Commons Chamber
Tuesday 16 June 2026
The House met at half past Eleven o’clock
Prayers
[Mr Speaker in the Chair]
Colleagues, today we mark the 10th anniversary of the murder of our former colleague and friend to so many in this place, Jo Cox. Jo was proud to be the Member of Parliament for Batley and Spen. She was dedicated to serving her constituents and was a relentless campaigner for equality, human rights and social justice. Jo’s death while carrying out her constituency duties shocked Members across the House. In my role as chair of the parliamentary security committee at the time of her death, and since then as Speaker, I have made it my personal mission to improve the security and safety of Members, their families and staff, because no Member should fear carrying out their democratic duties.
In remembering Jo today, I invite all the House to reflect on the words she shared during her maiden speech, when she said: “we are far more united and have far more in common than that which divides us.”—[Official Report, 3 June 2015; Vol. 596, c. 674-75.] Our thoughts are with Jo’s family and friends on this day.
The Secretary of State was asked—
Mr Speaker, I echo your words about Jo Cox, our friend and colleague, who we remember in our hearts. Had she not been so brutally murdered, she would have been in this House and, I am almost certain, would have been present for Foreign Office questions today.
Rivers originating from the Tibetan plateau are thought to sustain 1.8 billion people directly, providing drinking water, irrigation and power generation. Through the Himalayan resilience action programme, the UK has supported research into climate and environment risks around the Tibetan plateau and supported efforts to strengthen climate resilience in the region. The resilience action programme has promoted science based policy and dialogue across the Hindu Kush Himalaya.
Mr Speaker, I echo what you said about Jo Cox. I think her message is more important today than it ever was.
I thank the Minister for her response. China’s actions, from environmentally destructive mining to building dams to divert water sources, will have consequences far beyond the Tibetan plateau, as she says, as will the failure to address the impact of climate change on the third pole. What steps can the UK take to raise these issues at a global level? Does the Minister agree that the voices of Tibetans should be heard in any such talks?
The UK continues to engage with China on climate and environmental issues. During the recent UK China environment dialogue, the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs secured agreement for greater collaboration with China on ecosystem resilience, biodiversity, conservation and multilateral environmental processes. Our Himalayan resilience action plan is building regional resilience through nature based solutions, tackling water insecurity, air quality management and promoting dialogue through the International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development. As countries come together in pursuit of these solutions, it is important that affected communities are consulted.
The Tibetan Parliament in exile, which the all party parliamentary group on Tibet visited a couple of weeks ago—we have engaged extensively with it—is terribly worried that the central Tibet Autonomous Region is completely closed off by the Chinese Communist party to any outside access. Little comes out and almost nothing goes in. Is the Minister not worried about the complete secrecy in which the Chinese authorities can conduct environmental destruction that has a massive global impact?
The hon. Lady raises an important concern. We are concerned by reporting from the UN special rapporteurs that large scale environmental projects in Tibet risk the forced displacement of Tibetans from their ancestral villages. It is important that we keep these issues on our radar.
I stand and look at the shield to Jo Cox above us today, and I add my personal tribute to Jo. She was a fellow West Yorkshire MP and a passionate and committed internationalist, as well as somebody who brought communities together here at home. We think of Jo’s family and especially of her sister Kim who is keeping Jo’s legacy alive.
The US is our deepest security and intelligence ally, our biggest trading partner and our top export market, and I saw again the strength of our people to people relationship when I joined His Majesty the King on the state visit to mark 250 years since the declaration of independence.
I regret that I never had the chance to meet Jo Cox, but the Secretary of State is right: her sister is doing her very proud.
As well as being the year in which the current US President was born, 1946 was the year in which the UK US special relationship was formally cemented in Winston Churchill’s “Sinews of Peace” speech, and was credited by Russian historians with marking the start of the cold war. That war ended in the 1980s, but the relationship between western allies and Russia is distinctly chilly again, with threats appearing close to our shores even this weekend.
I welcome the progress on an Iranian ceasefire, but over the three months for which the US and Israel have been at war with Iran, the conflict has made many people rich, and it has been reported that Russian revenue from oil and petroleum has increased by 39%. Given that the actions of the United States appear to be helping Russia rather than supporting Ukraine and NATO, does the Foreign Secretary share my concern that that is causing further damage to a special relationship that has endured for 80 years?
The Prime Minister is discussing the importance of support for Ukraine at the G7 today, and the G7 has had meetings with President Zelensky about the importance of maintaining the economic pressure on Russia. The hon. Lady is right to highlight the risk that Russia will become a beneficiary from the conflict in Iran. It is crucial that we ensure that that is not the case and also maintain that pressure, which we are working with the US to do.
May I echo your words, Mr Speaker, and those of the Secretary of State about Jo Cox? I am sure that everyone in the House is thinking of her today.
Our special relationship with the United States is about more than just the President; it is about a deep connection with the American people, and I think we should always remember that. I am very proud of my Prime Minister’s actions with regard to the conflict in Iran, but does the Foreign Secretary agree that it is hugely important for us to continue to have that special relationship with the United States, not just with the American people but with American businesses such as Raytheon in my constituency of Harlow?
I thought for a second that we were not going to get to the mention of Harlow, but eventually we did, with my hon. Friend’s final word. I welcome his question. He is right: the UK took a different view from the US at the start of the Iran conflict, and I think we were right to do so, but our countries continue to engage in close security and economic co operation—and, having met representatives of many of the businesses most closely involved in that relationship during the King’s visit, I know that my hon. Friend’s businesses in Harlow will continue to do so as well.
I call the shadow Foreign Secretary.
I echo your sombre words about Jo Cox, Mr Speaker. Her memory and her family are in our thoughts today.
The United Kingdom’s long standing strategic, security, defence and intelligence relationship with the United States is crucial for us and for our allies. Can the Foreign Secretary tell us what role Britain has played in the negotiations between the United States and the middle east in relation to Iran, given our historic links to partners in the region? Have the Government seen the US Iran agreement, and what is Britain’s role in shaping future foreign policy and the security architecture in the middle east?
The shadow Foreign Secretary has made an immensely important point. I spoke to Secretary of State Rubio on Friday about the final stages of the discussions that were taking place before the memorandum of understanding was agreed. It is just the start of many further phases of work, negotiations and discussions, including discussions on nuclear power—we are clear about the fact that Iran must never obtain a nuclear weapon, and we stand ready to support those detailed and technical talks—and on the importance of reopening the strait of Hormuz. We have engaged in discussions not just with the US but with France, with which we have been building the maritime mission, and also with partners in the Gulf, so we can ensure that freedom of navigation is restored as swiftly as possible.
The settlements in the west bank are a fundamental barrier to peace, and a flagrant breach of international law. We condemn the rising and incredibly disturbing settler violence that we have seen over the past year. Last week I announced a new wave of sanctions to target the networks that are supporting this violence, which is the fourth package of sanctions against extremist Israeli settlers under this Government.
Let me add a few words about the murder of Jo Cox. I was a friend and colleague of Jo’s, and I still remember the numbness and shock that I felt on hearing the news. Quite simply, no Member of this House should fear for their life because they speak out on behalf of their constituents.
The west bank is illegally occupied by Israel. The settlements are illegal and have been expanded through extreme violence by settlers, supported by the Israel Defence Forces. I do not know whether my right hon. Friend is aware that, in May, the Dutch Government decided to ban trade in goods from settlements. They did so because they wanted to put pressure on the Israeli Government. The Dutch Foreign Minister made it very clear that the Dutch Government acknowledged that enforcement would be difficult and that they carefully weigh up these matters, but they decided in the end that doing anything was better than doing nothing. May I suggest that might be an appropriate course of action for our Government? We ought to be seen on the right side of this, and finding reasons why we cannot act is not right. We ought to be acting on this matter.
Let me respond to my hon. Friend’s important point. We are clear that action is needed, and we are acting. This Government have done more on this issue in the last two years than any Government have done for many decades, because we are so concerned about settlement expansion and settler violence. We have not only had the recent sanctions against settler violence but sanctioned two Israeli Cabinet Ministers, because we take this issue so seriously. However, I think my hon. Friend and I agree on the principle that the settlements are legal. No one should be profiting from them, and we do not want businesses to be trading with them or operating within illegal settlements. A number of countries have explored legal bans but have also had challenges with them, and we are looking at what they have done.
There have been over 760 incidents this year, resulting in casualties, property damage and 57 deaths, so it is clear that diplomacy and the action we have taken so far are not moving the dial. I appreciate that we are only one voice in the international community, but we clearly need to be seen to be doing absolutely everything we can to make a difference on this issue. What will it take for the Government to take further action, and to go further on sanctions and settlement trade?
Last week, we did take further action and set out a new wave of sanctions. On Friday, I went to Paris for a meeting with other Foreign Ministers, and also met civil society organisations and community organisations from across Israel and Palestine. Last week, we launched the international peace fund with Australia and Canada in order to support the community level building of the foundations of a two state solution. Later this week, I will go to Egypt to have similar discussions. In the end, we will only make progress through concerted international diplomacy and working in partnership, because no country can do this alone.
May I echo what hon. Members have said about Jo Cox?
One Palestinian child has been killed every week in the west bank since January 2025. Hundreds remain in detention, and many more face significant disruption to their education. What steps are the Government taking with international partners to improve the safety of children in the west bank and to ensure that they can enjoy an education free from violence?
My hon. Friend is right to raise the plight of children in the west bank. I would add to that the terrible plight of children in Gaza, where there is still not sufficient humanitarian support—that has gone backwards too. He is also right to say that some of this is about the impact of violence. Some of the targeted and ideologically driven violence against Palestinians on their own land is settler terrorism, and we should call it that. We are continuing to provide support for children in Palestine, including by providing additional funding for the Palestinian Authority so that it can pay the salaries of teachers and keep schools going.
Last week I signed a letter to the Foreign Secretary, along with 140 colleagues, asking the Government to take further action in response to settler violence and the rhetoric used by two far right Israeli Government Ministers. Over the last two years, I have heard from hundreds of my constituents expressing their deep concern about the Israeli Government’s actions in the west bank. Will the Secretary of State commit today to banning all trade with illegal settlements, and if not, why not?
I thank my hon. Friend for his question. The expansion of Israeli settlements and some of the violence circulating in them is a deliberate attempt by hardliners to undermine any possibility of a two state solution and to pursue in many areas what is effectively illegal annexation—that is their intention. We agree on the principles that no one should be trading with illegal settlements. That is different from long standing legitimate trade with businesses across Israel, which we continue to support. A small number of countries have explored legal bans, but they have had challenges with them. The most effective impact we can have on all these issues is to work internationally with other countries to provide new energy behind the two state solution, as we had last year.
I welcome the Foreign Secretary’s use of the term “settler terrorism”. She is absolutely right; the phrase “settler violence” does not do justice to what is happening. She will be aware that settler terrorism is often enabled and encouraged, or at best a blind eye is turned, by both the Israeli police and the IDF. She will know the damage perpetrated by that terrorist activity. If Israel wishes to remain the villa in the jungle it has always wished to be, can she at least remind her Israeli Government counterparts of the importance of the rule of law and the separation of the duties of the IDF and the police when it comes to protecting the citizens of both Israel and Palestine?
We continually raise these issues with the Israeli Government, because we cannot have what we have seen: property damage, intimidation, farmers’ olive trees burnt down, families’ water disconnected and mobs rampaging. That is why we have introduced the scale of the breadth of sanctions, including on organisations such as the Farms Association which have been supporting them. It is also why we need to challenge any culture of impunity. There has to be accountability for what are, effectively, criminal acts.
The Secretary of State says she is looking at options and that she wishes to work in partnership in the international sphere. She must accept that the UK has significant history and responsibility in this region. Does she not listen to the words of her Back Benchers? It is incumbent on her to take action now—not simply to look at things and to seek partnership—to have real effect on this appalling, continuing outrage.
I would point out to the hon. Gentleman that the action we have already taken has a stronger impact than many of the other measures he is talking about. That includes imposing sanctions on individual members of the Israeli Cabinet, which very many other Governments have not done. We encourage other Governments to do what we have done. It also includes the work internationally to seek to find new energy behind the two state solution. That includes the 20-point peace plan in Gaza, but must include the west bank as well. Tomorrow, when I travel to Egypt, I will be meeting the new Palestinian National Committee that will be operating in Gaza. It is that concerted international effort that we need to have an impact.
Last week Amnesty International published a report entitled “Erasing Anything Palestinian”, which shines a powerful light on Israel’s ethnic cleansing in the west bank. It makes clear that what is happening is not driven by rogue settlers or a few extremist Ministers; rather, it is state sanctioned and state financed. Yet to date the UK’s response has been largely performative and, unfortunately, fairly inconsequential. Do the Government accept that this is state enabled ethnic cleansing? If they do, should they not be doing much, much more to prevent it and to punish the perpetrator?
Once again, I point out the strength of the action we have taken; we have brought together countries from across the world—and gone further than most countries. What is being driven here is deeply disturbing: both the level of violence, and the deliberate attempt—with the E1 settlements in particular—to undermine any possibility of a two state solution. That is a long term thing, and it has been supported by many people across the Israeli Government. It is a deep challenge for everyone, which is why we need international action. In the autumn, we had the international consensus and energy to deliver the 20-point plan for Gaza, which nobody expected would be achieved. We need to pull that energy together again. That is why I was in Paris on Friday, it is why I discussed this issue with Australia and Canada, as well as European colleagues, and it is why I will go to Egypt—to the middle east, where the energy on many of these things has come from—in order to try to make progress on it again.
I would like to start by joining you, Mr Speaker, and colleagues across the House in paying tribute to the memory of Jo Cox. Her words about seeking what we have in common, and working to counter the politics of division, are today more relevant than ever—for all of us.
The Secretary of State set out piecemeal and entirely inadequate measures last week in relation to west bank settlement activity. It was raised with her then that the UK would be hosting the Great Israeli Real Estate Event at the weekend, and she undertook to look into it. That event took place, with properties in illegal settlements being marketed on British territory—the Government have been sent the evidence. How is it that this Government fail even to prevent the marketing of illegal property in this country? How is it that they still fail to take action? The Secretary of State continues to tell us about the meetings that she has had, but what we want is leadership. The UK has a particular responsibility, so will she step up and ban trade with illegal settlements?
We have been very clear not only that no businesses should be engaging in trade or marketing around the illegal settlements, but that they certainly should not be doing so on UK soil. We take this issue so seriously, which is why the Minister for the Middle East and North Africa and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport have raised it directly with the Advertising Standards Authority. We have asked the authority to urgently look into the matter and reassure us that, if there is any evidence of the advertising or promotion of property in illegal settlements at that event or any others, it will uphold the law, regulations and guidance that apply. It is extremely important that those standards are met in the UK, and that is exactly why we have raised the matter so seriously with the Advertising Standards Authority.
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
May I associate my party with your tribute to the life and work of Jo Cox, Mr Speaker, and extend our thoughts to her family and her many friends?
The prospect of a two state solution rests on at least two essential conditions: the protection of Palestine’s territorial integrity, and political reform within the Palestinian state. This weekend in London, we saw the selling of properties in illegal settlements. The expansion of such settlements must instead be reversed by cutting off their finance at source. Will the Foreign Secretary commit to withdrawing the licence to operate of any UK financial institution facilitating credit or services for illegal settlement activity? Given that President Abbas has now announced that legislative and presidential elections will be held in early 2027, what measures are the Government taking to ensure that those elections will be free and fair?
I welcome the points made by the hon. Member. We continue to look at what further sanctions could be needed in order to address illegal settlements, the activity linked to them, and settler violence. We are also looking at whether and where we may need to strengthen our overall sanctions regime, as well as at individual sanctions issues.
We support the reform measures around the Palestinian Authority, including the free and fair elections, which are crucial. We are also providing direct funding to the Palestinian Authority, including to pay salaries, and, through Michael Barber, we are providing expertise to support the modernisation of the Palestinian Authority, because that is a fundamental part of having a Palestinian state. Whether in the west bank, in Gaza, or in East Jerusalem, it is crucial that Palestine must be run by Palestinians.
As you will know, Mr Speaker, Jo Cox was a good friend of mine long before we came into this place, as well as a colleague of mine at Oxfam, and I have to say that coming in today on this anniversary is particularly sad. I also know that Jo would have told me to stop getting so emotional and to get on with the job in her inimitable way, as she often did—so I will do just that.
We are committed to increasing the economic pressure on Russia by disrupting the revenue the Kremlin generates from Russia’s energy trade, including oil, which remains its primary means of financing the illegal war in Ukraine. The Prime Minister has today announced further sanctions, designating and specifying 70 individuals, entities and ships under the UK’s sanctions regulations, including 20 shadow fleet vessels.
While diplomatic pressure on China, India and Turkey is essential, we must also do more militarily to disrupt the shadow fleet carrying Putin’s oil. I pay tribute to our armed forces who, this weekend, boarded a Russia linked tanker in UK waters under new Government powers. Since those powers were announced in March, 184 sanctioned shadow fleet vessels have made 238 journeys through UK waters, including 94 journeys into territorial waters, without a single interdiction until now. What is the Department doing with the Ministry of Defence and international partners to ensure that this is a sustained approach, rather than a one off?
The hon. Gentleman will understand that I am not going to comment on future operational matters. What I can say is that we have also assisted in the interdictions of other vessels, including by working with the French and the United States in relation to the Bella 1. We keep Russia’s activities under very close review and designate hundreds of vessels under the shadow fleet measures, and we will look at all opportunities to ensure that they cannot evade sanctions.
Two years ago, I visited Ukraine, taking medical supplies in refurbished ambulances; we had to stop only twice to fill up with diesel, which made us realise just how close to us the frontline really is. It is deeply troubling that the Government are now reneging on their full support of Ukraine by pursuing an indefinite waiver on imports of Russian oil via third countries. I ask the Foreign Secretary to reverse course on this, and to close any loopholes putting any money into Putin’s war machine.
With respect, the hon. Gentleman may not have caught up with developments on that front. First, it was never an indefinite waiver; we said that we were keeping it under two weekly review—my colleagues in the Department for Business and Trade made that very clear. Yesterday in the House, and indeed in announcements over the weekend, we set clear end dates for those temporary licences, which are to phase in these measures. Of course, these are new measures—we were never watering down previous sanctions; these are toughening the sanctions on Russia, but with sensible provisions in place to phase them in.
The Minister will be aware that the sanctioned oil and gas that is sold by Russia to Turkey and China is often used by companies in those countries to manufacture products, including ceramics. Those products are then dumped into the UK, distorting our domestic manufacturing base. That is a secondary impact of the profits coming from that sanctioned material. What evidence is the Department sharing with the Department for Business and Trade so that it can put in place the trade remedies necessary to protect our domestic manufacturing from the impacts of this illegal trading?
My hon. Friend raises an important issue. I would be happy to discuss it further with him, as, I am sure, would colleagues from the Department for Business and Trade.
I call the shadow Minister.
We pay tribute to our armed forces for their courage and bravery in boarding and seizing the Russian shadow fleet vessel at the weekend. We also welcome the further sanctions announced today, including those targeting the shadow fleet. We urge the Government to put pressure on those who buy and refine Russian oil, as the freedom of Ukraine depends on cutting off the funds that finance Putin’s illegal war. Given the urgency on the battlefields of Ukraine and the inflated revenue Putin has recently had from Russian oil, does the Minister think that the situation can wait until 2027 for the introduction of the ban on Russian originated diesel and jet fuel imports?
The shadow Minister asks an important question. I made it clear in yesterday’s Delegated Legislation Committee that that is the end date, but we are keeping it under review every two weeks and the licence could end before then, with the appropriate notice in place for industry. I am clear that our sanctions are having a categorical impact on the Russian economy. Russia has slashed its economic growth forecasts, and collectively our sanctions have denied Russia access to $450 billion, which could have fuelled the war for many more years. Our sanctions are having an impact, but we will continue to toughen them.
We both agree that this is important. While Putin uses globally inflated oil prices to fund his war machine, our own defence investment plan is in tatters. The former Defence Secretary’s shocking resignation letter said that the Prime Minister was “unable”, and the Chancellor “unwilling”, to provide the funding for the defence investment plan. That is absolutely damning. Astonishingly, the very next day the Government announced £4.5 billion to paint 10,000 new zebra crossings. Given that the FCDO made a big cut to its own budget to fund defence last year, does the Minister share my anger that other Departments are refusing to contribute to keep our country safe?
Order. We have to be careful not to go very wide of the original question—and I think that was well wide, so I will call Rachel Hopkins to ask the next question.
As the Foreign Secretary said in her Locarno speech in December, and as the Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service reinforced a week later, an industrial scale attack is being waged every day through social media, designed to undermine our democracies and divide our societies. We know that networks attributed to Russia, including Doppelgänger, are flooding social media in countries across the world—not just the UK—with counterfeit documents and deepfake material in an attempt to weaken global support for Ukraine. We are taking tough action on this front with our international partners.
Every single day a tidal wave of disinformation is being targeted at social media users in our country and around the world—and if we are in any doubt who is behind that wave of lies and fake images, we need only look at how much of it is designed to undermine the Ukrainian war effort or attack President Zelensky. Does the Minister agree that in order to protect the people of Ukraine, we need to take the fight to the sources of this information warfare?
I completely agree with my hon. Friend. That is exactly why we have taken the action that we have: since October 2024, we have exposed and sanctioned 96 actors and entities involved in this type of activity, and in May we imposed sanctions on another 56 individuals and entities that are particularly involved in activity to undermine Ukraine. That included employees of Social Design Agency and ANO Dialog. We are constantly looking at what measures we can take, and taking action. The Kremlin is spending billions of dollars on information warfare. We will expose this activity and take it down.
In 2017 there was appalling ethnic cleansing in Myanmar, and Facebook was used to recruit civilian death squads. Atrocities continue to this day. The UK holds the pen on Myanmar at the UN. At the General Assembly this year, will the Foreign Secretary hold a high level meeting to look at this issue and shine a spotlight on the human rights abuses that continue to this day in Myanmar?
I am sure that my ministerial colleagues with responsibility for Myanmar would like to follow up with the right hon. Gentleman on that issue. The challenge of misinformation and disinformation relates not only to Russia but to a whole series of contexts—and not just states. We also see it in non state actors, including Daesh and other organisations. We are working very closely with partners to identify and tackle those networks.
I call the Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee.
The political murder of Jo Cox was deeply affecting for many of us—and, frankly, none of us should ever recover from it. She was not only brave and principled; she was also funny. If I ever need to cheer myself up, I simply remember her throwing her little body into the interparliamentary tug of war and how very funny it was—and she knew it.
My Committee and the Philip Rycroft review have found that the UK is already experiencing Russian disinformation warfare and that our defences to it are worryingly weak. We have both recommended a statutory, public facing national counter disinformation centre to ensure a co ordinated response. The French have done it. The Swedes have done it. The Ukrainians have done it. I wonder whether the Minister can hold out hope that, someday soon, Britain might do it too.
Well, Jo certainly was funny. I remember standing in King Charles Street with her once just before going to see officials in the Foreign Office—she had lots of climbing ropes in her bag as she had just got back from a hiking expedition. There were many fun moments with her over the years.
My right hon. Friend raises a crucial point. I really welcome the work that she and her Committee have done on this issue. We have taken their recommendations seriously and I will continue the conversation with her. I cannot make the promise that she is asking for at the moment, but we are certainly looking closely at the suggestion.
At the end of March, the Foreign Affairs Committee published a report into disinformation diplomacy. We investigated how malign actors are seeking to undermine democracy in the UK from overseas using information manipulation and interference, with such techniques as spoofing, bots and co ordinated inauthentic behaviour. The Committee recommended that the Government demand greater transparency from social media companies in relation to the algorithms exploited by malign actors overseas. What discussions are being had with other Government Departments to make that so?
I assure the hon. Member that we are very much having discussions with counterparts across Government. I am sure that in the next few days I will be meeting the new Security Minister and the new Minister for the Armed Forces. I also recently met a Minister at the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology to discuss these very issues. I assure him that we are working closely together across Government on this issue.
The UK has allocated £26.9 million of UK aid funding to support the response to the current Ebola outbreak within the DRC. That funding will strengthen disease surveillance and rapid response, and improve infection prevention and control. We are also working with the World Health Organisation and the Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention to help scale up the response and adapt existing programmes. This is a deeply concerning situation. Over the coming weeks, we will continue to work intensively alongside international partners to monitor developments and take the necessary action to protect both regional and global health security.
The Ebola outbreak now spans 29 health zones across three eastern provinces and is a reminder to us all that infectious diseases do not respect borders. With global health funding under significant pressure, does the Minister share my concern that we risk undermining the early warning systems that ultimately protect people here at home? Can he set out what steps the UK is taking to maintain its leadership role in global security?
I am glad to say that the UK is not stepping back; our response to the outbreak confirms that. We currently sit on the board of the WHO, the Global Fund, Gavi and the Pandemic Fund. Our investment helps to maintain critical global health security infrastructure, as well as tackling other health security threats such as antimicrobial resistance. Our leadership is amplified by world class research and development, and is a trailblazer in the life sciences sector.
The covid-19 pandemic showed us how quickly infectious diseases can spread globally and the importance of acting early to contain outbreaks at source. Given that lesson, can the Minister outline how the UK is working with international partners to strengthen pandemic preparedness through this response, including by improving surveillance, early warning systems and rapid response capacity in countries like the Democratic Republic of the Congo, so that outbreaks such as Ebola are contained before they pose a wider global health risk?
As my hon. Friend said, our immediate priority is supporting the DRC and the Africa led response to the Ebola outbreak. The UK and international support will also strengthen health systems so that countries can better respond to future outbreaks. That includes backing Government owned surveillance systems through the World Bank and major global health organisations. It also means providing UK expertise through mechanisms such as the UK Health Security Agency’s UK public health rapid support team.
Thank you, Mr Speaker, for your wonderful words about Jo Cox and for the brilliant debate we had last Thursday as the main business of the House.
Following acknowledgment by the Development Minister, the noble Baroness Chapman, that Labour’s horrific development and aid cuts undermine the response to the Ebola crisis, and that funding is only 5% of the help provided for the last Ebola emergency a decade ago, will the Government make it clear that these pandemics cross borders and are a serious danger to all of us unless they are contained? Is that not the essence of the case for international development?
I can confirm that the UK is leading the global response on Ebola and was one of the first countries to respond with funding. I can also confirm that the Foreign Secretary is leading the charge on international funding to tackle the Ebola outbreak. The right hon. Gentleman is right to raise the concerns over international health security, and that is why the UK Government are continuing to lead from the front in tackling the Ebola outbreak.
This morning, we held an informal International Development Committee meeting with Professor Wim de Villiers and Richard Gordon of the University of Stellenbosch on the Ebola outbreak in the DRC. The University of Stellenbosch’s disease identification unit has been involved in working on strategies to combat this outbreak, and the team commended the FCDO and its involvement so far from Pretoria, citing the £100,000 funding committed locally. They made the point that in a situation like this, being fleet of foot is vital, and that much can be done locally in Africa to develop diagnostics and monitoring of the disease and, in the medium term, vaccines. Can the Minister confirm that all is being done to further support these local responses and initiatives—
Order. I think the Minister has got the message.
The hon. Member is absolutely right to say that this should be an Africa led response, and it is extremely important that we listen to what the African countries are telling us about how we respond to the Ebola outbreak. On investment in areas such as vaccinations, the Department of Health and the FCDO have invested £160 million in the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations to ensure that we are at the forefront of helping to develop vaccines. If the hon. Member would like to write to me further, he is very welcome to do so.
The closure of the strait of Hormuz has hit the global economy and prices at the pump here at home. No country should be able to hijack the global economy in this way. That is why we welcome the announcement of the memorandum of understanding between the US and Iran, and why the UK has been leading diplomatic work across the world to maintain the consensus behind the crucial principle of freedom of navigation and international maritime law, without tolls, restrictions or the threat of attack in the strait of Hormuz.
They say the devil is in the detail. While we await the full details of the US Iran agreement, does the Secretary of State agree that, had we followed the calls from Opposition Members to rush into war, it would only have prolonged the conflict and caused more financial misery to our constituents? Despite the noise and bluster, is it not the case that the only boats Opposition Members have stopped, through their cheerleading of the US aggression, are those left anchored between Iran and the Gulf states carrying oil bound for Britain?
We took a very different view from that of the US and Israel at the start of this conflict, and we were right to do so, and also a very different view from that of the Conservatives. However, we also believe in working internationally to bring this securely to an end, to support the further negotiations that are now needed, and, alongside France, to lead efforts to establish a defensive multilateral maritime mission to reassure international shipping and support the mine clearance to enable the reopening of the strait.
Iran has demonstrated that it can close the strait at will, and it probably will threaten to do so in the future when it wants something, so what can we do with international partners, particularly in the region, to engineer alternative routes that will allow oil, gas and fertiliser to exit the Gulf overland, thus neutralising the strait?
The right hon. Member makes a really important point, because economic security is something that all countries need to take much more seriously. The UK needs to take it more seriously. The Gulf countries are certainly taking it much more seriously and looking at ways to develop new infrastructure to provide different kinds of supply lines and opportunities. We are keen to work with them and we have been involved in discussions with them on that, but we also need to ensure that the strait of Hormuz opens. It is in line with international maritime law to open the strait fully, with no restrictions and no tolls, keeping it open for all.
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
The terms of the US Iran deal that have been briefed to the press look like a huge win for Iran. Above all, Iran has strengthened her position by showing the impact of closing the strait of Hormuz. This spectacular failure of Trump’s foreign policy has made us poorer and less secure, so what plans does the UK have to work with reliable allies to contain Iran’s malign influence, and will Ministers back the Liberal Democrat amendment to the National Security (State Threats) Bill, which would ensure that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is proscribed without delay?
The hon. Member will know that we are taking action to strengthen the legislation on state backed threats in the UK, and that I have been strongly involved in that and have strongly championed it. We have to ensure that any attempt to restrict or put tolls on the strait of Hormuz is never agreed to. It must be a fundamental principle that international shipping should be able to move through an international waterway. That is what we do in the strait of Dover; it is what needs to happen in the strait of Hormuz.
I have made violence against women and girls a priority for the Foreign Office. Last month, I had the privilege of launching the international coalition to end violence against women and girls, working with Spain, Australia, South Africa, Brazil, Jamaica, Morocco, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. We know that countries can work together and learn from each other on this crucial issue, which affects women worldwide.
I was moved to hear about Jo Cox’s life and the impact of her work on women globally in last week’s debate. She was a strong advocate for women’s rights and overseas development aid. Will the Secretary of State assure me that recent cuts to aid will not have an adverse impact on projects such as those I saw in Zimbabwe last year, which are helping to reduce the incidence of violence against women and girls?
I welcome my hon. Friend’s point. Jo was a tireless champion for women’s equality and opportunity in the UK, but she carried that with her all around the world, standing up for women’s opportunities and tackling issues internationally. My hon. Friend makes an important point. We have been clear that as part of the changes to overseas development, we will maintain and strengthen the priority of women and girls, so that by 2030 at least 90% of UK bilateral aid will support issues relating to women and girls.
A UN report from March last year laid bare the evidence of Israel’s systematic use of rape and sexual violence in the Occupied Palestinian Territories. Israeli settlers are committing sexual violence in sight of Israeli forces, according to a recent report by the West Bank Protection Consortium. Given the Government’s commitment to the safety of women and girls, will the Secretary of State commit to publishing a response to both of those reports?
I can tell the hon. Member that we take the abuse of and violence against women and girls in situations of conflict immensely seriously. That includes looking at issues that have been raised with us, including those relating to the west bank and other parts of the world. The UK was responsible for the UN resolution on women, peace and security 25 years ago; we are putting new energy behind that and raising it in every area of conflict.
I call the shadow Foreign Secretary.
What steps are being taken to investigate Daesh fighters who have returned to Britain and prosecute them for their crimes, including sexual violence and rape against the Yazidis and others? Given the importance of ensuring that there is accountability and reform of institutions to root out the risk of exploitation from the UN, charities and even the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, what is the Government’s response to the suspension of Karim Khan from the International Criminal Court for allegations of sexual misconduct?
The shadow Foreign Secretary will understand that I cannot comment in detail on individual cases, but we do take allegations extremely seriously in any institution. I can also tell her that we expect to see accountability for crimes of sexual violence, whether that is by individuals who come to the UK or issues across the world. We are also supporting expert evidence gathering, including in areas of conflict, so that there cannot be impunity for crimes against women and girls.
I want to formally welcome the fact that an agreement has been announced between the United States and Iran. We should be clear that this is an important diplomatic breakthrough, but it is still just the beginning of further discussions and negotiations that will be important to de escalate tensions, restore regional stability and reopen the strait of Hormuz. I commend the Government of Pakistan, alongside Qatar and others, who supported the mediation.
Now there must be full implementation and further work, including the restoration of toll free freedom of navigation through the strait, where the UK stands ready to provide support. We also stand ready to contribute to vital technical work to ensure that Iran never has a nuclear weapon and that there can be containment that restores regional security. It is vital that alongside this, all sides support a ceasefire and peace in Lebanon. We will work tirelessly alongside regional and international partners, including through the G7 and the United Nations and with our European partners, with sustained UK diplomacy to restore regional security and support for the global economy.
At COP29, an agreement was reached to provide $300 billion of international climate finance annually to developing countries by 2035 to help them pursue green growth pathways, access clean energy, reduce deforestation and so on. What steps is the Department taking to ensure that this commitment is delivered in full by our international partners, and will the Government press for that finance to be provided predominantly as grants rather than loans to avoid increasing debt burdens on developing countries?
My hon. Friend is right to raise the importance of this issue. Tackling climate change across the world helps in those countries, but it also helps us here at home. That is why we are supporting climate finance internationally, because we can multiply the impact we have by working through international climate finance and funds. As well as the billions of pounds of investment that the UK will be providing, we are mobilising billions more in finance from the private sector. We will continue to engage internationally with all countries so that they do their bit.
Can I please just remind everyone that we are on topicals? I call the shadow Foreign Secretary.
China’s human rights record is appalling. Did the Foreign Secretary know, while she was enjoying the hospitality of the Chinese Communist party earlier this month, that Chinese slave labour is being used to supply solar panels across UK schools and hospitals to meet Labour’s net zero targets? How has the Foreign Secretary allowed this to happen, and does she think it is acceptable for her Government to be turning a blind eye to Chinese slave labour and these awful human rights abuses?
I can be clear that this Government maintain high standards across our supply chains and are strengthening action against abuse within supply chains. While in China earlier this month, I raised issues around human rights and security. China is our third biggest trading partner and a permanent member of the Security Council. That is why we also discussed with it global security, and I think that the right hon. Lady should agree that it would be wrong to simply refuse to talk to China.
The Foreign Secretary will know that a secret camera was found in an office block where the plans for the Chinese spy hub super embassy were approved. No one knows yet where the camera came from, but it raises serious questions for the Government about their approval of this Chinese spy embassy. Can she say whether this act of foreign espionage will be investigated, and does this incident not once again highlight why China must be placed on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme?
The shadow Foreign Secretary and I are both former Home Secretaries who take any security threats immensely seriously. That is why the Government are strengthening the legislation on state backed threats—because we take security issues so seriously. As she will know, the UK has plans for new embassy facilities in Beijing, because it is important that we have international standard and secure facilities in order to be able to engage, including on security. That is why we have to talk to the biggest countries in the world.
We recognise the strength of feeling among diaspora communities and continue to press the Sri Lankan Government bilaterally and at the United Nations Human Rights Council for meaningful progress to improve the human rights situation. That includes securing truth, justice and accountability for past abuses affecting all communities, including Tamils. We have consistently raised concerns about the Prevention of Terrorism Act and its ongoing use, and we will continue to urge its repeal and replacement, in line with international law.
I met with European partners and others in Paris on Friday to discuss the importance of providing new energy behind not just the two state solution but, specifically, the Gaza 20-point plan. That is why we have announced the international peace fund, but we need that new commitment, because there is a serious risk that the 20-point plan is going backwards and into the ground. We need that international commitment.
Anthropic’s Fable 5 and Mythos 5 models have been withdrawn worldwide, including in the US. We respect that this is a decision for the US Government and are in direct contact with US Government officials as this develops. It reinforces the importance of Britain having greater sovereign control over critical technology and maintaining our national capabilities for us and our allies. The AI Security Institute is one of the best resourced teams of its kind anywhere in the world. Protecting our national security is central to this Government’s approach to AI.
We are very clear that the UK will not tolerate any attempts by foreign states to intimidate, harass or harm individuals or communities in the United Kingdom. That continues to be our position.
I call Dame Jessica Morden.
I congratulate my hon. Friend on her damehood, which is well deserved, and on her consistent advocacy in relation to Armenia. I can assure her that we are monitoring the concerning situation regarding Russian economic pressure on Armenia. We are developing our strategic partnership further. In fact, I was discussing Armenia with both US and EU counterparts in recent days, and we will work closely with international partners to ensure Armenia is robust and able to pursue its own future.
We call on the Taliban to respect the rights of women and girls, including the right to education, and condemn any ongoing restrictions. I will raise the hon. Member’s question with the Under Secretary of State for Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Affairs (Mr Falconer), who is travelling, and ensure that she gets a full written answer.
We are building long term partnerships between UK regions and our global network to support local growth, including in the west midlands and with more ministerial and head of mission visits across the UK this year. Our diplomatic advisory hub, delivered with the British Chambers of Commerce, is also supporting businesses to build geopolitical insight and to grow internationally, and we are working with the Department for Business and Trade to ensure that businesses seize opportunities from our trade agreements. Supporting growth at home is a priority for the whole Government.
The International Court of Justice directed third states not to enter into trade dealings with Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territories two years ago, but the Government have still not responded to that—why? Does the Secretary of State recognise the UK’s obligations to the ICJ, and will it comply?
The UK reiterates the call in the ICJ’s advisory opinion that Israel should end its occupation of Palestine as rapidly as possible and in line with our goal of a two state solution. There was a great deal in the advisory opinion with which we agree: the settlements are illegal, and we should distinguish in everything we do between Israel within its 1967 borders, and Palestinian territory that has been occupied since 1967.
I refer the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. The Government have previously stated that Hamas must voluntarily disarm in accordance with the 20-point peace plan, but that is clearly not happening. What is the Government’s practical strategy to ensure that Hamas is compelled to give up its weapons, cannot rebuild its military capabilities, and does not divert humanitarian aid?
Hamas is a terrorist organisation, and we have been clear that it must decommission its weaponry and no longer be allowed to pose a threat to Israel’s security. The UK is committed to supporting the implementation of the 20-point Gaza peace plan in full. As part of that transition process, set out in phase two of the peace plan, we will continue to support those international efforts and a credible plan to achieve those goals.
I recently visited Chad with the all party group for Sudan and South Sudan, and in that connection we will shortly be registering an interest. Like the Foreign Secretary, I was moved by Chad’s willingness to accept 1.3 million refugees, but disturbed by the horrific scale of the crisis. Will the Prime Minister be raising the Sudan crisis at the G7, because it must be raised at every international gathering? Is the UK advocating for countries such as Chad to be included in international talks?
I welcome my right hon. Friend visiting Chad and raising this issue, and I assure her that I have already raised it as part of the G7, when the G7 Foreign Ministers had a significant discussion. We will continue to raise the issue at every level, and pursue the possibility of comments around what is happening in Sudan at every level, including G7 communiques.
In Pakistan occupied Kashmir, Pakistani security forces have fired on peaceful demonstrators who were standing for human rights, and the right to food and proper security in their area. More than 30 people were killed, and more than 200 injured, including British nationals. What action has the Secretary of State taken to call in the Pakistani high commissioner and say not only that that is unacceptable, but ask what action is being taken to protect innocent bystanders?
We are concerned about developments in Pakistan administered Kashmir, including the loss of life of security personnel and civilians. We recognise that it is an internal matter for the authorities, but the hon. Gentleman will know that on 6 June we changed our travel advice to advise against all but essential travel to the Azad Jammu and Kashmir region of Pakistan administered Kashmir, due to the ongoing situation. He will also know that we continue closely to monitor the situation, including the impact on British nationals, engaging with the Government of Pakistan as appropriate.
Next January, the United Kingdom will take the chair of the G20, providing our country with a real platform to lead international conversations and to deliver here at home. Will the Minister tell the House what our priorities will be when we take the chair and what plans we have across Government to make the most of this unique position?
My hon. Friend is right to raise the importance of the G20 summit, not only this year but when the UK is hosting from January. I can confirm that tackling structural imbalances, future industries, open trade and reforming global economic systems to support developing countries will be our focus as we move into chairing the G20. He is right that this is a crucial moment for the United Kingdom. The FCDO will play an important part co ordinating the work across Government, via the Cabinet Office.
Will the Secretary of State join me in recommending that people visit the “06:29AM—The Moment Music Stood Still” exhibition that I and colleagues visited this morning in London, which shows examples of what happened on 7 October, so that we may all get more rounded information on why there is such a scale of horrendous murder in Israel and the middle east more generally?
We continue to condemn the horrendous attacks on 7 October, which were an act of the most barbaric terrorism by Hamas and left deep scars for families who lost loved ones. Huge trauma was instigated as a result and it was the worst attack on the Jewish people since the Holocaust. We remember with sadness all those who lost their lives.
Every year, billions of pounds never make their way to the Treasury coffers because of British tax havens, such as the British Virgin Islands. The upcoming illicit finance summit offers us a real opportunity to tackle tax evasion and dirty money in these havens. Ahead of the summit, does the Minister agree that we must ensure that these havens finally throw open their books, and that tackling tax dodging must be top of the agenda?
The illicit finance summit will convene a broad coalition to tackle dirty money globally and focus on financial transparency, property, crypto and illicit gold. The Crown dependencies and overseas territories with financial centres have committed to upholding international tax standards, but we work closely with them on upholding those international standards and on wider transparency, including in relation to beneficial ownership.
My right hon. Friend the shadow Foreign Secretary rightly challenged the Government on the use of Chinese slave labour in the manufacture of solar panels. Chinese companies also dominate the mining companies using slave labour to extract cobalt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, so how much more needs to happen for the Government to challenge this evil use of slave labour, particularly by the Chinese state?
Following on from the Foreign Secretary’s comments, the hon. Gentleman will know that we stand resolute in the support of human rights around the world, including in supply chains. We continue to raise the issue with Governments and the international community at every available opportunity.
The incarceration of Jimmy Lai and the persecution of Hongkongers in the United Kingdom by China is deeply wrong and disturbing. Will the Secretary of State set out what action the UK will be taking to ensure our concerns are heard and action is taken to protect Hongkongers living in the United Kingdom?
I raised the case of Jimmy Lai during my meetings in China and we will continue to raise the case, because it is immensely important to us and we believe that he needs to be released as swiftly as possible. My hon. Friend will know that we take the safety of Hongkongers across the UK immensely seriously, and we will always stand firm against any kind of transnational repression.
Watching coverage of the football in America, it may be difficult to believe that a great number of Scottish football fans were refused ESTAs—the electronic system for travel authorisation—at the last minute, after they had previously been approved, costing them thousands of pounds in cancelled airfares and hotels. Will the Minister tell us whether there have been conversations with the American authorities about how this has happened and how to avoid it, and will she impress on them the economic loss that they will face from all those missed alcohol sales?
We wish Scotland very well and congratulate the team on their success against Haiti.
The hon. Lady raises an important point. I have raised these issues with the US Government, as has our embassy in Washington. Obviously I cannot comment on specific cases, but I urge all constituents who are travelling to the United States for the world cup to follow the US guidance online. If they encounter any challenges, I urge them to speak to the US embassy.
I am the chair of the all party parliamentary group on Kashmir. The Foreign Secretary will know that I have written to her with the support of more than 60 parliamentarians to raise concerns around the serious escalation in tensions in Azad Kashmir, including reports of bloodshed, arbitrary arrests and food blockages. Will she reassure this House that she will use all diplomatic levers open to her to push for peace and justice in Kashmir? That includes the lifting of the lockdown, the restoration of all communications and the immediate resumption of peaceful table talks, at the heart of which must remain respect for Kashmiri human rights.
My hon. Friend will know how seriously we take this situation. We continue to monitor it closely—including, as has been raised, the impact on British nationals—and to ensure that we continue to engage with the Government of Pakistan where appropriate. We want to see this situation come to an end.
Last month, along with other members of the all party parliamentary group on Gibraltar, I visited the Rock in order to assess responses to the proposed treaty at first hand. Will the Minister give us an update? When does he anticipate that the treaty will be finalised?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his consistent advocacy on Gibraltar. We are committed to finalising this treaty imminently. The draft treaty text is undergoing its final legal checks, and as he will know, a draft was previously deposited in the House with a summary on 26 February. We look forward to signature imminently, and the provisional application is expected on 15 July.
I thank the Foreign Secretary for raising the case of my constituent Jagtar Singh Johal during her recent visit to India. Will she update the House on whether her discussions were positive? Are we any closer to securing Jagtar’s release and return home to West Dunbartonshire?
My hon. Friend is right. I raised this while I was in India, and I know how much he has been championing his constituent’s case. There is concern about the length of time without a resolution, and we will continue to raise it.
The world has failed Sudan. We know that the international fact finding mission has noted evidence of a genocide following the fall of El Fasher. What is the UK doing as penholder at the UN to ensure that the belligerents responsible are being held to account, as well as the state actors aiding and abetting them?
I continue to raise Sudan in every international forum. We have to keep a spotlight on what is the worst humanitarian crisis of the 21st century. That includes shining a spotlight on international arms flows—more than a dozen countries are involved—and it involves pressure on the parties involved to agree some kind of ceasefire or humanitarian truce so that we can get humanitarian support in and start to build a better future for Sudan.
On a point of order, Mr Speaker.
Points of order come after statements.
Before I begin, let me say that this is a solemn day, as we remember our dear friend and colleague Jo Cox—I got to know her when we were living in Brussels in our 20s. I pay tribute to her formidable sister and their family for all their vital work to honour her memory.
I will make a statement regarding the position of Thames Water and the proposed recapitalisation package under consideration. This Government were elected with a clear mandate to clean up our rivers, lakes and seas, having inherited record levels of pollution incidents from water companies. Thames Water has underperformed for 15 years. It has regularly missed performance targets, it has unacceptable levels of serious pollution incidents, and the company is heavily indebted. This situation, which delivers poor outcomes for consumers and the environment, cannot continue.
To fix this, over the course of the past two years, the company has been undertaking a recapitalisation process to seek vital long term funding. The Government have been clear throughout that any investor will need to have a credible and robust turnaround plan, the implementation of which must be monitored by regulators and must restore the company’s financial resilience and operational performance. Ofwat, with the support of Government, have been in discussions with the London and Valley Water consortium—a group of Thames Water’s creditors—regarding the terms of a proposal. On 6 March, the consortium presented its proposal for Thames Water to both Ofwat and the Government. Ofwat has been continuing its discussions with the consortium since then, and I wanted to update the House on the next stage of the process.
Ofwat is currently evaluating the consortium’s proposal and, as the independent regulator, is responsible for deciding whether to accept it. If Ofwat decides to accept the proposal, this would be subject to a public consultation and a court sanctioned restructuring process. A recapitalisation process of this size is complex and will take time. As the Environment Secretary, I have several duties, set out in section 2 of the Water Industry Act 1991. These include protecting consumers, securing the proper delivery of water and sewerage services, and ensuring that companies can finance those services and that statutory obligations are properly carried out. Today, I can confirm that I have sent a letter to Iain Coucher, Ofwat’s chair, outlining my early views on the proposal linked to my section 2 duties. These should not be taken as, nor do they constitute, a direction from Government to Ofwat.
I do not believe that the current proposal goes far enough to protect customers and the environment. I have three particular concerns about the proposal: the unfair cost to customers, delays to vital infrastructure investments, and delays to environmental improvements. The 16 million Thames Water customers are front and centre of my consideration, and I am primarily worried about the impact on them. There is an expectation in the proposal that customers will fund—and therefore bear an undue cost for—investment in the company.
In addition, I am not convinced about the proposal’s request to reduce performance standards, nor about the significant delay to vital infrastructure investments. This would mean delays to environmental improvements, particularly those related to waste water treatments linked to statutory requirements, as well as to projects that are important for drinking water safety and supply. I am therefore concerned that the long term resilience of the water and waste water systems may not be adequately protected. The Government will always act in the national interest, and my priority as Environment Secretary is protecting customers and the environment. We will stand ready for all eventualities.
I conclude by emphasising this Government’s commitment to turning around the water sector. In under two years, we have taken swift, decisive action. We have introduced the Water (Special Measures) Act 2025 to raise standards, enforce accountability, and make pollution cover ups a criminal offence. We have banned more than £4 million in bonuses for polluting water bosses; we have unlocked £104 billion of private investment to rebuild vital infrastructure; and we have commissioned Sir Jon Cunliffe to lead the most comprehensive independent review of the water sector since privatisation. Together, those steps have paved the way for the landmark clean water Bill announced in the King’s Speech. The Bill fulfils the commitments we set out in the water White Paper earlier this year and will deliver the fundamental reforms that are so desperately needed. This once in a-generation Bill will create a single powerful water regulator, moving away from a system where water companies mark their own homework by putting in place stronger, active supervision. This will strengthen water companies’ financial resilience and the long term stability of the sector, with modernised economic regulation and new powers to drive turnaround where companies perform poorly.
Additionally, the reforms will strengthen the consumer advocate, providing a more independent, authoritative voice that can challenge the system, drive improvements in outcomes and ensure that customers’ interests are put first. We will also improve water quality by cutting pollution at its source. Finally, we will avoid the situation we are discussing today happening again: our reforms will give the new regulator the powers to ensure water companies do not accumulate unmanageable levels of debt. More broadly, they will secure the long term stability of the sector and ensure that companies are financially resilient. Put simply, our reforms will deliver better outcomes for customers and the environment.
I commend this statement to the House.
I thank the Secretary of State for coming to the House at the earliest opportunity to update Members before making announcements elsewhere. She is a shining example to her Cabinet colleagues of how this House should be treated.
I call the shadow Secretary of State.
First, I echo the Secretary of State’s comments in remembrance of her dear colleague Jo Cox. Her loss was felt across the House and across party political lines, and I send all of our very best wishes to her loved ones and friends.
I thank you, Mr Speaker, and I thank the Secretary of State for advance sight of her statement and for a briefing call on this announcement. As you know, I have been trying for months to coax the Secretary of State to the Dispatch Box to explain major events within her portfolio, from the Government’s EU handover negotiations to their lack of support for farmers. Finally, she emerges into the light. We all assumed that it would be to announce progress towards resolving the many issues facing Thames Water and its customers; instead, it is to make a statement about a letter to the regulator. There is nothing new in this statement—no change in the situation of Thames Water, and still no certainty for billpayers.
Thames Water has repeatedly failed its customers and the environment with a record of pollution, leakage and chronic under investment. The latest figures lay this bare. The company is responsible for around a third of the nation’s worst pollution incidents, even as billpayers face steep increases in their bills. These are not abstract failures; untreated sewage has been poured into the rivers and chalk streams that local communities cherish, while customers are asked to pay more for less. The priority now must be a financial arrangement that keeps the company afloat and protects billpayers and taxpayers. While the Secretary of State’s Government are in chaos, paralysed by the Prime Minister’s weakness and the Mayor of Greater Manchester’s leadership ambitions, Thames Water continues to fail. If no deal is reached, Thames Water could collapse—again, at enormous cost to taxpayers.
The Secretary of State has said that she does not want a scenario where customers “pick up the bill for the company’s failures”, but when the Conservatives tried to amend the Water (Special Measures) Act to prevent consumers from being on the hook in the event of a company going into special administration and tried to impose a lending ratio limit on water companies to prevent this situation from happening again, Labour voted it down. Why? I also remember that under the former Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Streatham and Croydon North (Steve Reed), an investor pulled out of a previous rescue deal, partly due to political risk—in other words, the former Secretary of State had talked himself out of a deal. How is the current Secretary of State avoiding the failures of the now Secretary of State for Housing?
There are those who are urging nationalisation, a word that is thrown around carelessly by Labour Back Benchers and by Reform—in fact, I think I heard it just now. None of them ever explains that nationalisation would be extremely expensive, potentially costing the taxpayer up to £20 billion. For those who are wondering what that means, it is roughly equivalent to the defence funding shortfall we have heard so much about in recent days. However, there are reasonable concerns about how Thames Water’s failures will be managed during the Government’s restructuring of the sector and the abolition of Ofwat, so can the Secretary of State please confirm that the existing penalty regime will not be downgraded or diluted, which has been briefed to the newspapers? What safeguards will be put in place to ensure Thames Water remains fully responsible for its environmental and operational failures? How will the Government ensure that billpayers are not left bearing the cost of past mismanagement, and have they offered or begun any process to recommend an alternative deal? Ministers have still not explained how investment in the sector will actually be paid for. Indeed, the Secretary of State’s predecessor had to admit that so called private water industry investment is in reality paid for by higher bills, and the Secretary of State has repeated that today. Families already struggling with the cost of living should not become the safety net for a company that rewarded its executives while letting its infrastructure crumble. This is an important moment for the Government to show that they can balance financial stability with strong regulatory oversight and put accountability and the interests of billpayers and the environment at the heart of water reform. The Government must now deliver on the big promises they made during the election for the water sector.
Public trust in the water industry is already at rock bottom.
I am always happy to receive brownie points, Mr Speaker, so thank you for what you said.
The shadow Secretary of State rightly says that untreated sewage has poured into our waterways, and it did, in the long years that her party was in government. They cut the Environment Agency’s enforcement budget and moved to an approach where water companies marked their own homework—the so called self monitoring approach. She has some brass neck in lecturing us when we saw a series of failures under her Government.
We are here today, and we as a Government inherited record levels of pollution in our waterways, because of the failure by the Government of the right hon. Lady to see what was happening before their eyes. It was a failure of regulation, a failure of the regulators and a failure of the previous Government.
I am proud of what we have achieved in the two short years that we have been in power. I am proud of the Water (Special Measures) Act 2025. When did the Conservatives ever cap polluting water bosses’ bonuses? Never. The right hon. Lady lectures me about amendments to our Act. Our Act did more in less than a year than her party did in 14 years to ensure a fairer deal for customers and a better deal for the environment.
The right hon. Lady asks about nationalisation. I gently say that a special administration regime is not the same as nationalisation. [Interruption.] I am just clarifying for the House; I do not wish to have an exchange with her across the ballot box—sorry, the Dispatch Box—if I can possibly help it. The ballot box might be at some other point. There is a difference between nationalisation and a special administration regime. With nationalisation, the Government would be taking ownership of the company. With a special administration regime, the Government would finance a special administrator appointed by the courts to run the company.
The right hon. Lady talks about public trust in our water sector being at record lows. All I can say is that we are clearing up her party’s mess. [Interruption.] It was under her Government that Thames Water was plunged into unmanageable levels of debt.
Order. Can I just say to the shadow Secretary of State that I want to hear the Secretary of State? We do not need a running commentary all the way through. I made sure that those on the Government Front Bench listened to her.
I am not surprised that there are not many Opposition Back Benchers here, given the Conservatives’ terrible record on the water industry. In our clean water Bill, which we will introduce later in the Session, we will take forward a desperately needed, once in a-generation reform of the water sector to introduce a powerful single regulator that holds water companies to account.
I call the Chair of the Environmental Audit Committee.
Thames Water customers are paying the price for the incompetent regulation that allowed Macquarie to saddle the company with eye watering debts at the same time as its environmental performance was so disgraceful. That debt ultimately led to shareholders writing the equity value down to zero. Those who bought the debt are now making this proposal. I entirely understand why the Secretary of State would not want customers to receive a service that was failing in its environmental responsibilities while they paid higher bills, but what assessment has she made as to whether Thames Water is a viable business? We have been told that this is the final offer from the company. Is there a viable business there that will deliver long term investment within a reasonable cost window for billpayers? If there is not, at what point does public administration become inevitable?
As I set out in my letter to the regulator, Ofwat, I am concerned that the proposal will mean delays to environmental improvements and to improvements to water infrastructure, with, as my hon. Friend rightly says, unfair cost being laid at the door of Thames Water customers. He asks whether it is a viable business and about next steps. This is a stage in the process where I have given my early views on this proposal. It is now for Ofwat to decide what to do next, and we wait to see what happens.
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
I start by associating myself closely with the Secretary of State’s remarks about Jo Cox. It was a privilege to serve alongside her in this place, and we still miss her deeply.
I am grateful to the Secretary of State for advance sight of the statement and for the helpful briefing that I received earlier. Since Conservative privatisation more than 35 years ago, some £85 billion of billpayers’ money has flowed out like a torrent into the pockets of mostly overseas shareholders and executives paying themselves unearned bonuses. That money could and should have gone into cleaning up our waterways and modernising infrastructure. Instead, sewage was released into our lakes, rivers and seas for 1.8 million hours last year, and more than 100,000 of those were in the Thames region alone. Some 20% of our water leaks out of its pipes before it even reaches our homes. For Thames Water, the figure is even worse, with 25% of that water wasted.
Now Thames Water’s investors are asking for more time for more opportunity to take money before they inevitably run. The Secretary of State is right, then, that the creditors’ offer is a disgrace. They get to keep making money, and Thames Water billpayers get to pay even more to keep them going, while getting the privilege of seeing long overdue infrastructure improvements delayed for yet another decade. Thames Water is taking the mickey. The Liberal Democrats say, “No more, and no thanks.”
It is clear that Thames Water has failed in its basic performance as a water company, and that gives the Secretary of State all the reason she needs to place it into special administration, so why is she not doing that instead? Her letter to Ofwat is, I am afraid, a sign of dreadful weakness. She has to beg an equally weak Ofwat to show a resolve that it institutionally lacks. Thames has failed in its performance, so just put it into special administration and migrate the company to a mutually owned model, where the billpayers own the company and call the shots. That way, investment will be made, sewage spills will stop and water leaks will cease. By doing that, she could begin the process whereby all our water companies are owned not by private equity, overseas investors or the sluggish state, but by the people. If she did that, she would win the favour of people from Witney to Windermere. Why does she not stop faffing about and do that instead?
I thank the hon. Gentleman, I think, for his support for my statement today, although it was slightly half hearted. He is right to say that there have been serious pollution incidents in different water companies, but especially in the Thames, and that is of grave concern to the public and to Thames Water’s customers in particular. I point out to him that there are two types of special administration regime. An insolvency SAR is an insolvency process and is for the company directors to determine. A performance SAR would be triggered if a company was in serious breach of its statutory duties or if the company breaches an enforcement order in a way that is so serious that it is inappropriate for the company to retain its licence. The Government stand ready for all eventualities, including a SAR.
Will the Secretary of State confirm that, in the event of a special administration regime, any compensation would be based on appropriate value as set out in the case of Lithgow v. the UK, not on regulated capital value, as suggested by the shadow Secretary of State. For Thames Water, appropriate value would take account of the £23 billion in infrastructure repairs needed to meet condition P of its licence and comply with its statutory obligation, as well as the £13 billion of dividend and debt interest already paid to creditors. Appropriate value would therefore be nil. The Secretary of State said that Ofwat is responsible for taking the decision to modify the licence. I urge her to read section 12A(7) of the Water Industry Act 1991, because she has the power to overrule.
I think there were a number of questions there. As I have said, there is obviously a difference between a special administration regime and nationalisation. My hon. Friend refers to regulatory capital value, and he is right to suggest that the price of any company is a complicated matter, but in the event of a special administration regime, the state would seek to recoup the investment it had made upon SAR exit. Nationalisation would be a different matter.
What assurances can the Government give my constituents across Bexley that the £88 million of investment that is under way in our community to secure our fresh drinking water supply for the next 50 years is not derailed by this Government announcement, which means further uncertainty for Thames Water and its customers?
I think it is right that both the regulator and the Government hold Thames Water to account, and I find the hon. Gentleman’s question slightly bizarre. I can reassure his constituents, and other customers of Thames Water, that the Government will always ensure continuity of service, but I make no apology for ensuring that customers are at the front and centre of my consideration of this proposal.
I thank the Secretary of State for her statement. Thames Water is by far the worst water company when it comes to sewage spills, pollution incidents, flooding across overloaded sewer systems, customer complaints, regulatory penalties—the list goes on. The establishment of a robust, proactive regulator is a step in the right direction, but should not a company as bad as Thames Water be taken over by being put into special measures so that it can start again and work in favour of residents rather than shareholders, as an example to others that enough is enough?
My hon. Friend is right to say that Thames Water has a terrible record going back—as I said in my statement—at least 15 years. He is also right to say that sewage spills in the Thames Water area are completely unacceptable. As I have said, the Government stand ready for all eventualities, including a special administration regime.
The Secretary of State is absolutely right to put customers at the forefront, but the problem, as she said in her statement, is that this will all take rather a long time to unwind. At present, uncertainty is the real concern for customers, especially the uncertainty about whether they will be charged extra on their bills. The Secretary of State has given a letter to Ofwat, but what specific changes does she want to see in the deal to encourage her to agree to it, so that we can move forward rather than having uncertainty?
Quite simply, I do not want customers to pick up the bill for the repeated failures of Thames Water, but I hear the hon. Gentleman’s concerns about uncertainty, and I would like to see this situation resolved.
If Members google “Caledonian Road”, which is in my constituency, they might think it is a river, but it is not. Over the past decade, Thames Water has delivered to Islington seven major floods. Since privatisation, it has delivered to shareholders £7 billion. Last year, it delivered to my constituents a 31% increase in water rates. Residents are fed up, businesses are fed up, I am fed up, and I am sure that the Government are fed up. How much more do we have to take before Thames Water is finally given the boot?
My right hon. Friend is absolutely right to emphasise the appalling record of Thames Water, and the impact that it is having not just on her constituents but on businesses in her constituency. As I have said, there are two different options for a special administration regime, and we remain open to all eventualities.
Ten months ago, the Government appointed FTI Consulting to advise them on taking Thames Water into special administration. Can the Secretary of State update the House on the outputs of that work and how much it has cost to date?
We appointed FTI Consulting because, in the event of a special administration regime, it is right to have prepared for that eventuality and to have that contingency arrangement in place, but I am afraid that the figure for which the hon. Gentleman has asked is not at my disposal.
The Secretary of State is absolutely right: Thames Water has let down my constituents and Londoners more broadly with years of chronic under investment, while paying record levels of bonuses and dividends. I recently visited my local sewage treatment works, and saw proposed improvements to increase storm surge capacity on site and to improve filtration levels to clean up our waterways. Will the Secretary of State assure me and my constituents that those much needed planned improvements will not be further delayed by ongoing institutional uncertainty about the future of Thames Water, so that we can finally turn the page on 14 years of Tory neglect of our waterways?
I certainly want to turn the page on the failures of this company that have affected my hon. Friend’s constituents and those of other Members. Thanks to the Water (Special Measures) Act 2025, for which my hon. Friend voted, polluting water companies do not now receive bonuses. However, he is right to suggest that we need to resolve this situation and ensure that the improvements he has mentioned take place, and I have expressed my early concerns about this proposal because I do not want to see significant delays in such improvements.
It is tempting to say that there is a particularly bad smell about this company, but that would be a statement of the obvious. Although I am not normally a friend of nationalisation, I have a feeling that this company is on a one way journey to bankruptcy. Am I right in presuming that if that point ever arose, there would be no question of compensating shareholders for a bankrupt company that eventually had to be taken over by the state?
The company remains solvent, but if it were to become insolvent it would be for the directors to apply to the court for an insolvency special administration regime, and then those questions would be on the table.
What reassurances can the Secretary of State provide about basic customer services? For example, Turnpike Lane tube station in my constituency has been closed since last August, because Transport for London cannot reopen it owing to the leaks and other problems that Thames Water is far too incompetent to fix. Will today’s statement lead to better customer service?
I am very sorry to hear about the circumstances in my hon. Friend’s constituency, and I will happily raise them with the regulator. We need to get that fixed as soon as possible.
In recent months, 35,000 houses in West Oxford have had their water pressure cut by Thames Water, in some cases by as much as 50%. Veronica in Osney Island says that her upstairs shower is now nothing but a dribble, and is barely usable. This is not a service; it is a scam, and my constituents are having to foot the bill for it. Their bills were put up last year. Can the Secretary of State explain to them what we are waiting for? Why can we not just let this failed company fail, and start again?
I entirely understand why the hon. Lady and her constituents are fed up with the company’s poor performance, and I have written to Ofwat expressing my concerns. I do not want her constituents to pick up the bill for that poor performance.
For far too long, Dartford residents have put up with very poor performance and high water bills. It is extremely likely that Thames Water leaks contributed to the collapse of the Galley Hill road in 2023, as a result of which Swanscombe residents have been pretty much trapped in their town over the past three years. As the Secretary of State has said, it is vital that the company does not have its performance standards diluted or receives protection from fines as a consequence of the deal that is on the table. Does she agree that any deal must put consumers and environmental protections first, and that investors should not benefit at the expense of billpayers and vital infrastructure improvements?
As I said in my statement, customers are at the front and centre of my consideration of this serious issue. The Environment Agency will continue to investigate any pollution incident and any breach of statutory obligations of any water company, including Thames Water, and will continue to take enforcement action against those companies, including the imposition of fines.
I have a huge list of complaints about Thames Water across Mid Buckinghamshire, and I am sure it is identical to that of the Secretary of State next door in Wycombe, so I add my voice to my hon. Friends’ calls for real detail about the plan, rather than just ambition. In the meantime, there is something that is causing Thames Water and every other water company to chase their tails: their inability to have a proper voice in the planning system. When a village such as Ickford in my constituency, which already has its sewage pumped away by road in tankers because the system just cannot cope, is told that it has to connect another 90, 100 or 150 properties, it is never going to work. Given the huge demand for house building and data centres in Buckinghamshire, what action will the Secretary of State take to ensure that the water companies can have their say and say no when they cannot connect areas?
I thank my constituency neighbour for his question. Like him, I have had complaints about Thames Water in my constituency. With regard to his broader question, I reassure him that when we bring the clean water Bill to the House, there will be provisions for more intense regional planning, which involves water companies, local authorities and other stakeholders, so that we can avoid the sort of situation that he talks about.
My constituents have been catastrophically failed by Thames Water over many years by major floods that have closed local businesses, constant leaks and bursts, traffic disruption, loss of supply and terrible support for vulnerable customers. This is the consequence of shocking negligence by asset stripping investors, and there is no evidence that Thames Water can recover itself or that it will ever have a credible plan to deliver. I welcome the Secretary of State’s statement and ask her for further detail on the timescale for resolving the situation. When does she expect Ofwat to reach a decision on the offer from investors? How will she ensure that, following such a decision, action is taken swiftly to bring this scandal to an end and to bring Thames Water back into special administration, so that it can be run for the public good and for the good of the environment?
My hon. Friend is right to raise the impact of this issue on local businesses as well as residents in her constituency. I spoke to the chair of Ofwat yesterday evening, as well as sending the letter, and I know that he and the board of Ofwat are considering the proposal in great detail. I suspect that we will hear from them soon.
Enough is enough. Frankly, the sight of US hedge funds picking over the carcase of Thames Water’s pipe network is revolting—it stinks. The plan includes three quarters of a billion pounds of payments to hedge funds, shareholders, debt holders and bankers. It is completely unacceptable. Thames Water is bust: it is insolvent. Now is the time to put it into special administration. It cannot meet its financial obligations, and it cannot meet its performance obligations. I urge the Secretary of State to get on with it, put Thames Water into a special administration regime, and then buy it out for a pound. That would be a good deal for the taxpayer.
May I welcome the hon. Gentleman to the party? It was a long time coming. I do not remember any mention of the sewage crisis in the Reform manifesto at the last election.
I think some Opposition Members are suffering from amnesia and have forgotten the asset stripping that happened, which has led to infrastructure failing across Bexleyheath and Crayford, and to the 30% increase in bills last year. We have tried every option to keep Thames Water organisationally solvent, but my patience, and that of my constituents across Bexleyheath and Crayford, is running out. Will the Secretary of State outline how ready we are as a Government if we need to take the company into special administration? In Bexleyheath and Crayford, our patience is running out.
We have seen really poor performance over a number of years, and I absolutely appreciate my hon. Friend’s impatience on behalf of his constituents—he is right to express that. One of the problems that we have had with the regulatory regime is that the current economic regulator did not step in and stop Thames Water going into unmanageable levels of debt. As I said in my statement, our water White Paper and the clean water Bill set out that the new regulator will have new powers and responsibilities to ensure that companies do not get into that situation in the first place.
Communities such as Chalfont St Peter have suffered appalling circumstances in recent years, including flooding and sewage bubbling up through the drains. Thames Water has promised capital investment to address these issues. What assurances can the Secretary of State give that customers will not be asked to pay the price for years of financial mismanagement through higher bills, and that any future restructure or special administration regime will not mean that existing capital investment commitments are lost?
I thank my constituency neighbour for her question. She is right to talk about the problems in her constituency, which I know very well. I sent my letter yesterday evening precisely because of the issue that she mentions. I do not want to see severe delays to the capital investment that is necessary to improve the situation, as she has suggested, and I do not want customers to pick up the bill for it.
I echo the tributes to Jo Cox, whom I worked with when she was at Oxfam. We miss her greatly.
My constituents in Putney, Roehampton, Southfields and Wandsworth Town have been let down by Thames Water for years. The Tories lost a grip of the situation and cut back the Environment Agency. In 2025, Thames Water dumped sewage in the Thames for over 107,000 hours, but bills are rising and I get constant emails from constituents because there is nothing to show for it. They are paying the price, so I welcome the Secretary of State’s standing up for customers and the environment. What would she say to my constituents to assure them that they will not have to pay any more for this investment fund masquerading as a public service?
My hon. Friend puts her finger on the issue. As I said in my statement, there are three principal reasons why I sent Ofwat my early concerns about the proposal, and one of those reasons is the delay of the investment that we need to ensure that there are improvements to environmental performance, which I know is an issue of concern across the House. I do not want customers to pick up the tab for that delay.
Is it not clear that 30 years of the regulatory system has absolutely failed in the face of the greed, incompetence and profit taking of Thames Water? Surely to goodness it is time that Thames Water stopped being allowed to continue with this disastrous policy. The company was brought into public ownership, but it is public ownership with a difference, because it includes local authorities, local communities and the workforce—rather than the directors—who know something about water delivery. We need an efficient supply, an end to the flooding that happens in my constituency and others, and an end to the abominable polluting of the Thames and the seas around this country, which is caused by the greed of the directors of Thames Water.
I do not always agree with the right hon. Gentleman, but I do so on this issue. There has been real regulatory failure here—there has been a failure of the regulators, and a failure of the regulation itself. The Conservatives decided to cut the enforcement budget of the Environment Agency, and there has been a shift towards self monitoring, which essentially means that the water companies have been marking their own homework. It is like telling Ofsted not to visit any schools—that is the equivalent of the regime that we saw under the Conservatives. The right hon. Gentleman is right to say that customers and the environment need to be at the heart of the solution to this issue.
We all have examples of Thames Water letting our residents down. Just last week I heard from one of my farmers, who has had Thames Water discharging raw sewage into the ditch next to his fields. It has flooded his fields and contaminated the land, which is no longer in use. I welcome the progress made by the Secretary of State, but as she acknowledges, more may well be needed. Will she reassure my constituents that she will always put the interests of consumers, the environment and public health ahead of the interests of investors?
Absolutely, and I could not agree more with my hon. Friend. As I said in my statement, customers are front and centre in my consideration of this issue. It is completely unacceptable that farmers are suffering the consequences of the raw sewage crisis in our country, and they should not have their land contaminated. That is their livelihood, and it takes a great deal of work and cost to decontaminate the land.
Will the Secretary of State guarantee that no taxpayer money will be used to bail out Thames Water or its shareholders?
Well, we have to see. I have sent a letter to express my early concerns about the situation, and the Government remain open to all eventualities. If there was a special administration regime, which some people are calling for, then the Government would obviously be financing a special administrator to run the company. That would have to happen, because we would have to have continuity of service. If the hon. Gentleman does not want that to happen, he has to suggest an alternative.
I thank the Secretary of State for her statement and for robust way in which she is standing up for residents and the environment on this very important issue. My constituents are appalled by the sewage pollution in the River Thames and by the poor quality of customer service offered by Thames Water. We have had numerous breaks in supply and there was an issue with subsidence that closed a road in Reading. Can she tell me more about the process that will be followed by Ofwat and the action she will take through the clean water Bill?
The clean water Bill will introduce a supervisory regime whereby the new regulator, which will have more teeth, will have a team of people for each and every water company, really getting a grip on the performance of each water company and holding it to account. What we have seen up until now, as I said to the right hon. Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn), is the shift we saw 15 years ago towards a system where companies were basically marking their own homework. That cannot be right; that is not a proper regulatory system. That is just laissez faire and letting companies get away with the sorts of pollution incidents that we have seen.
Thames Water is in crisis, so I thank the Secretary of State for not approving the deal. It is sinking under £20 billion of debt. It is like a leaky ship that cannot stay afloat. Last year, my constituents were, on average, paying an additional £203 a year. They simply cannot continue to pay the price for this failure. When will she stop pouring money into this leaky ship, put Thames Water into special administration and put everyone out of their misery?
I thank the hon. Lady for welcoming the fact that I have sent the letter with my early concerns. As I said, there are two different ways for a special administration regime. One is insolvency, which is a matter for the directors of the company and would have to go through the courts. The other is the performance tsar.
Thames Water is clearly failing its customers and the environment. I thank the Government for their action this week, which makes it very clear to Thames Water that it will not be allowed off the hook for fines, it will not be allowed off the hook for performance targets, and it must not be allowed to mark its own homework. I want to probe the Secretary of State on a specific aspect of its failure. We on the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee asked Thames Water how much it had spent on the legal proceedings to try to avoid a special administration regime. The company replied: “we estimate that our legal fees for work done in connection with our liquidity extension transaction, as implemented through the interim restructuring plan at the High Court and Court of Appeal, was approximately £67.6 million”.
That was last June. I will be writing to Thames Water to ask for an update on those costs. Given that shocking amount being wasted on legal fees—almost 3% of what customers are paying in bills—does the Secretary of State agree that Thames Water must spend its money on fixing broken pipes, not bonuses and not bumper legal payouts?
Yes, we want Thames Water’s priority to be investing in the water infrastructure needed to improve the service it gives its customers and to drive environmental improvement.
As the Secretary of State pointed out, Thames Water has 16 million customers. It does not serve them; it fails them. That is nearly a quarter of the entire UK population and they do not get any choice—this is a natural monopoly. We are all stuck with the water company that supposedly serves the area we live in, but what do customers get? They get bills going up through the roof, pollution in our rivers and seas, and crumbling infrastructure. In her statement, the Secretary of State nodded towards special administration, which would be an improvement on the status quo, but is it not time to come clean with the British people and admit that the privatisation experiment has totally failed, and to take this struggling, failing company back into public ownership, where it belongs?
The hon. Lady is right to point out that these are natural monopolies and that there is no competition. I do not think nationalisation is a silver bullet in this regard. I point out to her that the Government are facing big fiscal pressures in all sorts of other areas, but we stand ready for all eventualities.
Thames Water was responsible for a third of all major pollution incidents in 2025. Now its creditors want to jack up my constituents’ bills, delay improvements to infrastructure and dodge future fines. My constituents are being failed. I welcome the action the Secretary of State has taken today, but I urge her to go even further and put Thames Water under special measures.
It is because of my concern about the delays to improvements in infrastructure and the environment that I sent the letter to Ofwat. Can I reassure my hon. Friend on one point? I have never even considered the idea that the Environment Agency would let this company off any fines. The agency will continue to perform its duties in holding Thames Water and all other water companies to account, and will enforce against them should they breach their statutory obligations.
My constituents are facing an average water bill of £658 a year, yet Thames Water continues to fail them. Sewage has poured into the River Mole, which runs through my constituency. The rec next to the Esher treatment works, where children play, has had sewage in it. I told the House last week that there was sewage outside the local primary school in Thames Ditton, as well as in the middle of the village. Will the Government get a grip on this regulatory and state failure, put the company into special administration, and create a public interest company that serves my constituents properly?
I am really sorry to hear about the sewage incident outside a local primary school. If the hon. Lady would like to take that up with me separately, I would be happy to follow it up. The Government are concerned about the underperformance of the company, which is why I expressed early concerns about this proposal. She is right to say that we need a solution that delivers for customers and the environment.
My residents are rightly angry that Thames Water has discharged sewage into the River Stort, one of our rare and precious chalk streams, for hundreds of hours. I have raised the issue in this House before, and Thames Water told me that its improvement plan will not be in place until 2028. That is clearly not good enough. Does the Secretary of State agree that this is the latest in a litany of failures by Thames Water? What assurances will she give my constituents that she will ensure that the need to protect our precious chalk streams will be a priority future consideration in the future of Thames Water?
My hon. Friend is right to say there have been 15 years of failure, with the company letting down customers and businesses in his constituency. Chalk streams are an absolute priority for me, both as a Member representing a constituency in the Chilterns and as Environment Secretary.
The Government have been very clear in their support for Thames Water’s proposed £5.7 billion White Horse reservoir in Oxfordshire. Given that Thames Water may run out of money in months, what assessment has the Secretary of State made of the risk that a collapse could lead to the Government having to bear the cost of the reservoir?
As a country, we have failed to build a reservoir for 30 years. That cannot be right. On the specific reservoir to which the hon. Gentleman refers, we will have to look at the details, but as it stands the company is ongoing; it is a solvent company and it should continue to complete the projects that it started.
I thank the Secretary of State for her statement, and my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Josh Dean) for raising his concerns about the River Stort, which goes past my constituency. I spend many hours running alongside it, so I know what a beautiful area it is and that it needs to be protected. Mr Speaker, I cannot tell you the number of people—not just in Harlow but everywhere I go—who raise with me their dissatisfaction with Thames Water. I thank the Secretary of State for what she is doing to raise standards, but I am dubious that Thames Water is going to be able to reach them. If it does not reach those high standards, what is she going to do? People in Harlow do not want us to prop up a company whose failures hit the pockets of the public.
I thank my hon. Friend for conveying the concerns of his constituency of Harlow. [Interruption.] The Minister for Harlow? I did not know that we had created that position!
The Government are prepared for all eventualities, and I reassure my hon. Friend that whatever happens, the Government will ensure continuity of service for his constituents with regard to water supply and waste water services.
Order. I am only going to call Members whose constituencies have Thames Water. Clive Jones, I think you are one of those Members.
Thank you very much, Mr Speaker. Residents in Wokingham have endured years of sewage dumping by Thames Water and ever rising bills, while stakeholders have lined their pockets. The current ownership model is unsustainable, so will the Minister consider the Liberal Democrats’ call for water companies to be mutually owned public benefit corporations, putting customers and the environment first, rather than prioritising the interests of creditors and financial institutions?
When I served as the Economic Secretary to the Treasury, I worked on our plan to double the number of mutuals across the economy. More broadly, not just with regard to Thames Water, I would be happy to see more mutual ownership of water companies, but the question is how we get there.
The Secretary of State has made the right decision in seeking to protect billpayers and opposing giving Thames Water a free pass to continue polluting our rivers. The thousands of hours of sewage spills into chalk streams and their tributaries across North East Hertfordshire that Thames Water has continued to oversee are unforgiveable, if not technically illegal. Thames Water is failing in practically every possible way. The level of incompetence is staggering, given that it has 16 million captive customers. My constituents are not interested in Thames Water being given any more chances—[Interruption.]
Order. What is the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Chris Evans) doing, on his feet while another Member is speaking? Come on, Chris, you should know better than anybody!
Will the Secretary of State put an end to this unholy mess and rid us of this frankly parasitic company once and for all?
I thank my hon. Friend for mentioning chalk streams. Like my hon. Friend the Member for Hertford and Stortford (Josh Dean), I have chalk streams in my constituency, and they are close to my heart. My hon. Friend the Member for North East Hertfordshire (Chris Hinchliff) is right to say that Thames Water is the biggest water company in the country, with 16 million customers. The Government stand ready for all eventualities, including a special administration regime. The customers are at front and centre of my consideration of this issue.
My very first letter as a Member of Parliament was to Thames Water, following the unacceptable fact that thousands of hours of sewage had been released into the River Ver, one of our precious chalk streams. Whatever the future structure of Thames Water, what guarantees can the Minister put in place that the environmental obligations will be strengthened rather than weakened?
As I have said previously, regardless of how the situation develops, the Environment Agency will continue to investigate pollution incidents and take enforcement proceedings against any company involved, including Thames Water.
In March, my constituents in North Leigh and Eynsham went without water for nearly three days due to the collapse of a major waterpipe. They are angry that one third of their bill payments go towards Thames Water’s ballooning debt, and to paying vulture funds, like Elliott Associates, instead of maintaining and replacing ageing infrastructure. My hon. Friend the Member for Witney (Charlie Maynard) was right to challenge further borrowing by Thames Water in the Supreme Court. Does the Secretary of State now agree with the Liberal Democrats that Thames Water’s financial model is broken?
As I said in answer to a previous question, through the clean water Bill the Government will seek to ensure that the new water regulator—which will be integrating the functions of Ofwat, the EA, the Drinking Water Inspectorate and Natural England—does not allow companies to get into the sorts of unmanageable levels of debt that we have seen.
It is clear that the creditors’ consortium has material influence over Thames Water, as it is funding the company and bilaterally negotiating with the Government. Material influence means that the consortium meets the defined criteria of being an ultimate controller. Will the Secretary of State finally acknowledge that fact and work with Ofwat to enforce it?
We are working closely with Ofwat, which has been talking to the consortium of investors for two years. Through my officials, the Government have been in discussions with the consortium alongside Ofwat since November. I thank all the officials who have been involved in those discussions. We need to find a way forward that puts customers and the environment at its heart.
With your permission, Mr Speaker, I will make a personal statement on my resignation as the UK Defence Secretary. Many in the media have pressed me to say more since Thursday, but I am a proud parliamentarian, and I wanted first to speak in this House, as I take my seat on the Back Benches for the first time in more than 10 years.
I took the decision to resign with the greatest regret and reluctance. I continue to be certain about the decision. In time, I believe it will be seen as necessary in securing the future of our armed forces and alliances. It has been the privilege of my life to work alongside the exceptional people who serve this country in Defence—military and civilian alike. They work 24/7, so often unseen, and are the very best of Britain. They, and the new Defence Secretary, have my fullest support.
I have been a Labour MP for nearly 30 years, a Labour member for 45 years and a trade unionist for longer still. It is my family—literally. Jackie, my wife, worked for Labour HQ. We met at a union conference. Two weeks later, we were engaged. All of us in politics ask so much of our partners. We only ever wanted a successful Labour Government leading a stronger Britain. My decision last week was about country, not career.
I loved the job, though I will not miss going to bed with three phones or the 3 am phone calls. I am proud of what we have done in less than two years as a Labour Government. We stepped up international leadership for Ukraine, raised defence investment three years earlier than anyone expected, won record defence export deals, gave the armed forces their biggest pay rise for 20 years, brought 36,000 forces family homes back into public ownership, and signed major defence agreements with Germany, Norway, France and the European Union. Delivering for defence; delivering for Britain.
The Prime Minister has led that drive, rightly earning respect at home and abroad. He and I jointly commissioned the first of its kind strategic defence review, which has set the vision to transform our armed forces to make our military more warfighting ready and better able to deter. We have been doing exactly that in the 12 months since the SDR was published. We are delivering in a different way: investment with deep reforms to get a grip on budgets, procurement and delivery; investment so that every taxpayer’s pound works twice, once for national security and once to back British industry and create British jobs; investment in new defence tech—drones and AI—that draws lessons from Ukraine for our UK forces.
I will always seek cross party common ground on defence, but I will not let the Conservatives forget their record in government or the hollowed out legacy they left in our armed forces.
Since the SDR, we have seen the world changing still faster, with threats increasing and demands on defence rising: conflict in the middle east, new NATO missions in the High North, the US moving forces away from Europe, intensifying attacks in Ukraine and increasing Russian aggression towards the UK. NATO has now said that we must prepare for war with Russia within the next five years. This is the age of hard power and rising threat. This is not the moment for calibration or incremental change. This means bigger politics, bolder priorities and harder choices. Britain’s challenge now is the transformation and rearmament of our armed forces.
The Prime Minister knows what the country needs for defence. He spelled out the threat this month when he said: “it is our intelligence assessment, and the assessment of other countries in NATO, that there could be an attack by Russia on NATO as soon as 2030.”
Britain must set the headmark of spending 3% on defence in 2030 and a clear path to 3.5% in 2035—the commitment all NATO nations have made to each other and to their people. I believe that this would command wide cross party support.
Our predecessors in this House experienced what happens when deterrence fails. They entrusted us with institutions such as NATO that they created to keep us safe. We do not choose the circumstances in which we serve or the responsibilities that fall upon us, either in this House or in government. It is the duty of our political generation to ready Britain for the uncertainties of the years to come. The decisions that we make in the months ahead will be judged by those who follow us.
At this dangerous time, I see the current defence investment plans falling well short of what is required: a rise of 0.08% from next year to 2030, no date for reaching 3%, and no path to 3.5%. By 2030, well over half of NATO members will be spending 3% or more. When allies are looking for British leadership, we must not fall behind. When NATO needs European nations to step up, we must not fall short.
Our adversaries do not follow timetables set by the Treasury. I appreciate how hard this is for Cabinet colleagues, and I am very grateful to those who support what is required, but not all needs to be done by cutbacks elsewhere. There are credible ways of meeting the mid term funding challenges, working multinationally and as other nations in Europe are doing, that could allow us to protect the ability to deliver our Labour missions across Government.
Beyond that, we need a bigger view of national security. It is not just a job for Defence or the agencies; every Department has a part to play in national security and national resilience. From Energy to Transport to Health, security must run through the Government like letters through a stick of rock. Security must be felt in communities right across Britain, reversing long term decline and bringing new jobs and new hope.
For now, Jackie is just grateful that I no longer carry three phones in my bag, although I do still have my bottle of HP sauce.
With your permission, Mr Speaker, I would like to make a speech on my resignation.
I start by echoing the remarks of so many in the House on the 10th anniversary of the death of Jo Cox. While I did not know Jo, I know what she stood for. Her unwavering commitment to equality has left a lasting legacy, and her words—we have more in common than that which divides us—still ring true and are still worth fighting for. I also pay tribute to my right hon. Friend the Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey). This is the second time I have followed him in the last week, and it is a privilege to do so.
Last week, I resigned as Minister for the Armed Forces. It was an exceptionally difficult decision. I have never quit anything in my life, as my mother will confirm; she tried to get me to quit the Marines for 24 years, but failed many times. I spent those 24 years in uniform, serving in operations around the world. I commanded men and women in combat and carried responsibility for their lives; I buried friends and stood beside families receiving the worst news imaginable. When I accepted ministerial office, I did so with a simple purpose: to serve those who serve us. I remain grateful to the Prime Minister for the opportunity to do so. I thank my ministerial colleagues, my hon. Friends on the Labour Benches, civil servants and, above all, the servicemen and women I have had the privilege to represent. But there comes a point when honesty requires action, and for me, that point came last week.
As hon. Members know, I came into politics for one reason: to enact change. In order to work out where we are going, we must realise where we have come from. The Labour party that I joined was chiselled out of the mines of the north east, hammered out of the shipyards of Govan, Liverpool and Belfast, and forged in the factories of the industrial revolution by people with calloused hands and sore backs—people who did a hard day’s graft and asked for one thing in return: a Government who have their back. That is the tradition in which I serve in this House, and it is the tradition that shaped the decision I took last week.
I resigned for several reasons—first, because I no longer believe that the defence investment plan is preparing us for the wars we are most likely to fight. The character of warfare is changing at exceptional speed. In Ukraine, a navy without a ship has destroyed a navy. A drone costing thousands can destroy a tank costing millions. A drone can now strike 2,000 km into Russia at a fraction of the cost of a fighter jet. It is not either/or; it is an equitable mix of high end sophistication coupled with low end mass. That is the balance we must seek. In my view, the defence investment plan does not strike that balance for various reasons.
I want to give just a small example to bring home that point, because it can often get lost. In a town in Ukraine the size of Hereford, there were 12,000 drones in the air in one day. Just comprehend that: 12,000 drones in the air. Some 90% of all casualties are from drones—not the rifle, the grenade, the tank or the artillery, but the drone. I ask the House: what will it take to realise that these figures are not fiction? They are not an embellishment of the truth, but a hard fact born out of the blood and steel of a hot war. That is the maths of modern war: millions of drones against high end, sophisticated systems that deliver late, with huge levels of inflation, and, importantly, cannot be reproduced at the pace required to sustain a conflict against a major adversary. What will it take to learn that lesson? Do we need to rerun the Snatch Land Rover? Do we need to rerun the lack of body armour? Do we need to rerun the lack of protected vehicles in Afghanistan, which I saw impact men and women on the frontline? We do not, and we should not.
Moreover, as the clouds of war darken Europe’s borders once more, do we need to learn the lessons our forefathers learned in world war two, or indeed the cold war? This is not about individual items of equipment or bespoke defence funding lines, but about preparedness, unity of purpose, prioritisation and national resilience. We are no longer packaging up our military to deploy to a foreign field; we must be ready to fight from here—from the home base—for democracy, for the right to self determination and for European security. The reality is that we are spending too much time preparing for last year’s war, not tomorrow’s. I urge the House to push hard for transformation and to push for delivery this side of 2030.
Secondly, I resigned because even if the plan had been right, it was not adequately funded. I do not lay all the blame at the door of No. 10 or No. 11; we failed—I failed—to make that argument. But national security and economic security are not competing priorities; they are the same priority. A country that cannot defend itself will not stay prosperous for long. Put simply, a country that cannot defend itself will struggle to protect its prosperity.
Thirdly, I left because I could no longer ignore the continued failure to address the treatment of our veterans in Northern Ireland. It is a difficult issue, and I cannot describe how difficult this fight has been. Whatever people’s view of the troubles, a country owes a duty to those it sent into harm’s way under lawful orders, and that duty does not end when the uniform comes off. The labour movement was built on a simple idea—that the people who do the hard work that this country asks of them deserve the backing of the state in return. Too many veterans have carried uncertainty for too long, while others have benefited from political accommodations that were never available to those who served. I could not reconcile that with my own understanding of duty.
To go into slightly more detail, the IRA failed to achieve its political ends through the use of terrorist tactics, and we must be exceptionally careful that we do not help them achieve those ends through other means. Constant, never ending legal wranglings that undermine the contract between the nation and those who serve is neither a good use of taxpayer money nor an effective execution of strategy. Having inquests, inquiries and an independent commission creates a hierarchy of truth. It will cost us hundreds of millions for 15 years, painting the state as an aggressor, supporting our adversaries, leading to political objections and causing untold anguish for those who only ever deployed to protect us. We have neither the political capital nor the resources to spare for this unjust journey.
In broader terms, in 2026 security means more than military strength alone. It means secure borders, secure energy, secure jobs and secure communities. It means people knowing that if they work hard and contribute, one unexpected bill will not push their family into crisis; it means knowing that their children will have opportunities that they did not. These things are absolutely connected. The cost of living is shaped by conflict thousands of miles from here. Hostile states target our infrastructure, supply chains and democracy. Energy security shapes economic security. Economic security shapes social cohesion. Importantly, above all else, social cohesion shapes national resilience.
The old line between domestic policy and national security is breaking down in front of us, but our history points the way. In 1945, Britain was exhausted and in debt. Our cities had been bombed, and rationing went on for years. Yet Attlee’s Government did not conclude that Britain could afford only one priority. They built the NHS, expanded the welfare state and invested in housing. They took the decision that Britain would become a nuclear power. Those decisions came from the same understanding of what this Government and Labour are for. A country worth defending should look after its people. A country that wants to look after its people must be secure enough to do so. That is the Labour tradition.
It is also, I would argue, the British tradition at its very best, but somewhere along the way we stopped thinking like that. We began treating defence, growth, energy, public services and social mobility as separate conversations. They are not. They are different parts of the same challenge: whether Britain can still provide security, opportunity and resilience for its people in a more dangerous world. That is why I ultimately concluded that I could no longer remain in Government. The issue was never simply a defence budget. It was whether the Government were moving with the urgency that the moment demands.
Nearly a million young people are outside education, employment and training. Poor mental health costs this country hundreds of billions. We know that our armed forces need modernising. We know that our adversaries are becoming more aggressive. We know that our energy system remains exposed. We inherited a mess, but the population is fed up of us pointing the finger. They are looking to us for courage, clarity and conviction to make changes at the scale and, importantly, the speed that the nation requires.
I have seen what our country can do. I have seen it in uniform. I have seen it in the communities across the nation. I have seen it on these Benches, where we are at our very best. The talent, the ideas, the passion, the courage—it is all here. Indeed, we have it all. I resigned because I believe that Britain and this Labour Government can deliver. I believe that we can think longer term and act earlier. I believe that we can once again build a country that provides security in the broadest sense of the word—security for our nation, communities, working families and the next generation. That is the debate that I am confident my resignation has started.
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. In February, the Women and Equalities Committee concluded an inquiry into the health impacts of breast implants and harmful cosmetic procedures. We sent our report to the Department of Health and Social Care on 18 February, expecting a response by 18 April. Four months on from sending that report, the official response is now two months overdue. We are still waiting on the Government.
Madam Deputy Speaker, I seek your guidance on what we can do to address this grave delay, which is a significant disrespect not only to my Committee members and the House of Commons staff who worked on the report but to the victims of harmful cosmetic procedures—people like Sasha who nearly died and who gave brave, vulnerable testimony publicly only to be ignored by the Department of Health and Social Care and Ministers.
I am grateful to the hon. Member for giving notice of her point of order. There is a long standing and well understood convention that the Government respond to Select Committee reports within two months. Where that is not possible, the Department should engage with the Committee to explain why. I have no power to compel the Department to produce a response, but the Table Office will be able to advise her on how she might pursue the matter further.
Consideration of Bill, as amended in the Public Bill Committee
New Clause 2
Cyber security support service for SMEs
“(1) The Secretary of State must, by regulations, make provision for the establishment and operation of a cyber security support service for relevant small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) for the purposes of improving the security and resilience of their network and information systems.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a relevant SME is one which is—
(a) an operator of an essential service,
(b) a relevant digital service provider,
(c) a relevant managed service provider, or
(d) a critical supplier,
within the meaning of the NIS Regulations.
(3) A support service established under this section must provide—
(a) advice and technical assistance to SMEs following a cyber incident; and
(b) guidance on recovery and remediation.”—(Victoria Collins.)
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a cyber security support service for relevant SMEs.
Brought up, and read the First time.
I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: New clause 3—Review of high risk bodies— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish and lay before Parliament a review of the national security risks posed to relevant network and information systems by foreign state ownership or control of relevant bodies.
(2) A review under this section must assess— (a) the number of relevant bodies which are owned, in whole or in part, by a foreign state or a foreign state owned enterprise; (b) the risk of such bodies being compelled to facilitate unauthorised access to, or surveillance of, network and information systems in the United Kingdom; and (c) the adequacy of current powers under Part 4 (Directions for national security purposes) to mitigate such risks posed to the security and resilience of essential activities.
(3) In this section— “relevant body” means— (a) an operator of an essential service, (b) a relevant digital service provider, (c) a relevant managed service provider, or (d) a critical supplier, within the meaning of the NIS Regulations.
“foreign state owned enterprise” means a body corporate in which a foreign state has a controlling interest; “network and information systems” has the meaning given by section 24(1).”.
This new clause would require the Government to review the security risks posed by critical suppliers and essential service providers linked to foreign states and evaluate whether current powers are sufficient to address these threats. New clause 4—Critical manufacturing and retail sectors— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, introduce regulations under section 24(3) to specify the following as essential activities— (a) the manufacture of critical transport equipment; (b) the industrial production and processing of food products; and (c) the retail sale of food and essential goods via large scale distribution chains.
(2) Regulations made under subsection (1) must designate appropriate regulatory authorities for these sectors.”.
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to designate the manufacturing of critical transport equipment and retail of food and essential goods (when part of a large scale distribution chain) as essential activities, bringing them within the scope of Part 3 of the Bill. New clause 5—Local authorities to be regulated as essential services— “(1) The NIS Regulations are amended as follows.
(2) In the table in Schedule 1 (designated competent authorities), after the entry relating to the energy sector, insert— “Local Government Local Government The Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government”
(2) For the essential service of the maintenance of electoral registers, the threshold requirement is that the entity is a local authority responsible for the maintenance of an electoral register.
(3) For the essential service of the management of social care records, the threshold requirement is that the entity is a local authority responsible for the management of social care records.
(4) In this paragraph “local authority” means— (a) in England, a county council, a district council, a London borough council, the Common Council of the City of London or the Council of the Isles of Scilly; (b) in Wales, a county council or a county borough council; (c) in Scotland, a council constituted under section 2 of the Local Government etc. (Scotland) Act 1994; (d) in Northern Ireland, a district council constituted under section 1 of the Local Government Act (Northern Ireland) 1972.”.
This new clause would bring local authorities within the scope of the NIS Regulations as operators of essential services in relation to their functions managing electoral rolls and social care records. This ensures that public sector bodies holding sensitive data such as electoral rolls and social care records are subject to the same statutory protections as other critical infrastructure. New clause 6—Computer Misuse Act 1990: security and resilience of network and information systems— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within twelve months of the passing of this Act, review whether amendments to the Computer Misuse Act 1990 may be conducive to ensuring, maintaining or improving the security and resilience of network and information systems used or relied upon in connection with the carrying on of essential activities.
(2) Following the conclusion of the review under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a report which outlines— (a) the potential amendments to the Computer Misuse Act 1990 which were considered as part of the review; (b) the review’s conclusions as to whether the potential amendments considered could be beneficial in ensuring, maintaining or improving the security and resilience of relevant network and information systems; and (c) the Government’s intentions to make amendments to the Computer Misuse Act 1990 or act on any other recommendations of the review.”.
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to review, within 12 months, whether amending the Computer Misuse Act 1990 could improve the resilience of network and information systems, and to report the government’s intentions to Parliament. New clause 7—Consultation on resourcing of regulatory authorities and regulated persons— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within one year of the passing of this Act, carry out a consultation with regulatory authorities and regulated persons for the purpose of assessing— (a) whether regulatory authorities and regulated persons have resources and capabilities adequate to fulfil their requirements under this Act; and (b) whether further government support is needed.
(2) The Secretary of State must publish a report setting out the findings of the assessment carried out under subsection (1).”.
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to consult and report within one year on whether regulatory authorities and regulated persons have sufficient resources and capabilities to meet their statutory obligations, and whether additional government support is required. New clause 8—Electoral infrastructure to be regulated as an essential service— “(1) The NIS Regulations are amended as follows.
(2) In the table in Schedule 1 (designated competent authorities), after the entry relating to digital infrastructure insert— “Elections Electoral infrastructure The Electoral Commission”
(2) For the essential service of the administration of an election or the maintenance of an electoral register in the United Kingdom, the threshold requirement is that the service relies on network and information systems to— (a) maintain a register of electors containing more than 50,000 entries; (b) issue, receive, or process postal ballots for a parliamentary or local government election; or (c) count or aggregate votes cast in a parliamentary, mayoral or local government election.
(3) In this paragraph— “parliamentary election” means an election of a Member to serve in the Parliament of the United Kingdom; “network and information system” has the meaning given by section 24(1) of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Act 2026.
(4) In regulation 8A (nomination by an OES of a person to act on its behalf in the United Kingdom), after paragraph 1(b) insert— ‘(c) provides an essential service of a kind referred to in paragraph 11 of Schedule 2 (elections sector) within the United Kingdom.’”.
This new clause would designate the administration of elections and maintenance of voter registers as an “essential service” within the meaning of the NIS Regulations. New clause 9—Political parties to be regulated as an essential service— “(1) The NIS Regulations are amended as follows.
(2) In the table in Schedule 1 (designated competent authorities), after the entry relating to digital infrastructure insert— “Government Political parties The Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government”
(2) For the essential service of the management and operation of a registered political party in the United Kingdom, the threshold requirement is that the political party is represented by at least two Members of the House of Commons.
(3) In this paragraph— “registered political party” means a party registered under Part 2 of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000.”.
This new clause would designate political parties as providing essential services for the purposes of cyber security. New clause 10—Board oversight of security and resilience of network and information systems— “(1) Where a relevant body is governed by a board or equivalent management body, that body must exercise oversight of arrangements relating to the security and resilience of the body’s network and information systems.
(2) In exercising oversight, the management body must— (a) approve the approach taken by the body to the management of risks to the security and resilience of the body’s network and information systems; and (b) satisfy itself, on a periodic basis, that appropriate and proportionate measures are in place to manage those risks.
(3) The management body may be held accountable for failures by the body to comply with duties relating to the security and resilience of its network and information systems.
(4) Members of the management body must undertake training designed to enable them to identify risks and assess appropriate risk management practices.
(5) For the purposes of this section, a relevant body is one which is— (a) an operator of an essential service, (b) a relevant digital service provider, (c) a relevant managed service provider, or (d) a critical supplier, within the meaning of the NIS Regulations.”.
This new clause would require active board oversight of, and accountability for, security and resilience measures, where a relevant body is governed by a board or similar body. New clause 11—Requirement for regular testing of network and information systems— “(1) A relevant body must undertake regular testing of the security and resilience of the network and information systems on which it relies in the provision of its services.
(2) Testing undertaken in accordance with this section must— (a) be proportionate, having regard to the size, nature and risk profile of the business; and (b) be conducted periodically, at intervals that are appropriate to the risks identified by the body.
(3) A relevant body must document— (a) the outcomes of testing undertaken in accordance with this section; and (b) any remedial actions required or taken in response to the testing.
(4) Information documented under subsection (3) must be provided to the relevant regulatory authority upon request.
(5) For the purposes of this section, a relevant body is one which is— (a) an operator of an essential service, (b) a relevant digital service provider, (c) a relevant managed service provider, or (d) a critical supplier, within the meaning of the NIS Regulations.”.
This new clause would require bodies to carry out proportionate, periodic testing of the security and resilience of their network and information systems and provide the results to regulatory bodies upon request. New clause 12—“Last resort” powers in respect of data centres and AI models— “(1) Regulations under section 29(1) may confer on the Secretary of State powers (“last resort powers”) to direct the shutdown of— (a) data centres, or (b) AI systems used or deployed by a data centre, in the event of an AI security or operational emergency.
(2) For the purposes of this section— “data centre” has the meaning given in paragraph 11 of the NIS Regulations (as amended by this Act); “AI system” means a machine based system that, from the input it receives, can infer how to— (a) generate predictions, digital content, recommendations, decisions or other similar outputs, or (b) influence a physical or virtual environment, with a view to achieving an explicit or implicit objective; “used or deployed” means made available to— (a) a substantial number of individuals within the United Kingdom; or (b) providers and operators of essential services; “AI security or operational emergency” means a situation where the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe that— (a) there is a security or operational compromise to one or more relevant network and information systems, (b) this compromise is caused, or contributed to, by the use or operation of an AI system used or deployed by a data centre, whether through autonomous or non autonomous means; and (c) this compromise poses a catastrophic risk; “catastrophic risk” means a risk carrying a reasonable likelihood of causing or contributing to— (a) large scale disruption to critical infrastructure or essential services; (b) significant degradation of the national security, national defence, or intelligence capabilities of the United Kingdom; or (c) severe, large scale harm to human life; “data centre operator” means a person who operates a data centre; (3) As soon as reasonably practicable after, and in any event within seven days of, giving a direction under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must— (a) lay a report before Parliament setting out the direction and the reasons for it; and (b) take all reasonable steps to arrange for the report to be the subject of a debate in each House as soon as is reasonably practicable.
(4) Regulations relating to last resort powers must establish requirements on data centre operators in relation to data centres used for the training, deployment or operation of AI systems, including relating to— (a) the possession or installation of technical infrastructure necessary for compliance with last resort powers; (b) the provision of secure communication channels for use by the Secretary of State when utilising last resort powers; (c) the implementation of regular emergency exercises to ensure that a direction under this section can be received safely and implemented; and (d) post mortem processes to be followed before a data centre is allowed to resume operations after the use of last resort powers, including— (i) incident reporting; and (ii) implementation of mitigation measures to prevent recurrence.
(5) A person commits an offence if they fail to comply with any requirement imposed by regulations made under subsection (4).
(6) Regulations relating to last resort powers may— (a) confer on the Secretary of State, or on a person designated by the Secretary of State, powers to act where they reasonably believe that an offence under subsection (5) is being, has been, or may be about to be committed; (b) include, for the purposes of paragraph (a), powers to— (i) close premises; (ii) turn off systems or require that they be turned off; (iii) take any other action necessary to control the risk arising from an AI security or operational emergency.
(7) Regulations must require that, where powers under subsection (6) are exercised, the Secretary of State must— (a) give written notice of the action taken, and the reasons for the action taken, to the operator or provider as soon as reasonably practicable; and (b) inform the operator or provider of their right to apply to the High Court for relief.
(8) The High Court may make any order it thinks fit on an application under subsection (7)(b), including— (a) confirming, varying or cancelling the requirements; (b) imposing additional requirements; (c) ordering compensation.
(9) The Secretary of State must publish guidance on the use by licensing authorities, planning authorities and other public authorities of their statutory powers to facilitate compliance with regulations relating to this section.
(10) A public authority must have regard to guidance issued under subsection (9) when exercising any function to which the guidance relates.
(11) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the commencement of this section and subsequently at six monthly intervals, prepare a report on the causes and potential causes of AI security or operational emergencies and lay a copy of the report before Parliament.
(12) The causes and potential causes of AI security or operational emergencies considered in any report under subsection (11) must include — (a) adversarial uses of AI systems by state and non state actors; (b) the capabilities for cyber attacks by autonomous AI systems; and (c) the development of AI systems that can autonomously compromise national security, escape human oversight, and upend international stability, including systems described as “superintelligent AI”.”.
This new clause would enable the Secretary of State to be granted “last resort powers” to ensure that the government can intervene in case of an emergency caused by AI used or deployed by a data centre which can cause large scale harm. New clause 13—Digital Sovereignty Strategy on risks posed by foreign interference and reliance on foreign technologies— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a strategy (“a Digital Sovereignty Strategy”) which sets out the Government's approach to maintaining the security and resilience of relevant network and information systems by— (a) assessing, managing and mitigating risks— (i) associated with foreign interference, (ii) arising from reliance on foreign supplied technologies, and (b) preventing over reliance on foreign providers by building domestic capacity.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a “relevant network and information system” is a network and information system belonging to— (a) an operator of an essential service, (b) a relevant digital service provider, (c) a relevant managed service provider, or (d) a critical supplier, within the meaning of the NIS Regulations.
(3) A Digital Sovereignty Strategy published under this section must— (a) include risks associated with— (i) hardware, (ii) software, (iii) supply chains, and (iv) procurement processes; (b) include a specific focus on security and resilience in government digital procurement processes, detailing how the Government intends to reduce strategic dependencies on foreign owned service providers to mitigate the risk of systemic disruption; (c) include a commitment to prioritise the use of technologies developed in the UK by UK organisations in relevant network and information systems to reduce reliance on foreign technologies, and (d) where risks are identified under subsection (1)(a)(i), state how the Government intends to address these risks by supporting the use of domestic technologies or systems for the purpose of ensuring the security of those systems.”.
This new clause would require the Government to publish a Digital Sovereignty Strategy setting out how it intends to address risks to relevant network and information systems posed by foreign interference and reliance on foreign technologies, including by supporting the use of domestic technologies. New clause 14—Register of foreign powers for the purposes of Part 4— “(1) For the purposes of informing action taken under Part 4 of this Act, the Secretary of State must by regulations, and within six months of the passing of this Act, establish and subsequently maintain a register of foreign powers that the Secretary of State believes present a risk to the United Kingdom’s critical network and information systems.
(2) Foreign powers determined by the Secretary of State as eligible for inclusion on the register under subsection (1) must include states which have been confirmed by GCHQ as posing a risk to the security or resilience of the network or information systems of one or more operators of an essential service or critical suppliers, including where the relevant risk is posed by state affiliated groups.
(3) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
(4) In this section, “foreign power” means— (a) the sovereign or other head of a foreign state in their public capacity; (b) a foreign government, or part of a foreign government; (c) an agency or authority of a foreign government, or of part of a foreign government; (d) an authority responsible for administering the affairs of an area within a foreign country or territory, or persons exercising the functions of such an authority; or (e) a political party which is a governing political party of a foreign government. A political party is a governing political party of a foreign government if persons holding political or official posts in the foreign government or part of the foreign government— (i) hold those posts as a result of, or in the course of, their membership of the party, or (ii) in exercising the functions of those posts, are subject to the direction or control of, or significantly influenced by, the party.”
This new clause would require the Government to maintain a register of state actors posing a threat to UK cyber security for the purposes of exercising the Secretary of State’s powers under Part 4 of the Act, which enable the giving of directions in the interests of national security. New clause 15—Review of the cyber security risk posed by foreign powers— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act and annually thereafter, review the extent and nature of the risk posed by relevant foreign powers to the network and information systems of operators of essential services and critical suppliers.
(2) A review under this section must identify whether any risk arises from— (a) activities undertaken outside of the UK, or (b) foreign owned or controlled infrastructure or locations within the UK.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (1), “relevant foreign powers” include states which have been confirmed by GCHQ as posing a risk to the security or resilience of the network or information systems of one or more operators of an essential service or critical suppliers, including where the relevant risk is posed by state departments, state agencies or affiliate groups.
(4) Within three months of each review under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must— (a) lay before Parliament a report containing the findings and conclusions of the review; and (b) where information is not included in a report on the grounds of being prejudicial to the UK’s national security, send such information to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.”
This new clause would require the Government to report on the risk to relevant network and information systems posed by specified foreign powers, considering whether such risks arise from extra territorial activities and/or UK infrastructure or premises owned or controlled by foreign powers. New clause 16—Digital Sovereignty Strategy (relevant network and information systems)— “(1) The Secretary of State must prepare and maintain a Digital Sovereignty Strategy (“the Strategy”) in relation to relevant network and information systems.
(2) The Strategy must— (a) set out the Government’s assessment of the risks to relevant network and information systems arising from or related to— (i) dependence on hardware, software, or digital services that may be subject to foreign interference; (ii) extra territorial legal requirements that may be imposed on non domiciled suppliers; (iii) vulnerabilities, undue control, or supply chain dependency on foreign states or entities; (b) technological developments, market concentration, or strategic dependencies that may affect the security or resilience of relevant network and information systems; (c) set out the Government’s approach to mitigating the risks identified under subsection (2); and (d) include an assessment of— (i) the role of open source software, open standards, and open architectures in strengthening the resilience, transparency, and security of relevant network and information systems; (ii) the security and maintenance needs of open source software components used, or proposed to be used, in relevant network and information systems; (iii) the skills, capabilities, and capacity of United Kingdom based developers, maintainers, and technical experts required to support the use of open source components in relevant network and information systems; (iv) options to increase the use of open source components and to diversify open source suppliers, reduce strategic dependencies, and enhance domestic capability in key technologies used in relevant network and information systems; (v) options for international collaboration in the production of open source components used in relevant network and information systems; (vi) any legislative, regulatory, procurement, or policy measures the Government considers necessary to support digital sovereignty through open source components and reduce systemic risk in relation to relevant network and information systems.
(3) The Secretary of State must publish the Strategy and any revisions to it, subject to the redaction of information the publication of which would be reasonably likely to prejudice national security.
(4) The Strategy must be reviewed at least once in every three year period but may be updated whenever the Secretary of State considers that significant new risks have arisen.
(5) In this section— “relevant network and information system” means a network and information system belonging to— (a) an operator of an essential service, (b) a relevant digital service provider, (c) a relevant managed service provider, or (d) a critical supplier, within the meaning of the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018; “digital sovereignty” means the ability of the United Kingdom to maintain secure, resilient, and reliable access to and control over the hardware, software, data, and digital services on which relevant network and information systems depend; “open source” has the meaning given to it in the definition published by the Open Source Initiative.”
New clause 18—Review of the number of bodies providing cloud computing services— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish and lay before Parliament a review of the risks posed to relevant network and information systems by the number of different bodies providing or supplying cloud computing services.
(2) For the purposes of this section, “cloud computing services” has the meaning given in paragraph 1 of the NIS Regulations.”
This new clause would require the Government to review the risks posed to relevant network and information systems by the number of different bodies providing or supplying cloud computing services. New clause 19—Review of risks posed by foreign state ownership or control of providers of cellular Internet of Things modules— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, publish and lay before Parliament a review of the risks posed to relevant network and information systems by foreign state ownership or control of providers of cellular Internet of Things modules.
(2) For the purposes of this section– “cellular Internet of Things modules” means devices that communicate over public mobile networks for the purposes of enabling autonomous machine to machine communication;”.
This new clause would require the Government to review the risks posed to relevant network and information systems by providers of cellular Internet of Things modules owned or controlled by foreign states. New clause 20—Specification of retail commerce as an essential activity— “(1) The Secretary of State must, within six months of the passing of this Act, introduce regulations under section 24(3) to specify as an essential activity retail commerce carried out by companies with an annual turnover in excess of £12 billion.
(2) Regulations introduced under subsection (1) must designate appropriate regulatory authorities for this sector.”
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to designate retail commerce carried out by companies with an annual turnover in excess of £12 billion as an essential activity, bringing it within the scope of Part 3 of the Bill. New clause 21—Food supply chain to be regulated as an essential service— “(1) The NIS Regulations are amended as follows.
(2) In the table in Schedule 1 (designated competent authorities), after the entry relating to digital infrastructure insert— “Food supply Food supply chain The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (United Kingdom)”
(2) For the essential service of the food supply chain in the United Kingdom the threshold requirement is that the person is in the food supply chain and does not qualify as small or a micro entity (or is excluded) within the meaning of Part 15 of the Companies Act 2006.
(3) For the purposes of this paragraph— (a) a “food supply chain” is a supply chain for providing individuals with items of food or drink for personal consumption, where the items consist of or include, or have been produced to any extent using— (i) anything grown or otherwise produced in carrying on agriculture, or (ii) anything taken, grown or otherwise produced in carrying on fishing or aquaculture; (b) a person is “in” a food supply chain if that person is a producer or an intermediary in a food supply chain.
(4) In paragraph (3)(b)— (a) “producer” means a person who is carrying on agriculture, fishing or aquaculture; (b) “intermediary” means a person in the food supply chain between a producer and the individuals referred to in paragraph (3)(a).
(5) In this paragraph— “agriculture” includes any growing of plants, and any keeping of animals, for the production of food or drink; “aquaculture” means the breeding, rearing, growing or cultivation of— (a) any fish or other aquatic animal, (b) seaweed or any other aquatic plant, or (c) any other aquatic organism.
“plants” includes fungi.
(6) In regulation 8A of the NIS Regulations (nomination by an OES of a person to act on its behalf in the United Kingdom), after paragraph 1(b) insert— ‘(c) provides an essential service of a kind referred to in paragraph 12 of Schedule 2 (food supply chain sector) within the United Kingdom.’”
This new clause would designate those in the food supply chain that rely on network and information systems as “operators of essential services” within the meaning of the Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018, thereby placing them under duties to manage risks to those systems and to provide notification regarding any incidents that have an impact on the food supply chain. Amendment 1, in clause 8, page 7, line 36, at end insert— “(1A) In paragraph (1), after “risks” insert “, including risks arising from fraud,””.
This amendment would explicitly include fraud as one of the risks to the security of network and information systems that relevant digital service providers must identify and manage. Amendment 28, in clause 10, page 9, line 33, at end insert— “(2A) The measures taken by an RMSP under paragraph (1) must ensure that the number of customers to whom the RMSP provides services does not exceed the critical risk threshold.
(2B) In paragraph (2A), the “critical risk threshold” is the number of customers within a sector or subsector where an incident affecting the provision of services to those customers by the RMSP would result in disruption that is likely to have a significant impact on the economy or the day to day functioning of society in the whole or any part of the United Kingdom.
(2C) Paragraph (2D) applies where the number of customers to whom an RMSP provides services exceeds the critical risk threshold by virtue of contracts entered into before the coming into force of section 10 of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Act 2026.
(2D) The RMSP must take steps to reduce the number of customers to below the critical risk threshold, including exercising any right to terminate a contract or vary the terms of a contract.”
This amendment would place a duty on relevant managed service providers (“RMSPs”) to ensure that they do not provide services to manage the technology systems for a number of customers that exceeds a critical risk threshold, such that an incident affecting those services would be likely to result in significant disruption in the United Kingdom. This would prevent an RMSP managing the technology systems for a whole sector or subsector. Provision is also made for a situation where an RMSP is in breach of the critical risk threshold because of contracts entered into before the enactment of the Bill. Government amendments 7 to 11.
Amendment 6, in clause 18, page 40, line 12, at end insert— “(8A) Where the CSIRT receives notification of an incident under regulation 11, 11A, 12A or 14E which it considers to materially involve autonomous or adaptive systems based on machine learning, the CSIRT must share relevant technical information with the relevant body within 72 hours.
(8B) For the purposes of this regulation, a “relevant body” means the AI Security Institute or any successor or replacement body designated by the Secretary of State.”.
This amendment would require incident data relating to AI systems in critical national infrastructure to be sent to the body designated by the Government as responsible for AI safety and security. Government amendments 12 to 14.
Amendment 3, in clause 18, page 41, line 15, at end insert— “Exemption from disclosure: right to a fair trial (1) Nothing in sub paragraphs (1)(d) to (1)(f) of regulation 6, or regulation 6A, permits a NIS enforcement authority to share information with another NIS enforcement authority or with a person within paragraph (2) of regulation 6 if the Secretary of State determines that— (a) the receiving jurisdiction is one in which the right to a fair trial cannot be guaranteed, or (b) the disclosure could result in actions being taken that would be incompatible with the right to a fair trial.
(2) For the purposes of making a determination under paragraph (1) above, the Secretary of State must have regard to the opinion of— (a) subject matter experts, and (b) competent civil society groups.
(3) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Act 2026, publish and lay before Parliament an annual report detailing the determinations made under paragraph (1) above in the previous 12 months.”
This amendment would prevent the sharing of information with overseas authorities for the purpose of prosecuting crimes not committed in the UK if the Secretary of State determines that the receiving country is one in which the right to a fair trial cannot be guaranteed. Government amendments 15 to 17.
Amendment 4, in clause 29, page 54, line 9, at end insert “, including the risks arising from the use of embedded communications components manufactured outside the UK;”.
This amendment would make explicit that regulations could concern the risks arising from the use of embedded components within the systems (such as cellular internet of things modules). Amendment 2, in clause 40, page 63, line 7, leave out “5” and insert “3”.
This amendment would increase the frequency of the reports that must be published under Clause 40, from every five years to every three years. Amendment 5, in clause 43, page 66, line 18, at end insert— “(i) a requirement relating to embedded communications components manufactured outside the UK.”
This amendment would provide an additional requirement that may be imposed on a regulated person, in relation to an embedded communications component manufactured outside the UK. Government amendments 18 to 27.
As the director of the National Cyber Security Centre has said, “Every organisation delivering the UK’s critical services…relies on uninterrupted digital operations. Disruptions to those operations isn’t simply an IT issue; it’s a…national resilience issue”.
The Liberal Democrats wholeheartedly support that point, and it is why we welcome the measures introduced by this Bill, which strengthen existing cyber protections to enhance national security. However, as the Liberal Democrats have made clear throughout the Bill’s stages so far, there are many missed opportunities to truly future proof our country’s cyber security to protect our democracy, economy and national security. I will speak to the Liberal Democrat amendments to the Bill, which we think would achieve that.
First, on the scope of the Bill, last year we saw the costliest cyber incident in UK history. The financial damage caused by the attack on Jaguar Land Rover is estimated to have cost between £1.6 billion and £2.1 billion—a cost shared between JLR directly and its supply chain. In the public sector, cyber attacks are causing eye watering costs too—just look at Redcar’s cyber attack, which cost them a staggering £10.4 million. Despite that, the Bill takes no consideration of the significant economic cost of such cyber attacks, excluding retail and manufacturing industries as well as local government from the scope of the Bill.
New clauses 4 and 5 address a crucial gap. New clause 4 would bring the manufacturing of critical transport equipment and the retail of food and essential goods, where they form part of a large scale distribution chain, within the scope of essential categories under the Bill. That means that companies such as Jaguar Land Rover would finally receive the protections that their strategic importance demands and protect their supply chains too. New clause 5 extends that same recognition to local authorities, whose digital infrastructure underpins the delivery of services that millions of people depend on.
The Government’s own industrial strategy recognises that sustainable and secure growth requires strong levels of cyber resilience across the economy, but their own cyber Bill does not live up to this. If a cyber attack brought JLR’s production lines to a halt or crippled the digital infrastructure of a council, the damage to our economy and people’s daily lives would be enormous.
Those are not the only issues within the scope of the Bill. Safeguarding our democratic processes must be treated as a national security priority, and here, too, the Bill falls short. At a time when foreign interference in our elections is not a hypothetical but a documented and growing threat, the Government have chosen not to act. New clauses 8 and 9 would begin to change that. New clause 8 would designate the administration of elections and voter registers as essential services within the meaning of the network and information systems regulations—a straightforward recognition that the machinery of our democracy is as critical as any power grid or hospital network.
New clause 9 would designate political parties as essential services for the purposes of cyber security, extending meaningful protection to the organisations through which the British people exercise their democratic voice. I understand that the Bill is not a silver bullet for cyber security, but these amendments make the modest, targeted and entirely reasonable ask that vehicle manufacturing, food retail supply chains, local authorities, our elections and our political parties are brought within scope.
In turning to online generated fraud and scams, we can see the impact of a lack of action to secure online and cyber spaces. Fraud makes up 44% of all UK crime, and online technologies—especially artificial intelligence—are supercharging that. According to reporting in The Times a few weeks ago, research by Lloyds bank found that Meta’s social media sites are a starting point for 76% of purchase scams in the UK, with the value of losses to UK customers estimated at around £66 million in the last year alone. Not only does the Government’s fraud strategy completely overlook the role of social media giants and big tech in the proliferation of online scams, but the Bill fails to address explicitly the risks that fraud and scams pose to critical infrastructure and organisations. That is especially striking when we consider that the Government’s official statistics on cyber security breaches show that phishing attacks—scams—remain the most prevalent type of breach or attack by far in the UK.
Amendment 1 would change that. It would amend clause 8 to add “risks arising from fraud” explicitly to the list of security threats facing relevant digital services so that those threats can be identified and managed. That is also why the Liberal Democrats are calling for social media giants to be financially liable for scams originating on their platforms and for an online crime agency to tackle these issues and standardise AI labelling.
We must not forget that these threats do not fall solely on large institutions and critical infrastructure. Small and medium sized enterprises are on the frontline of cyber crime; they are disproportionately targeted and too often without the resources or expertise to defend themselves. Many of the businesses caught up in the supply chains of our critical industries and exposed to the fraud and cyber risks that I have described are SMEs, yet there are no provisions in the Bill to help potentially under resourced SMEs cope with the increasing threat of cyber attacks. New clause 2 would require the establishment of dedicated cyber security support services for those businesses. For the Liberal Democrats, backing British small businesses means ensuring that they are not left to face those threats alone.
The Liberal Democrats have also tabled a series of further measures that would make the legislation fit for purpose over the long term. A law is only as good as its enforcement, which is why we are pressing for board level accountability for cyber resilience under new clause 10, regular proportionate testing of systems under new clause 11 and more frequent Government reporting every three years—rather than every five years—under amendment 2.
Last week, at London Tech Week, as I was surrounded by experts across the industry, one thing became clear. We think that technology is moving quickly now, but with the growth and development of AI this is the slowest we will ever see change happen. That is why we need the framework to evolve, which means reviewing the security risks posed by foreign linked critical suppliers, which new clause 3 would do, modernising the outdated Computer Misuse Act 1990, which new clause 6 would do, and assessing whether regulators have the resources they actually need to do their job, which new clause 7 would do. Those are not radical tasks; they are basic conditions for a cyber security regime that works today and will continue to work in the future.
If there is one matter that cuts to the heart of what the Bill should be about, and asks the fundamental question about Britain’s place in a contested digital world, it is digital sovereignty. All the protections we have discussed for our industries, our democracy and our small businesses will mean little if we do not first answer who controls the digital infrastructure on which all of them depend, and question whether, at every level of the stack, we have critical control over that.
That is echoed loudly by the industry itself. A study by Civo, a UK sovereign cloud provider, found that 83% of IT decision makers in this country worry about the impact of geopolitical developments on their data sovereignty. When we look at the numbers, it is not hard to see why. About 55% of central Government organisations report that over 60% of their estate is on the cloud, and the vast majority of that is with just two providers, both of which are American.
We have handed the keys to significant parts of our national digital infrastructure to foreign corporations, subject to foreign laws and exposed to foreign decisions entirely outside our control. That includes our public services. The Liberal Democrats are alarmed at the NHS’s growing reliance on complex, opaque digital systems set up by Palantir. With Palantir’s background in security and surveillance, that marks a divergence from the traditional relationship between the NHS and firms with specialised medical knowledge. The procurement process for the federated data platform, which was awarded to Palantir in 2023, is worryingly opaque.
We are pleased that the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee has called on the Government to exercise the break clause in that contract. We call on the Government to use the break clause and provide a clear timeline for Palantir’s removal from the NHS. Even Karp and Zamiska—from Palantir—said:
“The limits of soft power, of soaring rhetoric alone, have been exposed. The ability of free and democratic societies to prevail requires something more than moral appeal. It requires hard power, and hard power in this century will be built on software.”
Let us now look at Anthropic. Last week, it launched its new AI model, Claude Fable 5. Almost as soon as it was launched, the US Government intervened and shut it down for foreign nationals both inside and outside the country. Let me put that more clearly: Anthropic closed access to its tools under the direction of the US Government. This is a wake up call. Our reliance on the technology that fuels our economy and underpins our services shows that we desperately need a sovereign digital strategy. Fable 5 may have been a feature for only about a day, but imagine if it had been powering processes and public services when it was suddenly cut off by the US Government.
Crucially, this is about backing British tech as well as working internationally. Collaborative sovereignty would make us stronger partners globally. That is why we have tabled new clause 13—I urge the House to vote for it—which would require the Government to establish a digital sovereignty strategy that sets out clearly how Ministers will assess, manage and mitigate risks to the security and resilience of our critical systems and place British tech procurement at its centre.
I recognise the importance of sovereignty, but there are real challenges. How can we deal with the prevalence of, for example, Taiwanese chips in our tech market?
I thank the hon. Member for his question. That is why we need a strategy—we need to be clear about the Government’s priorities. On procurement, we have heard from the National Audit Office that cost is often a priority, but at what cost? When the Government are looking for suppliers, what do we value? There must be a strategy for that, and we need to have that conversation so that the direction is clear, whether on hardware or software.
Working internationally is vital, but it is also important to be clear about what is important for us, especially in the tech stack. That is the thing: it is about our security and resilience as well as our economy, strengthening those developing technologies as well as using technology. It is also about working together internationally and knowing that we have the resilience to look after and trade our technology stack.
It is about our security, our cyber security and our resilience. Within a three mile radius of Belfast, we have some of the best cyber security resilience in the whole of the United Kingdom. It is about those 2,750 employees and the £258 million of direct gross value added. Does the hon. Lady recognise that powerhouses like Belfast must be fully integrated into our national cyber strategy? Will she put on the record that that is what we should be aiming for?
I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. I absolutely agree. Across the United Kingdom, including in Northern Ireland, there are incredible British tech firms. Many of them have said to me that their services are being procured by other Governments in Europe and around the world, yet they find their own British Government not using them or getting the value out of that British technology here by developing skills and jobs.
The Liberal Democrats welcome the Government’s hardware strategy, announced last week, which at least acknowledges the importance of British procurement, but acknowledgment is not a strategy. New clause 13, which I am pleased to say has drawn support from across the House, would make it one. In an increasingly unstable world, the case for British digital resilience, British technology and British sovereign capability has never been stronger. I therefore urge hon. Members to vote for the new clause.
Cyber security is no longer a technical matter confined to server rooms and IT departments. It is a question of national resilience, economic strength and democratic integrity. The Bill before us takes important steps, but important steps are not enough in today’s digital age. With these amendments, we have the opportunity to close the gaps, broaden the protections and build a framework that is genuinely fit for the digital age.
I call the Chair of the Select Committee on Science, Innovation and Technology.
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted (Victoria Collins). I would like to start by making two relevant declarations of interest. I worked for the Office of Communications before entering Parliament and I am currently a fellow of the Institution of Engineering and Technology. Madam Deputy Speaker, you might have heard me mention on occasion that I was an engineer before coming into Parliament. As such, in 2010, I was desperate for issues around technology to come up in Parliament, as it was a subject I actually knew something about, but they rarely did. In the intervening 16 years, however, things have changed, and technology issues such as online safety, wi fi on trains, sovereign technology and infowars are now raised regularly.
I welcome the increasing role of technology in all our constituents’ lives, but this must go hand in hand with rigorous cyber security to protect against threats from state and non state actors. As I highlighted in my speech on Second Reading, the UK’s only cross cutting cyber security legislation is currently that inherited from the European Union. The previous Conservative Government failed to update these regulations, leaving us working under an outdated framework. I therefore really welcome this Bill, which seeks to expand the scope of existing cyber security regulations to new sectors, strengthen the role of regulators and grant the Government new powers to respond to the threats posed by cyber security breaches.
We are only as secure as our weakest link, but I am afraid we still have a number of weak links left. Cyber attacks are having a real financial impact on the UK and are happening at an increasing rate. According to the Institution of Engineering and Technology, cyber attacks cost UK businesses an estimated £64 billion annually, with £37 billion in direct costs and £26 billion in indirect costs. Last year we also saw the well documented cyber attack that hit Marks & Spencer, leaving shoppers unable to buy online from the company for months. The company’s profits were almost wiped out, down from £390 million to £3 million for the first half of 2025. As a Sparks card holder myself, I was unable to use my card for six months and I fear I may have contributed to those figures.
This brings me to my first amendment, new clause 20, which seeks to designate retail businesses as an essential activity, bringing them within scope of part 3 of the Bill. Retail is the UK’s largest private sector employer. It holds large amounts of consumer data but often relies on dated IT systems. Yet, as I noted on Second Reading, the existing scope of the Bill would not have prevented or even had an impact on the attacks on Marks & Spencer or Jaguar Land Rover, despite the significant disruption they caused to our constituents and our economic activity. Indeed, in November, the Bank of England cited the cyber attack on JLR as a factor in its decision to hold interest rates.
The Government’s plan to promote the new cyber governance code of practice to improve pre operative preparedness in sectors such as retail is welcome, but voluntary measures alone will not deliver the consistent adoption of good cyber governance across economically significant sectors such as retail. According to the Government’s figures, only 9,680 Cyber Essentials Plus certificates were issued to small and medium sized businesses between November 2023 and October 2024. There are an estimated 6 million small and medium sized enterprises in the UK, so this is not going to address that challenge at the rate at which it needs to be addressed.
I welcome the Opposition amendments that would bring retail businesses within the Bill’s scope, but I am concerned that they might be too extensive in bringing small and medium sized businesses into its remit and placing a disproportionate burden on them. The revenue threshold of £12 billion in my new clause 20 provides the necessary specificity to ensure that only large retail businesses, including Marks & Spencer and Jaguar Land Rover, would fall under the expanded Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018. This would lead to faster incident reporting responses and customer notification, alongside stronger powers, including those to deal with non compliance.
Turning to my new clause 18, we have already heard that the concentration of the UK’s public sector data within a small number of US owned providers—Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Azure specifically—presents a structural risk to national resilience. Combined, AWS and Microsoft account for 70% to 80% of the public cloud market, according to the Competition and Markets Authority. Part of the issue is that that figure is an estimate. I have put down a series of written parliamentary questions over the last seven years to find out just how dependent the Government are on AWS and Microsoft. This data is not tracked across Government. Can the Minister say how he intends to assess a threat that the Government are not measuring?
As set out in my Committee’s report entitled “Rewiring the state: Delivering digital government”, our national resilience is put at risk by the strategic lock in that these companies have in many of our public services and Administrations. Major Departments, including His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs and the NHS, are under multi year agreements that further entrench these cloud infrastructures within the Whitehall ecosystem. Included in my Committee’s report was evidence we heard from the Open Cloud Coalition, who suggested that the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology should consider a period of over correction, including the mandatory re competition of high risk or large scale contracts, to break cycles of vendor lock in.
The Government are rightly seeking to co ordinate cloud contracting, but I believe that this should be done in a way that would ensure more, not less, competition. We would like to see the detail of how the all of Government cloud contract will prevent vendor lock in, and I would like the Minister to outline his engagement with the CMA on the contract’s development. Not only does our reliance on these two cloud services raise practical issues—as seen with the AWS outage in October—but there are questions around data protection. Under the Clarifying Lawful Overseas Use of Data Act and the Patriot Act, the US Government can compel US companies, including AWS and Microsoft, to hand over data if held overseas—that is, in the UK.
I am aware that the Minister might reference our sovereign hosting capability, Crown Hosting, but it hosts only 4% of Government legacy services. Will he please outline how the Government intend to ensure protection so that the public sector makes better use of the services provided by Crown Hosting? Could he also set out how he will ensure that the Government’s digital transformation ambitions cannot be derailed at any time by decisions based on the narrow interests of a foreign, commercial or state actor? He might choose to argue that this is highly unlikely, but I would point him to the recent decision of the US Government to withdraw foreign nationals’ access to Anthropic’s Fable 5 model.
Finally, my new clause 19 calls on the Secretary of State to conduct a review into the risks posed by foreign state ownership or control of providers of cellular internet of things modules. I always like to mention that I was the first Member of Parliament to speak about the internet of things, in my debate back in 2011. Having worked in technology as an engineer, the threat posed by cyber attacks on the internet of things was very real to me from the start of my parliamentary career. Indeed, in 2017 I wrote an article highlighting the threat of cyber attacks on sex toys, in a vain attempt to raise the profile of the issue.
Common internet of things modules, or IOTs, are widely embedded across telecommunications and other critical national infrastructure, as well as in consumer products. In telecoms, CIMs—cellular IOT modules—underpin interoperability, monitoring, configuration and automation in complex multi vendor networks, including those supporting cellular IOT at scale.
Although CIMs do not directly control networks, dependence on foreign manufactured CIM enabled software and tooling poses risks to resilience, security and sovereignty. Chinese attempts to corner the global market in CIMs could have significant national security implications. When they are embedded in cars, they transmit the location, the route and even passenger video. I hope that I need not elaborate on the implications of their being switched off or turned to hostile uses.
The hon. Lady was very prescient then, and it has got worse since. There was lots of talk under the previous Administration about Downing Street cars being searched for IOTs. We know about the huge imports from bad actors, such as China and other countries—that is really what we should be worried about. Many of them contain kill switches, which would devastate some of our industry, such as energy. That would be a disaster. She is right to have raised the issue and to continue to raise it.
The right hon. Member does well to remind us that the impact of hostile action using CIMs, such as by turning on a kill switch, would be devastating across multiple sectors, including potentially the consumer sector, as well as security, automotive, transport and finance. That is why it is so important to consider this.
I particularly draw the Minister’s attention to the list provided by the US Federal Communications Commission—the equivalent of Ofcom—of equipment and services covered by section 2 of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act. The list dictates what technology is legally permitted to be authorised for import and sale in the US, and many companies on the list are owned or controlled by the Chinese state. I thank the Minister in the other place for meeting me and my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie), whose amendment I also support, and hearing our concerns about the supply of IOT devices. It was unfortunate that the Minister did not see the need for action, particularly given that the US has taken action against Chinese made goods and that, during a trip of the British American Parliamentary Group to the US just last week, we heard that further action is likely to be taken against cellular IOT modules specifically. That could mean UK products being banned from import into the US if they contain such CIMs.
We have seen a rapid growth of those devices across transport, as we have mentioned, as well as energy and, importantly, water and health. I am concerned about the ability of our domestic British businesses to export into the US given those restrictions, as well as the impact on our security. I would therefore be grateful if the Minister could set out whether he is looking into that concern.
As was eloquently emphasised in the personal statements made by the recently resigned Secretary of State for Defence, my right hon. Friend the Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey), and Armed Forces Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns), the first duty of Government is the security of their citizens. That is true when it comes to our armed forces and our defence in the real world, and it is also true when it comes to our security in the virtual world. Those two overlap so much more than in the past.
I welcome the Bill, but I have real concerns about the need to bring retail businesses such as M&S within its scope, the concentration of the UK’s public sector data in a small number of US owned providers, the implications for technology sovereignty that that raises, and the risks posed by foreign state ownership of providers of cellular internet of things modules. I hope that the Minister will address those concerns and deliver the cyber security and resilience that our constituents deserve.
It is always a great honour to follow the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah), who talks common sense most of the time she gets up, which may be one of the reasons why she is still on the Back Benches. If we listened more to those who know something about things, rather than talking as though we know things, and saying things that are invariably wrong, we in Parliament would obviously be better off.
The greatest threat we face is that bad actors out there are using this level of technology to get across to countries such as the UK. This is not a party political point, because both Governments have failed to face up to it to the degree that they should have—that is why this Bill is welcome, but it is not everything, as the hon. Lady says—but we think that we can treat the bad actors as though they were normal actors in a commercial sense. However, China is using slave labour to undercut markets and regularly puts IOTs into cars. It gets away with it because we think that we need China more than it needs us. That is the big problem. The hon. Lady is right to raise it, and I congratulate her for again making an excellent speech.
I will in due course beg to move my amendment on anti refoulement, because although this is a good Bill, some bits are missing and others have been skated over. This is one area about which we will come, again and again, to regret that we had not done more. The issue is British citizens abroad ending up under the rule of Governments that do not believe in the concept of freedom before the law, in a fair trial as part of that process, or in habeas corpus, which is an English common law right that has gone around the world.
The amendment seeks to prohibit data sharing with jurisdictions that cannot guarantee a fair trial. It maintains the current legal approach, which generally restricts the sharing of sensitive information outside the EU. Currently, information sharing of a type enabled by proposed new regulation 6, which is in clause 18, is prohibited outside the EU. The proposed new regulation is therefore weaker than what is going on in the European Union. Sadly, it paves the way for such sharing, rather than restricting it.
The amendment therefore seeks to prohibit information sharing with places where the Secretary of State believes that a fair trial simply cannot be obtained. It would require the Secretary of State to consult civil society and human rights experts to identify jurisdictions—this would apply universally and not just to China, although China is a big player in this—where the right to a fair trial cannot be guaranteed, with all decisions subject to mandatory annual reports to Parliament. That is important: Parliament should be part of this and make decisions about whether it agrees with the Government.
Beijing is a good example. It has frequently used seemingly legitimate criminal complaints to target dissidents. Proposed new regulation 6, if unamended, therefore raises transnational repression risks rather than solving them. The amendment is necessary to close that loophole in the Bill, which currently fails to anticipate politically motivated requests from such totalitarian states. I often say that we should stop speaking about countries such as China, Russia, Iran and North Korea as authoritarian states. They are not authoritarian states; they are totalitarian states. Why do I say that? Because everything in those countries is owned and run by the state. Authoritarian states are often dictatorships, but they are not the same thing as totalitarian states. They are brutal and nasty, but totalitarianism is a complete system. This is about totalitarian states.
Proposed new regulation 6 is predicated upon helping other Governments obtain justice. The argument of my amendment 3 is that—quite apart from the transnational repression risks—justice as we understand it cannot be served in a country where essentially there is no rule of law, no right to a fair trial, and a judicial system that serves the party. As I often say, it is a matter of pride that perhaps the greatest gift this country has given to the world is the concept of freedom in the face of the law. That is the point I made earlier: habeas corpus came from English common law and dominates so much of the free world’s thinking. It was not until the 1970s that some countries in Europe actually practised habeas corpus, so it was not just the case that it was produced by Britain; it was also owned by many other countries. That is what is at risk here, and we should be the greatest defenders of that right to a fair trial anywhere in the world.
Let us take a few of these countries as examples for why amendment 3 is needed. Let us look at China. Requests were made by authoritarian states—totalitarian states in this case—regarding Interpol notices, as has been the recent pattern, and this happens a lot. The People’s Republic of China and other countries have a troubling recent history of very significant transnational repression, hounding dissidents in the UK and cloaking their political persecution in superficially legitimate criminal charges. The PRC is not alone in requesting information on political opponents in the UK, and it does it a lot. We can confidently speculate that China will make requests of the UK almost immediately should the Bill be passed.
Let me look at the single biggest case that confronts us in China at the moment: that of Jimmy Lai. He is a British citizen. I cannot tell you, Madam Deputy Speaker, how endlessly in debates, even under the previous Administration, we had to fight to get the Government to state that he is a British citizen, not a dual nationality citizen. He is a British citizen, is proud to be British, has been British all his life and has only ever owned a British passport—he has never been a Chinese citizen with a Chinese passport.
The special rapporteur on torture, Alice Jill Edwards, in her 2024 and 2025 reports, specifically flagged concerns that evidence obtained through torture is still widely admitted in Chinese courts. She also expressed concerns in late 2024 regarding the case of Jimmy Lai in Hong Kong, noting that evidence allegedly secured through torture in mainland China was and is being used in the trial. On 15 November 2024, the United Nations working group on arbitrary detention published its opinion that Jimmy Lai is “unlawfully and arbitrarily detained” and called for his immediate release. The proposed new regulation will not go far enough and therefore does not deal with this, and that is what my amendment 3 is all about.
On the risk of extradition to China from safe third countries, currently the UK does not have a bilateral extradition treaty with the People’s Republic of China, and it has suspended its bilateral extradition treaty with Hong Kong—something that many of us were calling out for at the time in 2020. In 2025, proposed changes to the Extradition Act 2003 would allow co operation between UK and Hong Kong authorities on a “case by case ad hoc basis”.
The trouble with that is that it begins to open the door. The risk of sharing NIS data is not confined to the physical removal of individuals; it also poses a profound threat to national security and the safety of the diaspora within the UK—how often have we heard about that?
These totalitarian states not only seek to extradite dissidents, they seek to silence them through transnational repression and to compromise the UK’s own digital resilience. Sharing NIS data with an adversarial jurisdiction is akin to providing a road map for a state sponsored cyber attack. For dissidents and human rights defenders living in the UK, NIS data can be used to demonise and de anonymise their activity. This information is frequently used to identify and harass family members remaining in their home country, to conduct targeted phishing and surveillance against the individual’s private devices, and to coerce the individual into becoming an informant under the threat of criminal charges based on the shared technical data.
Let me deal with another case: that of Ryan Cornelius in the United Arab Emirates. Ryan Cornelius is a British citizen who has been arbitrarily detained in Dubai for 18 years, despite well documented evidence of an unfair trial and inhuman treatment. Ryan’s detention has been found to be arbitrary by the UN working group on arbitrary detention. His case arose from a high profile financial dispute involving loans connected to a major Dubai development project. Although he and his associates had reportedly complied with restructuring agreements with Dubai Islamic Bank, he was arrested without warning, transferred by plain clothed officers to a police facility, where he was held incommunicado, denied access to a lawyer and subjected to aggressive interrogation. During this time, he was coerced into signing documents in Arabic—a language he does not understand—under the false premise that this would give him his release.
Mr Cornelius’s trial proceedings were marked by violations of his right to a fair trial. He was not provided with an interpreter and could not understand the proceedings, while the appointed lawyer did not speak English, rendering effective communication impossible. In 2011, Mr Cornelius was convicted and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $1 billion in penalties. He served the full sentence, without the routine reduction for good behaviour despite being a model prisoner, further underscoring the arbitrary and punitive nature of the detention and the profound deficiencies in the judicial process against him. He was then to face the fact that the law was changed. He is now continuing to serve his 10-year sentence—it is now 18 years since he was given that sentence. That is hardly a fair trial.
I want to touch on Jagtar Singh Johal, who is detained in India. He is a British Sikh activist who has been held without trial in India for eight years. The United Nations says he is being held
“on discriminatory grounds, owing to his status as a human rights defender and based on his political activism, religious faith and opinions”.
This is the problem again; it is another example of somebody in a country that we seek to have alliances with who is not facing a fair and reasonable process under the law. That is the point that amendment 3 makes.
I want to praise one particular character—one person who I think should at least suggest that the Government vote for the amendment. While still Leader of the Opposition, the right hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) wrote both to Boris Johnson and to my right hon. Friend the Member for Richmond and Northallerton (Rishi Sunak), calling on them to officially request Jagtar’s immediate release. In that letter, he made it clear that Jagtar’s detention was arbitrary and that he had been
“gravely mistreated, with no legal basis”.
I bow before the ex head of the Crown Prosecution Service in the United Kingdom.
The point being made through those specific cases is made for a wider set of cases through amendment 3. I wish the Government would accept the amendment rather than our having to put it to a vote, but I think it is necessary for us to do so in order to make this point. Too often we co operate, rather lazily at times, with Administrations in foreign countries that we know will never give a fair trial to a British citizen sitting in their courts—in fact, they do not have a fair trial for many of their own citizens. For example, the UAE has been brutal in its behaviour, fomenting violence and war in Sudan, but it gets away with it simply because it happens to be wealthy enough and we want its investment. But we should never turn our head away from the single greatest thing we have given to the world, and which we should constantly recognise that we should maintain for the rest of the world: habeas corpus—the right to a proper and fair trial. It is an inalienable right of every individual who is a British citizen, and we should defend that right. To defend that right, we should not give cause to those courts that will not give a fair trial by giving them information, support or help at any time. That is the amendment I have tabled and, if called, I will move it.
It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). I concur with the points he made on Jimmy Lai and Jagtar Singh Johal and, more widely, about the internet of things. I think of Norway and Denmark, which suddenly realised that hundreds of buses they had imported from China had kill switches, meaning that their entire public transport networks could potentially have been disabled, just like that. That is the reality of these new technologies, and we need to face up to it and have our eyes wide open in the contracts and deals that we sign.
On Second Reading five months ago, I welcomed the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill, but even in the short time since then, the world has become an ever more dangerous place, and the cyber threat has only intensified. I commend the Government on their hard work in the intervening period, and in my remarks today I want to focus on the cyber threat landscape, my two amendments—new clause 21 and amendment 28—and the need for a national conversation on national security, which of course includes cyber security.
Let me start with the cyber threat landscape. The UK is the most cyber attacked nation in Europe and the third most cyber attacked nation globally, with three in four businesses having suffered a cyber attack in the past year. My hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah) talked about the attacks on Jaguar Land Rover, Marks & Spencer, the Co op and others. Having spoken with those businesses with the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy and individually, I know of the scale of the impact that was felt within their operation and how affected they were by these attacks. It is unimaginable, even for the most seasoned business and industry leaders, to suddenly find themselves under such attack, and the repercussions for the economy have been very significant.
In April, the CEO of the National Cyber Security Centre, Richard Horne, laid out the scale of cyber attacks: on average, the NCSC deals with around four nationally significant incidents a week—that is not the hundreds of incidents that are occurring every day, but the really serious, significant ones. The threat of cyber attacks will only intensify. Continued state backed cyber attacks from Russia, China and Iran, either directly or via proxies, are being fuelled by technological advancements in AI and quantum computing, increasing the complexity and sheer volume of such attacks. The reality is that major cyber attacks are no longer rare one offs but an operational reality facing every business and organisation—public and private—across the UK, as they are globally. It is important that we secure our systems to make them more robust and deter such attacks, so that those who wish to do us harm will go after others. It is in this context that the Bill has been introduced, and it takes serious, robust steps to increase the resilience of the UK.
However, given the escalating threat picture, I continue to have concerns about the scope and breadth of the Bill. That is why I have tabled new clause 21 and amendment 28, which I hope the Minister will reconsider. New clause 21 would bring those in the food supply chain within the scope of the NIS regulations and regulate them as “operators of essential services”, while excluding smaller businesses, to avoid an unnecessary administrative burden. I understand that the Minister addressed this on Second Reading, explaining that essential services would only include those sectors “the failure of whose network and information systems poses imminent threat to life to the British public.”—[Official Report, 6 January 2026; Vol. 778, c. 225.] I would gently suggest that the collapse or disruption of the food supply chain would pose an imminent threat to life. I say that in an honest and not patronising way. Those of us who have had conversations behind the scenes about what happened during the pandemic, and Opposition Members who were far closer to that when in government, will realise that the health threat was one element, but the collapse of society—not just the economy, but society—with the potential for civil unrest and rioting, due to the lack of food and toilet rolls on shelves and so on, would have been the most urgent and pressing issue. It is worth noting that the European Union’s NIS2 directive does include food distribution in its regulation, so it is feasible and recognised internationally as important. The Bill does grant the Secretary of State powers to bring in new sectors. Could the Minister reassure me that the Department will give this due consideration today and in the future?
Secondly, amendment 28 would ensure that relevant managed service providers do not provide services to manage the technology systems for a number of customers that exceeds a critical risk threshold within the same sector or subsector. The rationale behind this is simple: it is about building resilience and ensuring that if one RMSP fails or is breached, a whole sector is not hamstrung by it. I can envision a situation whereby one particular RMSP dominates a large category or small subsector that may be a crucial part of a supply chain, thereby crippling the whole chain. Indeed, my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West cited the UK Government’s dependency on AWS and Microsoft as an example. Will the Minister please consider that?
Aside from my two amendments, it is clear that the Bill, in itself, is not the only answer to our cyber resilience; multiple approaches are needed. Given that the Bill does not include large swathes of the economy or local government, it is even more important that we explain to businesses and the public the very real threats that we face. That brings me to my final point, which is on the need for a national conversation on national security. We can have the best crafted and tightest legislation and regulation, but unless we have a real cultural shift and acknowledgment of the cyber threat and its impacts, from board level to entry level positions, all of this will be wasted. I once again encourage the Department and the whole machinery of government to go further and faster in explaining the threat posed and the steps we can all take to boost resilience, because resilience starts with the mobile phone in our pocket, and cyber security is only as strong as its weakest link.
The Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy, which I chair, has begun its inquiry into building national resilience through a national conversation. It is clear from the evidence we have heard from Taiwan, the Netherlands and other European nations I have spoken to that we need to explain the threat to people, build a stronger cultural sense of resilience and explain that we all have a role to play; it is not simply the state’s responsibility. I will update the House on our findings in due course, and I hope the Minister and the Government will find that useful when considering their plans for national resilience.
To conclude, this Bill is a substantial and serious step forward in protecting the UK from cyber attacks. It makes us more resilient and strengthens our collective security, but there are areas where I encourage the Government to be more ambitious—namely, by bringing the food supply chain into the essential services classification, as Europe is doing; setting critical risk thresholds for RMSPs; and expanding the scope of the Bill to encompass more of the economy.
It is a pleasure to follow such esteemed colleagues. My only declaration before I start my speech is that I hold a degree in information systems from the University of Leeds.
I have been sat here for the last two hours looking at the memorial plaque for Jo Cox, 10 years after the horrific day that we lost Jo. I was a West Yorkshire candidate alongside Jo in the run up to the 2015 election. It is to my huge detriment that I never got to serve with her here. Today is such a difficult day for so many colleagues. I know that Jo would have dearly liked to see many of the things that Labour is doing in government. It is incumbent on us to try to push forward all the things that Jo strived for, to make this place better, to make the country better and to make the world better.
Let me now turn to cyber security. Data centres are warehouse like facilities that house the information technology equipment upon which almost all digital activity relies. The UK Government say that they “underpin almost all economic activity and innovation, including the development of AI and other technology, public service delivery”
and modern day communications. Europe’s largest data centre market is Greater London, where most of the UK data centres are concentrated. There are four types of data centre, one being AI data centres, which are facilities specialised for the high performance computing needs of AI development and AI models. Having data centres based in the UK allows our Government to regulate them, such as by requiring them to meet cyber security standards and reduce their environmental impact, which is obviously very important.
Data centres are an essential part of our critical national infrastructure. They have a huge environmental impact so must be managed carefully, but the benefits of having them on our home turf is that we can regulate them. In our current state of hybrid war with Russia, it is vital to protect those data centres from any nefarious actors or cyber warfare, and to strengthen their protections against cyber attacks spawned by AI. Otherwise, the impact on public safety, the economy and society could be catastrophic.
Given the importance of data centres, and the speed of development of AI systems, should the Secretary of State not hold last resort powers to hit the kill switch—the big red button—to direct a shutdown of data centres or AI systems deployed at significant scale, in the event of an AI security or operational emergency? Such powers would be strictly reserved for catastrophic risk scenarios, which are defined in line with the national risk register’s high impact threshold. It is a significant decision to shut down a data centre, and such a decision must come from someone who puts national security and the public interest at the core of their decision: the Secretary of State.
New clause 12, entitled “‘Last resort’ powers in respect of data centres and AI models”, would ensure that the Government could intervene in the case of an emergency caused by
“AI systems used or deployed by a data centre”
that can cause large scale harm. It is well recognised that today the UK finds itself in a new threat landscape, which poses unprecedented security challenges. As per the strategic defence review, we face threats that are
“more serious and less predictable than at any time since the cold war.”
Cyber attacks are now a daily reality and, as colleagues have said, the real world costs are substantial.
The 2024 NHS Synnovis ransomware attack disrupted over 11,000 out patient appointments, with a direct cost of at least £32.7 million. We have moved on at speed with data centres and AI models since 2024, and the risks become exponential as innovation in the sector charges on. More recently, AI models such as Claude Mythos showcased unprecedented autonomous cyber hacking and cyber offensive capabilities, to the point that it was not released publicly.
If implemented, the new clause would require data centre operators to maintain technical infrastructure, secure communications, and hold “regular emergency exercises” to ensure that powers can be used quickly and effectively. It would also mandate regular parliamentary reports on the causes and potential causes of AI security emergencies, including adversarial and non state actor use and autonomous cyber attack capabilities—we are seeing growing evidence of those, which could lead to tragic consequences. There is clear legal precedent for such powers. For example, the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 confers significant intervention powers in extreme harm scenarios.
The new clause would bake in robust checks and balances to constrain Government overreach. It would require parliamentary reporting within seven days of any direction, followed by a debate in each House at the earliest opportunity. It would require a High Court review, so that any operator served with a direction has an immediate right to apply for relief, with the Court empowered to confirm, vary, cancel or award compensation. There would be post incident accountability, with incident reporting and mitigation measures required before operations resumed. Compliance costs are expected to be minimal and would require only a small up front investment in technical infrastructure for a handful of data centres, some of which already possess such infrastructure. By definition, such powers are designed to be used sparingly and only in genuine emergencies.
The cost of inaction vastly outweighs the compliance burden, as a single major AI driven cyber incident could dwarf the total cost of implementing those powers across all affected operators. Last resort kill switch powers for AI systems and data centres underpin the overall concept of cyber resilience—the final backstop. The UK must remain proactive rather than reactive, and we need to be ready in these unprecedented times. As AI companies race towards superintelligence, it becomes ever more important to have the right safeguards in place to avoid catastrophic outcomes. The new clause provides an urgent, legally sound and proportionate mechanism to stay ahead of real world threats to our critical national infrastructure. I will not be pushing it to a vote, but perhaps the Minister will consider adding it to the Bill.
I also wish to mention amendment 3, tabled by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). If a country cannot guarantee a fair trial, how can we think that, for any reason and at any time, we could disclose data that could result in an unfair conviction? That undermines our whole idea, and today of all days I cannot imagine why we would not enact something to protect the rights of our citizens when abroad.
I refer Members to my registered interest as parliamentary chair of the Campaign for Secure Technology, which I thank for its work in preparing my two amendments as well as my speech.
I echo the comments of my hon. Friends the Members for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) and for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah) about the scale of the threat that we face from cyber attack. We must ensure that we are having that national conversation about the nature of the threats we face, and who those threats come from. In many ways, this country is already in conflict with Russia, and in more than what we could call competition with China—something that the public are not fully aware of. We must do more to ensure that they are fully aware of that threat, and that they hold our feet, and those of the Government, to the fire, and ensure that we are taking the kinds of measures in this Bill, and beyond, that we need to protect our economy, our military and our democracy more widely.
I will limit my remarks to amendments 4 and 5, which I tabled. It is always difficult to speak at this point in a debate, because people with far more experience and knowledge than me have said a lot of the things that I was planning to say, and have done so with far more eloquence and knowledge than I have. Amendments 4 and 5 seek to deal with part of our digital infrastructure that is almost entirely invisible to the public and rarely discussed in Parliament—other than this afternoon—yet is essential to our national security: cellular internet of things modules. As my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) described, cellular IOT modules are small electronic components, about the size of a credit card, and they allow a device to connect to the internet over a mobile network. They sit inside everything from smart meters, CCTV cameras and traffic lights to industrial sensors, medical devices and parts of our energy grid. They are the connective tissue of our modern digital economy, and we all rely on them every day. Despite their importance, however, very little is known publicly about what they do and the potential harm that they could cause.
Today, more than 70% of all cellular IOT modules used globally are manufactured in China, and that dominance creates strategic vulnerabilities that the Bill must address. Amendments 4 and 5 would ensure that the Bill covers the risks created by embedded communications components manufactured outside the UK. Amendment 4 would ensure that the Secretary of State can treat the provenance of those components as a cyber security risk, and amendment 5 would allow Ministers to require operators of critical systems to identify and mitigate those risks. In short, the amendments would give the Government clear authority to act where foreign made modules create known vulnerabilities.
Why is that necessary? Because the modules present three major security threats. The first is dependency. When one country controls the overwhelming supply of a critical technology, that is by its nature a structural risk. If supply is disrupted, whether for geopolitical leverage or commercial pressure, our energy systems, transport networks and emergency services could be left without essential replacement parts. We have already seen that threat with Huawei and our 5G network—a mistake we must not repeat.
The second reason is disruption—as colleagues have said, that is increasingly referred to as the “kill switch”. Internet of things cellular modules contain firmware that can be updated remotely. If a manufacturer is subject to state influence—and in China we know that they are—it could insert a kill switch or back door that allows it to disable devices at scale and at will. It could push out malicious updates, insert malware or remotely disable devices. That could mean vehicles being turned off, cranes and industrial machinery being halted mid operation, or financial terminals suddenly going offline. We could even see disruption to areas such as NHS refrigeration, affecting drugs and blood supply.
The concern with that type of module is that it might not happen overnight or be something we immediately see. It could be hidden for a number of weeks or months in different technologies and across different parts of our economy, and it would be incredibly difficult—nigh on impossible—to prove exactly what had happened and who had done it, and to tie it to any one state actor with certainty. It is certainly not something that could be done quickly, allowing for a full response. As my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington said earlier, there are a number of examples of that from around the world. Perhaps the best known was when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 and tried to steal more than two dozen John Deere tractors and ship them to Chechnya. The US company intervened to switch them off. It remotely locked the thieves out of the equipment, rendering the tractors useless. That is the kind of action we could see China take in the event of a future crisis.
Closer to home, my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington mentioned that Norway tested two of its Chinese designed electric buses, one manufactured in the Netherlands and one built in China, to discover exactly the same kill switch technology.
Does the hon. Member agree that, given that Transport for London now has 500 Chinese buses ordered and on the streets of London, there is a glaring opportunity for huge embarrassment to this nation if those kill switches were ever used on the buses in our capital city?
That proves why we need more awareness of the threat that we face. It is not necessarily a case of banning certain components or technologies, but we must be more aware and ensure that the Government have the powers they need to respond where possible.
My hon. Friend is right to say in his eloquent speech that raising awareness and having a debate about this issue is important, but the problems may not necessarily be the result of hostile actors. If the providers of the modules were to stop providing software updates, the modules would be more likely to fail and then become the subject of hostile attacks. So not only could the technology be killed by a hostile actor, but an increased dependency on software updates puts us at risk.
As ever, my hon. Friend is correct. How many of us have had some bit of technology break because the firmware is no longer allowed to be updated, meaning that something no longer works, it is no longer supported and it breaks down immediately?
To add to that, by its nature, something that is not regularly updated becomes more vulnerable to attack by hackers. They may not be state sponsored, but they may take advantage of a weaker part of a technology. That was pointed out to me on a recent visit to Taiwan. Its semiconductor industry is incredibly strong, but it builds the more high tech elements of semiconductors. I was told that it would not bother to commit to manufacturing other types of technology because they were too cheap and simple to make and could be mass produced. On that note, I refer to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests about the trip to Taiwan. I did not intend to raise it during my speech, but there was an opportunity to do so.
The third element of risk is data extraction, as was mentioned by the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). Under the Chinese national intelligence law, companies and organisations are legally required to assist state intelligence agencies and to hand over data upon request, creating a systemic risk in the UK that any data accessible through a cellular internet of things module could ultimately be accessible to the Chinese state.
Modern vehicles, especially electric and autonomous vehicles, are effectively computers on wheels, continuously collecting data on drivers, surroundings and infrastructure. The US Select Committee on China recently warned that Chinese EVs are “rolling data collection devices” and argued that restricting Chinese made components is a national security imperative. The US Department of Commerce has now moved to limit the deployment of software and communications equipment sourced from adversary Governments in connected vehicles. Those who are worried about China’s reaction to such measures should be aware that it has already taken precisely these steps against the west. Tesla cars have been banned not just from entering Chinese defence, bases but from various Government agencies and authorities.
In the meeting mentioned by my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah), I was concerned that there was a suggestion by one of the officials that there was no need to concern ourselves about the threat of Chinese internet of things modules because the threat was merely “theoretical”. As I and others have shown today, these examples are not just theoretical. Frankly, most threats are theoretical until they are not theoretical. This is happening now across critical sectors and national infrastructure. Other countries, such as the US, Australia and those in the EU, are all moving to toughen up their legislation specifically on cellular internet of things modules, and I believe that the UK must take action as well.
My amendments would ensure that the Bill explicitly covers these risks and gives Ministers the clarity and authority to act when necessary. If this Bill is to truly strengthen the UK’s cyber resilience, it must not leave one of the most serious threats to our modern and increasingly digital world outside its scope. I ask the Government to work with me to address the threat of cellular IOT modules.
Madam Deputy Speaker, I hope you will not mind if I take a moment to reflect on the fact that today is the 10th anniversary of the murder of our dear friend Jo Cox. I was lucky to serve alongside Jo on the board of the Labour Women’s Network and we had done similar kinds of work previously. I often sit here in the Chamber and look at Jo’s shield and wonder what she would have made of the state of our politics, our country and our world today. I think about how much better we would be if she was still here to contribute. Jo’s most famous words matter so much today—that we “have far more in common than that which divides us.”—[Official Report, 03 June 2015; Vol. 596, c. 674-65.] As my hon. Friend the Member for Midlothian (Kirsty McNeill) said today, holding on to Jo’s words and keeping her spirit going matter always, but they matter even more when it is difficult to do that. I hope that Jo’s family and friends, and those closest to her, know how much she is missed and that we strive to carry her light forward with us.
The threats that cyber attacks pose increase every year and the nature of the cyber threats we face is continually developing. Last year, the UK faced 204 nationally significant cyber incidents, attacks which threaten large organisations, local and central government or our other essential services. That represents an increase of more than double compared with 2024. The attacks are speeding up, and so must regulation. I am glad that the Bill brings data centres into the scope of network and information systems regulations, given that they underpin nearly all economic activity and public services.
Current NIS regulations are limited to sectors deemed critical in 2016, a year after OpenAI was founded and five years before the foundation of Anthropic. It is high time that our cyber security regulations caught up with the pace of threats, including those from Russia, who are already seriously targeting our country, as we have learned more about just this week. But this is where I believe we need to go further, particularly in limiting the threat posed by AI to our cyber security and our critical national infrastructure.
I will focus my speech on UK data centres and the scope to maintain cyber defences around them in the Bill. AI has the power to bring enormous benefits to our society and economy, from healthcare to productivity. AI growth will rely on having the right infrastructure to support it. Of course, this means the installation of data centres across our country. These data centres should be located in appropriate places, making use of former industrial sites and brownfield land wherever possible, in locations and settings that are as discreet as possible.
My constituents in Auchtertool are right to state that the fields beside their village are not an appropriate setting for a large data centre, as is currently proposed. In Scotland, there have been no changes to planning law to take account of the advent of data centres and the resources that they require. I hope that the Scottish Government will recognise this and rapidly change planning law so that villages like Auchtertool are not put in this situation.
Residents in Auchtertool are also right in their concern that Fife council does not, at this stage, appear to be taking full account of the environmental impact of a huge data centre like this, and that is why I have challenged this with the council. Scottish law must be brought up to date, as has already been done in other parts of the UK. We have an abundance of former industrial sites in Scotland and in Fife, which would be much more appropriate locations for such infrastructure.
AI will do incredible things while transforming society, and there is no point in anyone denying that or trying to turn back the clock. Indeed it is incumbent upon us to ensure that the UK is a world leader in AI and the good that it can do, and I know the Minister will agree with that. However, the pace at which the technology is developing and the pace at which safety regulation is developing are vastly different.
Powerful models, like Anthropic’s Mythos, are redefining the cyber security landscape with potentially catastrophic effects for our critical national infrastructure. Mythos has exposed previously undiscovered flaws in every major operating system and every major web browser, putting at risk our social and economic security. In the past week alone, the Trump Administration, not exactly known for its heavy handedness in regulating the tech sector, imposed an export control directive on Anthropic’s Fable 5 and Mythos 5, citing national security concerns. This means that the Administration felt so concerned about the model’s effects on national security, that it decided no one outside the US should have access to it. In the UK, the National Cyber Security Centre has predicted that it is highly likely that cyber attackers will be able to use AI to help them to find zero day vulnerabilities. Powerful models such as Mythos would aid cyber attackers in exploiting vulnerabilities in defence systems that our experts had not previously been aware of.
Similarly, as the race quickens to AI superintelligence, where the capabilities of AI models surpass the capabilities of any human, it is crucial that we have control over our data systems as well as over AI more widely. For all our history, humans have been the most intelligent beings on this planet, yet superintelligence means that AI systems could begin acting outside our control and in ways that are currently beyond our understanding. That will have extremely dangerous consequences for humanity.
We must be able to switch off those systems if we need to, but currently we cannot. That is clearly unacceptable and must change. That is why I am speaking in support of new clause 12, in the name of my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel). The new clause would provide the Secretary of State with a kill switch on data centres in case of a “catastrophic risk” posed by a UK data centre—the national risk register’s most serious level of risk.
The Government must have control over data centres in the UK. The innovation in AI is spectacular, but all too often its developers live in a world of their own, without Government regulation. That is the case particularly in the United States, where they have been given carte blanche to press ahead with AI development despite any security risks.
This week, I was proud to see our Labour Government announce a ban on under-16s accessing social media, which many of us have campaigned for since we were elected to this place. Many of my constituents across Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy, especially teachers and parents, have told me that they want that to happen, but the complexity in implementing the ban shows how hard it is to use rearguard action to regulate a technology that should have had more attention over a decade ago. While social media has many positives, the damage it is able to do to our democracy and our young people has been driven by many of the same tech bros who are now telling us that they need a regulation free environment to develop AI.
In my view, this Bill does not explicitly reference misinformation or disinformation threats. I have just met with the Council for Countering Online Disinformation, and in that meeting I learned that X’s algorithm amplified misinformation and disinformation online about the riots that took place in Epsom. Does the hon. Member agree that it is really important that we add strong safeguards against misinformation and disinformation into the Bill?
I certainly agree. Misinformation and disinformation are a huge challenge to our democracy and our country. We know that many enemy nations, such as Russia and Iran, are seeking to exploit loopholes, and I believe the Government have to take further action on that, for sure.
We should not wait to find out whether AI has the potential to damage our critical national infrastructure; we know that in some cases it does, and we should be prepared for it. “Catastrophic risk” includes harm to critical infrastructure, national security or a severe, large scale harm to human life. Governments should have the power to prevent those risks from coming to pass. It is our No. 1 duty to keep our citizens safe. In a speech in April, the Secretary of State argued in favour of greater AI sovereignty in the UK, and kill switches would provide exactly that—sovereign control over the most dangerous risks posed by artificial intelligence.
New clause 12 includes proportionality and accountability, and the costs of implementing kill switches on data centres would be minimal, particularly in comparison with the financial losses associated with major cyber attacks; we have heard more about that from many of my hon. Friends in this debate. It would ensure that there is parliamentary reporting within seven days of any direction from the Secretary of State and a debate in this House at the earliest opportunity. Any operator served with direction would have an immediate right to receive a High Court review.
We are elected to this House first and foremost to keep our nation safe. AI developers are moving at a pace far, far faster than Governments, and they are racing towards superintelligence. It is crucial that if—or, more likely, when—that is achieved, we have the right safeguards in place to avoid catastrophic outcomes. That is a crucial part of our national resilience and an issue that I and others who are present today continue to speak about, because it badly needs more attention.
New clause 12 does not seek to stymie the development of AI systems that could bring radical benefits to our society. Instead, it provides the Government with a suitable mechanism to stay ahead and in control of real threats to our critical national infrastructure. That is why I support the new clause and hope that the Government will do the same. If not, I ask the Minister to set out how the Government plan to ensure that we have these powers, which are so clearly needed.
I thank all my hon. Friends and all hon. Members who have contributed to what has been a really good and well meaning debate. People will be relieved to know that I intend to keep my contribution fairly brief. I say to the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) that I do not pretend to be an expert when it comes to cyber security and resilience, although other Members across the House would say that that has never stopped me talking before.
It was a pleasure to be on the Bill Committee for this legislation; in part, I think that was because of the very constructive nature of conversations in Committee. As the shadow Minister in particular will know, I sat very passively throughout Committee and said very little, which is common for me. This is a really important piece of legislation. As Members across the House have rightly said, it is the first duty of any Government to protect their citizens. There are obviously huge benefits as we move forward into a more technologically advanced world, but there are also real challenges, and as a country we need to be ready for them.
It was also a pleasure in Committee to have the opportunity to mention my father in law, Professor Robin Bloomfield—not least because I need all the brownie points that I can get—who is a professor of cyber security at City St George’s, University of London. Let me also reference the fact that I have a data centre in my constituency, the Kao data centre; it is named after Charlie Kao, who, along with George Hockham, created the fibre optic cable in Harlow. It is fair to say that I have some skin in the game in terms of the importance of this legislation.
When I looked through the list of amendments, the first thing I thought was, “The Liberal Democrats have been busying themselves.” I say genuinely to them that I welcome conversations about the need to protect local government and electoral services. Although I do not think that necessarily has to be covered in this legislation, I hope the Minister has listened to the comments made by the Liberal Democrats. We can absolutely come back to that conversation in this House, because it is hugely important that our democratic services in particular are not eroded by bad state actors, as has been discussed previously.
On local government, there are clearly hundreds of local authorities, many of which are busy upgrading their systems. However, one thing that is not spoken about enough is the human capacity to actually do the work. Many local authorities, like Government themselves, find a real difficulty in recruiting the talent that they need. Does my hon. Friend agree that central Government could provide a greater role and act almost as a centre of excellence for cyber security for local government?
As a former councillor in a district council bordering London, I know the particular challenges we had in recruiting really decent council officers. I should put it on record that we have had some fantastic officers in Harlow district council, but it was always more difficult to recruit them, because they were drawn particularly to London. I recognise the challenges that he highlights, and I obviously want more support to be given to those professionals to understand cyber security risks. My father in law is very much retired, so I am not giving him a job, but I am sure he would be very keen to see that as well.
My hon. Friend’s intervention brings me nicely on to my next point. My hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) spoke very well and with a great deal of expertise on this topic. He referenced something that I referenced in Committee, which was that even if we think this legislation is perfect, it will not be enough. We need a culture shift when it comes to cyber security, so I welcome my hon. Friend’s comments and ask the Minister to reflect on them when he concludes the debate.
I did say that I would not give a very long speech, but I have been on my feet longer than I thought I would be, which is typical of me. I will finish by saying that over 11,000 NHS appointments and procedures were lost last year due to cyber attacks. For too long, successive Governments have failed to properly address the growing threats from cyber criminals and hostile states. I am pleased that this Government are addressing those threats by giving regulators new powers to designate which suppliers are critical in the supply chain, and by investing £210 million to tackle threats and strengthen public services. For that reason, I strongly support the Bill.
My part of the world has already had a hard lesson in what a serious cyber attack can do, and I thank the Liberal Democrat spokesperson, the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted (Victoria Collins), for mentioning it. In 2020, Redcar and Cleveland council was hit by a cyber attack that has been attributed to the Russian Conti syndicate, and around 135,000 residents were left without online public services. Systems were disrupted, and the cost was put at more than £10 million.
That is a story that has been repeated across our public and private sectors, and we have heard other examples today—my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) spoke about the NHS, and my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western) spoke about manufacturers such as JLR. I echo their calls in the amendments they have tabled today, particularly about the need for last resort powers in relation to data centres, but also for a national conversation about these issues. I have had discussions with constituents who are sceptical that the Russian state might attack a little council like ours, and it is important to get across the point that it is precisely because ours was low hanging fruit that it was such a target for Russia.
That is exactly why this Bill is needed. Since the NIS regulations were introduced in 2018, the threat has changed; we are more interconnected and more reliant on cloud services, managed IT providers and data centres than ever before, often across long and complex supply chains. As such, it is very welcome that this Bill gives Ofcom a clearer role and brings significant data centre services into the regulatory framework, as well as relevant managed service providers and critical suppliers. The new reporting regime is a practical improvement as well—a 24-hour initial notification and a fuller report within 72 hours will help regulators and the National Cyber Security Centre to spot patterns, warn others and build a better national picture, which is especially important when we consider hostile states.
Cyber security is plainly now a frontline part of our national defence—we have seen how Russian military intelligence activity is targeting Government and critical infrastructure, and we need to be equipped to respond. I am sympathetic to new clause 3, which relates to the role of foreign state bodies, but it ought to be broadened beyond critical and essential services. I will give an example that concerns the security of British citizens’ data from foreign Governments. Right now, the largest leveraged buy out in history is under way—the takeover of global videogames maker Electronic Arts by Saudi Arabia and Jared Kushner’s Affinity Partners. They are buying access to the sensitive personal and behavioural data of 700 million players worldwide, as well as the ability to expand foreign influence in Britain. I urge the Government—both DSIT and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport—and the CMA to look at this deal with their eyes wide open. Ministers should be prepared to stand up for UK data, UK jobs and UK security.
The Chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah), mentioned interconnectedness between data security and national security. I endorse her amendments dealing with internet of things modules and the potential threat of hostile states switching off various pieces of infrastructure around our country. I also urge Ministers to keep pushing further on the threat of hostile state disinformation on social media, which has also been referenced in this debate. That is a fundamental security issue. Russia and others do not only try to knock systems offline; they also try to rot public trust, spread falsehoods and undermine democracy, so the technical threat and the information threat are part of the same hostile playbook. I do wonder whether regulators have sufficient resources to act, and I will listen carefully to the Minister’s remarks on new clause 7.
Ultimately, this Bill does not solve every problem, but it is a serious and necessary step forward. It strengthens resilience, widens responsibility, improves reporting, and gives Government clearer powers where national security is at risk. As such, I support the Bill.
I call the shadow Minister.
Before I begin, I would also like to make some remarks in commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the murder of Jo Cox. I never met Jo Cox. I never knew Jo Cox, and I am very sad that I did not, because having seen the impact she has had on our politics, on this place and on the people who knew her, she was clearly an incredible person. I do not think anyone can disagree with what she stood for, and in particular, that we have more in common in our politics. Our politics is worse off without her.
Yet again, we return to this Government’s vacant vacillation regarding our national security. I urge the Minister again to take this opportunity to strengthen UK cyber security from the threat posed by foreign state actors. Protecting the UK and its citizens is the primary responsibility of Government, but still, in the face of clear evidence of increasing threats, this Government fail to act. The risk of physical threats and the need to invest in defence are clear to all, yet the Government prioritise increasing welfare spending over the safety and security of armed forces personnel and our country. The situation is so serious that the Defence Secretary had to resign, as he could not defend the inaction of this Government or the risks they are taking.
While the dangers presented to our cyber security may be less visible, they are no less real. Hostile state actors are working every single hour of every single day to undermine our democracy and our security. These are risks that every Member across this House will be aware of. It is chilling to know that when Iran shut down its internet access, social media accounts purporting to be pro independence Scottish people stopped tweeting. Expert analysis has estimated that thousands of similar accounts could originate in Iran and that as much as 26% of such accounts could be fake. Social media is now a weapon. We know that hostile state actors have sought to attack and undermine Parliament. Just last week we were told that spyware had been discovered in Government buildings linked to recent high profile decisions regarding China’s controversial mega embassy project in London.
I have often said about the device that was found in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government that unless someone is a member of staff, they cannot get to that side of the building without going through the Home Office. That obviously raises serious questions about the complex on Marsham Street more broadly. Does the shadow Minister accept that there is a pattern of foreign malign forces impacting our institutions, whether that is our Parliament or even the sovereignty of the United Kingdom itself? Unless there is resolve by Government and all parties in this place, we will not face that threat with the scale of response needed.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for the knowledge and experience he brings to the background of that particular case. I entirely agree that it is incumbent on all parties across the House to strengthen our national security and to be clear eyed about the threat of hostile state actors. I will continue to develop that point in my wind up speech.
The evidence is clear that we face an increasing threat from foreign state actors. We need to take action to recognise those risks and to prevent such attacks. Cyber security should be at the forefront of our defences, and for that reason, His Majesty’s loyal Opposition have focused again on amending the Bill, particularly with new clauses 14 and 15. We table them in the hope that the Government will not squander another opportunity to act in this Bill.
New clause 14 would require the Government to directly identify the threats we face, ending the prevarication we have seen in recent months by obliging the Secretary of State to establish and maintain by regulation a list of foreign powers presenting a significant cyber security risk to the UK. The amendment would strengthen the link between intelligence agencies and policy enforcement, ensuring that decisions by the Secretary of State to deploy special national security direction powers are based on GCHQ’s verified risk assessments regarding hostile states and state affiliated groups. It is not about reacting after an attack occurs, but creating a proactive framework to evaluate and mitigate threats, built directly into UK supply chains. That would ensure that the UK is better prepared to deal with cyber threats and attacks from hostile state actors. With the risks continuing to grow, these decisions cannot remain at the political whim of a Government who are reluctant to act.
Let us talk about the dragon in the room. In 2024, the National Cyber Security Centre confirmed that China state affiliated actors were responsible for cyber attacks on the UK’s Electoral Commission and Parliament in 2021 and 2022, yet this Government continue to refuse to recognise China as a threat to the UK. New clause 14 would compel the Government to recognise formally what is readily apparent to those on these Benches, to our security services and to the many Members across both Houses who have expressed urgent concern about the security risks that China and other foreign state actors pose to the United Kingdom. The new clause would force the Government to acknowledge that China is a threat.
In view of this established and growing threat, our new clause 15 would compel the Secretary of State to review state sponsored cyber threats to the UK’s infrastructure, including the cyber security risk to surrounding critical networks in the vicinity of the super embassy site in the City of London. As I said in Committee, there is simply no point in granting the Secretary of State powers to issue directions on the basis of national security if the Government are not willing to be clear eyed about the most critical national and cyber security threats to this nation. The new clause also strikes an important balance between ensuring parliamentary scrutiny and recognising and protecting the sensitive nature of some of the material that may be unearthed, by making provision for such information to be sent to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament.
I am pleased that, having resisted calls to address this risk during previous stages of the Bill’s progress, the Government have now taken some action to address risks from foreign state actors. The publication last week of their National Security (State Threats) Bill comes in response to a sharp spike in state backed intelligence operations, sabotage and proxy violence. Their own explanatory notes to that Bill state: “Threats to the UK from foreign states are persistent and take many forms, including espionage, foreign interference in the UK’s political system, sabotage, disinformation, cyber operations, and even assassinations. Collectively these are referred to by the Government as state threats.”
However, the Bill itself does not once mention cyber security, and contains no provision requiring assessment of the risks posed. It does not apply to states themselves, and therefore can only be complemented and strengthened by new clauses 14 and 15, which no responsible Government or Member of the House could vote against.
Amendment 3, which would insert a provision headed “Exemption from disclosure: right to a fair trial”, was tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). As a Member of Parliament whose constituency includes Runnymede, I am proud both to call him a friend and to work with him on, in particular, his fight for the rule of law and fair trials.
The amendment would prevent the sharing of information with overseas authorities for the purpose of prosecuting crimes not committed in the UK, if the Secretary of State determined that the receiving country was one in which the right to a fair trial could not be guaranteed. It would address genuine human rights concerns, and would close a loophole in the Bill that currently fails to anticipate politically motivated requests from authoritarian states. It would help to block hostile state actors such as Russia, China and Iran from probing our systems to detect firmware back doors or vulnerabilities within, for instance, the UK’s utility networks, healthcare systems and data centres. It would also create a statutory duty for the Secretary of State to submit an annual report to Parliament justifying decisions on which foreign jurisdictions are trusted or barred from intelligence sharing. That alone would be invaluable, and would end the many fruitless hours of questions and debate in the Chamber initiated by Conservative Members seeking a clear answer from the Government on whether they see countries such as China as a threat—per my earlier remarks. I am therefore pleased, on behalf of His Majesty’s Opposition, to support my right hon. Friend’s amendment.
Let me also pay tribute to the Chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, the hon. Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah). I thank her for her comments, which were echoed by others, about the risk from the internet of things and cellular modules. That is an important area, and we need to get it right.
I will conclude by addressing the amendments tabled by our Liberal Democrat colleagues regarding digital sovereignty and the impact that this approach could have on the UK. New clause 13 is the clearest demonstration to date that the Liberal Democrats do not understand the tech sector or global supply chains. Of course it is right to support British business, but it is not feasible or possible to achieve full sovereignty in a global market or supply chain. Rather, we should prioritise capacities and capabilities, and ensure that the UK has an indispensable role in global supply chains.
I do not think that the hon. Member has understood our amendment, which is about having a strategy. It does not say that everything should be sovereign, but we need to look at our tech stack and have a strategy for what is sovereign and what requires the procurement of elements. I ask him to look at our amendment again.
I refer the hon. Member to her new clause 13, particularly subsection 3(c), which makes it very clear that companies would need to deviate from “foreign technologies”, which would be quite a burden.
We need to back Britain in key sectors, from quantum and photonics to chip design and innovation. In so many areas, we lead the world. We should not try to restrict the influence and access of global markets. We must engage not in protectionism, but in leverage, to back Britain and position ourselves so that we are indispensable in the modern global tech sector and supply chains.
Does the hon. Member agree that if we are to excel, we must excel on a UK wide basis? Does he agree that it would be a very retrograde step to have part of this United Kingdom subject to another jurisdiction’s AI regulations, rather than those of the UK? Does he agree that it is imperative that the AI regulations that govern our digital sector are those of this Parliament and not those of the European Parliament?
I do not want any part of the UK to be subject to the awful AI Act that has been passed by the European Union. Northern Ireland, and particularly Belfast, is a technological powerhouse of which we should be very proud. We need to ensure that it continues to go from strength to strength as part of our fantastic Union.
We on the Conservative Benches will not back new clause 13, because we understand how markets and global supply chains work. We believe in Britain.
I start by echoing the thoughts of many Members from across the House, particularly my hon. Friends the Members for Leeds Central and Headingley (Alex Sobel) and for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy (Melanie Ward). I did not know Jo Cox, but I admired her deeply. As we talk about our country’s resilience, her central message—that there is no deeper route to resilience than through the unity of our country and community—is top of our minds for all of us in this House.
It is a pleasure to bring this important Bill back to the House this afternoon. The Bill will increase our cyber defences and resilience, making the UK an even safer place to live and do business. I thank Members on both sides of the Chamber for their valuable contributions to this debate and for the expertise that they have brought throughout the passage of the Bill. I particularly thank them for their recognition of my core belief: that the central question for our national security and resilience is the question of our technological and AI capabilities.
We tested the Bill’s measures carefully before introduction, but we have since listened to feedback. There are a small number of minor, technical drafting improvements, which I will briefly go through. Government amendments 16 and 17 ensure that regulators can ask for the information they need to fulfil their obligations under the NIS regulations. This does not give regulators any new powers; it simply confirms that the current reasons for requesting information under the NIS regulations will still apply under the updated regulations.
Government amendments 7 and 8 make changes to align with two information gathering Government amendments made in Committee—amendments 16 and 17. Government amendment 11 makes consequential changes following an amendment made in Committee. That amendment enables information sharing between NIS regulators and other public authorities for cyber matters outside the scope of the NIS regulations.
Government amendments 14 and 15 clarify the safeguards for information sharing gateways, and amendments 9, 10, 12 and 13 make the necessary changes to ensure that the rest of the clause is consistent with the change made by amendment 14. Government amendments 18 to 26, to clause 57, allow regulators and the Secretary of State to issue notices related to the powers of direction to nominated representatives of regulated entities. I have also tabled Government amendment 27, which corrects minor drafting errors to ensure the Bill works as intended.
Members raised a series of questions, and I will address them thematically. First, the question of scope was raised by new clauses 4, 20, 21, 5, 8 and 9. I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West (Dame Chi Onwurah), the Chair of the Science, Innovation and Technology Committee, who brings consistent expertise and experience to these questions; the Chair of the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy, my hon. Friend the Member for Warwick and Leamington (Matt Western); and the hon. Members for Harpenden and Berkhamsted (Victoria Collins) and for Brecon, Radnor and Cwm Tawe (David Chadwick), who tabled amendments on the services and scope of the Bill.
All organisations, from high street shops to manufacturing giants, should take steps to increase their cyber security and resilience. The Government and the National Cyber Security Centre are making sure that the right tools are available for every part of the economy. I am sympathetic to their intent, and in particular with my hon. Friend the Member for Middlesbrough South and East Cleveland (Luke Myer) when he talks about the impact of cyber security incidents on local communities.
The Government have committed to reviewing whether new activities need to be brought into the scope of the NIS regulations, but it is essential that any such decision is based on a systematic and specific assessment of carefully considering whether the regulation in these particular parts of statute are the most appropriate response. The NIS regime has been put in place to protect the most essential parts of our economy, often those whose disruption would cause an imminent threat to life. It is focused on a specific set of tests where sectors have little or no alternative service provision in the event of disruption and relates the latest systematic evidence of the threats that each sector faces.
In that context, all Government Departments with sectoral responsibility work with their sectors on broader cyber resilience. The Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs does so with food, and the Department for Business and Trade does so with retail, automotive and so on. The NCSC also has strong relationships across sectors, actively working with them to share best practice and incident insights, and to strengthen overall resilience, such as by engaging with the British Retail Consortium following incidents affecting the sector last year.
The food sector is unique among other critical sectors because of its high levels of diversity. In the analysis underpinning the judgments made in the Bill, there are approximately 20,000 SME food manufacturers in the UK alone, and many more farms, distribution centres, retailers and other types of businesses that form the UK’s food supply chain. Given the lack of a single point of failure, we think there are more proportionate levers to pull, rather than bringing food in scope of the NIS regime. We have made similar judgments about other sectors on the basis of that systematic analysis, as I have shared in Committee and at other stages of the Bill’s consideration.
I accept the point about the plethora of businesses in the food supply sector, but my amendment simply seeks commonality with what the European Union has pushed for. Why can it not be the right thing for the UK Government to do as well?
I am happy to the write to the Chair of the Select Committee about comparisons with the EU, but the broad thrust is that we have undertaken a specific analysis of whether the burdens of the Bill should apply in a systematic, proportionate and coherent way to sectors. The analysis suggests that food supply is not in scope for the reasons I mentioned—primarily diversity of supply—but I would be delighted to engage with him on the question of why Europe took a different decision. We have based our decision on our analysis here.
Will the Minister give way?
I am going to make some progress but will try to come back to the Chair of the Select Committee shortly.
The Government’s cyber action plan is the overarching strategy to raise public sector standards across Government, including local government. The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government has taken action to strengthen local authorities’ cyber resilience, backed by £29 million of cyber grant funding, technical support and the adoption of the cyber assessment framework for local government. In that spirit, I take particularly seriously the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Oldham West, Chadderton and Royton (Jim McMahon) on supporting capacity even further with centralised capacity support from the Government Digital Service and other parts of cyber capability in central Government.
The joint election security and preparedness unit, also raised by Members, works to protect UK elections and referendums, co ordinating across Government on response to threats, including cyber risks. JESP works closely with the National Cyber Security Centre, producing guidance for organisations involved in delivering elections and electoral infrastructure, particularly local authorities. JESP and NCSC regularly engage with political party representatives as well.
The question of a register of foreign powers has been raised in relation to new clauses 14 and 15, tabled by the shadow Minister, the hon. Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer). New clause 14 would require the creation of a register of foreign states that pose a risk to the UK, based on GCHQ advice, for the purpose of exercising powers under part 4 of the Bill. I assure the shadow Minister, as I did in Committee, that the use of those powers will always be underpinned by robust intelligence. That includes, where relevant, information about state actors involved in cyber threats. As a result, it is unclear what additional support the register would provide to the Secretary of State.
New clause 15 would require the Government to report annually on risks posed by foreign powers. Drafting a report of vulnerabilities would simply duplicate existing assessments and risk distracting the Government from more effective measures to protect the UK from hostile foreign actors. The shadow Minister also proposes that information that cannot be included in the report for national security reasons is sent to the Intelligence and Security Committee. I have made it clear to him, both in Committee and more broadly, that the Government value the independent and robust oversight that the Intelligence and Security Committee provides on behalf of Parliament. However, we do not consider that the report described in the new clause sits within the ISC’s current oversight remit, as outlined in the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the Committee’s memorandum of understanding with the Prime Minister. The Government are actively reviewing the Committee’s existing memorandum of understanding and will update the House in due course.
New clause 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Harpenden and Berkhamsted, would require the Government to assess how many entities regulated by the NIS regime are owned, in part or in full, by foreign states, and the risks that they pose. Publishing a review identifying national security risks caused by foreign state ownership would provide valuable insight for our adversaries. Furthermore, conducting an assessment of the ownership structure of every in scope entity within six months would be disproportionately resource intensive, and would distract the Government from more effective measures to protect our services.
Let me take the Minister back to the question of bringing the retail sector into the provisions of the Bill. He seems to be saying that cyber security and resilience require Government intervention only when there is an immediate threat to life. Will he clarify whether that is what he is saying? My understanding is that we need to keep our economy and citizens secure in all circumstances. On the question of proportionality, my new clause 20 seeks to bring in only very large businesses, so that the requirements of cyber security on them are proportionate. We know that such businesses are not taking the measures to keep cyber secure, as we have seen recently with Marks & Spencer, Jaguar Land Rover and others.
It is rare for me to have a point of divergence with the Chair of the Select Committee, given her experience and expertise. However, on that question I am absolutely not saying that Government support is limited only to the certain number of sectors covered by the Bill. There are a range of other ways in which the Government act to support sectors outside of the scope of the Bill. That is the right thing to do.
The scope of this Bill—the only Bill horizontally applicable to large parts of the economy—is systematically and specifically set to sectors that are significant as essential services, sectors where there is the risk of significant disruption and threat to life, and sectors where alternative supply is limited. For those reasons, we have excluded retail. Consideration of the scale of the business is not currently in that rubric, because there are also businesses that are small in scale but very material in life threatening impact. I hope that is a satisfactory answer.
I thank my hon. Friends the Members for Dunfermline and Dollar (Graeme Downie) and for Newcastle upon Tyne Central and West for their amendments relating to the risks posed by communications modules made or controlled from outside the UK. Although I am sympathetic to their concerns, the Bill’s approach is intentionally technology and incident agnostic. Instead of reacting to individual components in isolation, we focus on structural chokepoints and systematic dependencies in this context.
There are a range of other levers—investment screening through the National Security and Investment Act 2021; telecoms and cyber data security requirements to protect data and networks; supply chain measures, such as those in the Procurement Act 2023; diversification requirements to reduce dependency and build resilience—all of which are important to respond to the deeply significant concerns raised.
Will the Minister give way on that point?
I will make some further progress.
I thank my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley for his amendment relating to AI emergencies. I recognise his concerns, as well as those of my hon. Friend the Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy. Technology is evolving rapidly, and Government must be equipped to respond. That is why the Bill grants the Secretary of State the power to direct regulated entities if the compromise of their network and information system, or the threat of it, gives rise to a national security risk. This could, for instance, require an entity to cease using and isolate an AI model.
These powers are a backstop to an effective cyber security regime, enabling Government to act swiftly in the face of unexpected national security threats. They are also designed to be proportionate, recognising the need for stability among regulated entities and the importance of proper accountability. While I share my hon. Friends’ concerns, I encourage them to work with the Government on a systematic range of ways in which we can mitigate the risks they have rightly highlighted.
I will give way to my hon. Friend the Member for Leeds Central and Headingley in the first instance and then to my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and Dollar.
There is obviously a level of complexity here in relation to the data centre, AI development and the network in the UK and more broadly. Will the Minister therefore commit to a meeting with me and my hon. Friend the Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy (Melanie Ward) to discuss this matter further?
I would be delighted to.
I would be more than happy to work with the Government on something that will provide specific protections against cellular internet of things modules. What assessment has he made of the specific threat of internet of things modules, and what protections are there against that in the legislation?
Given the specificity of his question, I will suggest that I come back to my hon. Friend. The broad thrust is that through our investment control legislation and procurement legislation, there are a series of responsibilities on Departments to look at it. [Interruption.] Given your encouragement, Madam Deputy Speaker, I shall move on.
Finally, I will respond to the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), who raised a very important point. The most important thing to say is that I share his diagnosis, although for reasons mostly of technical drafting, I disagree with his prescription—I hope he will take that in the spirit in which it is intended. His amendment risks creating undue uncertainty in law for many other areas where we do not have an explicit requirement. While I share his diagnosis and his objective, I hope that we can work together to consider how best to give it effect, including through the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office’s overseas security and justice mechanisms for information sharing.
I thank all hon. Members for their consideration.
I want to draw the Minister back to a point I raised with him at an earlier stage of the Bill, when he gave me what I would call a holding reply. When this legislation goes through, will the whole United Kingdom be subject to it, or will my part of the United Kingdom—Northern Ireland—be subject to the EU’s AI laws as they affect the digital sector? Businesses in that industry in my constituency want to know whether they will be governed by this Bill or by the EU’s AI Act. In other words, will the EU’s AI Act and Cyber Resilience Act be added to annex 2 to the Windsor framework, which would give them superiority and direct application in Northern Ireland? Can we have an answer—are they going to be added or not?
The hon. and learned Gentleman will be aware from a response I recently gave him that both the complexity of the EU’s AI Act and its interaction with the Windsor framework are under consideration at the moment. The EU has made a proposal and we are working with it on that. I will be happy to engage with him on that particular question in due course.
I am not quite certain that I understand the Minister’s reasons for why he cannot accept my amendment, tweak it or work with it in the other place. The reality is that with this Bill, we are opening the door in a way that we would not have otherwise done to the use of information that may predicate a failure for some British citizen sitting in a country where the rule of law does not protect them in the courts. The Government are taking a risk of making it worse, not better. While the Minister agrees to some degree with the principle of what I am saying, surely this is the time to put it right in the Bill.
As I say, I agree with much of the right hon. Gentleman’s diagnosis. Let me state in more detail the reasons for objecting on the mechanism. First, the provisions for information sharing are deeply discretionary for UK regulators. Secondly, the subjects in which they can pursue that information sharing are restricted to significant matters of national security and domestic crime prevention in the UK. Thirdly, the way that the amendment is drafted risks creating undue uncertainty in law. If this is the only regime where there is a specific and explicit reference to fair trial in the legislation, it calls into question how other information sharing regimes are interpreted, such as under section 114 of the Online Safety Act 2023. In other words, drafted as it is, the amendment could invite legal challenge where a regulator exercises its discretion not to disclose this in other regimes, as there is no explicit exclusion. For those reasons, while I totally agree with the right hon. Gentleman’s diagnosis and his objective, I am afraid that the amendment in question risks undermining the objective.
Will the Minister give way?
I will not, because I am testing the patience of Madam Deputy Speaker—[Interruption.] With your permission, Madam Deputy Speaker, I will give way.
I thank the Minister for generously giving way again. I have no desire to test the House by pushing my amendments to a vote, and I will be happy if I can receive his assurance. I take his points on not having technology specific regulation where possible, but can I have an assurance that the Minister will work with me, my Committee and other hon. Members to look at the need to safeguard where there are technology specific risks?
As ever, I would be delighted to work with the Chair of the Select Committee on a range of technology questions, including this one.
I am delighted with the support that this House has shown for the intention and principles of the Bill, and I am grateful for Members’ consistent, principled scrutiny.
On the amendment from the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), I think we have made some progress with the Minister, but it is clear that trying to isolate the issues around fair trial from other matters is complex. Repeating my earlier call, will the Minister meet me, the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green and others who signed his amendment to explore the complexities of this after the debate?
I can confirm that the Government will be very happy to engage on this question further with my hon. Friend and the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith). I commend the Bill to the House.
Before I withdraw new clause 2, I want to draw Members’ attention to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests in reference to my earlier speech. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the clause.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn. New Clause 13 Digital Sovereignty Strategy on risks posed by foreign interference and reliance on foreign technologies “(1) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of this Act, publish a strategy (“a Digital Sovereignty Strategy”) which sets out the Government's approach to maintaining the security and resilience of relevant network and information systems by— (a) assessing, managing and mitigating risks— (i) associated with foreign interference, (ii) arising from reliance on foreign supplied technologies, and (b) preventing over reliance on foreign providers by building domestic capacity.
(2) For the purposes of this section, a “relevant network and information system” is a network and information system belonging to— (a) an operator of an essential service, (b) a relevant digital service provider, (c) a relevant managed service provider, or (d) a critical supplier, within the meaning of the NIS Regulations.
(3) A Digital Sovereignty Strategy published under this section must— (a) include risks associated with— (i) hardware, (ii) software, (iii) supply chains, and (iv) procurement processes; (b) include a specific focus on security and resilience in government digital procurement processes, detailing how the Government intends to reduce strategic dependencies on foreign owned service providers to mitigate the risk of systemic disruption; (c) include a commitment to prioritise the use of technologies developed in the UK by UK organisations in relevant network and information systems to reduce reliance on foreign technologies, and (d) where risks are identified under subsection (1)(a)(i), state how the Government intends to address these risks by supporting the use of domestic technologies or systems for the purpose of ensuring the security of those systems.”—(Victoria Collins.) This new clause would require the Government to publish a Digital Sovereignty Strategy setting out how it intends to address risks to relevant network and information systems posed by foreign interference and reliance on foreign technologies, including by supporting the use of domestic technologies. Brought up, and read the First time. Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
24|16:07|77|255|The House divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0
New Clause 14
Register of foreign powers for the purposes of Part 4
“(1) For the purposes of informing action taken under Part 4 of this Act, the Secretary of State must by regulations, and within six months of the passing of this Act, establish and subsequently maintain a register of foreign powers that the Secretary of State believes present a risk to the United Kingdom’s critical network and information systems.
(2) Foreign powers determined by the Secretary of State as eligible for inclusion on the register under subsection (1) must include states which have been confirmed by GCHQ as posing a risk to the security or resilience of the network or information systems of one or more operators of an essential service or critical suppliers, including where the relevant risk is posed by state affiliated groups.
(3) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.
(4) In this section, ‘foreign power’ means—
(a) the sovereign or other head of a foreign state in their public capacity;
(b) a foreign government, or part of a foreign government;
(c) an agency or authority of a foreign government, or of part of a foreign government;
(d) an authority responsible for administering the affairs of an area within a foreign country or territory, or persons exercising the functions of such an authority; or
(e) a political party which is a governing political party of a foreign government. A political party is a governing political party of a foreign government if persons holding political or official posts in the foreign government or part of the foreign government—
(i) hold those posts as a result of, or in the course of, their membership of the party, or
(ii) in exercising the functions of those posts, are subject to the direction or control of, or significantly influenced by, the party.”—(Dr Ben Spencer.)
This new clause would require the Government to maintain a register of state actors posing a threat to UK cyber security for the purposes of exercising the Secretary of State’s powers under Part 4 of the Act, which enable the giving of directions in the interests of national security.
Brought up, and read the First time.
Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.
25|16:21|151|258|The House divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0
Clause 18
Sharing and use of information under the NIS Regulations etc
Amendments made: 7, page 38, line 33, leave out first “and” and insert “or”.
This amendment and amendment 8 would ensure that information could be shared between NIS enforcement authorities where it was for the purposes of security of network and information systems, or for the purposes of resilience of such systems.
Amendment 8, page 38, line 35, leave out “and” and insert “or”.
See the explanatory statement for amendment 7.
Amendment 9, page 39, leave out lines 15 to 17.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 14.
Amendment 10, page 39, line 42, leave out from “paragraph (1)” to end of line 2 on page 40.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 14.
Amendment 11, page 40, line 12, leave out “(1)(c)” and insert “(1)(b)”.
This is a drafting change consequential on an amendment tabled at Committee stage.
Amendment 12, page 40, line 24, leave out from “regulation 6(1)” to “, or” in line 26.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 14.
Amendment 13, page 40, line 31, leave out from “regulation 6(1)” to end of line 33.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 14.
Amendment 14, page 41, line 4, at end insert—
“(4A) A disclosure of information under any provision of regulation 6 or this regulation must be limited to information which is relevant and proportionate to the purpose for which the disclosure is being made.”—(Kanishka Narayan.)
This amendment would ensure that any disclosure under regulation 6 or 6A of the NIS Regulations (defined by clause 1), rather than just disclosures under particular paragraphs of those regulations, would be limited to information which is relevant and proportionate to the purpose for which the disclosure is being made.
Amendment proposed: 3, page 41, line 15, at end insert—
“Exemption from disclosure: right to a fair trial
6AB.—(1) Nothing in sub paragraphs (1)(d) to (1)(f) of regulation 6, or regulation 6A, permits a NIS enforcement authority to share information with another NIS enforcement authority or with a person within paragraph (2) of regulation 6 if the Secretary of State determines that—
(a) the receiving jurisdiction is one in which the right to a fair trial cannot be guaranteed, or
(b) the disclosure could result in actions being taken that would be incompatible with the right to a fair trial.
(2) For the purposes of making a determination under paragraph (1) above, the Secretary of State must have regard to the opinion of—
(a) subject matter experts, and
(b) competent civil society groups.
(3) The Secretary of State must, within 12 months of the passing of the Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Act 2026, publish and lay before Parliament an annual report detailing the determinations made under paragraph (1) above in the previous 12 months.”—(Sir Iain Duncan Smith.)
This amendment would prevent the sharing of information with overseas authorities for the purpose of prosecuting crimes not committed in the UK if the Secretary of State determines that the receiving country is one in which the right to a fair trial cannot be guaranteed.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
26|16:34|162|246|The House divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0
Amendment made: 15, page 41, line 23, at end insert—
“(1A) A disclosure of information under paragraph (1) must be limited to information which is relevant and proportionate to the purpose for which the disclosure is being made.”—(Kanishka Narayan.)
This amendment would ensure that any disclosure under regulation 7 of the NIS Regulations (defined by clause 1) would be limited to information which is relevant and proportionate to the purpose for which the disclosure is being made.
Clause 20
Powers to require information
Amendments made: 16, page 44, line 15, at end insert—
“(da) assessing the security or resilience of network and information systems relied on by a person regulated by the designated competent authority;
(db) establishing whether any incident has occurred that the designated competent authority believes could have had, has had, is having or is likely to have, an adverse effect on the security or resilience of network and information systems relied on by a person regulated by the authority, and the nature and impact of any such incident;
(dc) assessing the implementation of measures taken under regulation 10 to manage risks and to prevent and minimise the impact of incidents, including as a result of any inspection conducted under regulation 16;
(dd) identifying a failure of a person to comply with any duty imposed by these Regulations;”
This amendment would clarify that the power under paragraph (1) of regulation 15 of the NIS Regulations (substituted by clause 20) includes power to request information for the stated purposes. This makes provision broadly equivalent to what is currently in regulation 15(2) of the NIS Regulations.
Amendment 17, page 44, line 28, at end insert—
“(da) assessing the security or resilience of network and information systems relied on by a person regulated by the Information Commission;
(db) establishing whether any incident has occurred that the Information Commission believes could have had, has had, is having or is likely to have, an adverse effect on the security or resilience of network and information systems relied on by a person regulated by the Commission, and the nature and impact of any such incident;
(dc) assessing the implementation of measures taken under regulation 12 or 14B to manage risks and to prevent and minimise the impact of incidents, including as a result of any inspection conducted under regulation 16;
(dd) identifying a failure of a person to comply with any duty imposed by these Regulations;”.—(Kanishka Narayan.)
This amendment would clarify that the power under paragraph (2) of regulation 15 of the NIS Regulations (substituted by clause 20) includes power to request information for the stated purposes. This makes provision broadly equivalent to what is currently in regulation 15(3) of the NIS Regulations.
Clause 57
Means of giving directions and notices
Amendments made: 18, page 82, line 16, leave out “or notice” and insert “, notice, notification or decision”.
This amendment (and amendments 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26) is a drafting change to clarify that this clause applies to notifications and decisions under Part 4 as well as to directions and notices.
Amendment 19, page 82, line 20, at end insert—
“(1A) Where a regulated person has—
(a) appointed a representative to act on their behalf, and
(b) notified a regulatory authority of the appointment,
a direction, notice, notification or decision under this Part may be given to that representative instead of the regulated person, by any of the methods mentioned in subsection (1).
(1B) Any direction, notice, notification or decision given to a representative by virtue of subsection (1A) is to be treated as having been given to the regulated person.”
This amendment would clarify that a direction, notice, notification or decision can be given to an appointed representative by any method mentioned in subsection (1) of clause 57 instead of to the regulated person in question.
Amendment 20, page 82, line 22, leave out “or notice” and insert “, notice, notification or decision”.
Amendment 21, page 82, line 23, leave out “or notice” and insert “, notice, notification or decision”.
Amendment 22, page 82, line 25, leave out “or notice” and insert “, notice, notification or decision”.
Amendment 23, page 82, line 28, leave out “or notice” and insert “, notice, notification or decision”.
Amendment 24, page 83, line 5, leave out “or notice” and insert “, notice, notification or decision”.
Amendment 25, page 83, line 14, leave out “or notice” and insert “, notice, notification or decision”.
Amendment 26, page 83, line 17, leave out “or notice” and insert “, notice, notification or decision”.—(Kanishka Narayan.)
Schedule 1
Enforcement and Appeals
Amendment made: 27, page 90, line 3, after “sub paragraph (e)” insert
“(including the “or” at the end)”.—(Kanishka Narayan.)
This amendment is a minor drafting change.
Third Reading
King’s consent signified.
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
It has been a privilege to take this vital piece of legislation through the House. I thank everyone who has played a role in getting the Bill to this stage, including the noble Baroness Lloyd of Effra, who has been instrumental in driving the policy in this Bill and leading its passage in the other place. I also thank my right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for Science, Innovation and Technology; the officials who have worked tirelessly since the Bill’s inception; the Bill team, led by Shona Lester; the policy teams, led by Nick Dodd and Liam Harkin; the legal team, led by Alicia Swannell; and my private secretary, Ben Holloway. I also thank parliamentary counsel, the Clerks and the Chairs of the Public Bill Committee, and every Member of the House who served on the Committee, as well as Members who have provided important input today and during all previous stages.
This country is subject to daily and unrelenting cyber attacks. This is no longer the stuff of science fiction, but a daily reality that threatens public services, businesses and even our ways of life. As Dr Richard Horne, the CEO of the National Cyber Security Centre, has said: “The real world impacts of cyber attacks have never been more evident than in recent months”.
The Bill delivers on the Government’s commitment to drive secure growth and make the UK more resilient to the threats we face. It recognises how things have moved on since 2018, with data centres playing an increasingly important role in our digital lives and supply chains continuing to diversify. It also recognises that things will continue to change, with a deliberate, technology agnostic approach and proportionate powers to enable the Government to close regulatory gaps and respond to imminent national security threats.
Since the introduction of the Bill, I have tabled a small number of amendments to refine its drafting and ensure that it achieves its intended purposes. They include designating Ofcom as the sole regulator for data centres, to reduce administrative burdens and strengthen accountability in this key sector. They also include enabling the network and information systems regulators to share vital information with other regulators and public bodies overseeing sectors and vice versa, enabling more co ordinated and strategic oversight without unnecessary business burdens. They also updated the definition of cloud computing to respond to important feedback from the sector and made several minor and technical corrections to ensure that the Bill can be practically implemented.
The version of the Bill before us is an ambitious, practical and proportionate piece of legislation. It is the result of engagement with industry, important regulator feedback, international dialogue and tireless work from officials. I wish Baroness Lloyd the best in moving the Bill forward in the other place, and I commend it to the House.
I call the shadow Secretary of State.
I thank Members across the House for their contributions to this Bill over many months and for their relentless scrutiny. I have never known a Minister to be in such a rush, with three hours of protected time left. I am grateful to officials both in the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology and in Parliament for their hard work in getting this legislation to its final stage. I particularly recognise the hard work of my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge (Dr Spencer) and his team in providing such top notch scrutiny of the Bill during its passage through the House.
The Opposition have remained at all times supportive of the principles behind the Bill. It was the previous Government who recognised the need to increase cyber resilience standards for critical digital infrastructure and services, including managed service providers and data centres. It is welcome that those entities—which are so vital to the functioning of the economy, public services and our daily lives—are now covered. However, I said on Second Reading that opportunities to legislate in this area are few and far between, and we need to ask two questions to assess whether this law is fit for purpose: will it work, and is it enough?
There was already an urgent need to strengthen our cyber defences. However, AI is equipping hostile states, criminal gangs and opportunists alike with tools capable of eroding our national defences at speed and at scale, in ways that will affect businesses, the public sector and our infrastructure. It is right that Parliament legislates to raise the collective security bar, but the nature of the cyber security risks that necessitated this Bill have developed rapidly as we have been taking it through this House. That demonstrates the difficulties we all face as legislators in dealing with the constantly shifting sands of the digital age. We may need to be ready to return to this subject sooner than we had hoped.
It is right that critical digital infrastructure such as data centres will fall within the scope of regulation, but we need to recognise that no security measures or standards are 100% effective. Government and businesses need to ensure that essential data and workloads are stored and processed in a way that keeps them secure and operational even when they are under attack. Resilience is key—the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ apparent targeting of Amazon Web Services sites in the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain earlier this year has shown that digital infrastructure is becoming a prime target in times of conflict. It would be irresponsible to assume that these facilities will not also be targets for cyber warfare, which is why we have to look closely at concentration of risk, our overall resilience, and any leverage we can build in maintaining access to the best technology going forward. From work on the security of our telecoms infrastructure to scrutiny of the platforms on which critical Government services run, we must now be thinking extremely carefully about our procurement of digital technology.
A further significant development since this Bill was introduced is the rapid advance of AI systems capable of identifying cyber vulnerabilities, particularly in poorly protected legacy IT across Government and public services, including the NHS. It highlights the urgent need to address the Government’s extensive legacy estate, which is especially exposed to exploitation. Nothing in the Bill addresses that need, yet the Government are creating a broader digital architecture for hackers to attack through their plan for Government issued digital IDs.
If public trust is to be restored, especially after the Government’s abortive attempt to introduce mandatory ID last year—still, I fear, a risk by the back door—such systems must always remain both optional and secure. It is therefore concerning that the Public Accounts Committee felt compelled to write to the permanent secretary at the Department for Science, Innovation and Technology in April to criticise the lack of urgency in reviewing legacy IT equipment, given both the sensitivity of the data involved and the scale of the cyber risk.
Earlier, my hon. Friend the Member for Runnymede and Weybridge set out one of the most significant threats that this Bill fails to address: the intensifying cyber security risk posed by the Chinese Communist party and its affiliates. It is regrettable that the Government have, for a second time, voted down amendments that would have compelled the Secretary of State to create a register of hostile state actors threatening the cyber security of essential networks and information systems. Those concerns are not restricted to Conservative Members, which is why the amendment tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) attracted cross party support.
The risks posed by cellular IOT modules have been set out expertly in the Chamber today. IOT modules supplied by Chinese manufacturers are now embedded in nearly all internet connectable products and devices, from smart TVs to electric cars. They can be used to intercept data and track locations, and can even be controlled remotely. The scale of the cyber and physical security threat from IOT modules is the tip of the iceberg, with components that can be used for espionage or cyber attacks or disabled remotely woven into countless aspects of our critical national infrastructure. This is an issue that is not going away.
In summary, although this Bill is necessary and goes some way towards enhancing our cyber resilience in critical areas, it will not be enough in isolation. It heaps all the burden on the private sector, yet it would have been insufficient to prevent the Jaguar Land Rover incident. It does not address public sector vulnerabilities, and it falls far short of meeting the moment that the now former Defence Secretary, the right hon. Member for Rawmarsh and Conisbrough (John Healey), lamented that this Government were missing in their approach to our collective defence and security. It speaks to this Government’s continued inability to grapple with and address the red lights that are now flashing on the national dashboard.
The “corrosive complacency” that Lord Robertson called out in the Government’s approach to investment in defence can also be seen here, in the Government’s ongoing refusal to address the urgent threat to our national cyber security caused by our reliance on technology and components from nations that have demonstrably malign intent. We are living with the uncomfortable reality that the end of history was a dangerous illusion; one that has led to us gradually outsourcing our critical industries to our geopolitical rivals and competitors, only to have their wares sold back to us in the form of latent time bombs.
That is why this legislation, which we support, can only be a discrete tool in addressing a much wider challenge. Cyber security is no longer a niche compliance exercise; it is about protecting the fundamental economic and defence interests of our nation. That is why I suspect we will be returning to cyber issues in this House before too long, and with greater urgency.
I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.
I reiterate the importance of a digital sovereign strategy for our cyber security. It is about our resilience, our security and our economic strength as a country and collaborative sovereignty. We very much welcome the extended scope of the Bill and we support it moving forward.
Question put and agreed to. Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I seek your guidance. There are reports that a Russian warship has today fired warning shots near a UK registered yacht in the English channel, south of the Isle of Wight. If verified, this action would be of grave concern to the House and would represent a significant escalation in the hostilities shown by Russian actors towards UK interests. Can you guide me on how the House might seek to be urgently updated by a Defence Minister on this development and guided as to the Government’s proposed response?
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his point of order. I have had no notice that the Government intend to bring a statement, but I am sure that those on the Government Front Bench have heard him, and should that change, we will doubtless hear before the Adjournment.
Delegated Legislation
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118(6)),
Environmental Protection
That the draft Clean Air Zones Central Services (Fees) (England) (Amendment) Regulations 2026, which were laid before this House on 20 April, in the last Session of Parliament, be approved.—(Gregor Poynton.)
27|16:56|262|86|The House divided:|Question accordingly agreed to.||0|0
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118(6)),
Constitutional Law
That the draft Scotland Act 1998 (Increase of Borrowing Limits) Order 2026, which was laid before this House on 20 April, in the last Session of Parliament, be approved.—(Gregor Poynton.)
Question agreed to.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118(6)),
Food
That the draft Food Supplements Purity Criteria (Magnesium L threonate monohydrate) (England) Regulations 2026, which were laid before this House on 21 April, in the last Session of Parliament, be approved.—(Gregor Poynton.)
Question agreed to.
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 118(6)),
Sanctions
That the Russia (Sanctions) (EU Exit) (Amendment) Regulations 2026 (SI, 2026, No. 543), dated 18 May 2026, a copy of which was laid before this House on 19 May, be approved.—(Gregor Poynton.)
Question agreed to.
Delegated Legislation (Committees)
Social Security
Ordered,
That the Universal Credit, Personal Independence Payment, Jobseeker’s Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance (Decisions and Appeals) (Amendment) Regulations 2026 (SI, 2026, No. 457), a copy of which was laid before this House on 27 April, in the last Session of Parliament, be referred to a Delegated Legislation Committee.—(Gregor Poynton.)
On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. I wish to raise with you my concern about comments attributed to the right hon. Member for North West Essex (Mrs Badenoch), who I understand has described my right hon. Friend the Member for Houghton and Sunderland South (Bridget Phillipson) as acting like a Gestapo officer—I think that is the term she used. This is extremely alarming, particularly on this day of all days. In recognition of Jo Cox’s assassination, I just ask that all of us around this place temper our comments and calm down the rhetoric. I simply ask your advice, Madam Deputy Speaker, on how to take that matter forward.
I thank the hon. Gentleman for his point of order. He will know that comments made outside the Chamber are not a matter for the Chair, but he has put his point on the record.
I am pleased to present a petition on behalf of residents of the village of Wetheral calling for traffic calming measures, including a 20 mph zone, to improve the safety of pedestrians and other road users.
The issue of traffic calming was raised with me by local residents at a coffee morning I held in Wetheral a few months ago. The introduction of a 20 mph zone and other measures would build on the excellent work of Wetheral parish council, which has recently funded the installation of a speed camera in the village. However, Wetheral residents remain concerned by the speed of traffic through the village, and the lack of pavements on stretches of road. A total of 298 residents signed the petition that local people, members of the parish council and I took door to door around the village.
The petitioners “therefore request that the House of Commons urges the Government to work with the relevant local authorities to introduce traffic calming measures”, including the establishment of a 20 mph zone in Wetheral.
Following is the full text of the petition: [The petition of residents of Wetheral and the wider Carlisle constituency, Declares that traffic calming measures, including the establishment of a 20mph zone, should be introduced to the village of Wetheral. The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urges the Government to work with the relevant local authorities to introduce traffic calming measures in Wetheral, specifically the implementation of a 20mph speed limit through the village to improve road safety. And the petitioners remain, etc.] [P003207]
I rise to present this petition on a national strategy for motor neurone disease. I do so on behalf of my constituent Mark Sommerville, who was diagnosed with MND in 2023 and who, along with his foundation, has been doing tremendous work to identify new treatments and a cure.
Following is the full text of the petition: [The petition of residents of the constituency of Coatbridge and Bellshill, Declares that motor neurone disease is a devastating, fast acting, terminal illness that currently has no cure; and further declares that the UK Government must act to create a national strategy for MND that: is led by clinical and research experts, in partnership with patients and their families, and patient organisations; introduces a national taskforce to drives forward delivery of key objectives; supports MND research with enhanced access to participation in clinical trials; accelerates novel drug discovery, drug repurposing, and access to innovative treatments; improves diagnostic waiting times and specialist multidisciplinary care; ensures equitable support, equipment, and palliative services across the UK; co ordinates health, social care, and research through a single national plan. The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urge the Government to work in partnership with the devolved administrations to deliver a national strategy for motor neurone disease with emphasis on finding effective treatments and a cure, supporting research, enhancing access to clinical trials, and improving co ordination of social care. And the petitioners remain, etc.] [P003208]
The people of Tring have spoken. This petition, signed by over 500 residents, rejects the top down, developer led approach to planning from this Government, which threatens to impose significant large scale development on their community with little regard for its character, infrastructure or precious environment. That has been made even worse by the latest power grab from Whitehall, which will now take over large planning applications.
Residents are not opposed to housing, but they are righty alarmed by the burden being placed on their town and deeply frustrated by the lack of a meaningful voice in shaping proposals that will define Tring for generations to come.
Following is the full text of the petition: [The petition of residents of the United Kingdom, Declares that Tring faces significant large scale development proposals driven by top down national planning policy, which is being imposed on local communities with insufficient regard for the views of residents or the detrimental impact on Tring’s character, infrastructure, and environment. The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urge the Government to schedule a debate in the House of Commons on the Government’s review of the National Planning Policy Framework and how communities like Tring can be better protected from inappropriate over development, and how local residents can be given a genuine and effective voice in the planning decisions and infrastructure provision that shape their towns and affect their daily lives. And the petitioners remain, etc.] [P003209]
Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—(Imogen Walker.)
I am grateful to have secured my first Adjournment debate as an MP on an issue that has resonated so deeply with many residents across the Isle of Wight, whether they are directly touched by dementia or not. I put on record my thanks to those across the island who have contacted me and are passionately fighting for their family member or friend during their time of need. It really shows the best of our island, and it makes me even more proud to represent Isle of Wight West in this place.
I also thank the Minister for her engagement to date with me and my constituency neighbour, the hon. Member for Isle of Wight East (Joe Robertson), on the wider issue of patient discharges off the island. I will continue to do all that I can to work across the island and with Government to help find a solution.
I thank my hon. Friend and neighbour for securing this debate, and I strongly support him on this issue. People living with dementia and their families deserve care close to home, and should not have to cross oceans or seas and get trains to get the support that they need. I want to recognise the dedicated workers across Portsmouth North who support those people’s families. In my constituency, cuts to dementia nursing have led to some of my constituents—and my team—visiting the Isle of Wight, where we saw the Parklands Dementia Resource Centre, which is an excellent example of what can be done. Will my hon. Friend expand on Parklands’ work, and join me in urging the Minister to consider more dementia hubs in under served communities?
I thank my hon. Friend for that timely intervention. Before I get into the deeply troubling accounts that have been brought to me, I pay tribute to Maggie Bennett and her team who run the Parklands Alzheimer’s café. While the café cannot offer overnight accommodation, it offers vital respite for carers. Loved ones can spend a great day at the café, doing activities, chatting over tea and cake and even getting their hair cut. However, for island dementia sufferers, that is where the happy story ends.
The issue of mainland discharges has struck a chord across the island because it goes to the heart of many of the other inequalities my constituents have been expected simply to accept as part island life. We are the only English island where the sole means of transport on and off is entirely privately operated. Coupled with that, we have only a small specialist dementia in patient ward, and no dedicated long term NHS dementia provision. There is a very real fear that when someone is at their most vulnerable, where they live will determine how they are treated and whether they are afforded the dignity they deserve: the dignity of being close to family, of continuity in care, and of remaining in the place they call home.
For those unfamiliar with the situation, the recent closure of three care homes on the Isle of Wight, including one in Freshwater in my constituency, has led to 44 residents being displaced, with 10 already placed in care homes on the mainland. The niece of one resident living with dementia contacted my office to say that she is terrified that her uncle will die in his proposed placement in Horsham, 70 miles away, “alone, confused and feeling that no one cares.”
Worse still, his family have been told that if they do not accept the placement, they will be liable to pay £500 a day for the hospital bed he will need to occupy.
Other than a few brief periods away, the Isle of Wight is the only home that Phyllis, Adam and Rob Snow’s 87-year old island born mother, has ever known. Phyllis now requires round the clock care due to a brutal combination of dementia and Parkinson’s, and her family are absolutely terrified by reports of patients like her being relocated to the mainland. With Phyllis already having been stuck on a hospital ward for months, her family are in a lose lose situation: they either watch her become more vulnerable to infection the longer she spends in hospital, or push for a care home release only for her to be relocated miles away from the only home she has ever known.
It is important to understand how dementia care is currently funded on the Isle of Wight. Much of our provision relies on a limited number of block booked beds commissioned by the local authority, layered on to an adult social care budget that is already under severe strain.
The hon. Gentleman is giving a typically excellent and passionate speech. No person living with dementia should be removed from their family or support network. Does he agree that as the NHS is restructured, there needs to be a proper focus on outcomes for dementia sufferers right across the country?
I could not agree more; a national dementia strategy is of the utmost importance. As I will go on to say, we currently have a situation where people are being moved away from home or where the care they need just is not available.
Nationally, 87% of care services are now commissioned by councils or the NHS at rates below the true cost of care, and locally contracts are being let at around £24 an hour—only 84% of the Homecare Association’s minimum recommended rate. Within that model, smaller island providers are often subcontracted by larger mainland based organisations at even lower rates. Despite demand continuing to rise, the island is one of the only authorities inadvertently forcing local care providers to make staff redundant or even consider closure, simply because the funding does not stack up and because price increases are not being passed on to those smaller providers by first tier commissioning organisations. I strongly urge the Minister to press Isle of Wight council to ensure that any funding uplift reaches the frontline providers that are actually delivering care.
Once again, with no dedicated long term NHS dementia ward on the island, as soon as those block contracts are full, as they increasingly are, there is simply nowhere else for people to go. At that point, decisions are no longer driven by what is best for the individual, but by whatever capacity happens to be available.
The closure of three care homes this year has not occurred in a vacuum. In 2022, the island lost six care homes. With one third of our population aged 65 and over, alongside staff turnover rates that are significantly higher than the national average, this is a system already under immense strain. While dementia care on the Isle of Wight is delivered across a mix of NHS, council and private provision, the reality is that the capacity and specialist care has not been enough for some time.
This is not just an island problem; it is a warning of what lies ahead for the country as our population ages. In making that point, I wish to strongly advocate for any measures the Government consider adopting to confront this national challenge being piloted on the Isle of Wight, where the need is greatest and where meaningful change can be delivered most urgently and, most importantly, measured in almost real time. What makes the Isle of Wight a particularly stark case is the added cruelty of our geography: the reality that families must cross the Solent, which some estimates have placed as the most expensive stretch of water in Europe, in order to visit a loved one who is sick and in need of care that simply cannot be provided closer to home.
Eighty two year old Graham Martin, who is living with dementia, is yet another example of the impact of this reality. In mid April, he was moved to Southampton against the wishes of his family because of his complex needs, separating him from his wife of 63 years, Carol, who is unable to travel to visit him due to her own health and the cost of ferry travel. Being moved away from home, across a stretch of water, is distressing enough; being effectively cut off from loved ones because they cannot afford or physically manage the journey, at the very moment that people need their family most, borders on forced isolation.
As the niece of another patient facing a mainland placement said to me, “Imagine a vulnerable elderly resident in Westminster being sent to a care home on the Isle of Wight. It simply would not happen.” It would not happen because in other parts of the country, the system would not tolerate separating vulnerable people from their families in this way, yet for the Isle of Wight, that basic standard is not applied.
MPs and Ministers all the way up to the Prime Minister have heard me talk relentlessly about how the island is a brilliant place to live, work and learn, and despite my intervention today I still believe that to be the case. But that comes despite the inequality and deprivation we face, which is hidden by neighbouring prosperity. Whether it is schools unable to take a trip across the Solent due to budgetary constraints, young workers having to look for jobs elsewhere due to lack of opportunity, or—as I have spoken about today—an elderly person ripped away from their home because of lack of capacity, the Isle of Wight has been functioning with one arm tied behind its back. The time has come to do something about it.
When capacity on the island runs out—and without the necessary action, it inevitably will—people are not just delayed but displaced. What should be an absolute last resort for the most vulnerable people is fast becoming a routine response, with elderly people being sent miles from their home simply because the system cannot cope. That is neither sustainable nor dignified, and it cannot be allowed to continue. I ask the Minister to take action for the benefit of my Isle of Wight residents.
I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Isle of Wight West (Richard Quigley) for raising this very important issue, and I recognise the deeply concerning experiences that he has highlighted of families on the Isle of Wight, including the story of Maggie Bennett and the café that she runs.
For people living with dementia or complex disabilities, being moved away from their homes and loved ones can be profoundly distressing. Familiar surroundings, routines and relationships are often central to their wellbeing, and it is entirely understandable that families feel anxious when those links are disrupted. The Government are clear that people should be discharged from hospital safely, promptly and with appropriate care and support in place. This is essential not only for patient outcomes but to ensure that hospitals can continue to treat those in greatest need.
Local authorities have a statutory duty under the Care Act 2014 to shape their local care markets, ensuring that there is a sufficient range of high quality, person centred services available to meet local needs. Decisions about care placements are made at a local level based on clinical need, the suitability of available services and the individual’s circumstances. Where a person requires specialist or higher intensity support, it is essential that the placement meets those needs in full.
However, I do recognise that local capacity pressures, particularly in geographically isolated areas such as the Isle of Wight, can mean that suitable placements are not always immediately available. My hon. Friend spoke about the impact of care home closures in his constituency and shared Phyllis’s story. While temporary placements further away are necessary to ensure that a person is discharged safely and without delay, those situations clearly have a huge impact on families.
On the Isle of Wight, local partners are working to improve access to more seamless pathways across health and social care so that people can move more easily between services and receive the support that they need. This includes strengthening co ordination and expanding care in the community so that wherever possible people can be supported at home or close to home. As my hon. Friend said, because of the island’s size and physical isolation, that also requires close working with mainland partners to ensure that residents can access the full range of care that they need, including specialist provision where it is not available locally.
We will continue to explore and build on opportunities to deliver services for the benefit of the Isle of Wight community so that care can be delivered at the right place at the right time. We expect local systems to plan for demand and work with providers to strengthen capacity, including for people with dementia and complex conditions.
As we heard from my hon. Friend, it is vital that when a difficult decision is made to close a care home, the process is handled as sensitively as possible. Local authorities should have procedures in place to minimise disruption, with time allowed to support a safe transfer that supports the wellbeing of individuals, families and carers. Providers should ensure that proper arrangements are in place to support the transition of residents to their new position. Our expectation is that every effort should be made to provide care as close to home as possible and to take account of family connections and personal preferences wherever practicable. It is also essential that individuals and their families are involved in decisions about discharge and ongoing care. The guidance is clear that planning should begin early and that patients and carers should be supported to make fully informed decisions where appropriate.
We know that people who are discharged in a timely way with the right care and support in place experience better recovery and health outcomes. That is why we expect local systems to work together to ensure discharge processes are as effective as possible, particularly for people with dementia and other complex needs. The Government are therefore working with the NHS and local authorities to strengthen the local health and care system so that it can better meet those challenges.
Through the better care fund, more than £9 billion is being used to support integrated working between the NHS and local authorities, enabling more joined up services and improving the planning of care outside of hospital. We will also reform the better care fund to support more effective joint planning and delivery between health and social care. That will be focused on improving how services are co ordinated and supporting care that helps people regain their independence, reduces unnecessary hospital stays and enables people to receive care closer to home.
We also recognise the importance of improving care and support for people living with dementia. According to NHS data, NHS Hampshire and Isle of Wight integrated care board recorded that as of March more than 18,000 people had a diagnosed form of dementia. The Government want a society where individuals with dementia and frailty receive high quality, compassionate care from diagnosis through to the end of life. That is why we will deliver the first ever modern service framework for frailty and dementia to deliver rapid and significant improvements in the quality of care and productivity. That will be informed by phase one of Baroness Casey’s independent commission into adult social care, which is under way and expected later this year.
We are committed to feeding into the NHS and local government planning cycles in September and aim to publish the full framework by the end the year, as recommended by Baroness Casey. We intend to engage with a range of partners over the coming months and will ensure that the voices of people with lived experience are at the centre of our work to develop the modern service framework.
I thank my hon. Friend for bringing his constituents’ voice to the House. I reiterate that we recognise the very real concerns raised by families on the Isle of Wight, particularly when people with dementia or complex needs have been moved away from their homes and communities. While there will be circumstances where temporary placements further from home are necessary, care should be provided as close to home as possible in a way that respects the individual’s needs, preferences and connections to their family and community.
I did not have time to congratulate the Minister, a fellow Brummie, on her promotion. It is good to see those from Birmingham here in the Chamber.
Question put and agreed to.
House adjourned.