National Security (State Threats) Bill

Considered in Committee (Order, this day)

[Judith Cummins in the Chair]

Clause 1

Designation of bodies involved in foreign power threat activity

I beg to move amendment 16, page 2, line 12, at end insert— “33AA Conduct relevant to designation (1) For the purposes of section 33A, a body is to be regarded as involved in foreign power threat activity if the Secretary of State reasonably believes that the body is, or has been, involved in— (a) transnational repression; (b) abusive lawfare; (c) sanctions evasion connected to a foreign power, a designated body or foreign power threat activity; (d) the concealment, movement or control of assets for or on behalf of a foreign power or a body acting for or on behalf of a foreign power; or (e) conduct which enables, facilitates, assists or conceals any activity falling within paragraphs (a) to (d).

(2) For the purposes of this section, “transnational repression” means conduct carried out by, for, or on behalf of, or with the intention of benefiting, a foreign power, where the conduct has the purpose, or effect, of intimidating, coercing, punishing, silencing, controlling or retaliating against— (a) a person in the United Kingdom; (b) a United Kingdom national; (c) a person resident in the United Kingdom; (d) a person with a substantial connection to the United Kingdom; or (e) a family member, associate or representative of a person falling within paragraphs (a) to (d).

(3) Conduct falling within subsection (2) includes, but is not limited to— (a) surveillance, harassment, intimidation, threats or coercion; (b) threats or reprisals against family members or associates overseas; (c) forced return, attempted forced return, abduction or attempted abduction; (d) misuse of criminal, civil, immigration, extradition or administrative processes; (e) misuse of Interpol notices or other international police cooperation mechanisms; (f) targeting of journalists, activists, human rights defenders, lawyers, political opponents, dissidents, whistleblowers or members of diaspora communities; and (g) conduct intended to conceal, enable or facilitate any activity falling within paragraphs (a) to (f).

(4) For the purposes of this section, “abusive lawfare” means the use, or threatened use, of legal, regulatory, administrative, criminal, civil, immigration, extradition or other proceedings where the predominant purpose, or one of the predominant purposes, is to— (a) intimidate, silence, punish or deter a person from engaging in public interest speech, journalism, advocacy, democratic participation or human rights work; (b) deter investigation or scrutiny of corruption, human rights abuses, sanctions evasion, hostile state activity or foreign power threat activity; (c) impose disproportionate cost, delay, pressure or reputational harm on the target; or (d) protect, conceal or advance the interests of a foreign power or a body acting for or on behalf of a foreign power.

(5) Proceedings, or threatened proceedings, are not abusive merely because they are brought by, or on behalf of, a foreign power, or a person connected to a foreign power.

(6) For the purposes of this section, “sanctions evasion” means conduct which has the purpose, or effect, of enabling or facilitating the evasion, circumvention or frustration of— (a) sanctions imposed under the Sanctions and Anti Money Laundering Act 2018; (b) asset freezing measures; (c) trade sanctions; (d) export controls; (e) immigration restrictions; (f) public procurement restrictions; or (g) any other restrictive measure imposed by or under an enactment for the purpose of protecting the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(7) Nothing in this section is to be read as preventing legal advice, representation or advocacy, provided that such activity is not undertaken for the purpose of facilitating foreign power threat activity, transnational repression, sanctions evasion, abusive lawfare or the concealment of assets connected to a designated body.”

This amendment would specify categories of conduct that may be regarded as involvement in foreign power threat activity for the purposes of designation.

With this it will be convenient to discuss the following: Amendment 15, page 2, line 42, at end insert— “33C Mandatory review following designation (1) Where regulations are made under section 33A designating a body, the Secretary of State must, within 30 days of the regulations being made, conduct a review of whether further action should be taken in relation to— (a) the designated body; (b) any person who owns or controls the designated body; (c) any person owned or controlled by the designated body; (d) any officer, employee, agent, member or representative of the designated body; (e) any person acting for or on behalf of the designated body; (f) any person who materially assists the designated body; and (g) any person who provides funds, economic resources, professional services, goods, technology or other material support to the designated body.

(2) The review under subsection (1) must consider whether it is appropriate to take, recommend or request action including— (a) designation under the Sanctions and Anti Money Laundering Act 2018; (b) asset freezing measures; (c) travel bans or other immigration restrictions; (d) director disqualification; (e) public procurement exclusion; (f) civil recovery, restraint, freezing or forfeiture action; (g) referral to Companies House, the National Crime Agency, the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Solicitors Regulation Authority, the Bar Standards Board, HM Revenue and Customs, the Charity Commission, the Electoral Commission or any other relevant authority; (h) enhanced beneficial ownership checks; (i) enhanced reporting requirements; and (j) any other action necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(3) In conducting a review under subsection (1), the Secretary of State must consult— (a) the Treasury; (b) the Secretary of State responsible for foreign, Commonwealth and development affairs; (c) the National Crime Agency; and (d) any other Minister of the Crown or public authority as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.

(4) Within 30 days of a body being designated under section 33A, the Secretary of State must lay before Parliament a statement confirming— (a) that the review required by this section has been conducted; (b) what categories of action listed in subsection (2) have been considered; (c) whether any such action has been taken, recommended or requested; and (d) where no such action has been taken, recommended or requested, the reasons for that decision.

(5) A statement under subsection (4) may omit information where the Secretary of State considers that publication of that information would be contrary to the interests of national security, international relations, the prevention or detection of serious crime, or the protection of ongoing legal proceedings.

(6) The Secretary of State must keep under review whether further action under subsection (2) is required in relation to a designated body and persons connected to it.”

This amendment would require the Secretary of State, within 30 days of designating a body, to review whether further action should be taken against the body and persons connected to it, and to lay a statement of the outcome before Parliament. Clause stand part.

Amendment 3, in clause 2, page 3, line 8, leave out from “body” until end of line 9.

This amendment and Amendments 4 to 6 would remove the additional defence of supporting a designated body for a non prohibited purpose. Amendment 4, page 3, line 16, leave out from “body” until end of line 17.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 3. Amendment 5, page 3, line 21, leave out from “body” until end of line 22.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 3. Amendment 6, page 3, leave out lines 23 to 25.

See the explanatory statement for Amendment 3. Amendment 1, page 4, line 23, at end insert— “(3A) The conduct specified in subsection (3) includes establishing, administering or maintaining a company, trust, partnership or similar arrangement which conceals, or is intended to conceal, the beneficial ownership of assets connected with a designated body.”

Amendment 8, page 4, line 27, after “United Kingdom” insert “or are conducted outside, but were planned from within, the United Kingdom”.

Amendment 7, page 5, line 15, leave out “14” and insert “25”.

This amendment would increase the maximum sentence for assisting a designated body from 14 years to 25 years imprisonment. Amendment 11, page 6, leave out lines 21 to 23.

This amendment would remove the defence of reasonable excuse for retaining a material benefit provided by or on behalf of a designated body. Amendment 12, page 6, line 38, leave out “(7) or”.

This amendment is consequential on Amendment 11. Amendment 9, page 7, line 8, at end insert— “17D Uniform and publication of images in relation to a designated body (1) A person in a public place commits an offence if he— (a) wears an item of clothing, or (b) wears, carries or displays an article in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter of a designated body.

(2) A person commits an offence if the person publishes an image of— (a) an item of clothing, or (b) any other article, in such a way or in such circumstances as to arouse reasonable suspicion that the person is a supporter of a designated body.

(3) In subsection (2) the reference to an image is a reference to a still or moving image (produced by any means).

(4) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on summary conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding level 5 on the standard scale (or both).

(5) A constable may seize an item of clothing or any other article if the constable— (a) reasonably suspects that it is evidence in relation to an offence under subsection (1), and (b) is satisfied that it is necessary to seize it in order to prevent the evidence being concealed, lost, altered or destroyed.

(6) In connection with exercising the power in subsection (5), a constable may require a person to remove the item of clothing or other article if the person is wearing it.

(7) But the powers conferred by subsections (5) and (6) may not be exercised so as to seize, or require a person to remove, an item of clothing being worn next to the skin or immediately over a garment being worn as underwear.”

This amendment would create an offence of wearing or displaying in public, or publishing an image of, an article in a way that arouses reasonable suspicion that a person is a supporter of a designated body. Amendment 10, page 7, line 8, at end insert— “17D Preparation of acts relating to a designated body (1) A person commits an offence if, with the intention of— (a) committing an offence under section 17A, 17B or 17C, or (b) assisting another to commit such an offence, the person engages in any conduct in preparation for giving effect to the intention.

(2) It is irrelevant for the purposes of subsection (1) whether the intention and preparations relate to one or more particular offences, offences of a particular description, or such offences generally.

(3) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable, on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).”

This amendment would create an offence of engaging in conduct in preparation for committing, or assisting another to commit, an offence relating to a designated body. Amendment 13, page 7, line 8, at end insert— “17D Self directing acts in support of a designated body (1) A person commits an offence if the person engages in conduct of any kind which is— (a) inspired by the ideology, actions, and self promotion of a designated body, and (b) prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(2) A person commits an offence if the person— (a) engages in UK related activities that are likely to assist the stated, or assumed, aims of a designated body, and (b) knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought to reasonably to know, that their activities are likely to assist the stated, or assumed, aims of a designated body.

(3) UK related activities” means— (a) activities taking place in the United Kingdom; (b) activities taking place outside the United Kingdom which are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(4) Subsections (1) and (2) apply to conduct outside the United Kingdom, but apply to conduct taking place wholly outside the United Kingdom only if the person engaging in the conduct— (ab) is a UK person, or (b) acts for or on behalf of, or holds office under, the Crown, or is in Crown employment (whether or not they engage in the conduct in that capacity).

(5) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence to show that the person engaged in the conduct in question— (a) in compliance with a legal obligation under the law of the United Kingdom which is not a legal obligation under private law, (b) in the case of a person having functions of a public nature under the law of the United Kingdom, for the purposes of those functions, (c) as a lawyer carrying on a legal activity, or (d) in accordance with, or in relation to Uk related activities carried out in accordance with, an agreement or arrangement to which— (i) the United Kingdom was a party, or (ii) any person acting for, or on behalf of, or holding office under, the Crown was (in that capacity) a party.

(6) A person is taken to have shown a matter mentioned in subsection (5) if— (a) sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and (b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(7) A person who commits an office under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).

(8) The following terms have the same meaning as in section 3— “Crown employment” ; “financial benefit” ; The “law of the United Kingdom”; “lawyer” ; “legal activity” ; “UK person” .”

This amendment creates a new offence of undertaking conduct harmful or prejudicial to UK interests that is inspired by a designated body, rather than actively commissioned on behalf of a designated body. Amendment 14, page 7, line 8, at end insert— “17D Dissemination of publications relating to a designated body (1) A person commits an offence if the person engages in conduct falling within subsection (2) and, at the time of doing so— (a) intends an effect of the conduct to be a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to support, or to provide assistance to, a designated body, or (b) is reckless as to whether the conduct has that effect.

(2) A person engages in conduct falling within this subsection if the person— (a) distributes or circulates a publication relating to a designated body; (b) gives, sells or lends such a publication; (c) offers such a publication for sale or loan; (d) provides a service to others that enables them to obtain, read, listen to or look at such a publication, or to acquire it by means of a gift, sale or loan; (e) transmits the contents of such a publication electronically; or (f) has such a publication in the person's possession with a view to its becoming the subject of conduct falling within any of paragraphs (a) to (e).

(3) For the purposes of this section a publication relates to a designated body if matter contained in it is likely to be understood by a reasonable person as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to support, or to provide assistance to, a designated body.

(4) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to show that— (a) the matter by reference to which the publication was treated as relating to a designated body neither expressed the person's views nor had the person's endorsement, and (b) it was clear, in all the circumstances of the conduct, that the matter did not express the person's views and did not have the person's endorsement.

(5) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).”

This amendment would create an offence of disseminating, or possessing with a view to disseminating, a publication that encourages support for or assistance to a designated body. Clause 2 stand part.

Amendment 2, in clause 3, page 7, line 27, at end insert— “(5) Regulations under subsection (3) may not be made unless a draft of the statutory instrument containing them has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.”

This amendment ensures that any regulation under section 33C made by the Secretary of State to remove a designation is subject to the draft affirmative procedure. Clauses 3 to 8 stand part.

New clause 3—Designation of the IRGC— “(1) The Secretary of State must take reasonable steps to lay before Parliament regulations under the provisions of this Act to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a body involved in foreign power threat activity.

(2) Before laying such regulations, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the IRGC fulfils the conditions set out in Section 1 of this Act.

(3) The regulations specified in subsection (1) should be laid before Parliament within a month of this Act coming into force.”

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to take reasonable steps to bring forward regulations designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) within a month of this Act coming into force. New clause 4—Assessment of the adequacy of the powers contained in the Act— “(1) Within twelve months of passing of this Act, the Secretary of State must commission the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation or another such person performing a similar function to produce a report on the adequacy of the powers contained in this Act.

(2) The report specified in subsection (1) must consider the effectiveness of the Act’s powers in tackling the threat posed by state backed and state linked actors to the security of the United Kingdom.

(3) The report specified in subsection (1) must include any proposals for legislative changes to the provisions of the Act as are considered necessary by the Independent Reviewer.

(4) As soon as receiving the report, and no later than three months after receiving it, the Secretary of State must lay the report before both Houses of Parliament.

(5) Within three months of laying the report before Parliament, the Secretary of State must publish a response to the report and to any recommendations made by the Independent Reviewer.”

This new clause would require the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation to assess the adequacy of the powers introduced by this Act twelve months after its passing. New clause 5—Seizure of Passports etc from Person Suspected of Assisting a Designated Body— “(1) This section applies in the case of a person at a port in Great Britain, Northern Ireland, or in the border area, if a constable has reasonable grounds to suspect that the person— (a) is there with the intention of leaving Great Britain or Northern Ireland for the purpose of assisting a designated body outside the United Kingdom; or (b) has arrived in Great Britain or Northern Ireland with the intention of leaving it soon for that purpose.

(2) The constable may— (a) exercise any of the powers in sub paragraph (4) in the case of the person, or (b) direct a qualified officer to do so.

(3) A qualified officer must (if able to do so) comply with any direction given by a constable under sub paragraph (2)(b).

(4) The powers are— (a) to require the person to hand over all travel documents in the person’s possession to the constable or (as the case may be) the qualified officer; (b) to search for travel documents relating to the person and to take possession of any that the constable or officer finds; (c) to inspect any travel document relating to the person; and (d) to retain any travel document relating to the person that is lawfully in the possession of the constable or officer.

(5) The power in sub paragraph (4)(b) is a power to search— (a) the person; (b) anything that the person has with him or her; and (c) any vehicle in which the officer believes the person to have been travelling or to be about to travel.

(6) A constable or qualified officer— (a) may stop a person or vehicle for the purpose of exercising a power in sub paragraph (4)(a) or (b); (b) may if necessary use reasonable force for the purpose of exercising a power in sub paragraph (4)(a) or (b); and (c) may authorise a person to carry out on the constable's or officer's behalf a search under sub paragraph (4)(b).

(7) A constable or qualified officer exercising a power in sub paragraph (4)(a) or (b) must tell the person that— (a) the person is suspected of intending to leave Great Britain or (as the case may be) the United Kingdom for the purpose of assisting a designated body, and (b) the constable or officer is therefore entitled under this Schedule to exercise the power.

(8) Where a travel document relating to the person is in the possession of an immigration officer or customs official (whether a qualified officer or not), the constable may direct the officer or official— (a) to pass the document to a constable as soon as practicable, and (b) in the meantime to retain it, the officer or official must comply with any such direction.”

This new clause would replicate existing powers to seize travel documents from individuals suspected of terrorism, applying those powers in relation to individuals suspected of assisting a designated body New clause 6—Police powers to apply for serious crime prevention orders in designation cases— “(1) The Serious Crime Act 2007 is amended as follows.

(2) In Section 8, after subsection (2)(a) insert— “(ab) it is an application for an order under section 1 that is related to an offence committed under section 2 of the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026.””

This new clause allows police to apply for serious crime prevention orders in relation to offences committed under this Act. New clause 7—Sanctions— “(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations under the provisions of Section 1 of the Sanctions and Anti Money Laundering Act 2018 to subject any— (a) body designated under the National Security (State Threats) Act 2026, or (b) a person who commits an offence under section (2) of that Act to any available sanction within that Act.”

This new clause would ensure that any body designated under this Act, or any person who commits an offence under this Act, may be subject to the sanctions regime set out in the Sanctions and Anti Money Laundering Act 2018. The schedule.

We have tabled 13 amendments, not to frustrate the Bill but to give it the necessary teeth. This Bill is soft where it should be hard, silent where it should speak, and blind where it should see. It is soft because, as drafted, it sets a higher bar to prosecute a person who supports the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps than a person who supports the terrorists whom the IRGC funds and commands; it is silent because whole categories of hostile conduct that our terrorism laws have criminalised for 20 years are simply missing; and it is blind because it has been written for one organisation on one timetable, with almost no provision for future designations. Good will is not enough, and we must close the holes that our enemies will exploit.

The Government have lifted much of this legislation from section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000, yet they have added something that does not appear in the terrorism offence: a requirement that support was given for a prohibited purpose that was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United Kingdom. Let me ask the Minister the simple question that this Bill invites: what level of support for the IRGC do the Government consider beneficial to the United Kingdom? The IRGC is the world’s largest state sponsor of terrorism, and if she agrees that there is no level of support for it that is beneficial to the UK, we can simply remove the prohibited purpose. She has just said from the Dispatch Box that she agrees that there is absolutely none, so let us act and amend the Bill.

Under the Bill as drafted, to convict someone who supports the IRGC the prosecution must prove that their support was prejudicial to the safety or interest of the UK—an additional threshold—but that requirement does not exist in terrorism law. To convict someone who supports Hamas, Hezbollah or the Houthis—the proxies that the IRGC arms and funds—there is no such hurdle, so the body that inspires, organises arms and funds the terrorists is handed a protection in law that the terrorist himself is denied. That is the difference between a prosecution that succeeds and one that never gets off the ground, and I know something about prosecutions that fail at the last moment. Our amendment 3 simply removes the extra defence and brings this offence into line with the terrorism law from which it is drawn.

I recognise that the Government may seek to argue that state entities enjoy protections in international law that terrorists do not, that we must set a higher bar than in equivalent terrorism legislation and that acting prejudicially to the UK’s interests is a reasonable test. However, state immunity protects the Iranian state from being sued or prosecuted in our courts, and it has nothing to do with the British resident who chooses to fund or promote the IRGC. We are not prosecuting Tehran; we are prosecuting the person here who does its work. The proposition that the Minister is left defending is that supporting the world’s biggest sponsor of terrorism should be harder to prosecute than supporting the groups it sponsors. That is not a higher bar; it is international lawyers tying the hands of Ministers who are meant to be keeping us safe.

On amendments 11 and 12, the same instinct to protect where we should prosecute runs through subsection (7) of proposed new section 17C, which makes a reasonable excuse a defence for accepting and keeping a material benefit from a designated body. That is not necessary, because there are already protections in the Bill for, for example, a lawyer or somebody who has no ability to know that funds were being taken. I recognise that such a provision is in the National Security Act 2023, but that is not a reason to repeat a weakness, and we have an opportunity to fix it. There is no excuse for keeping a hostile state’s money—not in this Bill and not in the Act it leans on.

The sentencing gets the gravity backwards. As drafted, supporting a designated body and actively assisting one carries the same maximum sentence of 14 years or a fine.

Before my hon. Friend moves on to fines, the issue she has raised, and which I raised earlier, seems to be crucial. It is true that Jonathan Hall, as the Minister said on Second Reading, recognised that the approach to a terrorist organisation was different from the approach to a state. Nevertheless, creating this higher bar whereby to secure a successful prosecution it must be established that the individual concerned was acting on behalf of the designated body for a prohibited purpose—connection with the body alone is not sufficient—seems to me to make prosecution less likely rather than more likely. If international law is at the heart of that—the fear of appeals, and so on and so forth—we need to hear that from the Minister, and the case needs to be a highly persuasive, because it seems to me that the Government are making their lives more difficult, rather than easier.

That is exactly the crux of the point I made in my speech on Second Reading. We should not set a higher threshold, because we will see prosecutions collapse for exactly that reason. We need to be arming prosecutors to go and get the justice that our country needs to better protect us.

Turning to the maximum sentence of 14 years, actively doing a hostile state organ’s work—moving its money, carrying its information, committing violence on its behalf—is graver than just supporting it. It is a kind of treason, and I suspect most British people would call it that. We urge the Government to consider having a higher potential sentence for actively working with or receiving material benefit from a designated body. Amendment 7 would therefore raise that maximum sentence from 14 years to 25 years. That figure is not plucked from the air; it matches the Australian regime under which the IRGC was listed last November. As I have said, the Government may argue that the 14 year maximum sentence is taken from the NSA 2023, but let us raise the maximum sentence in both. After all, we are talking about treason.

On amendment 10, I turn from where the Bill is too soft to where it says nothing at all. This is one of the gaps about which the Government have offered no answer, and I have looked hard for one. Section 5 of the Terrorism Act 2006 makes preparing an act of terrorism an offence, but this Bill contains no equivalent. As the Bill is drafted, a person can plan to assist a designated organ—to be straightforward, let us talk about the IRGC—and unless and until they commit the act, they have committed no offence at all under this Bill. However, the entire purpose of national security work is to prevent and disrupt before harm is done, not to see the plot and clear it up afterwards. We would not tolerate that vulnerability in terrorism law and we should not invent it here. Amendment 10 closes that gap, and lets police and prosecutors act while a plot is still on the drawing board. If the Minister believes preparation is already caught elsewhere, I would welcome her showing me where, but I have yet to be shown that in the briefings I have had.

Amendment 13 recognises that the gap left by preparation is widened by a second omission: self directed and inspired actors. The Bill misses entirely the person who is never directly commissioned or directed, but who absorbs a hostile state’s propaganda and acts on it alone. Twenty years of counter terrorism has taught us this lesson at a terrible cost. The gravest or most likely threat is no longer the directed plot, but the individual radicalised online who acts on their own. Hostile states bring the resources, reach and sophistication of states to that propaganda, arguably with a greater inspiring power than any terrorist group can muster. We saw that with the bots that screamed for independence in Scotland and fell silent the moment Tehran’s internet went down, something my right hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge (Tom Tugendhat) raised in his speech earlier. That is just a small insight into the ways they are invested in turning us against each other. A Bill that catches only the commissioned and directed is fighting the last war and leaving us dangerously exposed to the next. Amendment 13 captures those inspired to act by a designated body, but not directed by them.

I turn now to the most dangerous omission of all, which we touched on in the wind ups on Second Reading, and the omission that would worry our allies and partners, which amendment 8 seeks to address. As drafted, the Bill captures activity in the UK and activity abroad that is “prejudicial” to the UK. It does not catch activity planned here on British soil to be perpetrated abroad where there is no ability to prove that it is prejudicial to the interests of the UK where there is no harm to the UK. Activity by the IRGC in France, Iran or Bosnia, or by the Chinese in Hong Kong, may not be directly prejudicial to the interests of the UK, so again we are adding an unnecessary threshold. But if it is perpetrated here, be it in Manchester, London or anywhere else, we must be able to prosecute those responsible.

In plain terms, the gap was turning the UK into a base for state terrorism: a cell here in Britain planning a campaign of intimidation against a journalist in Dublin on behalf of the IRGC, or a network running sabotage operations in Germany. Arrested and charged, their defence writes itself. If the act was not to take place here in the UK, you cannot argue that it was prejudicial to UK safety. The law does not like ambiguity. We should not leave prosecutors having to argue that an attack on Dublin or Berlin was also somehow an attack on London. Amendment 8 closes that gap directly, so that planning hostile activity from British soil is caught wherever that activity is aimed. If the Government are confident that that scope is already reached, they lose nothing by putting it beyond doubt. Far better to write the law clearly today than to watch a case fall apart on that very point.

The next omission is propaganda itself. Since 2006, it has been an offence to disseminate publications that promote terrorism. The Bill extends no equivalent protection against the propaganda of designated states. We have heard colleagues today talk about publications such as Press TV which, shamefully, former Members of this House appear on and are paid to have shows on. Two of the principal weapons of hostile states are the propaganda that recruits and the disinformation that divides. The Chinese Communist party pushes propaganda and disinformation through the United Front Work Department. I hope these powers will reach it one day, but amendment 14 brings designated bodies within the same standard applied to terrorist publications for 20 years, because I do not in any way think that the Government think that IRGC propaganda should have more latitude than that of a proscribed terrorist group.

Next is an omission that many living in our country, especially our Jewish community, will find the most difficult. Under section 13 of the Terrorism Act 2000, it is an offence to display in public the insignia of a proscribed organisation. It is the power that we rely on to take Hamas flags, Hezbollah banners and the symbols of Hizb ut Tahrir off our streets. The Bill as drafted contains no equivalent provision whatever, so if the amendment is not accepted by the Government, either now or in the other place, the flag of the IRGC may fly lawfully on a British street, glorifying every stabbing, every attack on our Jewish communities, every kidnap plot and every assassination attempt that the regime has directed here. How do we look the people who are being hunted in the eye and tell them that the banner of their hunter is welcome on our streets?

The Government may say that criminalising the display of state symbols brings lawful state activity under UK criminal law, contrary to diplomatic convention, and that by reciprocity, hostile states could criminalise the Union Jack and UK uniforms abroad, exposing our personnel and dual nationals. I have taken the time to consider that. Yes, state immunity protects foreign states in our courts, but it should not and does not dictate what a resident of this country may do on British pavements.

The amendment does not touch the Iranian state, or its embassy or any accredited diplomat protected by the Vienna convention. It touches the person waving the flag or wearing the uniform. The reciprocity argument does not survive five seconds of contact with reality, because Iran already jails its own citizens for waving the Union Jack. We do not keep our flag safe in Tehran by keeping their flag flying in London.

I move from the offences that the Bill omits to the powers it withholds from our police and the officers standing at the border. New clause 5 closes one of the starkest gaps between the Bill and the terrorism law that the Secretary of State clearly said she seeks to mirror: “the same as” was the language she used. If an officer has reasonable grounds to suspect at the border that someone is leaving the United Kingdom to assist a designated terrorist group—which, under the Bill, would be a designated hostile state body—they should be able to seize the passport of the person seeking to travel and stop them.

We grant that exact power in terrorism cases. Parliament created the provision in 2015 so that an officer at the border does not have to watch a suspect board a plane and vanish. On 29 March 2024, two men stabbed Pouria Zeraat, a journalist with Iran International—an incredibly brave man who continues to do everything he can to shine a light on what is taking place in Iran—outside his home in Wimbledon. The Crown told the court that the men had acted as proxies for the Iranian state, and within hours they were at Heathrow and gone. We can close that loophole by accepting new clause 5.

Jonathan Hall KC, the independent reviewer of whom we have spoken much, recommended the power last year. He said that it was an immediate recommendation, and the Government rightly accepted it. I welcomed them doing so, but now the Government have left it out of the Bill. The equivalent power against terrorism has worked for 10 years and been used 75 times. If the threat is visible at the border, we must not tie the hands of the officer standing in front of it.

The second power that the Bill withholds is the serious crime prevention order. Again, terrorism law already allows it, but this Bill does not, which is why I tabled new clause 6. A serious crime prevention order lets a court manage risk beyond the conviction, limiting travel, restricting internet access, controlling communications, and compelling disclosure that aids an investigation. Each one of those tools would help us tackle hostile state networks. We grant them against organised crimes and terrorists, but the Bill grants them against neither the IRGC nor any future designated body.

The Minister must explain why a SCPO is right for county lines gangs and terror cells, but not a hostile state. I suspect that the real answer is that it may have been an omission, or that there may be plans for a future Bill, but we have this Bill in front of us now, so let us give the police the necessary powers.

There is a blind spot at the centre of the Bill—a consequence of writing it for one organisation and forgetting that there will be more state bodies that behave as terrorists. The Bill does not mention sanctions once. For legislation the entire purpose of which is to act against hostile state bodies, there is a remarkable and revealing silence that tells us who the Bill was drafted for. The IRGC is already sanctioned, so the Government did not trouble to build a bridge to the sanctions regime, but the next body we might designate may not be sanctioned at all, and I assure the House that there will be a need for future designations. I have touched on one: the United Front Work Department of the Chinese Communist party.

New clause 7 enshrines designation as grounds for sanction. It does not impose anything automatic, and neither does it ask for a running commentary on sanctions—Government lawyers can rest easy—but it gives the Bill a bridge to a second or third designation, not just the first. Amendment 15 builds directly on that bridge. Where new clause 7 makes the link possible, amendment 15 makes the Government turn their minds to it. It requires the Secretary of State, within six months of designating any body, to consider whether that body should also be sanctioned, and to lay the reasons for that decision before this House.

Amendment 15 is not a demand that the Government sanction anyone. The amendment deliberately ensures that designations and sanctions do not drift apart due to inattention. If the Government are serious that the power should be used agnostically against bodies not yet sanctioned, they would welcome a discipline that forces them to look every time.

Finally, I come to the threat that the Bill cannot even bring itself to name. Hostile states, and the bodies that serve them, will use any tool they can to silence dissent, subvert democracy, and advance their interests, particularly in those who sought safety in our country—Tibetans, Hongkongers, Ukrainians and British nationals who dared to stand up to autocrats and terrorist technocrats, and who are now under attack on our soil.

Amendment 16 names three of the most common and most sinister forms of attack by hostile states: transnational repression, abusive lawfare and sanctions evasion. It would be the first time that transnational repression was put into British law. That may seem like an amazing, glaring omission to many Members of this House; I myself was not aware of it until I gave the Bill Office my amendment and asked them to provide me with the legal definition of transnational repression, only to be told that there is no such definition because it is not in law. We can correct that through this Bill. Doing so would send a single, unambiguous warning that a foreign power that reaches on to our streets to do these things will be designated for it.

We have heard about the threats from Iran to our country. We know how the Chinese Communist party has put bounties on the heads of pro democracy Hongkongers—cash for the abduction of people as young as 19, kidnap notes put through the doors of neighbours saying, “Bring this person to the Chinese embassy so that we can deal with them.” We have talked about Russia murdering people on our soil, and behind all the names we know—Litvinenko, Berezovsky and all the others—there are hundreds and thousands we do not know who are still being attacked.

Section 33 of the NSA already names some hostile acts, including sabotage, the theft of trade secrets and entering a prohibited premises. If the Act can name those examples, it can find the room to name transnational repression. This is the chance to improve the National Security Act, protect the vulnerable and put autocracies on notice.

To conclude, I will draw these threads together. Every one of these 13 amendments is drawn not from theory, but from the body of counter terrorism law that this country has built, tested and relied upon for two decades. Apart from the transnational repression suggestion, every measure is taken from terrorism legislation to ensure that we do not have omissions or gaps in the Bill. They also come from my experience working directly to counter hostile states and terrorist groups before I came to this place. Even the basics—a propaganda offence, the flags and uniforms, the power to seize a passport at the border; orders we already have—are the bare minimum the Government should be looking to accept. If these amendments are not agreed to, it ceases to become an issue of haste and becomes one of choice—a choice to give the IRGC a gentler regime than the terrorist groups it funds.

We support the Bill. We are not trying to stop it. I hope that I have made the case clearly that we just want to plug the gaps. I do not think it is fair for the Government to suggest that we are trying to use this Bill like a Christmas tree and hang lots of additional items on it. I seek simply to close existing gaps. The only new measure would be the one concerning transnational repression. I commend these amendments to the Committee, and I hope they will be considered.

I have to commend the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) for doing her homework. I wish to explain why we do not think these amendments are needed at the moment.

There are a couple of themes that run through my response to the hon. Lady’s amendments. The first is that it is not possible to treat a state body the same as a terrorist organisation, because one cannot abolish a state body. One has to think about the differences between the two, which is why we have called the measure closing the loophole in this Bill designation, rather than proscription. It is also the case that we clearly have other international obligations, both under international law, for the sovereignty of individual states, and under diplomatic law, with the Vienna convention, so that we can enable diplomatic relations or other arrangements with states that we might not approve of particularly. Within that difference lie some of the different approaches in the Bill and in the hon. Lady’s amendments.

The other common theme, which perhaps divides us in our approach to the Bill, as well as explaining the differences and why we will not be accepting the hon. Lady’s amendments, is that we are not trying to put all of Jonathan Hall’s recommendations on to the statute book in this Bill. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary said in her opening remarks, we have accepted all the recommendations in Jonathan Hall’s report and will be legislating for them subsequently. What we wish to do with this quite narrow Bill is close that loophole with state sponsored or proxy organisations as quickly as possible so that we can deal with the rising threats present on our streets as we speak. It may help to bear those two things in mind as I lay out the Government’s position regarding the amendments that the hon. Lady has just spoken to.

Through amendments 3 to 6, the hon. Lady seeks to remove the prohibited purpose test. The test is there precisely to cover the difference in treatment between terrorist organisations and states, which we cannot proscribe and with which we may have to have some kind of arrangements. While the Bill is modelled on the provisions in the Terrorism Act 2000, it has to reflect the realities of dealing with state entities. That is what the prohibited purpose test is about. There may be some cases where UK persons need to have legitimate dealings with a state entity; it might be a British diplomat or a non governmental organisation delivering humanitarian aid. The prohibited purpose test is necessary to protect legitimate conduct without creating loopholes that can be exploited by hostile actors.

I am glad that the Minister has addressed that point, because it was raised by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright) and I on Second Reading. Surely the counter argument is that it will be a sure defence when prosecutions are brought; it will be much harder to secure a conviction, because the necessity to prove a purpose will be tested beyond measure. The association with a state sponsored organisation such as, for example, the IRGC is ipso facto proof, surely, of guilt.

Action that is prejudicial to the safety and interests of the UK is the test that we are talking about. If one were delivering humanitarian aid and had to deal with part of a state that we did not particularly approve of, that would not be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. It would be in line with what the UK wished to do, but if it were prejudicial, because it was hostile activity, the test would be passed.

The Minister gives the example of a diplomat, and she is right that our diplomats in Tehran will need to engage with the IRGC—it is nonsense to suggest that they would not be able to do so—but that is why there is a specific exception for that in the Bill. Proposed new section 17A(5) refers to a person who “acts for or on behalf of, or holds office under, the Crown, or is in Crown employment (whether or not they engage in the conduct in that capacity).”

As I have mentioned, I am concerned that that means that anyone who is a traitor and works for the civil service would have protections under any circumstances, but it means that we do not need that additional threshold, because diplomats are already specifically protected in the Bill at another point.

It is not only diplomats. It may well be NGOs delivering humanitarian aid and people who have to come across states or their designated proxies in particular cases.

We need to be clear about which provisions relate to which offences. The offence that I think the Minister has heard concern expressed about, and to which amendment 3 relates, is the offence under proposed new section 17A of the National Security Act 2023—in other words, the offence of supporting a designated organisation. The provisions that relate to protections for those who are acting on behalf of the UK state apply to the other two offences, not to the 17A offence, do they not?

The Minister is of course right that there is a difference between the way in which the UK state needs to interact with another state entity and the way in which it needs to interact with a terrorist entity, but these offences relate to individuals not to states or, indeed, the designated body. We are talking about offences that might be charged against individuals who are themselves accused of supporting that designated body.

Is not the point here—the point has been made several times—that we are setting up an additional hurdle in order to prosecute successfully for an offence of supporting a designated body? As the Minister heard me say on Second Reading, what I am concerned to understand is why that is not duplication, in effect, of the designation process itself, which distinguishes an innocent, perfectly rational state body from one that is up to no good for all the ways described in the designation process. Why do we need the prohibited purposes test in addition to the designation process?

I think it is to cover all potential actions that individuals may undertake that are okay; they can assure themselves that an activity is okay, even if it involves a designated state, if it is not prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK. Many humanitarian organisations are worried about being inadvertently caught in the designation process, and the prohibited purpose test is there to give assurance in those contexts.

Earlier today, I and other members of the Foreign Affairs Committee met the head of the International Committee of the Red Cross’s regional delegation to the UK. The ICRC makes the point that while it is not a non governmental organisation, it needs access to state actors on both sides of a conflict. I am curious about whether the prohibited purpose test is specifically looking to protect NGOs and organisations such as the ICRC, or whether it is also to do with compliance with international law, such as the European convention on human rights.

The Bill does accord with the European convention on human rights, international law and all our obligations. The prohibited purpose test is there precisely to give assurance to bodies like the one that the hon. Member mentioned, so that there will not be any dubiety about whether they can engage with the organisations that they must work with as part of their core job.

May I put on record my thanks to the Home Secretary and the team for the speed with which they have addressed the major issues in the Bill? I also thank the Home Secretary for making it clear on Second Reading that the Bill’s provisions will not apply to humanitarian organisations.

Yes. This is the test that delivers that assurance.

I am extremely grateful to the Minister for giving way again. I hope she accepts that I am genuinely trying to ensure that I have understood correctly how the test is supposed to work. I would be grateful if she also addressed the other point that I raised. I understand her argument that the intention is to ensure that, for example, those at NGO level who might engage with a designated body are not held criminally accountable for doing so. However, she will recognise that the Bill deals differently with the offences of assisting or obtaining a material benefit from a designated body. In those cases, there is provision for the defence that she has outlined, but that approach is not taken in relation to supporting a designated body. Can she explain why we have that difference?

I think it is about consistency. The Bill was drafted to try to mirror—albeit in a slightly different context—the Terrorism Act provisions, while fitting into the National Security Act’s provisions, so that we do not have a complicated range of tests.

Amendment 7 relates to defences and sentencing. Essentially, the hon. Member for Rutland and Stamford (Alicia Kearns) wishes to increase the prison sentence for actively assisting to 25 years from the current 14 years. The idea is that 14 years would very much fit in with the sentences under the National Security Act, and we would not end up with a complex range of sentences for quite similar offences. One could increase both, if we were minded to do so, but the point about the introduction of designation in the Bill is that it is trying to fit into the National Security Act, which has been working quite well, rather than our having a whole range of different sentences for very similar offences.

I fully recognise the Minister’s point that she is trying to align the provisions with those in the National Security Act, but as per my argument earlier, let us improve the National Security Act while we are at it. The Minister says that the question is whether she is minded to make the change; I say she should be minded to. If someone actively assists or materially benefits from a hostile state while committing treason, it is absolutely right that they should get a tougher sentence than that for just flying a flag or supporting a hostile state. Those acts are still heinous, but a far worse crime has been committed. I ask the Minister to consider making the change when the Bill is in the Lords.

I note the hon. Lady’s point.

Amendment 10 would “create an offence of engaging in conduct in preparation for committing, or assisting another to commit, an offence relating to a designated body.”

It is not necessary, because a person who engages in conduct of any kind, including preparatory conduct, that is intended to assist a designated body in carrying out UK related activities would be caught by the Bill’s provisions.

The hon. Lady talked about what she called a loophole; she said that the Bill does not cover attacks inspired by a designated body. Her amendment 13 would create a new offence for self directed acts inspired by a designated body, but we do not believe it is necessary. The test for the assisting offence in proposed new section 17B of the National Security Act is whether conduct is intended to assist a designated organisation, or whether the person ought to have known that their conduct was likely to assist the organisation. The person does not need to be tasked or directed by the organisation to commit the offence, so those who are inspired to do things, rather than being asked or told to do things by the designated body, are caught.

With amendment 8, the hon. Lady seeks to capture conduct that occurs outside the UK but is planned within the UK. Again, we believe it is unnecessary. If planning takes place in the UK, it is already caught in the Bill, under the offence in proposed new section 17B of assisting a designated body. That offence refers to conduct of any kind, and it will be an offence to plan something in the UK that takes place outside the UK if it materially assists a designated body in carrying out activities that are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the UK—the prohibited purpose test. That could cover someone in the UK who assists a designated body in its work, done overseas, to target an ally of the UK, so the amendment is unnecessary.

Amendment 14 would create an offence relating to the dissemination of publications that encourage support for a designated body. The conduct that the amendment seeks to address is already covered by the new offence of supporting a designated body.

I think the hon. Lady wanted people to be criminalised for wearing clothing or displaying flags or similar symbols linked to a designated body. The Bill does not ban the wearing or carrying of an image, because we cannot ban what might be worn by a foreign diplomat, but if somebody is supporting or promoting the hostile activities of a proscribed body in any way, they will be caught by the new support offence. I hope that assures the hon. Lady that that issue is covered.

New clauses 5 and 6 would give effect to other recommendations made by Jonathan Hall by creating new powers to seize travel documents, and to allow police to apply for serious crime prevention orders in relation to offences committed under this legislation. We are committed to legislating on those recommendations and, as my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary announced on Second Reading, we will do so as soon as parliamentary time allows.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

I want to begin by restating that Liberal Democrats support this Bill. We have long called for action to tackle the threat posed by the IRGC, and we have repeatedly been disappointed by slow progress. The Bill represents a positive step, and a rare moment of agreement on a principle across this House. When it comes to important matters of national security, this is a desirable outcome.

The UK is increasingly targeted by hostile state backed groups, and the IRGC has been involved in such activity, as we know. Attacks on Britain’s Jewish community in recent months have laid bare the clear and ongoing threat to that community, and also to UK national security. The uptick in antisemitism and the threats against our national security continue, regardless of the politics in this House, and we must bear that in mind when we act urgently to protect Jewish communities. That is why I urge Members across the House to support new clause 3 on the designation of the IRGC. This will provide, after long delays, much needed certainty for the Jewish community and others that the Government will act at pace by bringing forward regulations within a month of this legislation passing.

The hon. Gentleman will know that I have called for the proscription of the IRGC numerous times in this House, and that it is something I absolutely want, but does he not accept that we have to pass this legislation, set the framework up and allow the Home Secretary to make an evidence based decision before proscription is brought into effect? Should he not withdraw this new clause, and allow due process to take its course?

I thank the hon. Member for his intervention. The new clause will not be withdrawn. The sentiment is shared between us, and I think we should appreciate that.

New clause 3 reflects the Government’s stated intention to move by the summer recess, and it ensures that this commitment will be honoured in practice; that would give much reassurance to those watching from outside the House. Importantly, the new clause does not force the Home Secretary to designate the IRGC prematurely; it would have to do so only in line with the coming into force of the rest of the Bill. It does not override due process; nor does it lower the evidential threshold required under the legislation. It ensures that the intelligence gathering and preparatory work necessary for designation are treated as an urgent priority, rather than something that can be continually delayed. This urgency is long overdue.

Liberal Democrats will also support new clause 4, which provides for an independent post legislative review within 12 months of this legislation passing. This is a crucial safeguard. The Bill introduces significant new powers, and it is essential that their effectiveness and proportionality are independently assessed.

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to want this. However, there is already a requirement under law for Jonathan Hall, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, to review all terrorism legislation and related legislation, including the National Security Act 2023—which this would fall under—every single year, and to report back to Parliament. Hopefully the hon. Gentleman will be reassured that this is already covered in law, and that there is a specific requirement.

The hon. Lady knows much more about this than I do, and I bow to her greater knowledge.

The Home Secretary gave a reassurance on Second Reading that humanitarian organisations would not find their work being criminalised, and the Security Minister has just touched on that point as well. We welcome that further reassurance on the official record, but I have no doubt that the point will be further explored elsewhere when the Bill moves on. I am sure that Members from across the House will agree that the accelerated passage of the Bill through Parliament, which will limit the amount of scrutiny it receives, heightens the imperative for independent post legislative scrutiny, which may be useful to the Government.

Similarly, we will support amendment 2, which ensures that any decision to remove a designation is subject to the draft affirmative procedure. Again, speed is a factor in this Bill’s passage, as the official Opposition have mentioned a number of times today, and it is likely that this will not be needed in the short to medium term. However, parliamentary oversight should apply not just at the point of designation, but at the point of removal. It is vital that there should be adequate parliamentary scrutiny if a future Home Secretary should seek to remove a designation, and this amendment will enshrine that mechanism.

We also support amendment 1, tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for North Norfolk (Steff Aquarone). This amendment closes a critical loophole by making it an offence to use corporate structures to conceal assets belonging to designated individuals or organisations. It would strengthen enforcement against the murky structures which many Members of this House have long opposed. I urge Ministers to consider the merits of the amendment, even if it does not reach a Division today.

The Liberal Democrats will support amendment 8. The Bill refers to “UK related activities”, but fails to account for activities that are conducted overseas but planned from within the UK. It cannot be right that groups planning attacks on our allies and neighbours are sheltered from the law by this oversight. These actors do not respect traditional borders and so our laws must adequately adapt to meet the challenge. The amendment would close that loophole and, in doing so, strengthen the Bill.

The Bill can be further strengthened to bring the activity of copycat and lone wolf actors into scope, as set out in amendment 13. Experts are warning that access to violent content online is a contributing factor to violent acts being carried out by those who feel they are acting on behalf of a group, even if they hold no direct link or contact. The laissez faire attitude of social media platforms to content moderation means that attacks of that kind are more likely. Amendment 13 would bring lone wolf and copycat actors into scope by creating a new offence of undertaking conduct that is harmful or prejudicial to UK interests that is inspired by a designated body, rather than actively commissioned on behalf of a designated body.

Finally, while there is merit in many of the amendments thoughtfully and helpfully proposed by the official Opposition, we will not support amendment 3. The amendment would remove the additional defence of supporting a designated body for a non prohibited purpose. That is an important protection in the Bill to ensure the performance of the functions of the diplomatic mission in accordance with the Vienna convention on diplomatic relations, or to allow humanitarian assistance or other activities that support basic human needs. It would also ensure that the engagement of the UK Government with the designated body would not be for a prohibited purpose.

We support the Bill, which is long overdue. We hope that it will pass today and make quick progress in the other place.

I declare an interest that I chair, and have done for about five years, a group called Solidarity with the Iranian Workers’ Movement Committee. We formed officially about five years ago and have been working for about 10 or 15 years. It is a group of Iranian refugees and trade unionists in this country, and we have tried to provide solidarity and campaign on human rights issues, focused on trade unionists in Iran. We started informally around the Tehran bus workers’ dispute, if people can remember that taking place, because a lot of the trade unionists we worked with were subsequently arrested and detained, and some were executed. That brought us together in solidarity.

On new clause 3, we have been raising time and again the proscription of the IRGC and have expressed our disappointment at the lack of action by the Government. I understand why the legislation is brought forward, and I hope that it will be brought through effectively and with the impact that we want, particularly on that organisation. Members will remember that we worked with the National Union of Journalists. In this country, the IRGC targeted journalists in particular, and a broadcasting station in Chiswick had to depart and operate from New York for a period.

Although I support the intentions of the legislation, may I also express my reservations about it? I have been in this place long enough to have experience of legislation that has come through not with undue haste, but with haste, and it is in that legislation that we usually make mistakes because we have not taken into account others’ views about the impacts. What worried me was that the explanatory notes—the Secretary of State asked us to look at them in some detail—made clear: “Given the pace at which this legislation was developed, outside groups have not been engaged on the specifics in the Bill.”

A range of organisations are now expressing concern, such as the Red Cross, and that worries me. That is why rushing a Bill through in one day is precipitous. I am worried that as a result of that, we will legislate poorly. When I say “poorly”, I am referring to incursions on people’s rights; I do not mean the right to in any way defend the organisations or states that many hon. Members referred to on Second Reading, but people’s right to express solidarity with some organisations or even countries in struggle, which we have had in the past.

To cite an example, I am a member of the Cuba Solidarity Campaign. Trump is now targeting Cuba and has designated it as a terrorist state. Under the Government’s proposals, for an organisation to be designated there are two factors, which were set out on Second Reading. First, a body has to have been “involved in foreign power threat activity”, as set out in proposed new section 33A of the National Security Act 2023 and in the Bill’s explanatory notes. One of those activities is foreign interference in elections. Secondly, the Secretary of State may designate a body if they believe that “is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.”

In the coming months, even until the next general election if necessary, I will be working in solidarity, through the Cuba Solidarity Campaign, with the current Cuban Government. I will be working to influence that election to ensure that a Government are elected that prevent the hostile attack by the US on Cuba, so that will be seen as foreign interference in an election.

The right hon. Gentleman references Cuba in the context of this legislation. The United States has elections—whether they elect the right president or not, is a matter for the Americans—but the Cuban people do not have that luxury. On direct or indirect threats to the United Kingdom’s interests—this is indirect threat—he will know that many Cuban nationals have been sent to Ukraine to fight in Russia’s illegal war. They are killing Ukrainian soldiers and aiding and abetting the bombing of civilians. Putin is losing, but if he did win, Cuba would have been aiding a regime that is not in our national security interest.

Well, QED. There we have it. Under the Bill, as members of the Cuba Solidarity Campaign, I and many other hon. Members will be committing an offence—

I have a great deal of respect for my right hon. Friend, as he knows, but in order for that to be the case, this Government would have to decide to designate the Cuba Solidarity Campaign. Obviously I cannot talk about what may or may not be designated should the Bill get on the statute book, but I think he is winding himself up into a bit of a tight knot.

I am grateful for the Minister’s consideration of my mental health, et cetera. The designation covers “foreign interference in elections” and we will be campaigning to maintain solidarity with Cuba itself. On the second designation— “is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”— in our current trade negotiations with the United States, we are taking decisions about the “interests” of the UK as interpreted by the US. So I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that when we introduce such legislation, we must discern what could be the worst that could happen and how could it go wrong? We are opening up an opportunity for things to go wrong. I am sure that my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary would not designate the Cuba Solidarity Campaign, but in a certain situation, certain Administrations would. By not including sufficient protections in the legislation we are, unwittingly, opening the door to its being used to designate organisations, and therefore individuals, as breaking the law, with significant penalties imposed. That is why the rush to legislation is my concern. If we are not engaging with outside bodies that could be in the specifics of the legislation, as the explanatory notes say, that is where we will make mistakes.

What consultations or discussions have been had with some of the organisations campaigning on the international implications of what is happening, particularly regarding the role of the US. What discussions have taken place? There could be ramifications well beyond what we all agree on today with regard to the designation of the IRGC and others that, at this moment, could be specifically designated as advancers of terrorism.

I note the definition on activities being “prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom”, but does my right hon. Friend agree that we are getting into some tortuous territory? It could be properly argued that it is in the interests of the United Kingdom to seek to uphold basic human rights and have international humanitarian law observed consistently. That is in our collective and global interests, but we could find ourselves in situations where actors who we currently class as our allies, such as in the example he has given, use organisations to undermine that very principle. Is that not an example of how we need to think this legislation through?

There is a consideration that needs to be properly debated and given the time to be debated. My specific point is that if the US moves against Cuba and imposes and demands a wider trade ban, for example, the argument could be made that we are undermining our own interests if we do not co operate with the US. That argument has been used in the trade negotiations so far. Under this legislation, we could have an organisation designated specifically around trying to break that blockade. That is my worry.

That leads me on to a minor point about designation. At the moment, designation is made through the affirmative procedure, which brings a statutory instrument before the House that we can vote for or against; we cannot amend it. What we saw under the proscription process, particularly with Palestine Action, was that the statutory instrument came before us with a bloc of 20 organisations. We had to vote for it or against it; we could not distinguish in voting between any of those organisations.

I ask the Government to consider that when we deal with this matter, it should be dealt with through the super affirmative procedure, rather than the affirmative procedure. In the super affirmative procedure, there is a process of consultation in which individual organisations can be dealt with, rather than dealing with organisations en bloc. In that way, we could take a more considered decision about the individual roles and aspects of organisations that the Government are designating.

I hope the Government will consider that process better, because it would reassure us more that this legislation will be effective and will not have the sweeping consequences that bloc proscription has brought so far. We have seen maybe 3,000 people going through our courts simply for holding up a poster with regard to Palestine Action.

I will speak to my amendment 1, which I am very pleased has the most supporters of any amendment before us today.

Amendment 1 would make an offence of the concealment of beneficial ownership relating to a designated organisation and the establishment and maintenance of that concealment of finance and assets. In simpler terms, it would crack down on the professional enablers working to hide the ownership of assets for a designated group by clarifying that that is the same as providing them with a material benefit. These groups rely on hiding their money, and opaque financial systems only help them to do that. By extending liability to those who make that opacity possible, we limit the ability of designated groups to continue to benefit from their assets and finances.

Amendment 1 makes it clear that financial transparency is a national security issue. The opaque systems, all too often in overseas territories and Crown dependencies, and those who enable their use, are assisting nations and organisations that want to do our country harm. Designating these state backed groups is vital. We have seen the issues they cause across the country: targeting our institutions, targeting those who speak out against regimes, and directing acts designed to target and strike fear into our Jewish communities.

I did not table this amendment for theoretical cases or as a stimulant for debate, however; I tabled it because groups such as the IRGC are benefiting from these structures right now. It is alleged by The Times, Bloomberg and Transparency International that Iranian Cypriot banker Ali Ansari has purchased a huge London property empire for the benefit of the new Ayatollah. His purchases are linked to a company called Birch Ventures Ltd, which is registered on the Isle of Man with Ansari listed as the beneficial owner. Last year, this Government sanctioned Mr Ansari because they believe he is funding the IRGC. The Government believe that Mr Ansari is such a risk of supporting a group which may be designated a state threat that they have frozen his assets, but I fear this Bill does not actually ensure that his role in supporting these groups is properly captured. The usefulness of Mr Ansari to the Iranian regime is his ability to obscure their wealth, hide their assets and ensure that their financial flows carry on unabated by acting as the beneficial owner when it appears this is not actually the case.

It is not only the Iranian regime who can fund their state threats through obscuring ownership. Just this week the Government have sanctioned individuals and companies that existed as fronts to purchase technology that could be used in Ukraine at the behest of the GRU—another candidate to become a designated group under this Bill. Those responsible for disguising the benefits to the GRU of the ownership of these companies or the assets they hold could also become liable for prosecution under my amendment.

Another Russian intelligence arm, the FSB, directs cyber attacks against our country and the businesses in it. Indeed, the Government identify that FSB Centre 18, known as Star Blizzard, has targeted Members of this House. Sanctioned oligarchs Dmitry Patrushev and Denis Bortnikov were identified as part of the Navalny 35 as acting as wallets for their powerful fathers who have held senior positions in the FSB. Again, these are powerful people who are enabling the continued existence of the wealth of senior figures in dangerous groups, and those roles should not go unpunished.

The malign state actors—the people my amendment is targeting—have a simple role: they are the enablers, the fixers, the money men. They may not write the hacking code or carry out sabotage or violent acts personally, but by enabling and obscuring the finances which make such activity possible, they are culpable and responsible. We cannot allow a loophole in this vital legislation that leaves these individuals who play such a key role without punishment. Making it clear that this role is illegal will remove their usefulness to these groups. It will cut out sources of funding and make it harder for them to continue their activities.

To make sure that this new law has a real effect, the Government urgently need to take two key steps. First, they need to work with overseas territories and Crown dependencies to ensure they are operating to the highest global standards to prevent the financing of designated groups—just as they would be expected to stop the financing of terror groups. There can be no hiding places for those who do us harm, and now that we are finally giving these groups a proper legal classification, we must root out their financing in the same way we have done with terrorism for decades. I would appreciate the Minister telling us what plans she has to do this, and if she has had these conversations already, and if not, when she will.

Secondly—this is incredibly important if, as I suspect, the Government do not accept this amendment today—we need to get better at enforcing the current laws around beneficial ownership. We must ensure that those who are not correctly reporting beneficial ownership, for whatever reason, are not able to get away with it.

I support this Bill and want it to pass, but I am concerned that some who play a crucial role in propping up designated groups, shielding their finances and contributing to their malign activity could get away unscathed. I urge the Government to support this amendment today.

I call the Minister.

New clause 3, tabled by the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Max Wilkinson), would require the Secretary of State to bring forward regulations designating the IRGC within a month of this Act coming into force, but the exercise of these powers under this Bill will have significant implications for national security and foreign policy, and it is right that they should be exercised independently by the Secretary of State on the basis of expert advice, including from the security and intelligence agencies. That is what this Bill allows, and putting these designations on the face of the Bill would be a very difficult way to effect the change, so the way to do this is the way that the Bill sets out.

The hon. Member for Cheltenham’s new clause 4, which would “require the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation to assess the adequacy of the powers introduced by this Act twelve months after its passing”, is already essentially covered by the Bill’s provisions, because they would be subject to part 3 of the National Security Act. The independent reviewer of state threats legislation has to carry out an annual review into the operation of its provisions, and is also empowered by part 1 of that Act to review any other such things he or she sees fit. Amendment 2 would require the draft affirmative procedure to be used for regulations removing a designation. He is right that such regulations should receive the proper parliamentary scrutiny, and the Bill already provides that such regulations are subject to the draft affirmative procedure. The use of the negative procedure is limited to very minor technical changes, such as the addition of aliases.

My right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) asked whether it would be possible to proscribe a particular group, and gave a particular example. The test is whether the body is engaged in “foreign power threat activity”; it is a high bar, and it targets organisations that pose a real threat to the UK. I cannot imagine for one minute that my right hon. Friend would be involved in any of those.

Amendment 1, tabled by the hon. Member for North Norfolk (Steff Aquarone), would provide further examples of conduct that would be considered a material benefit, and he spoke about what those might be. Obtaining material benefits from a foreign intelligence service is an existing offence under section 17 of the National Security Act, so I do not think the further examples of conduct in amendment 1 are needed, as that conduct is already caught by the provisions in the Bill.

I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. Clause 1 ordered to stand part of the Bill. Clause 2 Offences relating to designated bodies Amendment proposed: 3, page 3, line 8, leave out from “body” until end of line 9.—(Alicia Kearns.) This amendment and Amendments 4 to 6 would remove the additional defence of supporting a designated body for a non prohibited purpose. Question put, That the amendment be made.

29|18:07|85|317|divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Clause 2

Offences relating to designated bodies

Amendment proposed: 8, page 4, line 27, after “United Kingdom” insert

“or are conducted outside, but were planned from within, the United Kingdom”.—(Alicia Kearns.)

Question put, That the amendment be made.

30|18:21|143|249|divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Amendment proposed: 13, page 7, line 8, at end insert—

“17D Self directing acts in support of a designated body

(1) A person commits an offence if the person engages in conduct of any kind which is—

(a) inspired by the ideology, actions, and self promotion of a designated body, and

(b) prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(2) A person commits an offence if the person—

(a) engages in UK related activities that are likely to assist the stated, or assumed, aims of a designated body, and

(b) knows, or having regard to other matters known to them ought to reasonably to know, that their activities are likely to assist the stated, or assumed, aims of a designated body.

(3) “UK related activities” means—

(a) activities taking place in the United Kingdom;

(b) activities taking place outside the United Kingdom which are prejudicial to the safety or interests of the United Kingdom.

(4) Subsections (1) and (2) apply to conduct outside the United Kingdom, but apply to conduct taking place wholly outside the United Kingdom only if the person engaging in the conduct—

(ab) is a UK person, or

(b) acts for or on behalf of, or holds office under, the Crown, or is in Crown employment (whether or not they engage in the conduct in that capacity).

(5) In proceedings for an offence under this section it is a defence to show that the person engaged in the conduct in question—

(a) in compliance with a legal obligation under the law of the United Kingdom which is not a legal obligation under private law,

(b) in the case of a person having functions of a public nature under the law of the United Kingdom, for the purposes of those functions,

(c) as a lawyer carrying on a legal activity, or

(d) in accordance with, or in relation to Uk related activities carried out in accordance with, an agreement or arrangement to which—

(i) the United Kingdom was a party, or

(ii) any person acting for, or on behalf of, or holding office under, the Crown was (in that capacity) a party.

(6) A person is taken to have shown a matter mentioned in subsection (5) if—

(a) sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect to it, and

(b) the contrary is not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

(7) A person who commits an office under this section is liable on conviction on indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years or a fine (or both).

(8) The following terms have the same meaning as in section 3—

“Crown employment” ;

“financial benefit” ;

The “law of the United Kingdom”;

“lawyer” ;

“legal activity” ;

“UK person” .”—(Alicia Kearns.)

This amendment creates a new offence of undertaking conduct harmful or prejudicial to UK interests that is inspired by a designated body, rather than actively commissioned on behalf of a designated body.

Question put, That the amendment be made.

31|18:32|135|258|The Committee divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Clauses 2 to 8 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

New Clause 3

Designation of the IRGC

“(1) The Secretary of State must take reasonable steps to lay before Parliament regulations under the provisions of this Act to designate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a body involved in foreign power threat activity.

(2) Before laying such regulations, the Secretary of State must be satisfied that the IRGC fulfils the conditions set out in Section 1 of this Act.

(3) The regulations specified in subsection (1) should be laid before Parliament within a month of this Act coming into force.” —(Max Wilkinson.)

This new clause would require the Secretary of State to take reasonable steps to bring forward regulations designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) within a month of this Act coming into force.

Brought up, and read the First time.

Question put, That the clause be read a Second time.

32|18:44|144|244|The House divided:|Question accordingly negatived.||0|0

Schedule agreed to.

The Deputy Speaker resumed the Chair.

Bill reported, without amendment.

Third Reading.

I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.

This Bill will create crucial new powers to allow the Government to keep pace with the evolving threat picture that Members from all parties referred to in the previous debates. The Bill will now move on to the other place, where I am sure colleagues will give it rigorous scrutiny while ensuring that its passage continues as smoothly as possible.

The Bill asks how our country confronts the greatest threat it faces: states that behave like terrorists. We support the Bill, and have today set out its weaknesses—the places where, as drafted, it is found wanting. We tabled 13 amendments and new clauses, with not one designed to delay the Bill, not one designed to wreck it and, tonight, not one accepted—not a clause, not a line, not one additional defence for our country. There are two ways for a Government to show their contempt for the House: they may deny it time or deny it influence. They may rush this House or overrule it. This Government have chosen both.

Does the hon. Lady not accept that Jonathan Hall, whom Members on all sides of the House respect, backs the Bill as a narrow and focused measure to designate state threats?

I am not sure that anyone has disputed that Jonathan Hall backs the Bill. I had a lengthy call with him to discuss the gaps in the Bill, which I am sure the hon. Gentleman has not had. I will not share a private conversation, but I encourage the hon. Gentleman to have a similar call with Jonathan Hall to discuss those gaps.

We are here in this place to find the gaps while they can still be mended. That is the whole of our purpose, but we were not permitted to fulfil it today because scrutiny was declined. I have to admit that it feels like our suggestions were not even given due consideration. So I must tell the House what in the Bill now leaves this Chamber unaltered. The sponsor remains more gently treated in law than the proxies that it arms. The world’s largest sponsor of terrorism keeps a protection denied to its terrorist proxies.

The self directed actor—the lone individual that our terrorism law learned to tackle, at great and terrible cost, two decades ago—will fall through a gap that we were forbidden to close. Britain may be used as a base from which to plot against our friends in Dublin, Berlin or Brussels, or even those in Hong Kong and Tehran.

The flag of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps may still be flown, lawfully, on a British street, glorifying every threat against our Jewish communities that the regime has directed here. [Interruption.] The Minister may say, “Not necessarily,” but she specifically ruled out our amendment on the basis that we should not prevent members of the Iranian diplomatic corps from wearing uniforms here. The Bill does not apply to members of the diplomatic corps; it applies specifically to UK persons. That is therefore still the case and there is no protection against seeing those flags walked past Jewish people’s homes. In Committee, I asked the Government how we look the people the regime has hunted in the eye and tell them that the banner of the hunter is still welcome on our streets. Tonight, I have no answer to offer them.

A law passed in good faith but built wrongly fails as surely as one that is passed in bad faith. When a prosecution comes, it will turn not on the speeches given today, the Government’s good intentions or our warnings, but on what a defendant did. When that day comes and there is a gap that was identified in this House today that could have been closed in an afternoon, let the record show that it could have been mended.

The Bill now passes to the other place, and I have every confidence that their lordships will give it the scrutiny it deserves. We will not oppose the Bill tonight. We will support it, not because it delivers the full protections it should, but because a flawed shield is still a shield of some form and the men and women that the Bill is designed to protect cannot be left with nothing. We support it, having placed on the record of this House what was refused and whose hand refused it. The threat we face is patient, it is ruthless and it will not be deterred by a law that we were too rushed to finish and that the Government were too proud to mend.

I have supported this Bill at every stage, and it is because of that that I lament what the Bill could have been and that the House was given a single afternoon to try to get it right. I hope this Bill is as watertight as the Government assert, but if they wish to be absolute and to remove risk or ambiguities, we ask those in the other place to shut down any risk that the shield this aims to be might let even one traitor succeed in harming our nation. I hope they will do that on the basis of the way we have put forward our amendments: in the national interest.

I call the Liberal Democrat spokesperson.

This has been an exercise in efficient democracy today, and I have enjoyed all six or so hours of it. Now, the Bill has passed this House and it proceeds to the other place. When it has completed its journey, I hope that the Government will move forward and designate the IRGC as soon as possible, according to the timetable they have stated they aspire to. That is something that those on all sides of the House have aspired to for some time, and it will make our country a safer place, particularly for our Jewish communities.

Question put and agreed to. Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed.