on the hon. Member’s Committee for the better part of the last two years, and as I stand down from it, I wish to thank him for his leadership—it has been exemplary.

On the whole society conversation, to go back to the hon. Gentleman’s earlier point about the incident with the Prime Minister’s car, does he agree that we must do a better job of informing the British public about the actual threat? The first stage is getting the public to understand the real threat that we are facing right now. We are under hybrid attack, and we will need the whole of society to support us in the solution.

I thank the hon. Member, who I would also call a friend, not just for his kind words, but for his valuable contributions to the Committee over the past 18 months or so. Yes, it is vital that we engage the public, and it is incumbent on our media to start spelling some of this stuff out—not fearmongering, but explaining some of the harsh realities of what we face. There are certain nations who wish us absolute harm—we are their public enemy No. 1. We need to be much more open about that in our discourse with the public, not so as they become overly alarmed—as I may have been as a kid growing up—but so that they recognise the sorts of pressures that we face economically, socially and militarily. The situation demands that we bring the public along with us. The Committee has discussed how we develop that nationwide conversation, possibly including an education programme, by being more honest with the public about the threats that the UK faces.

The pandemic highlighted huge gaps in our country and society’s resilience. Are we ready for the next crisis that might be heading our way? We must not fearmonger, but the Government must learn all they can from our allies who are further ahead of us with spending on resilience and preparedness. I want to stress that the situation was obvious to the last Government too.

It is increasingly clear that for too long the UK has outsourced its security and resilience needs elsewhere, and is now entirely dependent on others for critical elements of its infrastructure. It is only through increasing the scale of investment in its sovereign capabilities, particularly in the realm of emerging technologies, that we can wean ourselves off these dependencies.

The defence investment plan is crucial. It is essential in guiding businesses and investors. Direction is needed, as well as dynamism and agility. At a time when UK firms need certainty, we still lack clarity on exactly how investment will be allocated. As we highlighted in our report on the national security strategy, the longer businesses lack an adequate signal from Government about what investment might be on the way, the more vulnerable they are to acquisition by foreign investors and the more difficult it becomes to achieve our sovereignty goals.

The Government have made steps in the right direction through investments as part of the AI opportunities action plan and the work of the sovereign AI unit. Those are to be commended. The UK has a strong base of talent in those technologies, but the Government need to go further and faster to secure our advantage in the long term. Now is the time to secure the investment, the jobs and economic security we need through a proper digital sovereignty strategy. As we saw last week in the series of cyber attacks, economic security is national security.

The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy will continue to fulfil its role and to press the Government on all these points and more in a constructive and collaborative way, as it has done these past 18 months. It is only through robust challenge and scrutiny that we can ensure the Government are doing all they can to keep the people, businesses and critical systems of the UK safe and secure. As Lord Robertson of Port Ellen told the Committee earlier this year, “it is much better to pay for deterrence than to pay for war.”

It is also, ultimately, less costly. I urge the Government to take heed.

I thank the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) for introducing the debate so well. He makes many excellent points, including that we face a wide range of threats to our security and resilience. Clearly, we face threats from hostile actors and not just through conventional means: he talked about cyber warfare and the threat of disinformation. He briefly touched on the effects of the pandemic on our country. The covid pandemic, which killed nearly a quarter of a million people, was the greatest threat to human health for many decades. Recognising pandemic preparedness as hugely important within the security and resilience framework is key.

Another key threat to our country’s security and resilience, which does not receive nearly enough attention, is climate breakdown. It is not just the environmentalists but the ambulance workers who say that, and the Joint Intelligence and Security Committee’s national security assessment itself says that ecosystem breakdown poses a clear threat to national security. The Committee on Climate Change has pointed out that we are woefully ill prepared as a country for the effects of climate breakdown.

We urgently need to take more action to avoid causing climate change. Equally, we urgently need to take far more action to recognise the threat to our national security and resilience posed by the effects of climate breakdown. That was brought home to us in hugely clear terms last week, as we faced the second major heatwave of the last month or so. That heatwave led to record call outs for the ambulance service—even more than under covid.

A couple of weeks ago, I spent time with the London ambulance service, which told me that the May heatwave saw its highest number of ambulance call outs, even including covid, and that terrible record was exceeded last week. We have to recognise the reality of the effects on human life and livelihoods and the effects on our national security and resilience caused by these issues.

This is not just about the health effects. I spoke to numerous constituents over the weekend about the effects that the appalling temperatures faced by our students are having on schools. Clearly, we need urgently to put in place maximum temperatures for schools and workplaces and take action to ensure that that is followed through.

Does the hon. Member accept that there is a certain irony when the same people who are concerned about climate change and temperatures rising have campaigned for air conditioning to be taken out of buildings because of its energy consumption and carbon dioxide emissions? We cannot have it both ways, can we?

I honestly do not recognise the caricature that the right hon. Gentleman paints. Technology exists to provide both heating and cooling in ecologically friendly ways, and that is absolutely what we need going forward. We need far better building standards so that we build buildings that adapt and are suitable, and we need homes that are fit for the future. That is essential.

The Committee on Climate Change—the Government’s independent adviser—has set out repeatedly that these solutions are available and has set out the things that we need to put forward. The Committee has also set out repeatedly, as have any number of people over any number of years, the fact that the costs of inaction far exceed those of action. The hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) made that point previously in relation to other security challenges, and it applies with knobs on to tackling the challenge of climate breakdown. Twenty years ago, Professor Nick Stern set out clearly that the costs of inaction far outweigh—many times over—the costs of action to address these risks. After 20 years of our heads collectively being in the sand as a country, we are reaping the whirlwind of that inaction.

I call on the Government and the Cabinet Office to recognise the reality that tackling climate resilience must be a central plank of any strategy to protect national security and resilience. We need a Minister in the Cabinet Office whose responsibility it is to put in place that work and to take a cross Government approach. This is not a siloed issue and cannot be dealt with in one single Department; it needs a cross Government approach.

We need a comprehensive strategy to prepare the NHS for new public health challenges. We need to invest in flood protection, because we face not just extreme heat but flooding incidents of increasing frequency and severity. We have all seen what a disastrous effect that has on the economy as well as on lives and livelihoods.

We need to develop a comprehensive extreme heat strategy, a national drought plan and a farmer led transition to climate resilient food production. Our farmers are crying out for that support, and they too are on the frontline of the security and resilience challenges that the reality of climate breakdown places on us. We need to strengthen our transport infrastructure, energy infrastructure and water infrastructure. Last week, we heard about nuclear power stations going offline in France. Train companies were saying that nobody should travel unless it was a matter of life and death. Water shortages are becoming more and more frequent. The collective, long term and strategic approach to tackling climate resilience must be a core plank of national security.

Tackling climate breakdown is not just an environmental issue but a central plank of security and national resilience. The costs of inaction far outweigh the costs of taking action now. Will the Minister commit to putting in place a national strategy? Will there be an individual identified in the Cabinet Office who leads on it? Does she recognise that we must invest now or pay far worse costs later?

rose—

Mr Brickell, I was not sure if you were going to swap seats again. Are you comfortable where you are?

I am indeed.

Marvellous. The Floor is yours.

I wish to confine my remarks to the responsible, resilient and transparent use of taxpayers’ money. I say that as the chair of the all party parliamentary group on anti corruption and responsible tax, a role which sees me engage with ministerial colleagues from across Government on a whole swathe of issues. I push Government constructively to increase transparency, improve controls and increase enforcement when those who seek to defraud the taxpayer are identified.

Public sector fraud and error is estimated to cost taxpayers between £55 billion and £81 billion annually. That is not sustainable when we are asking taxpayers to shoulder a large burden and when our public finances are already squeezed, at a time of increasingly turbulent geopolitical headwinds. That is why, back in December 2024, I was delighted to see the Government announce the introduction of Tom Hayhoe as the new covid fraud commissioner. He was tasked with identifying areas of reckless spend overseen by the previous Government and going as far as possible in claiming back moneys for the taxpayer.

Since then, Mr Hayhoe has identified £10.9 billion lost to fraud and error across the covid schemes, at a time when the Government’s resilience was pushed to the limit. Let us dwell on that £10.9 billion figure. Of that money, £324 million was lost in personal protective equipment fraud during the pandemic and £1.88 billion was lost in fraud on the bounce back loan scheme, issued by the Department for Business and Trade. We talk about more money for the defence investment plan or increased resilience at a time of increasing geopolitical instability, and those figures of taxpayers’ money lost to fraudsters by the last Government are truly astonishing.

Without straying into ongoing litigation, let us dwell on the PPE Medpro scandal for a second. It has become symbolic of the waste and poor oversight that occurred during some covid-19 procurement processes. As we know, the company was awarded Government contracts worth more than £200 million through the controversial VIP lane system. In 2025, the High Court ruled that PPE Medpro had breached a £122 million contract for surgical gowns, because the products supplied did not meet the required standards, and the company was ordered to repay that money to the Government.

That matters, because holding suppliers accountable when contracts are not fulfilled properly helps to protect public funds and reinforces the principle that those who benefit from Government contracts should meet their obligations. That is a vital premise, because we must ensure that Government procurement is resilient and delivering the best value. Ensuring that those who rip off the state—and, by default, you, Madam Deputy Speaker, me and every other person up and down the length of the country—are held to account is vital.

Alongside our debate on the Cabinet Office’s estimates, will the Minister articulate why the Government announced last week that they had chosen to only “partially accept” four of Tom Hayhoe’s recommendations? The first of those recommendations was that the Government should have a challenge champion in crisis situations—we talk a lot about resilience. The second recommendation was to ensure that small companies publish profit and loss accounts—remember that small companies were the engine of the bounce back loan scheme fraud.

The third recommendation was that there should be stronger measures when Ministers issue directions to override the civil service. That is crucial, given that ministerial directions included overriding an accounting officer’s concerns about fraud on bounce back loans. The fourth recommendation was to have clearer central oversight of the spending of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government through local bodies, including grants. I appreciate that my hon. Friend the Minister may not have the answers to hand, but I would be very grateful if she could write to me after this debate.

Do not let my questions distract from the good work undertaken during this Parliament. I particularly commend the Cabinet Office for the work undertaken by the Public Sector Fraud Authority, including last week’s launch of the new public authorities fraud investigation and enforcement service. I had the benefit of meeting my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton Test (Satvir Kaur) only a few weeks ago to discuss the vital work of the PSFA. We both know how critical it is to drive up transparency, break down information silos, and drive cultural change via the tone from the top across Government. As such, we should be proud that the PSFA has reported savings to the taxpayer of £311 million in 2022-23, £373 million in 2023-24, and over £480 million in 2024-25. That is a trajectory I want to see continue—an increase of approximately 50% over the course of two financial years. In total, the Government reported £7.53 billion of taxpayer savings from counter fraud activity in the last financial year, including almost £400 million linked to covid fraud that had been recovered. That is vital work that should not go unnoticed, and it is not small change; those are critical funds that need to be retained in the public sector, for the sake of our infrastructure, resilience and security.

The Minister may not be surprised to hear me say that we must not rest on our laurels. I therefore welcome the views of my hon. Friend the Member for Southampton Test on establishing a central Government database to strengthen the detection and prevention of fraud, alongside enhanced mitigation measures and greater transparency in how they are implemented. I also support a new offence of fraud against the public purse, coupled with meaningful incentives and protection for whistleblowers to help identify and expose wrongdoing, as recommended by the campaigning organisation Spotlight on Corruption.

My constituents—whether in Heaton or Horwich, Chew Moor or Chequerbent—need to know that the Government are on their side and that attempted public sector fraud will have consequences, no matter who you are or who you know. It is only by pursuing fraudsters tenaciously that we will be able to find the much needed resources to support investment in critical infrastructure and ensure that we are as prepared as we can be, whether that is for the next pandemic, climate change, industrial sabotage or conflict.

We now come to the Front Benchers. I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson—are we ready?

Born ready, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Earlier this year, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte said that “we are not at war, but we are certainly not at peace either.”

Just over the two years since this Government took office, there have been many reports of instances of foreign espionage and interference. Earlier this year, it was reported that Chinese spies use LinkedIn and other recruitment platforms to target UK officials and military staff. A tracker was successfully placed on the Prime Minister’s car, and—as has been mentioned by my hon. Friends the Members for Epsom and Ewell (Helen Maguire) and for West Dorset (Edward Morello)—there have been attacks on the Prime Minister’s home and car. Also, people with links to a sitting MP were arrested on suspicion of assisting a foreign intelligence agency. It is therefore no surprise that the Government say that national security is their first responsibility. They are right to do so.

I am lucky enough to be a member of the armed forces parliamentary scheme this year. I have been fortunate enough to meet some of the remarkable people who serve in our military, from the most junior to the most senior, and the key message I have taken from those interactions is that, as a society, we are not scared enough and we are certainly not prepared enough. When talking about preparation, the thoughts of many will instantly go to physical safety and defence spending. I understand why, but there needs to be a whole of society approach that goes beyond our armed forces to include national security, resilience, civic preparedness, food security, economic security, cyber security, energy security and so on. This point has already been raised by other Members, but when the Minister responds shortly, I would be grateful if she could update the House on the Government’s plans to increase the awareness of the British people—including my own Hazel Grove constituents —about the role we must all play to keep our country safe and to prepare should the worst happen.

After looking at the estimates, I have one specific question for the Minister. As I understand it, the security spending under the “Keeping the country safe” subheading is rising largely because the integrated security fund has been moved across to the Cabinet Office, not because Ministers have found new money to meet new dangers. Could the Minister tell the House how much of that uplift is new investment in our resilience, and what changes are happening to that spending as it comes under the Cabinet Office?

We cannot have national resilience if the public can no longer trust the integrity of our democracy. The National Cyber Security Centre dealt with more than 200 attacks on our critical national infrastructure in the past year alone, and around three quarters of those attacks were traced to hostile states, primarily China, Russia and Iran. They reach into hospitals, our energy supply, and the public services that many across the country depend on. That is why the Liberal Democrats tabled an amendment to the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill that would have required the Government to publish a digital sovereignty strategy. Had it been put in place, that strategy would clearly have set out how the Government would assess, manage and mitigate risks to the security and resilience of critical network and information systems arising from foreign interference and reliance on foreign technology. Additionally, our strategy would place a focus on strengthening Government procurement practices, which would ensure that the Government lay out how they intend to reduce strategic dependencies on foreign owned service providers and commit to prioritise domestic tech. We would ensure that critical national functions are powered by technology that only the UK Government or UK companies could control.

Perhaps the sharpest threat to our democracy is the money flowing into it from outside. British politics is being targeted by powerful interests beyond our shores who would happily see our democracy weakened, and the loopholes that let them in remain far too open. Opaque, foreign and dark money can still find its way into our political parties, our campaigns and our online conversations, and the Government have not yet done enough to prevent that money from entering our democracy. They commissioned the Rycroft review into political finance, but to date, they have committed to just two of its 17 recommendations. We Liberal Democrats ask that the Minister give serious consideration to the other 15 and commit to all of them in full very soon.

The elections strategy paper published last summer and the Representation of the People Bill are both welcome steps, but there is an Elon Musk shaped hole running right through the middle of them. They contain nothing to stop social media platforms paying elected representatives to post increasingly divisive and incendiary content, and nothing to shut the back door through which foreign money reaches our politics. Liberal Democrats have tabled amendments to the Representation of the People Bill to fix exactly that. Our amendments would ban payments to MPs by X and other platforms and bar people who have served foreign Administrations from donating to political parties, campaign groups and think tanks, and we would implement the Rycroft review’s recommendation of banning foreign funded online political ads altogether.

Given the scale of potential foreign interference, we believe that the Government should go one step further and launch an investigation into US interference in our democracy, including financial support by this White House for those in the UK who—and I quote—share their values. I urge the Minister to further consider how we can best ensure that the Department’s budget is used effectively to limit the reach of foreign interference in our political system, because our democratic security is our national security.

I call the shadow Minister.

This debate is very timely, and I congratulate the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) on securing it. In recent months, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy has been joined by an ever growing and increasingly anxious chorus of voices despairing at the Government’s failings on national security. Lord Robertson, who this Government commissioned and asked to lead the strategic defence review, warned in April that Britain’s security was “in peril” due to the “corrosive complacency” that was being shown towards defence. He went so far as to accuse the Treasury of “vandalism”.

Earlier this month, the right hon. Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey) resigned as Defence Secretary. He was clear that the reason was a defence investment plan—which, it appears, The Times newspaper has also had sight of—that did not give the armed forces “the resources they need”. He was followed out of the door by the Armed Forces Minister, the hon. Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns), who said that the Government’s plans were “neither transformative enough nor sufficiently funded.”

Given that the hon. Member had served in our armed forces, one would have thought that his warning might have been heeded.

Bearing in mind an item that has appeared in the news reports today, does my hon. Friend agree that either the right hon. Gentleman or the hon. and gallant Gentleman to whom she has just referred would be a far more suitable future Secretary General of NATO than the present Prime Minister, whose lack of proper funding of a defence policy—among other deficiencies—has led him to be looking for a new job?

I always found the former Defence Secretary to be very decent in how he engaged, how he worked across parties and how seriously he took the job. I do not think there is a vacancy for the NATO Secretary General for at least another eight years, but the current Prime Minister, who has taken us from third place to 12th in NATO defence spending in the past couple of years, would not be the right man to lead NATO at this time or any other.

The shadow hanging over this whole state of affairs is the defence investment plan. It was due for publication in autumn 2025, and we have not yet seen it. As a NATO member, we are committed to spending 5% of GDP on defence and national security by 2035, with 3.5% on core defence and 1.5% on national security and resilience. Let us review where the Government are. On rearmament and the progress towards 3.5% and 1.5%, we are second to last—31st out of 32 NATO members. We have only moved to that place in the past year. We best only Iceland, a country that has no armed forces at all. That is where the Government have left us on the road to rearmament. On defence spending as a percentage of GDP, we have gone from third in 2021 to 12th this year. Both those things are on the Labour Government.

The failure of this Government to properly fund our core defence is not just a disaster, but an international humiliation, and the very same pattern is playing out across national security and resilience. Lord Harris, the chair of the National Preparedness Commission, has said that funds for these vital areas are currently being treated as a “creative accountancy exercise”. When we look at the figures before us today, we can see what he means. I recognise the headline increase in the Cabinet Office’s security focused expenditure, but the vast bulk of that additional £130 million is simply the integrated security fund being moved from the Foreign Office to the Cabinet Office. It is not new money; it is the same money in a different pocket. Meanwhile, the figure that tells the real story is the budget for the national security secretariat, which has been cut to £18.9 million—down from £34.4 million last year. That has nearly halved—at a moment like this.

While little detail has been given to us to scrutinise, it is clear that Cabinet Office spending on national security and resilience is not at the level required, and nor will it match the threats that we face. I will press the Minister on specific areas shortly, but let us check in on whether some past commitments. Have they been fulfilled—or, like the defence investment plan, are they languishing out of sight, underfunded and promised but never delivered?

In February, the former Security Minister, the right hon. Member for Barnsley North (Dan Jarvis), promised a one third increase to the integrated security fund for Indo Pacific threats: primarily, the Chinese Communist party. There is no sign of that increase. We were promised a £17 million increase in counter terrorism funding and a further £10 million to address organised crime by the end of 2026-27. Are the Government on track to deliver those things, or have they, too, been quietly forgotten?

I will turn to the specific areas that demand the attention of the House. The first is cyber security. As we have heard from various Members, 40% of British businesses have suffered a cyber attack or breach over the past year, including iconic names such as Marks and Spencer, and Jaguar Land Rover. The Government brought forward the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, which was welcome, but it was not sufficient. Indeed, it failed to name the threat of the Chinese Communist party. Extraordinarily, it excluded central and local government computer systems from its scope. The very systems that hold our citizens’ data have been left outside the Bill. What investment is being made to bolster our cyber defences, and is that funding rising?

Secondly, the JCNSS reported last September on the risk of our undersea cables being targeted by hostile states. They carry 99% of our data. They are the arteries of our economy and our daily life. Closer co operation with Joint Expeditionary Force nations, especially Norway, has been welcomed across this House, but specific plans and any funding remain elusive. These cables carry everything that we do, and there is no plan to protect them. When will funding come forward to do so?

Thirdly, we have discussed the covid pandemic today, and the inquiry that followed, which laid bare the need for a greater focus on biosecurity. The Government promised that it would publish the Cabinet Office’s plan for biological emergencies this spring. That deadline has, like many others, been missed. When will those plans finally appear, and when will the £1 billion promise to establish a network of national biosecurity centres come into being?

Fourthly, on our critical national infrastructure, Putin’s renewed illegal invasion of Ukraine and the brutality that Russia has industrialised should serve as a warning. The Russian military has deliberately targeted power infrastructure—substations, pylons and cables. Drone warfare has made our energy networks a target for terrorists and hostile states. As the Member for Rutland and Stamford, I am dismayed by the Government’s plans to put a string—mile upon mile—of pylons across eastern England. One single drone could plunge huge swathes of our country into darkness, and Google Maps literally provides an online map—a targeting plan for anyone who wishes us harm. We have the capability to lay those cables underground. Instead, the Government have chosen to sacrifice our security to save a few pounds, when we should be learning from Putin’s daily attacks on Ukraine’s infrastructure.

The fifth area—this matters more than any other line, and it has been discussed by every single Member—is whole of society resilience. The threats that we discuss cannot be tackled by Government alone, and it would be foolish to suggest so. They demand that each and every one of us is prepared and able to play our part, but the Government therefore have to kick off the national conversation that they promised. Here we must be honest that the failure is not Labour’s alone.

I agree with the chair of the JCNSS, the hon. Member for Warwick and Leamington, that since the Iraq war it has suited the political class to say to the public, “You don’t need to worry about national security or foreign policy—don’t you worry your little heads; we’ve got it under control.” We have taught a generation or two that danger is someone else’s problem, that resilience is a job for the state, and that citizens do not need to think about it at all. We have allowed the public to abdicate their personal responsibility, be that choosing whether or not to be on TikTok—get off it!—the purchases they make or the way they live their lives. That is a fatal arrow in the heart of our national resilience. When the crisis comes—and it will come—a people who have never been asked to prepare will not suddenly know how to be ready.

The Risk Assessment and Risk Planning Committee in the Lords, the JCNSS and the National Preparedness Commission have all called for a single, simple step: the appointment of a chief resilience officer to co ordinate across Government. It is a sensible suggestion and I am not sure why it has been ignored. That role would look at protecting everything, whether that is our research, our innovation, our education, our universities, our genomics, our charities or the information environment, and it would tackle such things as the use of organised crime, which led to that heinous attack on our Prime Minister. That has been exploited by foreign states, which have misconstrued what took place to harm the Government. That is a shameful state of affairs, and I agree that we should have discussed it more.

I will now turn to China. Before the election, Labour promised to take China to the international courts over the genocide of the Uyghurs, which is an issue that you, Madam Deputy Speaker, and I have spoken about consistently in this place. The Government promised a full audit of China policy to guide strategy across every Department, yet the China audit was never published, its contents have never been shared with this House, and we are now in a situation where the National Security Adviser travels regularly to Beijing to meet Chinese Communist party officials. We only find out about those meetings because the Chinese Communist party publishes press releases. It is more transparent than our own Government, and that is not least because the National Security Adviser will not appear before this Parliament, unlike all his predecessors, to face justice—apologies, to face scrutiny. Well, both actually, because does our country not deserve to know that things are being done right? How can we know that they are being done right, that our country is being protected, and that hostile states are being held to account, if there is no scrutiny?

Our own Government keep quiet while preparing to pay billions to surrender sovereignty over the Chagos islands, and the protections that we put in place are not used. We passed the National Security Act 2023 precisely to counter the threat from hostile states, yet Labour refuses to put China in the enhanced tier, and the results speak for themselves. In July, it will be one year since the foreign interference registration scheme came into force. How many organisations or companies have registered as working for China on the foreign influence risk register? Not one. Three have registered as working for Republika Srpska, a tiny little entity within Bosnia, but no one says they are getting any money from the Chinese state. Have there been any investigations about this failure of anyone to register themselves? No. Have there been any prosecutions? No. Why? It is because the Government are too busy wooing the Chinese Communist party to deter it.

When the Prime Minister went to Beijing, he even met Cai Qi, the very man who had been running a spy network targeting this Parliament. The Prime Minister did not apologise for doing so; he seemed to think it was the right thing to do. Since that case collapsed last year, there have been zero repercussions for the Chinese Communist party for spying on this Parliament. That is not deterrence; it is rewarding a state that attacked our Parliament. Why are this Government content to let our own laws be flouted by Beijing?

Let us be honest about what has been described. A retailer that sells our groceries has been halted by hostile actors. A car maker that employs thousands of our constituents has been brought to its knees. Undersea cables carrying 99% of our data have been shadowed and mapped by Russian vessels. A spy network was run from Beijing against our own Parliament. Our Prime Minister was attacked. Luckily, he and his family were not hurt, but the Government answer all this with a transferring of budgets, missed deadlines and an audit they will not publish.

These are not isolated incidents. We are not at peace, but we may not be in the same state of war as our grandparents would have recognised. There is no declaration, no frontline, no army massing on our borders—thankfully—but make no mistake: we are under sustained, deliberate and co ordinated attack every single day. Call it what you will, but previous generations understood their duties when the nation was under threat, and they put our country on a war footing. They found the money, told the public the truth, and did not hide behind “creative accountancy”—not my words, but those of an expert. We are 31st out of 32. We have a National Security Secretariat that has been cut in half. There is no resilience officer, no investment plan, and no published audit. That is not the posture of a country that knows it is under attack. So my challenge to the Minister is simple: fund what must be funded, and protect what must be protected.

Given that this is a debate about the money, let me end by asking about what the figures cannot show. Once we strip out the transfers of function and the accounting changes, what is the real terms trajectory of spending on the security and resilience functions of the Cabinet Office? If it is rising, by how much and how fast is it rising? The first duty of the state is to protect its people, and on the evidence before us today, based purely on the figures, it is a duty in which the Government are failing. History will not forgive those who saw the danger, named it and looked away. We therefore hope that the Government will take away our request and act to fund our defence, fund our national security, and step up and fund our national resilience.

I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) on securing the debate. He will, of course, know the importance to this Government of the topics discussed today. Keeping the country safe is the first responsibility of any Government, and as the world changes, the way we uphold that responsibility must change with it. This adaptability is set out in the national security strategy, published last year at the beginning of the NATO summit in The Hague. Alongside it was the commitment to spend 5% of GDP on national security by 2035—3.5% for core defence spending and 1.5% for broader resilience and security spending.

The Majority of the UK’s hard national security capabilities, such as the recently announced 150,000 drones that the Ministry of Defence will supply to Ukraine by the end of the year, are funded and delivered by line departments. The Cabinet Office’s role is ensuring the effective running of government, and co ordinating cross cutting policies and operations. More than 90% of the national security and resilience budget for the Cabinet Office is therefore spent on the day to day running costs of the National Security Secretariat. That is a vital body that works with Departments to implement the national security strategy. It develops, leads and delivers policy across Government, and aligns, convenes and brokers the collective efforts of our stakeholders and partners on all aspects of national security. It is the nerve centre of our collective cross Government security response. However, that spending it is not by any means the vast amount that is spent on national security and resilience across Government.

The Cabinet Office does invest in some assets. For example, the National Situation Centre, which is highly regarded internationally, provides situational awareness for crisis response by bringing together data analysis and expertise. The emergency alerts system is one of many public warning and informing capabilities that the UK Government, devolved Governments and category 1 responders have at their disposal. Since its launch, it has become an integral part of keeping the public safe, allowing the quick sharing of lifesaving information, and it is regularly tested to ensure its resilience. The UK Resilience Academy forms an important part of the skills and engagement offer. It was established in April last year to build the skills that are needed across the whole of society to respond to emergencies.

The national security strategy consolidates various reviews and strategies related to national security into a single, coherent framework. It outlines the strategic context, identifies the main challenges we face as a nation in an era of radical uncertainty, and establishes the framework that the UK uses to guide its actions both at home and abroad. It is both a clear eyed and a hard edged plan to deal with the breadth of the challenges that we face, setting out a long term vision for how we will do three crucial things: protect security at home, promote strength abroad, and increase our sovereign and asymmetric capabilities.

The Government have developed an internal implementation approach to ensure the accountability and delivery of the national security strategy, as well as ensuring that we adapt to a volatile geopolitical landscape. That is why our national security is not the remit of one Department or Minister. We have identified specific objectives, and have assigned lead and assisting Departments to deliver them. Departments are responsible for periodic reporting on progress, and taking action to address any deficiencies.

The Government will continue to update the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy on progress, through formal public sessions and confidential sessions where appropriate. As part of the implementation of the strategy, we continue to make ourselves a harder target for hostile actors who seek to exploit our open, democratic society. That includes bolstering our cyber and economic security defences, which are essential to the fostering of innovation and growth.

Additionally, we are strengthening the defence of our borders and territorial waters.

In April the former Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey), exposed covert Russian undersea activity, paying tribute to the readiness of the UK’s armed forces to respond. In May, Baroness Lloyd, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology, outlined DSIT’s plans to present new legislative proposals to modernise and strengthen penalties for malicious activity impacting our undersea infrastructure.

As I am sure events in recent weeks have made clear, our overriding priority is ensuring stability and security in the Euro Atlantic area, starting with our unwavering support for Ukraine. In total, the UK has committed up to £25 billion for Ukraine: £16 billion in military support, £5.6 billion in non military support, and £3.5 billion in UK export finance. We continue to go further, renewing and deepening our key alliances, particularly those with the United States and the European Union. All this work is bolstered by new international partnerships, especially in emerging policy areas such as technology—for example, the UK India technology security initiative and the UK Japan frontier technology partnership.

It remains the Government’s intention to publish the defence investment plan before the NATO summit, which will take place on 7 July. The plan will set out much of our future strategy when it comes to how we will protect and defend our country. Let me give Members some idea of its focus. We will rebuild our core defence industrial base, focusing on achieving greater resilience in our stockpiles and supporting warfighting readiness.

I am going to ask the rather obvious question. Given that the plan is to be put forward under the existing Prime Minister, does that mean that if the new Prime Minister wishes to change it, it will be changed, or will the commitment that is to be made to the forthcoming NATO Assembly have to stand as it is?

As always, the right hon. Gentleman has asked a very important question. I think the key thing to understand is that this work is ongoing, and that there will be co operation between the current Prime Minister and—I do not want to get ahead of what Labour party members might decide to do—whoever the next Prime Minister will be. I hope that gives the right hon. Gentleman some assurance.

Beyond defence, we will identify, protect and cultivate other sovereign capabilities, such as foundational industries and frontier technologies, that are critical to our industrial base and national competitiveness. I was interested by what my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington said in this connection. We are in close contact and collaboration with states such as Canada to learn as much as we can about how they do resilience, although I might gently suggest that the Canadian landmass is slightly different from the UK landmass when it comes to thinking of organising a defence for it, and slightly different approaches will clearly have to be taken, given the geographical realities. However, there is much on which we can co operate.

rose—

Has he just come in?

Order. The hon. Member has been here throughout the debate.

I give way.

Thank you very much for coming to my assistance, Madam Deputy Speaker—or to my defence, rather ironically.

The Minister has touched on critical industries as a key part of our defence plans for the future. Does she agree that our sovereign capability to manufacture our own fighter aircraft is critical, and does she share my dismay that our production lines sit empty, with no orders from the Government to maintain that sovereign capability?

All I will say is that it is important that we rebuild our industrial infrastructure and make sure that we not only maintain but strengthen our sovereign capabilities, not only for now but with forward looking tech and investment. The Government are determined to do that.

A foundation of our national security is our ability to assess, mitigate, respond to and recover from the risks that we face, should they manifest. These risks could come from anywhere. They could be natural hazards, as we have all been experiencing over the last few days, or they could be deliberate attacks, disease outbreaks or other civil emergencies.

The Minister has not mentioned climate change. Climate change is not a natural hazard; it is a human made major risk.

I agree, and it is important for the hon. Lady to understand that we are integrating climate change risks into our work. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs is the leading Department on work on climate adaptation, not mitigation. It is important that lead Departments can focus on the issue at hand, and DEFRA is doing adaptation.

One of the key points that I tried to get across in my speech is that this has to be a whole of Government effort. DEFRA cannot put in place a strategy to adapt the health service to the reality of climate change. It cannot put in place a strategy to adapt our schools, our transport infrastructure or our energy infrastructure to the reality of climate change. Does the Minister not recognise that this has to be a whole of Government effort, and that it is not something that DEFRA can hold? That is precisely why we need a Cabinet Office Minister to lead on climate resilience.

The hon. Lady points out that adaptation is a cross Government, cross departmental thing. The way that the UK Government are organised means that Departments that are responsible for school buildings or transport deal with the adaptation issues that crop up in those Departments. I do not disagree with the hon. Lady’s analysis, but while the Cabinet Office does have a co ordinating role, I do not necessarily think that having a Minister co ordinating it would make an awful lot of difference.

Since as early as 2013, when I was working with the Cabinet Office—specifically with the Joint Intelligence Organisation and others—climate change has been included in the matrix that it is required to plan for, respond to and seek to mitigate from a national security perspective. It is very much reflected in the national —I have forgotten the exact words, but it is the one that does not have an acronym. That is what happens when you work on something for too long. Climate change is in there and has been in there for a very long time, even way back when I was a civil servant.

The hon. Lady is correct, and she talks about mitigation. There is also an adaptation issue here, which I was addressing, but clearly the cross departmental nature of co ordination happens within the Cabinet Office.

Our country’s resilience is front and centre of our approach to national security. Without security and resilience at home, we cannot deliver economic growth or any of our other missions to improve the lives of the British people.

My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) gave a good speech about what happens if corruption is allowed to get out of hand and people who defraud the public purse of money are allowed to get away with it. I thank him for asking important questions about Tom Hayhoe’s recommendations. I promise to make inquiries with colleagues in Government, and commit to writing to him about the specific issues that he raised in his speech.

The Government inherited a resilience landscape that had too often been neglected, leaving our nation exposed to the shocks of an increasingly volatile world. The resilience action plan, published last July, sets out the Government’s strategic approach to creating a stronger and more resilient UK, and the steps being taken to deliver it. We face a rapidly changing global risk landscape. From severe weather to geopolitical instability, the risks are complex and numerous. We must be honest with the public about the challenges while demonstrating our resolve to address them head on, and we have to strike a balance by giving an appropriate warning without panicking people. Building a truly resilient society requires a fundamental cultural shift in the way that emergency preparedness is thought about. That includes being clear about the risks we face and the actions that we can all take to improve collective resilience, as the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart) said from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench.

In summary, our No. 1 priority is to keep the country safe. The Government are undertaking plenty of work within our own shores to strengthen our stance, which is further bolstered by our unshakeable commitment to Europe wide security. That responsibility has been spread right across the Government, and it is emblematic of the good work that can come when collaboration is at the heart of planning. Thanks to this work, the risk landscape is not an unknown country; we have made it familiar terrain through rigorous mapping of what could harm us and our citizens, and of what our response should be. It is through level headed planning that we will create resilience at home and, through that work, create a secure foundation for families, businesses and economies to thrive.

I call Matt Western to wind up briefly.

I will keep it brief, as requested. I thank all Members from across the Chamber for making time to contribute to this debate, which underlines the importance and urgency of the challenge that we face in the wider security and resilience landscape. That includes health, energy, water supplies, climate, our economy and our democracy. Even the Electoral Commission has suffered a cyber attack.

We face so many challenges and threats, and there are states that wish to exploit our weaknesses. That is why this debate is so important. The Backbench Business Committee recognises the number, scale and diversity of the attacks that we are now facing. Members have made points about the Canadian system and spoken about corruption. My hon. Friend the Member for Bolton West (Phil Brickell) talked about financial impropriety, and others spoke of the attacks on the Prime Minister. It is vital that we get our heads around the urgency of this issue, because the attacks that we face are growing exponentially and becoming more and more creative and inventive.

Once again, I thank the Backbench Business Committee for granting this debate, and thank Members for their contributions.

Question deferred until tomorrow at Seven o’clock (Standing Order No. 54).